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1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NST$ 22_06, _nst_uctio_s
for Preparation of FMEA an_ CID, i0 October 1986, with changes i,
2, 3, and 4, through 23 November 1987. The IOA approach features
a top-down analysis of the hardware to determine failure modes,
criticality, and potential critical items. To preserve
independence, this analysis was accomplished without reliance
upon the results contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL
documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Communication and Tracking hardware.
The IOA analysis process utilized available Communication and
Tracking hardware drawings and schematics for defining hardware
assemblies, components, and hardware items. Each level of
hardware was evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes
and effects. Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of
the effect for each failure mode.
Figure 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the twelve major subdivisions of the Communication and
Tracking. A summary of the number of failure modes, by
criticality, is also presented below with Hardware (HW)
criticality first and Functionali(F) criticality second.
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
m
Criticality :
Number I i/i I 2/IR( 2/2 I 3/IR'5 149 ) 51 189
3/2R
239 3/3 I TOTAL406 1,039
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Figure l.la - COMMUNICATION AND TRACKING OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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Figure 2 - COMMUNICATIONS OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY - EXPANDED
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Figure i. ic - TRACKING OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY - EXPANDED
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality :
Number i/I I 2/IR 2/2 I 3/IR5 149 51 24
3/2R I TOTAL
40 269
L
Z
w
w
B
w
u
i
r
m
m
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
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2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Communication and Tracking Ground Rules and Assumptions
The Communication and Tracking ground rules and assumptions used
in the IOA are defined in Appendix B.
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Figure 3.1 - COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING SUBSYSTEM PICTORAL
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3.0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The Communication and Tracking Subsystem consists of all hardware
required for ground communication, crew station communication,
attached and detached payload communication, Ground Command
Interface Logic (GCIL) commands, video, audio, and coded
telemetry transmission and reception, and state vector
updates. See figure 3.1. Electrical power distribution has been
included where it meets the criteria established in NSTS 22206
for evaluation of each individual subsystem. Refer to Figures
3.2 through 3,21 for the location of each ORBITER subsystem and
related Block Diagram. The following specific subsystem
functions are included:
i. S-band Phase Modulation (PM) RF links provide two way
communication either direct with NASA or DOD ground stations
or via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS), for
the following: commands, real time telemetry data, two way
voice communication, teleprinter data, tone ranging (direct
links only), and doppler tracking. Network Signal Precessor
functions are included in the S-Band PM system analysis. See
Figure 3.5.
•
3.
The S-band Frequency Modulation (FM) system provides for
data transmission direct to ground. This FM signal can be
modulated by selectable (one at a time): real time main
engine (ME) data during launch, real time or playback Closed
Circuit Television (CCTV) video, real time attached payload
data, playback of Operations Recorder (telemetry and/or
voice data), or playback of payload recorder digital data.
Figure 3.6.
Detached Payload two-way communication is via S-band payload
system• This system provides a forward link (to the
payload) for commands and a return link (from the payload)
for telemetry. See Figure 3.7.
See
• The Ku-band system is used for either two-way communications
via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) or for
radar operations, but not simultaneously. The Ku-band
forward link can transmit commands, voice, and forward data
link either for text and graphics (TAGS) or for DOD commands
via the communications interface unit (CIU). The return
link provides capability for transmission of voice,
telemetry, and TV video. The Ku-band system can be used
only with payload bay doors open, during on-orbit
operations. See Figures 3.8 and 3.18.
5, The UHF communication system provides voice communication
between the Orbiter and ground stations, between the Orbiter
and Astronauts on EVA, and distress (Guard) function on the
international distress frequency. In the EVA mode. it can
be used for duplex voice between Orbiter and up to two EVA
.,
•
•
i0.
Ii.
crewmen, and for transmission of biomedical data to the
Orbiter which can be interleaved with operational data down-
linked to ground. UHF is also used for communication with Air
Traffic Control (ATC) and chase aircraft during landing
operations• The UHF amplitude modulation (AM) transceiver is
capable of operation in four major modes and on four different
frequencies. By selecting or bypassing the power amplifier, it m
wilI operate at i0 watts or 0.25 watts• See Figure 3.9.
The Audio Distribution System (ADS) gathers audio signals i
from multiple sources and routes them throughout the
Orbiter. Through these eight audio loops, the crew-members _
are able to communicate with each other, with Ground through i
access with external rf link equipment, with payloads or
other spacecraft, or astronauts on EVA. Caution and Warning
audio signals are passed through the audio system, as are
TACAN ground station coded signals. Equipment included in
the ADS are the Audio Central Control Unit (ACCU), Audio Terminal
Units (ATU), Speaker Microphone Units (SMU), Audio Center, and
Crew Communications Umbilical (CCU) jack. See Figures 3.10
through 3.13.
Navigation Aids include three Tactical Air Navigation
(TACAN) receivers Operating in a redundant set mode, two u
independent Radar Altimeters (RA) for low altitude terrain
tracking and altitude sensing, and the Microwave Scan Beam
Landing System (MSBLS), which is a K_band receiver-transmitter
landing and navigation aid with decoding and computational
capabilities. The Ku-band system can be used in its radar mode
for rendezvous operations• See Figures 3.14 through 3.20_
Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) is provided to support
on-orbit activities. Monitors are provided for the
Orbiter crew to observe select activities• Cameras may
be controlled by ground control or by panel controls•
TV video can be downlinked by either Ku-band or S-band FM.
Crew Equipment/Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) includes
the following items which have been included in this
analysis: Comm Carrier Electronics Module, Interim
Teleprinter, Interim Video Tape Recorder (VTR), Headset
Interface Unit (HIU), Headset Cables, Wireless Crew
Communication System (WCCS), Audio Central Control Unit
(ACCU) bypass, Very Lightweight Headset, handheid
microphone, multiple headset adapter, PRC-90 hand-held
beacon/voice transceiver, and AN/URT-33 RF beacon
transmitter.
EMU TV provides video scenes selected by the EVA helmet
mounted camera. The scenes are transmitted by S-band FM
transmissions to the Orbiter for distribution in the Orbiter
CCTV system•
The GCIL controller provides the capability of controlling
selected subsystem functions in either the PANEL or COMMAND
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mode. In the PANEL mode, selected subsystems are under
control of the manual Displays and Controls (D&C) panel
switches; in the COMMAND mode these subsystems are
controlled by uplinked ground commands or commands entered
via the Orbiter keyboards. There are five PANEL/ COMMAND
mode switches to control given functions of the following
systems: S-band PM, S-band FM, CCTV, Ku-band, and S-band
Payload. See Figure 3.21.
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TABLE I COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING EQUIPMENT LOCATIONS
NOMENCLATURE
COMMUNICATIONS
USE/INSTALLED LOCATION
S-Band PM System
Transponder
Power Amplifier (2, one encl)
Preamplifier (2, one encl)
Panel Control switches
GCIL Command/Panel Switch
Antenna Switch/Beam Switch
Manual Quad Antenna Switch
Quad Antennas (4)
Avionics Bay 3A
Avionics Bay 3A
Avionics Bay 3A
Panel A1
Panel C3
Avionics Bay 3A
Panel C3
Forward Fuselage
Network Signal Processor (2) Avionics Bay 3A
S-Band FM System
Transmitter (2)
Signal Processor (2, one encl)
Panel Control Switches
RF Transfer Switch
Antenna Switch
Hemi Antennas (2)
Avionics Bay 3A
Avionics Bay 3A
Panel A1
Avionics Bay 3A
Avionics Bay 3A
Upper, Lower Centerline,
Cabin Area
s-Band Payload System
Payload Interrogater (2)
Signal Processor (2)
Panel Control Switches
Antenna
Avionics Bay 2
Avionics Bay 2
Panel A1
Upper Centerline,
Cabin Area
Ku-Band Communications System
EAi-Comm Data Processor,
Antenna Control
EA2-Radar Data Processor
Signal Processor Assembly
Deployed Assembly (RF, Antenna
Gimbals, Gyro Assembly)
Panel Control Switches
Jettison Controls
Avionics Bay 3A
Avionics Bay 3A
Avionics Bay 3A
Right Sill Longeron,
behind cabin
Panel AI, Panel ML86B,
Panel RI3
Panel ML86B, Panel AI4
Audio System
Audio Control Unit (2, one encl)
Audio 1/2 Power Switch
Audio Termination Units,
Panel Controls
Crew Equipment (Headsets, etc.)
Avionics Bay 1
Panel C3
Various Crew Stations
Various Orbiter Locations
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UHF EVA_ATC System
Transceiver
EVA Transceivers
Panel Controls
UHF Antenna, Ex£ernal
UHF Antenna, Internal
GCIL
Logic Modules, Drivers
GCIL Panel/Command Switches
CCTV
CCTV Monitors
Panel Control Switches
EMU TV
EMU TV Camera/S-Band Transmtr,
Antenna, Battery Pack
EMU TV Receiver, Video
Processing Unit, RF Cables
Text and Graphics System (TAGS)
TAGS Hard Copier
Avionics Bay 3A
Payload Bay EVA Locations
Panel 06, Panel A1
Lower Centerline,
Cabin Area
Airlock
Avionics Bay 3A
Panel C3 (S-Band PM/NSP)
Panel A! (S-Band FM,
Payload, Ku-Band)
Aft Flight Deck
Panel A7, Panel LI2,
Panel RII, Payload
Bay, Various
Locations in Orbiter
Crewman Helmet/Suit,
Various EVA Locations
Middeck
Avionics Bay 3B
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TABLE II COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING EQUIPMENT LOCATIONS
TRACKING/NAVAIDS
NOMENCLATURE USE/INSTALLED LOCATION
TACAN System
TACAN LRU (3)
TACAN Panel Control Switches
TACAN Antenna (3)
TACAN Antenna (3)
Avionics Bay 1 (one)
Bay 2 (one)
Bay 3A (one)
Panel 07
Upper Fuselage, Nose
Lower Fuselage, Nose
MSBLS
MSBLS RF Assembly (3)
MSBLS Decoder Assembly (3)
MSBLS Antenna (3)
MSBLS Panel Control Switches
Avionics Bay 1 (one),
Bay 2 (two)
Avionics Bay 1 (one),
Bay 2 (two)
Upper Fuselage, Nose
Panel 08
RADAR ALTIMETER System
RADAR ALTIMETER LRU (2)
Panel Control Switches
Antenna
 Avi6n csBay l,
Avionics Bay 2
Panel 08
Lower Forward Fuselage
Ku-BAND RADAR System
EAI- Comm data processor,
ant control
EA2- Radar data processor
Deployed Assembly (RF, Antenna,
Gimbals, Gyro Assembly)
Panel Control Switches
Jettison Controls
Avionics Bay 3A
Avionics Bay 3A
Right Sill Longeron,
behind cabin
Panel AI, Panel ML86B,
Panel RI3
Panel ML86B, Panel AI4
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3.2 Interfaces and Locations
Various parts of the Communication and Tracking Subsystem are located
throughout the Orbiter. S-band quad antennae are positioned on the
forward upper and lower fuselage on the starboard and port sides. S-
band hemi antennae are centered directly above and below the flight
deck, with the payload antenna behind the upper hemi antenna. (Figure
3.20) The Ku-band antenna is mounted at the forward starboard sill
longeron. (Figure 3.18) The three TACAN LRUs each have an upper and
lower antenna, mounted in front of the flight deck windows and
directly below that location on the lower fuselage. (Figure 3.19)
MSBLS antennae are on the upper forward nose, in front of the TACAN
antennae location. (Figure 3.17) The Radar Altimeter antennae is
mounted on the lower nose, close to the nose wheel bay. (Figure 3.17)
Avionics bays i, 2, 3A, and 3B contain the individual LRUs for
each of the systems analyzed herein. Panel controls for each of
the systems are located on the various panels on the Flight Deck,
Aft Station, Mid-deck, and other locations for mission specific
panels. See Tables I and II for equipment locations.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 3.2 through 3.4 illustrate the hierarchy of the
Communication and Tracking Subsystem hardware and the
corresponding subcomponents.
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Figure 3.2 - COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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3.3 - COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM HIERARCHY
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Figure 3.4 - TRACKING SYSTEM HIERARCHY
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Figure 3.5 - S-BAND PM COMMUNICATIONS
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Figure 3.7 - S-BAND PAYLOAD COMMUNICATIONS
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Figure 3.8 - KU-BAND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
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Figure 3.9 - UHF/AUDIO INTERFACE BLOCK DIAGRAM
23
mI
ml
m
m
g
m
i
m
M
=
m
J
m
m
!
=i
m
m
g
m
Figure 3.10 - AUDIO DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM BLOCK DIAGRAM
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Figure 3.11 - TYPICAL CREW STATION
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Figure 3.18 - DEPLOYED KU-BAND ANTENNA ASSEMBLY LOCATION
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m4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis-results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table III presents a summary
of the failure criticalities for each of the two major
subdivisions of the Communication and Tracking subsystem.
Further discussion of each of these subdivisions and the
applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
TABLE III Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
S-BAND PM
S-BAND FM
S-BAND PAYLOAD
KU COMM
UHF
AUDIO
NAVAIDS
CCTV
GCIL
EMU-TV
TAGS
GFE
TOTAL
1/l
4
1
5
2/1R
3
2
4
139
1
149
2/2
6
i0
4
4
5
21
1
51
3/IR
78
1
33
8
28
30
2
5
4
189
3/2R
ii0
48
26
1
3
43
3
5
239
3/3
39
26
20
4
36
6
228
2
8
15
22
406
TOTAL
236
27
58
89
17
76
57
412
12
9
15
31
1039
35
Of the 1,039 failure modes analyzed, 5 failures were determined
to result in loss of crew or vehicle, and 264 were determined to
result in loss of mission. A summary of the potential critical
items is presented in Table IV. Appendix D presents a cross
reference between each potential critical item (PCI) and a
specific worksheet in Appendix C.
4 F
TABLE IV
Criticality:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
S-BAND PM
S-BAND FM
S-BAND PAYLOAD
KU COMM
UHF
AUDIO
NAVAI DS
CCTV
GCIL
EMU-TV
TAGS
GFE
TOTAL
. mmmm_q
i/I 2/IR
-- 3
4 2
- 4
- 139
- 1
1
5 149
2/2
6
l0
4
4
5
21
3/IR
22
3/2R
17
i
2
D
14
8
1
TOTAL
48
0
24
18
7
9
21
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4.1 Analysis Results - S-band PM
The S-band PM analysis considered 236 failure modes, of which 48
modes were found to potentially cause loss of mission, or loss of
redundancy to potentially cause loss of life or vehicle. These
items are therefore placed on the Potential Critical Items list.
4.2 Analysis Results - S-band FM
The S-band FM analysis considered 27 failure modes, of which only
one was rated 3/IR. This item did not fail any screen; it was
therefore not placed on the PCI list.
4.3 Analysis Results - S-band Payload
The S-band Payload analysis considered 58 failure modes, of which
24 were found to potentially cause a loss of mission. These 24
items were placed on the PCI list.
4.4 Analysis Results - Ku-band Comm
The Ku-band Comm analysis considered 89 failure modes, of which
four were found to potentially cause a loss of life or vehicle
and an additional 14 were found to potentially cause a loss of
mission, when with a loss of redundancy to also cause a loss of
life or vehicle. These 18 items were placed on the PCI list.
4.5 Analysis Results - UHF
The UHF communication system analysis considered'17 failure
modes, of which seven were found to potentially cause a loss of
mission or loss of redundancy to cause a potential loss of life
or vehicle. These seven items were placed on the PCI list.
4.6 Analysis Results - Audio
The Audio system analysis considered 76 failure modes, of which
nine were found to potentially cause a loss of mission, or loss
of redundancy to cause a potential loss of life or vehicle.
These nine items were placed on the PCI list.
4.7 Analysis Results - Navaids
The Navaids analysis considered 57 failure modes, of which 21
were found to potentially cause a loss of mission. These 21
items were placed on the PCI list.
4.8 Analysis Results - CCTV
The CCTV analysis considered 412 failure modes, of which 139 were
found to potentially cause a loss of mission, .or with a loss of
redundancy to potentially cause a loss of life or vehicle. These
139 items were placed on the PCI list.
37
w
w4.9 Analysis Results - GCIL
The GCIL analysis considered ten failure modes, of which two were
found to potentially cause a loss of mission, or with a loss of
redundancy to potentially cause a loss of life or vehicle. These
two items were placed on the PCI list.
4.10 Analysis Results - EMU-TV
w
The EMU-TV analysis considered nine failure modes, of which one
was found to potentially cause loss of life or vehicle. This
item was placed on the PCI list.
4.11 Analysis Results - TAGS
The TAGS analysis considered 15 failure modes, none of which were
found to potentially cause loss of mission or loss of life or
vehicle.
4.12 Analysis Results - GFE
The GFE analysis considered 31 failure modes, none of which were
found to potentially cause loss of mission or loss of life or
vehicle.
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XMTR), VS70-740299 (GCIL), VS70-740109
(Ku-Band), VS70-740569 (MSBLS RCVR),
VS70-740129 (NTWK S-Band XPDR),
VS70-740400 (Power Block Diagram),
VS70-740159 (Radar Altimeter),
VS70-7402S9 (S-Band Antenna
Switch), VS70-740229 (S-Band NTWK SIG
Proc), VS70-740139 (S-Band PWR AMPL),
VS70-740179 (TACAN), VS70-740189
(Television), VS70-740199 (Text and
Graphics), VS70-740119 (UHF ATC/EVA
XCVR)
2. Comm/Instrumentation Workbook, COM/IN 2102, Feb 1985
3. JSC-II174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Rev. C, Sep 1985
• Intro to Orbiter Comm/Instrumentation Systems, NAS9-18000,
Oct 1986.
5. KU-Band Radar Workbook 2102, Nov 1985
6. KU-Band Comm Radar System SFOM, Vol. 4c, May 1985
7. INCO/Comm Systems Brief, Rev. C, PCN-3, Aug 1983
8. S-Band SFOM, Vol. 4B, Jan 1987
9. Payload Comm Workbook 2102, NAS9-18000, Feb 1987
i0. Audio Systems UHF SFOM, Mar 1985
ii. CCTV SFOM, Vol. 4D, Rev. A, PCN-2, Sep 1985
12. OMRSD NSTS 08171 File III
13. JSC-12820 FLT Rules Sect II
14. NSTS 22206, with Revisions i, 2, 3, and 4.
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ACRONYMS
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A/A
A/G 1
A/G 2
ACCU
ADS
AOS
ATC
ATU
C&W
cb
CCA
CCTV
CCU
CDR
CIU
CMD
con_n
cont
CPLT
D&C
DA
DAM
DEA
DMA
DOD
EMU
EVA
FM
FMD
GCIL
GPC
GSE
GSTDN
HIU
ICMS
ICOM
ICOM A
ICOM B
ICRS
ind
JSC
- Air-to-Air
- Air-to-Ground 1
- Air-to-Ground 2
- Audio Central Control Unit
- Audio Distribution System
- Acquisition of Signal
- Air Traffic Control
- Audio Terminal Unit
- Caution and Warning
- Circuit Breaker
- Communications Carrier Assembly
- Closed-Circuit Television
- Crew Communications Umbilical
- Commander
- CommunicationsInterface Unit
- Command
- Communication
- Controller
- Complete
- Displays and Controls
- Deployed Assembly
- Driver Amplifier Module
- Deployed Electronic Assembly
- Deployed Mechanical Assembly
- Department of Defense
- Extravehicular Mobility Unit
- Extravehicular Activity
- Frequency Modulated (or Modulation)
- Frequency Division Multiplexer
- Ground Command Interface Logic
- General Purpose Computer
- Ground Support Equipment
- Ground Spaceflight Tracking and Data Netowrk
- Headset Interface Unit
- Intercom Master Station
- Intercommunications
- Intercom A
- Intercom B
,- Intercom Remote Station
- Indicator
- Johnson Space Center
A-I
ACRONYMS
LCC
LEH
LRU
It
MADS
MCA
MCC
MDM
ME
MHz
MMU
MNA
MS
MSBLS
NSP
- Launch Control Center
- Launch/Entry Helmet
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Light
- Modular Auxiliary_Data System
- Motor Control Assembly
- Mission Control Center (JSC)
- Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
- Main Engine
- Megahertz
- Mass Memory Unit
- Main A _
- Mission Specialist
- Microwave Scanning Beam Landing System
- Network Signal Processor.
OI
OPS RCDR
OTB
- Operational Instrumentation
- Operational Recorder
- Orbiter Timing Buffer
PCM
PCMMU
PDI
PFS
PI
PL ANLG
- Pulse Code Modulation
- Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit
- Payload Data Interleaver
- Percent Full Scale ...............
- Payload Interrogater
- Payload Analog
PL DIGITAL - Payload Digital
PL MAX - Payload Maximum
PLT
PM
PROM
PS
PSP
PTT
QPSK
- Pilot
- Phase Modulation,
- Programmable read-only memory
- Payload Specialist
- Payload Signal Processor
- Push-to-talk
- Quadrature Phase Shift Keying
RAM
rf
RFI
RMS
rot
RTS
- Random Access Memory
- Radio Frequency
- Radio Frequency Interference
- Remote Manipulator System
- Rotary Switch
- Remote Tracking Station
SA
SGLS
SGSC
SPA
- Single Access
- Space Ground Link System
- Strain Gage Signal Conditioner
- Signal Processor Assembly
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SRB
SSO
STDN
SW
TACAN
TAGS
TDRS
TLM
TV
tw
UHF
UL
VCO
VOX
VSU
VTR
WBSC
WCCU
XMIT
XPNDR
ACRONYMS
- Solid Rocket Booster
- Space Shuttle Orbiter
- Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network
- Switch
- Tactical Air Navigation
- Text and Graphics
- Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
- Telemetry
- Television
- Thumbwheel
- Ultra High Frequency
•- Uplink
- Voltage Controlled oscillator
- Voice Operated Transmit
- Video Switching Unit
- Video Tape Recorder
- Wide-Band Signal Conditioner
- Wireless Crew Communications Umbilical
- Transmit
- Transponder
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
B-I
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
m
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in_qSTS 22206, Instructions For PreDaration
Of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
_NTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort add ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunctionprocedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY M_SSIQN TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase'by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(OPS)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAF!NG PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation o_ FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
l•
•
3 .
•
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any par£ of the caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
Z77:7 _:
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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,
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser•
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed•
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
I0. Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
p
ii. Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
B-5
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
Communications and Tracking Subsystems-
-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions :
I
mm
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the Communications and Tracking subsystem. The analysis con-
sidered the worst case effects of the hardware or functional
failure on the subsystem, mission, and crew and vehicle safety.
I. Human error (e.g., system misconfiguration by crew or
ground) will not be considered.
Rationale: Possible misconfigurations are out of scope
for this analysis.
• Inadvertent misconfigurations (e.g., accidental body contact
by a crew member with a switch in zero-g operations) will
not be considered ...... _ ....
Rationale: Most critical switches have guards, or are
lever-lock type. Possible inadvertent miscon-
figurations are out of scope for this analysis.
, Hardware items have been properly qualified, have passed
applicable acceptance testing, and have been properly
installed in the orbiter. Exception: if analysis of
failure history of a part, subassembly, or LRU in the
subsystem disclos@s multiple failures, that item will be
flagged for special attention.
j
Rationale: Baseline assumption is that Program controls
have resulted in hardware that is properly
qualified and installed•
Rationale:
The criticality of a Communications and Tracking Subsystem
hardware item will be assigned on the basis of the highest
criticality function it performs.
The Communications and Tracking Subsystem
exists to process and route information for
use by the crew and by ground controllers to
facilitate the accomplishment of mission
objectives and to ensure the safety of crew
and vehicle. Worst-case effect from the
loss of capability by a hardware item to
perform a function determines its
criticality.
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•
Loss of all capability to update Orbiter State Vector can
cause loss of crew/vehicle.
Rationale: GN&C hardware and Master Timing Unit
drifts/errors can cause vehicle location
errors in de-orbit and landing operations
that cQuld result in loss of crew/vehicle.
Interconnecting cables will not be evaluated•
Rationale: Baseline assumption is that the program
controls require hardware that is properly
installed, and cables are beyond the scope
of this analysis.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets employed during
the analysis of the DPS subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the FMEA's written by
Rockwell and the NASA. Each of these sheets identifies the item
being analyzed, and parent assembly, as well as the function. For
each failure mode, the possible causes are outlined, and the
assessed hardware and functional criticality for each mission
phase is listed, as described in the Rockwell Desk Instructions
100-2G. Finally, effects are entered at the bottom of each
sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities :
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
IR = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
4 = Do Not Know
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 4/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: I001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3 ) RF COMM
4) S-BAND QUAD ANTENNAS
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNAS
LOSS 0F-OUTPUT, SHORT CIRCUIT, OPEN CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ill
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
B[P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC481-0088-00XX
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILU-RE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, LOSS OF INPUT,
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONA_
THE FOURQUADANTEm,,AS,USEDONE AT A• EITHER
UNDER GPC CONTROL OR MANUALLY FOR OPTIMUM TWO-WAY S-BAND PM RF
LINK WITH TDRS OR GROUND STATIONS, CARRY OPERATIONAL UL/DL DATA.
LOSS oF ALL UL/FL LINK RF PATHS FOR STATE _CT_R(SV) UPDAT_S _
AND ALL DL/RL PATHS FOR TELEMETRIC CONFIRMATION OF PROPER RECEIPT
OF SV ABOARD SSO COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY FOR SV UPDATES EXITS FOR ALL MISSION PHASES VIA UHF UL
AND, FOR FULLY OPERATIONAL TDRS, DURING ON-ORBIT VIA KU-BAND
(WHEN KU-BAND IS NOT BEING USED IN ITS RADAR MODE). SV UPDATES
ARE TWO-STAGE LOADS REQUIRING AN EXECUTE FROM GROUND AFTER TLM
CONFIRMATION THAT THE CO_CT SV_DATAWAS LOADED ABOARD ORBITER;
THUS TWO-WAY COMM IS REQUIRED FOR NORMAL SV LOADS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, 10; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/06/87
COMM & TRACK
1002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNAS
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNAS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE
MC481-0088-00XX
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FOUR QUAD ANTENNAS, USED ONE AT A TIME, CARRY OPERATIONAL
UPLINK/DOWNLINK DATA VIA THE S-BAND PM RF LINK. LOSS OF ALL
UPLINK/DOWNLINK RF PATHS FOR STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES AND
TELEMETRIC CONFIRMATION OF PROPER RECEIPT OF SV LOAD ABOARD
ORBITER COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW AND VEHICLE. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
FOR SV UPDATES EXISTS FOR ALL MISSION PHASES VIA UHF UPLINK AND
DURING ON-ORBIT VIA KU-BAND (EXCEPT WHEN KU-BAND IS IN RADAR
MODE). SV UPDATES ARE TWO-STAGE LOADS REQUIRING AN "EXECUTE"
FROM GROUND, NORMALLY AFTER TELEMETRIC CONFIRMATION THAT THE
CORRECT SV DATA WAS LOADED ABOARD ORBITER; THUS TWO-WAY COMM IS
REQUIRED FOR NORMAL SV LOADS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, I0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-3
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
4/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
1003 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNAS
FAILURE TO SWITCH BEAM, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3) RF COMM
4) S-BAND QUAD ANTENNAS
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
H DW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
3/3 •
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MC481-OO88-00XX
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAiLUi_E, CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS_iONALE._. _z_:_ =_ _ ........ _!_:_i_ii_;__ .... _ _!_
THE FOUR QUAD ANTENNAS, USED ONE AT A TIME, CARRY THE S-BAND PM
TWO-WAY RF LINKS, WHICH IN TURN CARRY UPLINK/DO_LINK QPERATIQNAL
DATA. EACH QUADANTENNA IS A DUAL_rBEAMUNIT WHOSE BEAM CAN BE
DIRECT_ EITHER FORW_D_-dR "_ BY RF=SWITCHES MOUNTED IN THE
ANTENNA CAVITY. LOSS OF BEAM SWITCHING CAPABILITY (BECAUSE OF RF
SWITCH FAILURE, FOR EXAMPLE) COULD CAUSE VEHICLE ATTITUDE
CONSTRAINTS FOR TWO-WAY COMM WITHGROUND, _D POSSIBLE Loss OF _
MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES BECAUSE UNTIL THE TRACKING AND DATA
RELAY SATELLITE SYSTEM (TDRSS) IS FULLY OPERATIONAL , TWO-WAY
OPERATIONAL DATA FLOW IS DEPENDENT ON THE S-BAND PM COMM SYSTEM.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, i0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/14/87
COMM & TRACK
1004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNAS
BEAM SWITCH FAILS MID-TRAVEL
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNAS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE
MC481-0088-00XX
CAUSES:
FAILURE
CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FOUR QUADS, USED ONE AT A TIME, CARRY S-BAND PM 2-WAY RF,
WHICH CARRIES UL/DL OPNL DATA. EACH QUAD IS A DUAL-BEAM UNIT
WHOSE BEAM CAN BE DIRECTED EITHER FWD OR AFT BY RF SWITCHES IN
THE ANTENNA CAVITY. RF SWITCH FAILURE IN MID-TRAVEL WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF THE AFFECTED QUAD. QUAD LOSS WOULD IMPOSE VEHICLE
ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS FOR TWO-WAY COMM WITH GROUND, AND COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. WITH FULLY OPERATIONAL TDRSS THERE WILL
NORMALLYBE NEAR FULL-TIME UNLIKE REDUNDANCY ON-ORBIT VIA KU-BAND
COMM FOR S-BAND PM LINK, BUT WHEN K-J-BAND IS IN RADAR MODE, AS
FOR RENDEZVOUS OPS, OR IS UNAVAILABLE (PL VULNERABLE TO KU-BAND
RF), QUAD FAILURES COULD IMPOSE UNACCEPTABLE CONSTRAINTS ON SSO
AND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, I0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
41o8187
COMM & TRACK
1005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT-.
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT :: _ : :: ::_
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF CO_
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNA SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: _ 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: FWD AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0064-0001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
CONTAMINATION, ERRONEOUS INPUT
w
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: :___:i:_<:_!i_i_
THE ACTIVE SWITCH BEAM CONTROL E_CTRONICS (SBCE) UNIT CONTROLS
SELECTION OF FORWARD OR AFT RF BEAM DIRECTIVITY FOR EACH OF THE
FOUR DUAL-BEAM S-BAND QUAD ANTENNAS. THERE ARE TWO IDENT!gA_L __iE
UNITS. THEY _=USED6NE AT A TI__°6=_ SELECTED BY GROUND
CONTROL INTERFACE LOGIC COMMANDS (COMMAND MODE) OR PANEL CONTROL
SWITCH (PANEL MODE), WITH ERRONEOUS SBCE OUTPUT, ANTENNA RF
PATTERN COVERAGE FOR A GIVEN ORBIT_ER_A_TITUDE COULD BE GREATLY!_
REDUCED, PLACING ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS ON ORBITER THAT COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES AND THUS COULD CAUSE MISSION
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, I0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
1006 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS
LOSS OF OUTPUT, ELECTRICAL SHORT, ELECTRICAL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3) RF COMM
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNA SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R' AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC450-0064-001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ACTIVE SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS (SBCE) UNIT CONTROLS
SELECTION OF FWD OR AFT BEAM DIRECTIVITY FOR EACH OF THE FOUR
DUAL-BEAM QUADS. AN SBCE FAILURE COULD INVOLVE AN INDIVIDUAL
CHANNEL (E.G., PULSER OR RELAY DRIVER FAILURE) CONTROLLING BEAM
DIRECTION FOR ONE QUAD, OR COULD AFFECT ALL FOUR QUADS (E.G., A
FAILURE IN SELECTOR LOGIC). AFTER FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT SBCE,
THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CONTROL QUADBE_DIRECTIVITYCOULD
PLACE ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS ON SSO THAT L"OULD _AUSE LOS_OF
MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, i0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
w
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/14/87
COMM & TRACK
1007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM ....
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNA SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: • 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: FWD AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0064-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ACTIVE SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ELECTRONICS (SBCE) UNIT CONTROLS
SELECTION OF FWD OR AFT BEAM DIRECTIVITY FOR EACH OF THE FOUR
DUAL-BEAM QUADS. AN SBCE FAILURE COULD INVOLVE AN INDIVIDUAL
CHANNEL (E. G., _PURER 9R_RELAY DRIVER_FAILURE) CONTROLLING BEAM
DIRECTION FOR ONE QUAD, OR COULD AFFECT ALL FOUR QUADS (E.G., A
FAILURE IN SELECTOR LOGIC). AFTER FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT SBCE,
THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CONTROL QUAD BEAM DIRECTIVITY COULD
PLACE ATTITUDE CONST_!NTS ON SSO THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, I0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 4/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1008 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC478-0106-4004
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE QUAD SECTION OF S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH LRU HAS FOUR RF
SWITCHES TO SELECT QUADS. THERE ARE TWO IDENTICAL SETS OF
ELECTRONIC CONTROLS, IN ONE ENCLOSURE, USED ONE AT A TIME. FOR A
GIVEN COMBINATION OF S-BAND PM OPERATIONAL FREQUENCIES/MODES,
SEGMENTS OF TWO OF THE FOUR SWITCHES INTERCONNECT ACTIVE RF LRU
WITH OPTIMUM QUAD. IF EITHER SWITCH REQUIRED FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE
PROPERLY, RF SYSTEM IS MISCONFIGURED FOR CURRENT SSO ATTITUDE,
AND TWO-WAY COMM VIA S-BAND PM IS DEGRADED OR INTERRUPTED.
THE FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO INTERCONNECT RF LRU'S WITH QUADS WOULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, I0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/16/sv
COMM & TRACK
1009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
APORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
INTERMITTENT/ERRATIC OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC478-0106-4004
HDW/FU_NC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAIL_, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE QUAD SECTION OF S-BAND AN_ SWITCH LRU HAS FOUR RF i_....
SWITCHES TO SELECT QUADS. THERE ARE TWO IDENTICAL SETS OF
ELECTRONIC CONTROLS, IN ONE ENCLOSURE, USED ONE AT A TI_ _.....20R A
GIVEN COMBINATION OF S-BAND PM OPERATIONAL FREQUENCIES/MODES,
SEGMENTS OF TWO OF THE FOUR SWITCHES _HTERCO__A_TfVE RF LRU
WITH OPTIMUM QUAD. IF EITHER SWITCH REQUIRED FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE
PROPERLY, RF SYSTEM IS MISCONFIGURED FOR CURRENT SSO ATTITUDE,
AND TW_6&_Y COMM VIA S-BAND PM IS DEGRADED O_ YNT_RRUPTED? _
THE FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO INTERCONNECT RF LRU'S WITH QUA DS_OULDCAUSE MISSION_SS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, i0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 4/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: i010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: RF SWITCH FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC478-0106-4004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE QUAD SECTION OF S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH LRU HAS FOUR RF
SWITCHES TO SELECT QUADS. THERE ARE TWO IDENTICAL SETS OF
ELECTRONIC CONTROLS, IN ONE ENCLOSURE, USED ONE AT A TIME. FOR A
GIVEN COMBINATION OF S-BAND PM OPERATIONAL FREQUENCIES/MODES,
SEGMENTS OF TWO OF THE FOUR SWITCHES INTERCONNECT ACTIVE RF LRU
WITH OPTIMUM QUAD. IF EITHER SWITCH REQUIRED FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE
PROPERLY, RF SYSTEM IS MISCONFIGURED FOR CURRENT SSO ATTITUDE,
AND TWO-WAY COMMVIA S-BAND PM IS DEGRADED OR INTERRUPTED.
THE FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO INTERCONNECT RF LRU'S WITH QUADS WOULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, I0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-II
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM & TRACK , FLIGHT:
I011 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: RF SWITCH SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST : A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PMSYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAYING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC478-0106-4004
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FOUR RF SWITCHES IN THE QUAD SECTION INTERCONNECT QUADS WITH
ACTIVE RF LRU'S. FOR ANY COMBINATION OF S-BAND PM OPNL
FREQUENCIES/MODES, RF SEGMENTS OF TWO OF THE FOUR SWITCHES
INTERCONNECT ACTIVE RF LRU WITH OPTIMUM QUAD. IF EITHER RF ....
SWITCH-REQUIREDAT A GIVEN TIME S_ST_SANRFSHORT _CROSS
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CQNTACTS THAT SHOULD OPEN, THE TWO-WAY RF SIGNALS WOULD BE ROUTED
VIA TWO QUADS SIMULTANEOUSLY, CAUSIN_SE_RE RF SIGNAL
DEGRADATION FOR DESIRED TWO-WAY PAT-H_*_D POSSIBLE M_SS_0NLOSS.
IF THE SHORT IS TO GROUND THE RF SIGNALS ARE LOST FOR THAT
DESIRED PATH, AND THAT ALSO COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT QUADS WOULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS,
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF S 4, i0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/21/87
COMM & TRACK
1012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
RF SWITCH OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND QUAD ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/5
I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC478-0106-4004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE QUAD CONTROL SECTION OF THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
CONSISTS OF CONTROLS, LOGIC GATES, AND RF SWITCHES. THE FOUR RF
SWITCHES INTERCONNECT QUAD ANTENNAS WITH ACTIVE RF LRUS. FOR ANY
Gi_N COMBINATION OF S'_ _ OP_ON-ALFREQUENCIES AND
MODES, RF SEGMENTS OF TWO OF THE FOUR RF SWITCHES ARE USED TO
INTERCONNNECT THE ACTIVE RF LRU WITH THE OPTIMUM QUAD. IF EITHER
RF SWITCH REQUIRED AT A GIVEN TIME SUSTAINS AN OPEN CIRCUIT
ACROSS AN RF PATH BETWEEN CONTACTS THAT SHOULD BE BRIDGED, THE
TWO-WAY RF SIGNALS WOULD BE INTERRUPTED FOR THAT RF SYSTEM PATH.
LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SEt_CT A__IC QUAD COUL_CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT QUADS WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 4, i0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE"
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/21/8v
COMM & TRACK
io13
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PREAMPLIFIER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST : A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3 ) RF COMM
4 ) S-BAND PREAMP
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC478-0106-2001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TWO PREAMPS, USED ONE AT A TIME, PROVIDE SELECTABLE
AMPLIFICATION OF NASA S-BAND PM UL/FL RF IN STDN MODE, AND ARE
REQUIRED FOR TDRS MODE. LOSS OF BOTH WOULD REQUIRE RECONFIGURING
TO STDN LO PWR MODE FOR OPNL S-BAND PM TWO-WAY COMM AND COULD
REQUIRE LO DATA RATE MODE BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE RF LINK DEFICITS AT
HI DATA RATE. FOR SOME MISSIONS KU-BAND MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE
BECAUSE OF PAYLOAD VULNERABILITY TO KU-BAND RF. LOSS OF TDRS
MODE AND HI DATA RATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF PRIME MISSION
OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF CONFLICTING%_H_CLE ATTI_DE tO_ST_INTS
(EXPERIMENT VS COMM ATTITUDE REQUIREMENTS). NOTE: LOSS OF
PREAMPS FOR UL/FL ALSO CAUSES LOSS OF PWR AMPS FOR DL/RL.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740259; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/21/8v
COMM & TRACK
1014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PREAMPLIFIER
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PS SYSTEM
3 ) RF COMM
4 ) S-BAND PREAMP
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC478-0106-2001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TWO PREAMPS, USED ONE AT A TIME, PROVIDE SELECTABLE
AMPLIFICATION OF NASA S-BAND PM UL/FL RF IN STDN MODE, AND ARE
REQUIRED FOR TDRS MODE. LOSS OF BOTH WOULD REQUIRE RECONFIGURING
TO STDN LO PWR MODE FOR OPNL S-BAND PM TWO-WAY COMM AND COULD
REQUIRE LO DATA RATE MODE BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE RF LINK DEFICITS AT
HI DATA RATE. FOR SOME MISSIONS KU-BAND MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE
BECAUSE OF PAYLOAD VULNERABILITY TO KU-BAND RF. LOSS OF TDRS
MODE AND HI DATA RATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF PRIME MISSION
OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF CONFLICTING VEHICLE ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS
(EXPERIMENT VS COMM ATTITUDE REQUIREMENTS). NOTE: LOSS OF
PREAMPS FOR UL/FL ALSO CAUSES LOSS OF PWR AMPS FOR DL/RL.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740259; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/22/87
COMM & TRACK
1015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PREAMPLIFIER
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDO_ HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3 ) RF COMM
4 ) S-BAND PREAMP
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 :_
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC478-0106-2001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TWO PREAMPS, USED ONE AT A TIME, PROVIDE SELECTABLE
AMPLIFICATION OF NASA S-BAND PM UL/FL RF IN STDN MODE AND ARE
REQUI_D FOR TDRS MODE. THEY ARE COOLED BY COLDPLATE. TEMP ....
EXTREME OR OTHE-R-_ILURE COULD CAUSE_bEGRADED OUTPUT OR _ING
AND REQUIRE SELECTION OF REDUNDANT UNIT. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY
WOULD REQUIRE USE OF LO PWR MODE FOR S-BAND PM TWO-WAY COMM (LOSS
OF PREAMPS ALSO CAUSES LOSS OF PWR AMPS FOR DL/RL) AND COULD_I
REQUIRE _DATA RATE FOR_0-WAY CO_. LOSS OF TDRS MODE AND HI
DATA RATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF PRIME MISSION OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF
CONFLICTINGVEHICLEATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS (EXPERi_ VS COMM ....
ATTITUDE REQUIREMENTS).
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740259; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5; OMRSD V74 FiLE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/22187
COMM & TRACK
1016
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3 ) RF COMM
4) S-BAND PREAMP
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC478-0106-2501
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TWO PAS, USED ONE AT A TIME, PROVIDE SELECTABLE AMPLIFICATION
OF NASA S-BAND PM DL/RL IN STDN MODE, AND ARE REQUIRED FOR TDRS
MODE. LOSS OF BOTH WOULD REQUIRE RECONFIG TO STDN LO PWR MODE
FOR S-BAND PM TWO-WAY COMM AND COULD REQUIRE LO DATA RATE
MODE BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE RF LINK DEFICITS AT HI-DATA-RATE. FOR
SOME MISSIONS KU-BAND MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF PAYLOAD
VULNERABILITY TO KU-BAND RF. LOSS OF TDRS MODE AND HI DATA RATE
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF PRIME MISSION OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF
CONFLICTING VEHICLE ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS (EXPERIMENT VS COMM
ATTITUDE REQUIREMENTS). NOTE: LOSS OF PAS FOR DL/RL ALSO CAUSES
LOSS OF PREAMPS FOR UL/FL.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/23/87
COMM & TRACK
1017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3 ) RF COMM
4) S-BAND PREAMP
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC478-0106-2501
CAUSES: cONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-P_T FAILURE, _
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......................................
THE TWO PAS, USED ONE AT A TIME, PROVIDE SELECTABLE AMPLIFICATION
OF NASA S-BAND PM DL/RL IN STDN MODE, AND ARE REQUIRED FOR TDRS
MODE. LOSS OF BOTH WOULD REQUIRE RECONFIG TO STDN LO PWR MODE
FOR S-BAND PM TWb_WAY COMM AND colD'QUIRE LODA__
MODE BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE RF LINK DEFICITS AT HI-DATA-RATE. FOR
SOME MISSIONS KU-BAND MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF PAYLOAD
VULNERABILITY TOKU-BAND RF. _SS OF TDRS MODE AND HI DATA RATE
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF PRIME MISSION OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF
CONFLICTING VEHICLE ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS (EXPERIMENT VS COMM
ATTITUDE REQUIRE_NTS). NOTE: LOSS OF PAS FOR DL/RL ALSO CAUSES
LOSS OF PREAMPS FOR UL/FL.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/24/87
COMM & TRACK
1018
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND PREAMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC478-0106-2501
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TWO PAS, USED ONE AT A TIME, PROVIDE SELECTABLE AMPLIFICATION
OF NASA S-BAND PM DL/RL IN STDN MODE, AND ARE REQUIRED FOR TDRS
MODE. THEY ARE COOLED BY COLDPLATE. TEMP EXTREME OR OTHER
FAILURE COULD CAUSE DEGRADED OUTPUT OR DETUNING AND REQUIRE
SELECTION OF REDUNDANT UNIT. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WOULD REQUIRE
USE OF LO PWR MODE FOR S-BAND PM TWO-WAY COMM (LOSS OF PAS ALSO
CAUSES LOSS OF PREAMPS FORUm) AND COULD_AUSE]3OES_OF PRIME
MISSION OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF CONFLICTING VEHICLE ATTITUDE
CONSTRAINTS (EXPERIMENT VS COMM ATTITUDE REQUIREMENTS).
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-19
E
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/23/87
COMM & TRACK
1019
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
PREAMP PANEL POWER SWITCH
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3) RF COMM
4) S-BAND PREAMP
5) PANEL POWER SWITCH
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PI_OVIDES P0_ TO pREAMP_ ! O_ 2 WITH $=BAND PM SYSTEM
IN GCIL PNL MODE. IT ALSO PROVIDES INTERLOCK CONTACTS FOR PWR TO
S-BAND PAS IN PNL MODE. BINDING/JAMMING COULD PREVENT EITHER
PREAMP AND ASSOCIATED PA FROM GETTING POWER IN PNL MODE.
OPNL REDUNDANCY FOR POWERING THE LRUS EXISTS WITH SYSTEM IN GCIL
CMD MODE, NORMAL OPNL MODE. PREAMP & PA ARE REQUIRED FOR STDN HI
AND TDRS MODES. LOSS OF CONTROL OF PREAMPS/PAS AND
UNAVAILABILITY OF KU-BAND WOULD REQUIRE OPS IN STDN LO
AND COULD RE--QUIRE LO DATA RATE BECAUSE OF_OSSIB_LE RF LINK
DEFICITS AT HI DATA RATE. THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES (VEHICLE ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS AND/OR LOWER DATA RATE
CAPABILITY) AND CONSEQUENTLY MISSION LOSS_ _
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMIRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
1020 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PREAMP PANEL POWER SWITCH
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, OPEN, FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PS SYSTEM
3) RF COMM
4) S-BAND PREAMP
5) PANEL POWER SWITCH
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO PREAMP 1 OR 2 WITH S-BAND PM SYSTEM
IN GCIL PNL MODE. IT ALSO PROVIDES INTERLOCK CONTACTS FOR PWR TO
S-BAND PAS IN PNL MODE. OPEN CIRCUIT COULD PREVENT EITHER PREAMP
AND ASSOCIATED PA FROM GETTING POWER IN PNL MODE.
OPNL REDUNDANCY FOR POWERING THE LRUS EXISTS WITH SYSTEM IN GCIL
CMD MODE, NORMAL OPNL MODE. PREAMP & PA ARE REQUIRED FOR STDN HI
AND TDRS MODES. LOSS OF CONTROL OF PREAMPS/PAS AND
UNAVAILABILITY OF KU-BAND WOULD REQUIRE OPS IN STDN LO
AND COULD REQUIRE LO DATA RATE BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE RF LINK
DEFICITS AT HI DATA RATE. THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES (VEHICLE ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS AND/OR LOWER DATA RATE
CAPABILITY) AND CONSEQUENTLY MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/27/87
COMM & TRACK
1021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PREAMP PANEL POWER SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3) RF COMM
4) S-BAND PREAMP
5) PANEL POWER SWITCH
6)
7)
8)
9)
cRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDWyFUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBt_TIQN
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO PREAMPI OR 2 WITH s'B_D-PM sYSTEM
IN GCIL_MODE, IT A_OPROV_DES INTERLOCK CONTACTS FOR PWR TO
S-BAND PAS IN PNL MODE. ELECTRICAL SHORT COULD PREVENT EITHER
PREAMPAND ASSOC_ATED=PAFROM GETTING POWER IN PNL MODE. ...._ _
OPNL REDUND_CY FOR POWERI"N_ THE LRUSEXISTS WITH SYSTEM IN GCIL
CMD MODE, NORMAL OPNL MODE. PREAMP & PA ARE REQUIRED FOR STDN HI
AND TDRS MODES. LOSS OF CONTROL OF PREAMPS/PAS AND
_AVAILABILITY_F-_B_D_WOULD-_QU_REQPSIN - ST-DNLO _ .....
AND COULD REQUIP/E L0 DATARATE BECAUEE O? POSS_]_I_LINK
DEFICITS AT HI DATA RATE. THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES (VEHICLE ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS AND/QR _WER DATA _TE
CAPABILITY) _b_CoNSEQUEST_YM_SS_ON _SS, _
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/16/87
COMM & TRACK
1022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PA OPERATE SWITCH
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
=BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER
PA OPERATE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P J ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PA PNL PWR ("OPERATE") SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO PAl OR PA2
FOR S-BAND PM SYSTEM GCIL PNL CONTROL MODE. BINDING/JAMMING OR
FAIL IN MID-TRAVEL COULD PREVENT EITHER PA FROM GETTING POWER IN
GCIL PNL MODE, AND PREVENT SWITCHING TO OTHER PA. PA
(AND PREAMP) ARE REQUIRED FOR STDN HI AND TDRS MODES.
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY EXISTS WITH THE SYSTEM IN GCIL CMD MODE.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO OPERATE IN HI PWR MODE WOULD FORCE
SYSTEM OPERATION IN LO PWR MODE AND COULD REQUIRE ATTITUDE
CONSTRAINTS THAT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES AND THUS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/29/87
COMM & TRACK
1023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PA OPERATE SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER
POWER AMPLIFIER OPERATE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSes:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ............ _ -............ ,
FOR S-BAND PM SYSTEM GCIL PNL CONTROL MODE. ELECTRICAL OPEN
COULD PREVENT EITHER PA FROM GETTING POWER IN GCIL PNL MODE, AND
PREVENT SWITCHING TO OTHER PA. PA (AND PREAMP) ARE REQUIRED
FOR ST_ HIrAND TDRS MODES. OPERATION-AL REDUNDANCY EXISTS WITH
THE SYSTEM IN GCIL CMD MODE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO OPERATE
IN HI PWR MODE WOULD FORCE SYSTEM OPERATION IN LO PWR MODE AND
COULD REQUIRE A_TUDE CONSTRAiNTS-THATWOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVES AND THUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/29/87
COMM & TRACK
1024
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PA OPERATE SWITCH
ELECTRICAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER
POWER AMPLIFIER OPERATE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PA PNL PWR ("OPERATE") SWITCH PROVIDES POWER TO PAl OR PA2
FOR S-BAND PM SYSTEM GCIL PNL CONTROL MODE. ELECTRICAL SHORT
COULD PREVENT EITHER PA FROM GETTING POWER IN GCIL PNL MODE, AND
PREVENT SWITCHING TO OTHER PA. PA (AND PREAMP) ARE REQUIRED
FOR STDN HI AND TDRS MODES. OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY EXISTS WITH
THE SYSTEM IN GCIL CMD MODE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO OPERATE
IN HI PWR MODE WOULD FORCE SYSTEM OPERATION IN LO PWR MODE AND
COULD REQUIRE ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS THAT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVES AND THUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
1025 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER AMPLIFIER STANDBY SWITCH
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER
POWER AMPLIFIER STANDBY SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE 3-POSITION STANDBY SWITCH (PAI/OFF/PA2) ALLOWS THE REDUNDANT
PA TO BE IN HOT STANDBY WHILE THE OTHER IS ACTIVE IN THE S-BAND
PM SYSTEM RL STRING FOR GCIL PNL MODE. IF STANDBY UNIT IS
SUBSTITUTED THE 140-SECOND POWER TUBE WARMUP PERIOD WILL BE
AVERTED, AND THE NEW LRU CAN BE OPERATIONAL1 "_ET_TL_f- LOSS OF
PANEL CONTROL OF WARMUP WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16. i, 16.2 ; INCO/COMM sYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMRSD V74 FILE IIi
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
4/3o/87
COMM & TRACK
1026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PA STANDBY SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN, ELECTRICAL SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3 ) RF COMM
S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER
POWER AMPLIFIER ISTANDBY SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE 3-POSITION STANDBY SWITCH (PAI/OFF/PA2) ALLOWS THE REDUNDANT
PA TO BE IN HOT STANDBY WHILE THE OTHER IS ACTIVE IN THE S-BAND,
PM SYSTEM RL STRING FOR GCIL PNL MODE. IF STANDBY UNIT IS
SUBSTITUTED THE 140-SECOND POWER TUBE WARMUP PERIOD WILL BE
AVERTED, AND THE NEW LRU CAN BE OPERATIONAL INSTANTLY. LOSS OF
PANEL CONTROL OF WARMUP WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740139; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 9.0; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/Ol/87
COMM & TRACK
1027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
LOSS OF UPLINK/FORWARD LINK OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
ME478-0106-I001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE EXTREME,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _.
THE TWO S-BAND PM TRANSPONDERS, USED ONE AT A TI_,PROVIDE TWO-
WAY RF COMM WITH NASA AND DOD GROUND STATIONS AND WITH TDRS. THE
UPLINK/FORWARD LINK (UL/FL) RF SIGNAL MAY BE MODULATED WITH
OPERATIONAL VOICE, COMMANDS, AND TELEPRINTER DATA. THE UL/FL .....
IS ALSO USED FOR TURNAROUND TONE RANGING AND_?O_O_WAY DO_LER
TRACKING OF ORBITER. LOSS OF UL/FL DATA FROM BOTH TRANSPONDERS
IN ON-ORBIT PHASE WOULD CAUSE MISS!ON ABORT BECAUSE ONLY THE KU-
COMMANDS, AND ONLY UHF VOICE FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND TWO-WAY
VOICE SUPPORT FOR DE-ORBIT/LANDING OPERATIONS. LOSS OF ALL
......CAPABILITY FORS_U_pATES AND TWO-WAY VOICE FOR LANDING COULD
CAUSE LOSS _6?C-_EW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7; OMRSD V74 FILE III; JSC-12820 FLT
RULES SECT ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1028
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
FAILURE MQDE: UPLINK/FORWARD LINK FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
AVIONICS BAY 3A
ME478-0106-I001
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE EXTREME,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TWO S-BAND PM XDNDRS, USED ONE AT A TIME, PROVIDE TWO-WAY RF
COMM WITH NASA AND DOD GROUND STATIONS AND WITH TDRS. THE UL/FL
RF SIGNAL MAY BE MODULATED WITH OPNL VOICE, CMDS, AND TELEPRINTER
DATA. IT IS ALSO USED FOR TURNAROUND TONE RANGING AND
TWO-WAY DOPPLER TRACKING. OUT-OF-TOLERANCE (E.G., FREQ. DRIFT,
SIGNAL ATTENUATION) CONDITIONS CAUSING LOSS OF FUNCTION WOULD
REQUIRE USE OF REDUNDANT LRU. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR S-BAND
ms UL/FL WOULD cAuSE MISSION TERMINATION BECAUSE ONLY KU-BAND
FL WOULD REMAIN ON-ORBIT FOR CMDS, AND ONLY UHF VOICE FOR SV
UPDATES AND TWO-WAY VOICE SUPPORT FOR DE-ORBIT/LANDING OPS. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR SV UPDATES AND TWO-WAY VOICE FOR LANDING
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7; OMRSD V74 FILE III; JSC-12820 FLT
RULES SECT ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-29
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
5/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CQ_ & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/IR
1029 ABORT: 3lie
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINK
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION OF UPLINK/FORWARD
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC _ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
=:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/IR
3/IR
A[I] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
ME478-0106-I001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS_RATIONALE: =_=i= ........................... :
THE TWO S-BAND PM TRANSPONDERS, USED ONE AT A TIME, PROVIDE TWO-
WAY RF COMM WITH NASA AND DOD GROUND STATIONS AND TDRS. THE
UPLINK/FORWARD LINK (UL/FL) RF SIGNAL MAY BE MODULATED WIT H_
OPERATIONAL VOICE, CO_DS, AND TELEPRINTER DATA. .....THE UL/FLIS
ALSO USED FOR TURNAROUND TONE RANGING AND FOR TWO-WAY DOPPLER
TRACKINGOF ORBITER. LOSS OF UL/FLDATAFROM BOTH TRANSPONDERS
IN ONLORBIT PHASE WOULD CAUSE MISSION-ABORTBECAUSEONLY THE KU-
BAND FORWARD LINK WOULD REMAIN FOR COMMANDS, AND ONLY UHF VOICE
FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND TWO-WAY VOICE SUPPORT FOR DE-
ORBIT/LANDING OPERATIONS. LOSSOF ALL CAPABILITY FOR SV UPDATES
AND TWO-WAY VOICE FOR LANDING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129; sSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7; OMRSD V74 FILE III; JSC 12820 FLT
RULES SECT Ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/06/87
COMM & TRACK
1030
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
LOSS OF DOWNLINK/RETURN LINK OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
ME478-0106-I001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, LOSS OF INPUT,
CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE EXTREME
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TWO S-BAND PM XPNDRS, USED ONE AT A TIME, PROVIDE TWO-WAY RF
COMM WITH NASA AND DOD GROUND STATIONS AND WITH TDRS. THE DL/RL
RF SIGNAL MAY BE MODULATED WITH OPNL VOICE AND TLM DATA, AND IS
ALSO USED FOR TURNAROUND TONE RANGING AND FOR TWO-WAY
DOPPLER TRACKING OF ORBITER. LOSS OF RL OUTPUT FROM BOTH XPNDRS
IN ON-ORBIT PHASE WOULD CAUSE MIN DURATION FLIGHT AND WOULD CALL
FOR IFM TO REPLACE ONE PM XPNDR WITH FM XMTR. FAILURE OF IFM
WOULD CAUSE MISSION ABORT (NEXT PLS) BECAUSE OF LOSS OF TLM
AND BECAUSE ONLY UHF WOULD REMAIN FOR SUPPORT OF LANDING OPS AND
SV UPDATES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR SV UPDATES AND VOICE COMM
FOR LANDING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7; OMRSD V74 FILE III; JSC-12820 FLT
RULES SECT ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/06/87
COMM & TRACK
1031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
DOWNLINK/RETURN LINK FAILS OUT-OF-TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/iR AOA: 3/iR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: ME478-0106-i001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE EXTREME,
CONTAMiNATiON ........
EFFECTS/RATIONAl| _ =
THE TWO S-BAND PM XPNDRS, USED SINGLY, PROVIDE TWO-WAY RF COMM
WITH NASA AND DOD GND STATIONS AND TDRS. THE DL/RL RF SIGNAL MAY
BE MODULATED WITH OPNL VOICE AND TLM DATA, AND IS A_O IUSED FOR
_AROUND TONE RANGING AND FOR TWO-WAY DOPPLER TRACKI_DF
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ORBITER. OUT-OF-TOrRANCE CONDITIONS (E,G., F_Q. DRI_T) CAUSiNG
LOSS OF RL OUTPUT FROM BOTH XPNDRS ON-ORBIT WOULD CAUSE MIN
DURATION FLIGHT AND WOULD CALL FOR IFM TO REPLACE ONE PM XPNDR
WIT___IFM FAILURE WOULD CAUSEMISSION-ABORT (NEXT P_)
BECAUSE OF LOSS OF TLM AND BECAUSE ONLY UHF WOULD REMAIN FOR
SUPPORT OF LANDING OPS AND SV UPDATES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR SVUPDATESTd_D VOICE COMM_FORLANDING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7; OMRSD V74 FILE III; JSC-12820 FLT
RULES SECT ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/IR
1032 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LINK
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION OF DOWNLINK/RETURN
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
ME478-0106-I001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TWO S-BAND PM XPNDRS, USED ONE AT A TIME, PROVIDE TWO-WAY RF
COMM WITH NASA AND DOD GROUND STATIONS AND WITH TDRS. THE DL/RL
RF SIGNAL MAY BE MODUALTED WITH OPNL VOICE AND TLM DATA, AND IS
ALSO USED FOR TURNAROUND TONE RANGING AND FOR TWO-WAY
DOPPLER TRACKING ORBITER. ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION CAUSING
LOSS OF RL OUTPUT FROM BOTH XPNDRS IN ON-ORBIT PHASE WOULD CAUSE
MIN DURATION FLIGHT AND WOULD CALL FOR IFM TO REPLACE ONE PM
XPNDR WITH FM XMTR. FAILURE OF IFM WOULD CAUSE MISSION ABORT
(NEXT PLS) BECAUSE OF LOSS OF TLM AND BECAUSE ONLY UHF WOULD
REMAIN FOR SUPPORT OF LANDING OPS AND SV UPDATES. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR SV UPDATES AND VOICE COMM FOR LANDING COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7; OMRSD V74 FILE III; JSC-12820 FLT
RULES SECT ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-33
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM& TRACK FLIGHT: 3/!R
MDACID: 1033 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER POWER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
TRANSPONDER POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
36V73AIA2SI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: ..............
THE THREE POSITION XPNDR POWER SWITCH (XPNDR I/oFF/XPNDR 2)
PROVIDES PO_R TO EITHER XPNDR I OR 2 FOR GCIL PANEL CONTROL
MODE. OPNL REDUNDANCY FOR POWERING THE XPNDRS EXISTS WITH THE S-
BAND PM SYSTEM IN GCIL COMMAND MODE, IWHICH IS THE NQ_L CONTROL
MODE. OTHER UNLI_ REDUNDANCY FOR TWO-WAY OPE_TIONAL DATA COMM
WOULD NORMALLY EXIST DURING ON-ORBIT PHASE VIA KU-BAND. LOSS OF
BOTH XPNDRS IN ON-ORBIT PHASE WOULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION
BECAUSE ONLY KU-BAND WOULD REMAINFOROPERATIONA L COMMANDS AND
TELEMETRY. UNAVAILABILITY OF BOTH XPNDRS AND UHF IN DE-
ORBIT/LANDING PHASE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE OF
INABILITY TO UPDATE STATE VECTOR AND TO SUPPORT _DING OPS WITH
TWO'WAY VOICE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129; SSSH 16.1, 16.2; .....
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7; OMRSD V74 FILE III; JSC-12820 FLT
RU_S SECT ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-34
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/o7/87
COMM & TRACK
1034
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER POWER SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
TRANSPONDER POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
36V73AIA2SI6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE 3-POSITION XPNDR PWR SWITCH (XPNDR I/OFF/XPNDR 2) PROVIDES
POWER TO LRU i OR 2 FOR GCIL PNL MODE. OPNL REDUNDANCY FOR
POWERING THE LRUS EXISTS WITH SYS IN GCIL CMD MODE, THE NORMAL
CONTROL MODE. UNLIKE REDUNDANCY FOR TWO-WAY OPNL DATA COMM IS
VIA KU-BAND. CURRENT-LIMITING RESISTORS AND DIODES PROTECT
BUSSES BCI AND BC2 FROM HARD SHORTS IN PNL MODE. A ONE-AMP FUSE
PROTECTS EACH BUSS IN CMD MODE. LOSS OF BOTH XPNDRS IN BOTH PNL
AND CMD MODES ON-ORBIT BECAUSE OF HARD INTERNAL SWITCH
SHORTS WOULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION BECAUSE ONLY KU-BAND WOULD
REMAIN FOR CMDS/TLM. UNAVAILABILITY OF BOTH LRUS AND UHF IN DE-
ORBIT/LANDING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE (INABILITY TO
UPDATE SVAND TO SUPPORT LANDING WITH 2-WAY VOICE).
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7; OMRSD V74 FILE III; JSC-12820 FLT
RULES SECT ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-35
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1035 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: S-BAND PM SYSTEM MODE SELECTOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
SYSTEM MODE SELECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
PANEL Al
36V73AIA2S6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE S-BAND PM MODE SELECTOR PEWITS _AL SELECTION 0F MODES:
TDRS RANGING (NOT USED), TDRS DATA, STDN HI, STDN LO, SGLS (DOD)
WITH THE SYSTEM IN GCIL PNL MODE. OPEN CONTACTS COULD PREVENT
SELECTION OF PROPER SYSTEM CONFIGURATION AND ALSO PRE_NTNSP
1 AND NPS 2 DATA XMIT ON ENAB_ SIGNALS REQUIRED TO KEEP ACTIVE
NSP AND XPNDR INTERFACED. OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY EXISTS FOR ALL
MISSION PHASES VIA GCIL CMD MODE (THE NORMAL MODE). LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL THE SYSTEM EITHER IN PNL OR CMD WOULD
CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION FOR ON-ORBIT BECAUSE ONLY KU-BAND WOULD
REMAIN FOR OPNL CMDS & TLM AND ONLY UHF WOULD REMAIN FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATES FOR DE-ORBIT/LANDIN G. .....LOSS OF ALL PATHS FOR SV
UPDATES COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
RE_EREN_ES:SYSTEM SCHE_TIC VS70-740129; SSSH 16.1, 16.2; .....
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7; OMRSD V74 FI_ III; _SC-i2820 FLT
RULES SECT ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-36
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/o7/87
COMM & TRACK
1036
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT'.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PM SYSTEM MODE SELECTOR
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
SYSTEM MODE SELECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
36VT3AIA2A6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MODE SELECTOR ALLOWS MAN SYS MODE SELECT WITH SYS IN GCIL PNL
MODE. HARD SHORT TO GND, DECKS 5, 6 WOULD KILL NSP I, NSP 2 DATA
XMIT ON ENABLE DISCRETES REQUIRED TO KEEP ACTIVE NSP/XPNDR
INTERFACED IN PNL MODE, AND ALSO DISABLE MANY NSP PNL CONTROL
FUNCTIONS ALSO USING POWER FROM FLCA 2, FLCA 3. HARD SHORT TO
GND IN OTHER DECKS WOULD KILL MNB, MNC VOLTAGES FOR PNL CONTROL
OF SYSTEM MODES. OPNL REDUNDANCY EXISTS IN GCIL CMD MODE FOR ALL
THOSE PNL CONTROL FUNCTIONS. INABILITY TO CONTROL IN PNL OR
CMD ON-ORBIT WOULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS (ONLY KU-BAND WOULD REMAIN
FOR CMDS & TLM, ONLY UHF FOR SV UPDATES, DEORBIT/LNDG). LOSS OF
ALL PATHS FOR SV COULD CAUSE CREW/VEHICLE LOSS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740229, VS70-740299; SSSH
16.1, 16.3; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC
12820 SECTION II; OMRSD V74 FILE III; JSC-12820 FLT RULES SECT II
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1037 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: S-BAND PM SIGNAL STRENGTH SELECTOR SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
SIGNAL STRENGTH METER SWITCH/CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL F9
PART NUMBER: 34V73A9A2S2, 34V73A9A2M3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ............. ÷
THE SELECTOR/METER AND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITRY PROVIDE THE PILOT
WITH A MEANS OF DETERMINING RELATIVE RF SIGNAL STRENGTH OF THE S-
BAND PM SIGNAL RECEI?ED A_BO_D O_RBITER. LOSS OF T_E INDICATION
WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL. AN ALTERNATE INDICATION WOULD BE
AVAILABLE ON A METER ON PANEL AI, AND. ALSO ON "SM OPS 201
ANTENNA _ DISPLAY ON THE CRTS._
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/11/87
COMM & TRACK
1038
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PM SIGNAL STRENGTH SELECTOR
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
SIGNAL STRENGTH METER SWITCH/CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
-- 3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL F9
34V73A9A2S2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SELECTOR/METERAND ASSOCIATED CIRCUITRY PROVIDE THE PILOT
WITH A MEANS OF DETERMINING RELATIVE RF SIGNAL STRENGTH OF THE S-
BAND PM SIGNAL RECEIVED ABOARD ORBITER. LOSS OF THE INDICATION
WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL. AN ALTERNATE INDICATION WOULD BE
AVAILAB_ ON A METER ON PANEL AI, AND ALSO ON "SM OPS 201
ANTENNA" DISPLAY ON THE CRTS. A SHORT CIRCUIT TOGROUND AT THE
INPUT TO THE BUFFER AMPLIFIER FEEDING THE METER COULD KILL THE
SIGNAL FOR THE PANEL A1 METER, AND ALSO COULD AFFECT THE AGC
CIRCUIT
PROVIDING THE SIGNAL, ALSO KILLING THE SIGNAL USED FOR THE SM OPS
201 ANTENNA DISPLAY.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740129; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7
.===
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1039 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SIGNAL STRENGTH METER SELECTOR SWITCH AND CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS-MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
SIGNAL STRENGTH METER SWITCH/CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
36V73AIAIS2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION -
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
THE THREE-POSITION SELECTOR SWITCH PERMITS THE CREW TO DETERMINE
RELATIVE RF SIGNAL STRENGTH OF THE RECEIVED SIGNALS FOR S-BAND
PM, S-BAND PAYLOAD, AND KU-BAND RF SYSTEMS. LOSS OF ANY OF THE
INDICATIONS WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL. ALTERNATE INDICATIONS
WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR S-BAND PM AND K'U-BAND ON "SM OPS 201
ANTENNA" DISPLAY AND FOR S-BAND PAYLOAD ON "SPEC 62 PCMMU/PL_
COMM" VIA CRT, AND FOR S-BAND PM ALSO ON PANEL F9. IN ALL, FIVE
RECEIVERS CAN PROVIDE READIS[GS FOR THE METERS AND DISPLAYS: TWO
S'BAND PM XPNDR _CEI_RS, TWO PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR RECEIVERS_
AND ONE _-BAND _CEIVER.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, VS70-740129, V70-
740239; SSSH 16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 5, 7, 18, 34
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
1040 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SIGNAL STRENGTH METER SELECTOR SWITCH AND CIRCUIT
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
RF COMM
SIGNAL STRENGTH METER SWITCH/CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
36V73AIAISI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE THREE-POSITION SELECTOR SWITCH PERMITS THE CREW TO DETERMINE
RELATIVE RF SIGNAL STRENGTH OF THE RECEIVED SIGNALS FOR S-BAND
PM, S-BAND PAYLOAD, AND KU-BAND SYSTEMS. LOSS OF ANY OF THE
INDICATIONS WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL. ALTERNATE INDICATIONS WOULD
BE AVAILABLE FOR S-BAND PM AND KU-BAND ON "SM OPS 201 ANTENNA"
DISPLAY AND FOR S-BAND PAYLOAD ON "SPEC 62 PCMMU/PL COMM" VIA CRT
AND FOR S-BAND PM ALSO ON PANEL F9. A SHORT TO GROUND ON THE AGC
LINE FROM A RECEIVER FOR ANY OF THE THREE SYSTEMS COULD
AFFECT THE AGC CIRCUIT FOR THAT RECEIVER AND KILL ITS OUTPUT,
CAUSING LOSS OF THE ASSOCIATED REFERENCE SIGNAL FOR TELEMETRY AND
FOR INDICATIONS ON THE METER(S) AND ON THE CRT DISPLAY FOR THAT
RECEIVER.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, VS70-740129, V70-
740239; SSSH 16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 5, 7, 18, 34
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-41
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/1 I/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1041
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: S-BAND PM SYSTEM PANEL/COMMAND GCIL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
S)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC
S-BAND PM SYSTEM PANEL/COMMAND SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PR_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: 35V73A3A7S9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ ...................._ _; _ ....._ _-_ ....._ i_.....
THE GCIL PNL/CMDSWITCHPERMITS PNL CONTROL OF THE SYSTEM AND
NSPS VIA PNL SWITCHES WHEN IN PNL POSITION AND VIA GCIL GND CMDS
OR SSO KYBD ENTRIES IN CMD POSITION. NORMAL MODE IS CMD. FOR
FAILURE IN CMD MODE PNL MODE WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL S-BAND PM/NSP MODE/CONFIG IN CMD OR PNL
COULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC V70-740299; SSSH 16.1; INCO/COMM SYSTEM
BRIEF 3, FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820 SECTION ii; OMRSD V74 FILE iII
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/04/87
COMM & TRACK
1042
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM PNL/CMD GCIL SWITCH
SHORTED
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
.3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC
PANEL/COMMAND SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL C3
35V73A3A7S9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM "PNL/CMD" GCIL SWITCH PERMITS CREW
CONTROL OF THE SYSTEM VIA PANEL SWITCHES IN "PNL" AND CONTROL VIA
GCIL GROUND COMMANDS OR ORBITER KEYBOARD ENTRIES IN "CMD". A
HARD INTERNAL SWITCH SHORT TO GROUND COULD TRIP CB44 (MNA) AND
CB49 (MNC) ON PANEL RIS, DISABLING "COMMAND" MODE FOR ALL FIVE
GCIL-CONTROLLED C&T SYSTEMS, INCLUDING S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM. THE
SYSTEMS WOULD THEN REVERT TO THE OPERATIONALLY REDUNDANT "PANEL"
CONTROL MODE. LOSS OF THAT REDUNDANCY WOULD DISABLE THE
NSPS, LEAVING ONLY UHF UPLINK VOICE FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR SV UPDATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC V70-740299; SSSH 16.1; INCO/COMM SYSTEM
BRIEF 3, FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820 SECTION ii; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 c-43 C -
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1043 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, UL SECTION
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR
NSP UL SECTION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PP_EI_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3 _
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: _3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SC_ENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC476-0137-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..............................................
THE UPLINK SECTION OF THE NSP RECEIVES BASEBAND FROM THE S-BAND
PM UL (ALL PHASES) OR THE KU-BAND FORWARD LINK (ON-ORBIT ONLY),
PROCESSES IT, AND ROUTES OPERATIONAL VOICE AND/OR TELEPRINTER
DATA TO THE ORBITER AUDIO SYSTEMAND COMMANDS TO DATA _ii_ _
PROCESSING. ON LOSS OF ACTIVE NSP UL SECTION, THE REDUNDANT NSP
WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF THE SECOND UL PATH WOULD INVOKE
MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT RULE BECAUSE ONLY ONE PATH, UHF, WOULD
REMAIN FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND FOR UL VOICE COMM FOR
LANDING. LOSS OF ALL PATHS FOR SV UPDATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE FOR DE-ORBIT/LANDING AND FOR AOA OR ATO.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740229; SSSH 16.1, 16.2,
16.3; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ii; OMR_D V74 FILE III
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/21/87
COMM & TRACK
1044
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, UL SECTION
ERRATIC OPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR
NSP UL SECTION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: B/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC476-0137-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE UPLINK SECTION OF THE NSP RECEIVES BASEBAND FROM THE S-BAND
PM UL (ALL PHASES) OR THE KU-BAND FORWARD LINK (ON-ORBIT ONLY),
PROCESSES IT, AND ROUTES OPERATIONAL VOICE AND/OR TELEPRINTER
DATA TO THE ORBITER AUDIO SYSTEM AND COMMANDS TO DATA
PROCESSING. ON LOSS OF ACTIVE NSP UL SECTION, THE REDUNDANT NSP
WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF THE SECOND NSP UL SECTION WOULD
INVOKE MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT RULE BECAUSE ONLY ONE PATH, UHF,
FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND FOR UL VOICE COMM FOR LANDING WOULD
REMAIN. LOSS OF ALL PATHS FOR SV UPDATE COULD CAUSE LOSS oF
CREW/VEHICLE FOR DE-ORBIT/LANDING AND FOR AOA OR ATO.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740229; SSSH 16.1, 16.2,
16.3; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
Ii; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-45
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/21/87
COMM & TRACK
1045
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, DL SECTION
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNALPROCESSING
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR
NSP DL SECTION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC476-0137-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE DOWNLINK (DL) SECTION OF THE NSP MULTIPLEXES OPERATIONAL _-
TELEMETRY DATA AND VOICE, CONVERTS THE MULTIPLEXED DATA TO EITHER
NRZ OR BI-PHASE, AND ROUTES IT TO THE TRANSMITTER (S-B_AND PM
AND/OR KU-BAND) FOR TRANSMISSIQN TQ GROUND FOR AOS _TQ OPS _
RECORDER FOR LOS. ON LOSS OF THE ACTIVE NSP DL, MINIMUM DURATION
FLIGHT RULE WOULD BE INVOKED BECAUSE ONLY ONE NSP PATH WOULD
REMAIN FOR DOWNLINK/RETURN LINK TELEMETRY (INCLUDING ORBITER_cL_
STATE VECTOR STATUS). LOSS OF THE REDUNDANT NSP DL WOULD CAUSE
MISSION TERMINATION BECAUSE ONLY ONE SYSTEM (UHF) WOULD REMAIN
FOR SV UPDATES _D FOR TWO-WAY VOICE FOR LANDING OPERATIONS.
LOSS OF ALL PATHS FOR SV UPDATES AND TWO-WAY VOICE FOR LANDING
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740229; SSSH 16.1, 16.2,
16.3; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ii; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-46
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
5/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT:
1046 ABORT:
t
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, DL SECTION
INTERMITTENT OPERATION, ERRATIC OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR
NSP DL SECTION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC476-0137-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE DOWNLINK (DL) SECTION OF THE NSP MULTIPLEXES OPERATIONAL
TELEMETRY DATA AND VOICE, CONVERTS THEMULTIPLEXED DATA TO EITHER
NRZ OR BI-PHASE, AND ROUTES IT TO THE TRANSMITTER (S-BAND PM
AND/OR KU-BAND) FOR TRANSMISSION TO GROUND FOR AOS AND TO OPS
RECORDER FOR LOS. ON LOSS OF THE ACTIVE NSP DL, MINI_ DURATION
FLIGHT RULE WOULD BE INVOKED BECAUSE ONLY ONE NSP PATH WOULD
REMAIN FOR DOWNLINK/RETURN LINK TELEMETRY (INCLUDING ORBITER
STATE VECTOR STATUS). LOSS OF THE REDUNDANT NSP DL WOULD CAUSE
MISSION TERMINATION BECAUSE ONLY ONE SYSTEM (UHF) WOULD REMAIN
FOR SV UPDATES AND FOR TWO-WAY VOICE FOR LANDING OPERATIONS.
LOSS OF ALL PATHS FOR SV UPDATES AND TWO-WAY VOICE FOR LANDING
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740229; SSSH 16.1, 16.2,
16.3; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
II; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-47
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/2v/8"1
COMM & TRACK
lO4.7
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMSEC
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
COMSEC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: KGX-60
CAUSES:_CO-NTAMINATION, MiSHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE'PARer FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/   9 A I   .... ' .................... '
THE KGX-60 COMSEC SYSTEM HAS TW6_IDENTZeX_:(REDUNDANT) _
TRANSMIT/RECEIVE SETS, USED ONE AT A TIME. COMSEC 1 IS DEDICATED
TO NSP 1 AND COMSEC 2 TO Nsp 2 (NoCROSS-STRAPPING CAPABIITY).
THE ACTIVE T/R SET WORKS WITH ITS ASSOCIATED NSP TO PROVIDE
ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION DATA PROCESSING FOR DOD AND NASA SECURE
OPERATIONS FOR VARIOUS COMBINATIONS - TRANSMIT/RECEIVE, RECEIVE-
ONLY; OR RECORDING OF OPERATIONAL DATA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR SECURE OPERATIONS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES'_ ......SCH-E_TICi:_027-_0 _', i_"V_7:0L7_:6_2 _ 2__$70/7402'99)
SSSH 16.1, 16.2, 16.3; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6, 27; FLIGHT
RULES JSC-12820, SECTION I!; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/2v/87
COMM & TRACK
1048
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMSEC
ERRATIC OPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3) SIGNAL PROCESSING
4) COMSEC
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: • 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: _ 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: KGX-60
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE KGX-60 COMSEC SYSTEM HAS TWO IDENTICAL (REDUNDANT)
TRANSMIT/RECEIVE SETS, USED ONE AT A TIME. COMSEC 1 IS DEDICATED
TO NSP I AND COMSEC 2 TO NSP 2 (NO CROSS-STRAPPING CAPABIITY).
THE ACTIVE T/R SET WORKS WITH ITS ASSOCIATED NSP TO PROVIDE
ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION DATA PROCESSING FOR DOD AND NASA SECURE
OPERATIONS FOR VARIOUS COMBINATIONS - TRANSMIT/RECEIVE, RECEIVE-
ONLY, OR RECORDING OF OPERATIONAL DATA. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR SECURE OPERATIONS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION FOR
SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740229. VS70-740299;
SSSH 16.1, 16.2, 16.3; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6, 27; FLIGHT
RULES JSC-12820, SECTION ii; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-49
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSISWORKSHEET
5/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_NC
CO_ & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3 ,
1049 ABORT: 3/3
NSP ENCRY_ION POWER ON-OFF SWITCH
FAI_ MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/J_ING, FAILS
L__
l
N
m
_AD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BRE_DO_ HIE_CHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) CO_ & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3) SIGNAL PROCESSING
COMSEC
ENCRY_ION ON-OFF SWITCH
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SC_S: A [ ]
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
RT_:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART _ER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALEI _-_ _ _
THE NSP ENCRYPTION POWER SWITCH PROVIDES CONTROL BUS ABI VOLTAGE
TO CONTROL REDUNDANT, SIMULTANEOUS MNA AND MNB POWER TO COMSEC 1
AND CONTROL BUS AB3 VOLTAGE TO CONTROL REDUNDANT, SIMULTANEOUS
MNA AND MNB POWER TO COMSEC 2. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
ENERGIZE COMSEC STRINGS 1 AND 2 COULD CAUSE LAUNCH DELAY, BECAUSE
OF INABILITY TO LOAD THE COMSEC KEY.
REFERENCES: SCHE_TIC VS70-740129, VS70-740229. VS70-740299;
SSSH 16.1, 16.2, 16.3; INCO/CO_ SYSTEMS BRIEF 6, 27; FLIGHT
RU_S JSC-12820, SECTION II
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m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 1050 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: NSP ENCRYPTION POWER ON-OFF SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
COMSEC
ENCRYPTION ON-OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH APPLIES CONTROL BUS VOLTAGES (ABI AND AB3) TO FWD
PCA2 TO PERMIT APPLICATION OF SIMULTANEOUS MNA AND MNB POWER TO
COMSEC 1 AND COMSEC 2. A FAILURE IN THE SWITCH RESULTING IN LOSS
OF ALL POWER TO BOTH COMSEC 1 AND COMSEC 2 (INTERNAL OPENS OR
SHORTS) WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION CAPABILITY
FOR MISSION BECAUSE LOSS OF POWER TO BOTH COMSEC BOXES WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION KEYS. LOSS OF
ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION CAPABILITY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR THE FUNCTION OF THIS SWITCH.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740129, VS70-740229. VS70-740299;
SSSH 16.1, 16.2, 16.3; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6, 27; FLIGHT
RULES JSC-12820, SECTION Ii
F
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-51
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/27/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT,
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) " S-BAND PM SYSTEM
3 ) SIGNAL PROCESSING
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NSP
ENCRYPTION MODE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 °TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ J B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401
cAUSEs: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES PNL CONTROL TO SELECT NSP MODES IN WHICH
OPNLDATA IS ROUTED VIA COMSEC TO BE ENCRYPTED/DECRYPTED .....IN
"ALL" (DOD MODE)_ REAL£TIME XMIT & RCV DATA (CMDS, VCE_ & T_)
ARE ENCRYPTED/DECRYPTED; FOR PLAYBACK, DOWNLINK TLM & VCE ARE
ENCRYPTED FOR TRANSMISSION TO GROUND. IN "SELECT" (NASA MODE),
ANoT_RPANEL-SWITCH_SE_CTS=TH=REE _I_FE_ _ COMBI_TIONS _Q_i_ _
"ENCRYPTED" OR"CLEAR" (UNENCRYPTED) OPS FOR XMIT, RCV, AND RECORD
FUNCTIONS t....FOR SE_RITY, _THER!__E NO CMDS FOR SELECTION OF
"ALL" OR "SE_CTED". THER_E IS NQ _DWARE _D__OR THE
SWITCH'S FUNCTION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SELECT OPNL MODE FOR
ENCRYPT/DECRYPT ON SSO COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS FOR SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-52
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/27/87
CO_ & TRACK
1052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
, FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
NSP
ENCRYPTION MODE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_NC
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7401
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PROVIDES PNL CONTROL TO SELECT NSP MODES IN WHICH
OPNL DATA IS ROUTED VIA COMSEC TO BE ENCRYPTED/DECRYPTED. IN
"ALL" (DOD MODE), REAL-TIME XMIT & RCV DATA (CMDS, VCE, & TLM)
ARE ENCRYPTED/DECRYPTED; FOR PLAYBACK, DOWNLINK TLM & VCE ARE
ENCRYPTED FOR TRANSMISSION TO GROUND. IN "SELECT" (NASA MODE),
ANOTHER PANEL SWITCH SELECTS THREE DIFFERENT COMBINATIONS OF
"ENCRYPTED" OR"CLEAR" (UNENCRYPTED) OPS FOR XMIT, RCV, AND RECORD
FUNCTIONS. FOR SECURITY, THERE ARE NO CMDS FOR SELECTION OF
"ALL" OR "SELECTED". THERE IS NO_DW_ REDUNDANCY FOR THE
SWITCH'S FUNCTION. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SELECT OPNL MODE FOR
ENCRYPT/DECRY_ON SSOCOULD CAUSEMISSION _SSFOR SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/CO_ SYSTEMS BRIEF 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION ii
i
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-53
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/29/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1053
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
NSP
ENCRYPTION SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE _ HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
i
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL Al
ME452-0102-7406
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION _ PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION _
THIS SWITCH WORKS IN SERIES WITH THE "ALL" (NASA) POSITION OF THE
"NSP ENCRYPTION MODE" SWITCH TO PERMIT SELECTION OF 3 OPNL MODES
FOR NASA. IN "T/R" POSITION XMIT AND RCV OPNL DATA AND HIGH DATA
RATE RECORDED DATA ARE ROUTED BY NSP VIA C0_C;_ _ ___ _i_:_ "
"RCV" ONLY RCV (UL) DATA ARE SO ROUTED; AND IN "BYPASS" XMIT, RCV
AND HIGH DATA RATE DATA BYPASS THE COMSEC (CLEAR MODEI_ THERE IS
NO HARDWARE _q_ FOR- THE SWITCH, NOR rS_TI_ 01_--_
RED___Y_. POLI_CY HA_ BEEN TO EN_ _S __
TO PROTECT AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED FL DATA. LOSS OF FL SECURITY VIA
COMSEC CAN BE PARTLY COMPENSATED FOR BY USE OF THE "UPLINK BLOCK"
SWITCH, BUT LOSS OF FL SECURE OPS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INcO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6, 27;=FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/29/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1054
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
NSP
ENCRYPTION SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7406
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH WORKS IN SERIES WITH THE "ALL" (NASA) POSITION OF THE
"NSP ENCRYPTION MODE" SWITCH TO PERMIT SELECTION OF 30PNL MODES
FOR NASA. IN "T/R" POSITION XMIT AND RCV OPNL DATA AND HIGH DATA
RATE RECORDED DATA ARE ROUTED BY NSP VIA COMSEC; IN
"RCV" ONLY RCV (UL) DATA ARE SO ROUTED; AND IN "BYPASS" XMIT, RCV
AND HIGH DATA RATE DATA BYPASS THE COMSEC (CLEAR MODE). THERE IS
NO HARDWARE REDUNDANCY FOR THE SWITCH, NOR IS THERE OPNL
REDUNDANCY BY CMDS. POLICY HAS BEEN TO ENCRYPT CMDS AND LOADS
TO PROTECT AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED FL DATA. LOSS OF FL SECURITY VIA
COMSEC CAN BE PARTLY COMPENSATED FOR BY USE OF THE "UPLINK BLOCK"
SWITCH, BUT LOSS OF FL SECURE OPS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION ii
=
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/29/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1055
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ENCRYPTION ZEROIZE/NORMAL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICA), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
NSP
ENCRYPTION ZEROIZE/NORMAL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES .....
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7463
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ -_ i _ .......
THIS SWITCH IS USED TO RENDER THE COMSEC LRU FUNCTIONALLY
INOPERABLE (BOTH TRANSMIT AND RECEIVE) UNTIL THE RAM IS RESTORED
BY LOADING A KEY I_O IT. (THE _Y IS ALSO ZEROIZED BY _MOVING
POWER TO THE COMSEC LRU WITH THE NSP ENCRYPTION POWER SWITCH,)
ZEROIZING INITIALIZES THE LRUS, SETTING ALL KEY LOGIC ELEMENTS TO
THE ZERO STATE. THIS IS A GROUND OPERATION, DONE POST-FLIGHT AND
PRE-LAUNCH IN PREPARATION FOR LOADING A KEY INTO THE RAM. LOSS
OF THE FUNCTION IN PRE-LAUNCH COULD CAUSE A LAUNCH DELAY.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION 11
J
I
m
B
i
l
l
m
i
mm
mm
m
I
B
mm
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-56
i
m
=i
w
Z
=
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/Ol/87
COMM & TRACK
1056
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENCRYPTION ZEROIZE/NORMAL SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
NSP
ENCRYPTION ZEROIZE/NORMAL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI2
ME452-0102-7463
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH IS USED TO INITIALIZE THE COMSEC LRUS BY SETTING ALL
ENCRYPTION KEY LOGIC ELEMENTS TO THE ZERO STATE. THE ZEROIZING
IS ACCOMPLISHED IN EACH ENCRYPT/DECRYPT SECTION OF COMSEC 1 AND 2
BY GROUNDING A CIRCUIT VIA THEZEROIZE SWITCH.
INADVERTENT SHORTING INSiDE THE SWITCH BODY COULD GROUND BOTH
CIRCUITS AND THUS REMOVE THE KEY, RENDERING THE COMSEC LRUS
INOPERABLE. THAT WOULD FORCE THE SYSTEM TO BE OPERATED IN THE
"CLEAR" MODE, AND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION ii
w
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/02/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1057
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: NSP UPLINK DATA SOURCE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
UPLINK DATA SOURCE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES : CO-NTAMINATION' PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: ..........................
WITH THE_'_N_ _M/NSPSYSTEM IN THE GCIL '_P_EL" Mo_E, _IS
SWITCH PERMITS PANEL SELECTION OF EITHER S-BAND PM OR KU-BAND AS
THE SOURCE FOR FORWARD LINK OPERATIONAL DATA. IN "COMMAND" MODE,
SELECTION IS EITHE _ BY GCIL GROUND COMMANDS OR BY KEYBOARD_ _i_
INPUT ABOARD ORBITER. COMMAND MODE IS THE NORMAL OPERATIONAL
MODE FORTHESzBAND PM/NSP SYSTEM, WITH PANEL MODE THE ALTERNATE.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT EITHER S-BAND PM OR KU-BAND
FORWARD LINK AS DATA SOURCE BECAUSE OF SWITCH FAILURE WOULD
REQUIRE STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES VIA UHF UPLINK VOICE. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY FOR SV UPDATES COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
Ii; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-58
I
DINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1058 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NSP UPLINK DATA SOURCE SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
UPLINK DATA SOURCE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN GCIL PNL MODE THIS SWITCH SELECTS S-BAND PM OR KU-BAND AS
SOURCE FOR FL DATA. IN CMD MODE, SELECTION IS BY GCIL GND CMD OR
BY KYBD. CMD MODE IS NORMAL OPNL MODE WITH PNL MODE THE
ALTERNATE. A HARD SHORT TO GND IN SWITCH COULD KILL PWR FROM
FLCA2 AND FLCA3, DISABLING NUMEROUS NSP CONFIGURATION PNL CONTROL
SELECTOR CIRCUITS (E.G., UL DATA SOURCE, NSP DATA RATE XMIT AND
RCV, NSP CODING XMIT AND RCV, NSP ENCRYPTION MODE). IT WOULD
ALSO KILL "DATA XMIT ON NSP i" AND "DATA XMIT ON NSP 2"
SIGNALS REQUIRED BY XPNDRS 1 AND 2 FOR DL XMIT FOR PNL MODE.
LOSS OF PATHS FOR VCE COMM & SV UPDATES VIA NSP CMD MODE AND VIA
UHF COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ii; OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-59
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1059 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: NSP DATA RATE XMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JItMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
NSP DATA RATE XMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANE A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : ....... _
WITH THE S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM IN THE GCIL "PANEL" MODE, THIS
SWITCH PERMITS PANEL SELECTION OF HI-DATA-RATE OR LO-DATA-RATE
FOR SSO-GROUND OPNL TLM. IN "COMMAND", THE NORMAL OPERATIONAL
MOD-E, SELECT-ION IS BY GCIL GROUND COMMAND OR BY ORBITER_I"YBD_/_D.
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR PANEL MODE CONTROL 0FXTMiT DATA I_ATE
FOR S-BAND PM IS BY GCIL COMMAND MODE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
SELECT XMIT DATA RATE IS TANTAMOUNT TO LOSS OF S-BAND PM DL.
CURRENT FLIGHT RULES REQU_MISSION TE_INATIO_EXT PLS
LANDING) FOR LOSS OF ALL DL TELEMETRY/VOICE VIA S-BANDPM, WHICH
LEAVES ONLY UHF FOR DL VOICE FOR LANDING OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ll
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-60
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/o8/87
COMM & TRACK
1060
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NSP DATA RATE XMIT SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
NSP DATA RATE XMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3" ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH S-BAND PM/NSP SYS IN GCIL "PNL" MODE, THIS SWITCH PERMITS
PNL SELECTION OF ORBITER-TO-GND OPNL TLM HI-DATA-RATE OR LO-DATA-
RATE. IN "CMD," THE NORMAL OPNL MODE, SELECTION IS BY GCIL GND
CMD. A HARD SHORT OF BOTH POLES TO GND WOULD DISABLE
NUMEROUS NSP PNL CONTROL FUNCTIONS USING PWR FROM FLCA2 (MNB) AND
FLCA3 (MNC), AND WOULD ALSO KILL STATUS DISCRETES "DATA XMIT ON
NSP i" AND "DATA XMIT ON NSP 2" REQUIRED BY XPNDRS 1 AND 2 FOR DL
IN PNL MODE. OPNL REDUNDANCY IS AVAILABLE IN CMD MODE.
LOSS OF ALL OPNL REDUNDANCY FOR S-BAND PM (BOTH STRINGS, IN
EFFECT) WOULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION (ONLY KU-BAND WOULD
REMAIN FOR TELEMETRY FOR ON-ORBIT, AND ONLY UHF FOR SV UPDATES
AND VOICE DURING DEORBIT AND LANDING OPS).
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-61
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1061 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: NSP DATA RATE RCV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (E_CTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
NSP DATA RATE XMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......
WITH THE S-BAND I_/NSP SYSTEM TN GCI£ _P_ _M_D_i_S SW_H :
PERMITS PNL SECTION OF HI-DATA-RATE OR LO-DATA-RATE FOR
OPERATIONAL UL/FL. IN CMD, THE NORMAL MODE, SELECTION IS BY GCIL
GROUND CMD OR SSO KEYBOARD. FAILURE OPEN IN BOTH HI A/_D LO DATA
RATE SWITCH PATHS (SWITCH JAMMED, CONTAMINATION, FAILS MID-
TRAVEL) WOULD KILL S-BAND PM UL/FL LEAVING ONLY KU-BAND FL AND
UHF UL FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND VOICE ON-ORBIT, AND FLIGHT
RULES WOUL_QUI_ _FLIG_ _ TE_INAT_- ....LOSS DI_ALL_REDUNDANCY
INCLUDING UHF UPLINK VOICE FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND LANDING
OPERATIONS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLEo
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1062
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: NSP DATA RATE RCV SWITCH
FAILURE MODEL SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
NSP DATA RATE XMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA_ 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7401
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN GCIL PNL MODE, THIS SWITCH SELECTS UL/FL DATA RATE FOR SSO
RCV. IN CMD MODE, SELECTION IS BY GCIL GND CMD OR BY KYBD. CMD
MODE IS NORMAL OPNL MODE, WITH PNL MODE THE ALTERNATE. A HARD
SHORT TO GND IN SWITCH WOULD KILL PWR FROM FLCA2 AND FLCA3,
DISABLING NUMEROUS NSP CONFIGURATION PNL CONTROL SELECTOR
CIRCUITS (E.G., UL DATA SOURCE, NSP DATA RATE XMIT AND RCV, NSP
CODING XMIT AND RCV, NSP ENCRYPTION MODE). IT WOULD ALSO KILL
"DATA XMIT ON NSP i" AND "DATA XMIT ON NSP 2" SIGNALS REQUIRED
BY XPNDRS 1 AND 2 FOR DL XMIT F6R _ PNL MODE. LOSS OF PATHS FOR
VCE COMM & SV UPDATES VIA NSP CMD MODE AND UHF COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-63
n
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1063 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: NSP CODING XMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
NSP CODING XMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANE A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATON
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .... .... _
WITH THE S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM IN GCIL "PNL" MODE THIS SWITCH
PERMITS PNL ON-OFF CONTROL OF CONVOLUTIONAL CODING OF RL DATA
(VIA TDRS). CODING REDUCES CHANNEL BIT ERROR RATES AND IMPROVES
RF LINK PERFORMANCE. IN "CMD", THE NORMAL OPNL MODE, SELECTION
IS BY GCIL GROUND CMD OR SSO KEYBOARD. CODING IS NOT USED FOR
DIRECT DL TO GSTDN, BUT IS REQUIRED FOR RELAY VIA TDRS. Loss QF
SWITCH CONTROL (PNL MODE) WouLD REQU_ U SIE OF _-OPERA=TIONALLY
REDUNDANT "CMD" MODE FOR RL. LOSS OF THAT REDUNDANCY
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES AND THUS MISSION
TERMINATION BECAUSE OF CONFLICTING VEHICiJE LATTITUDE _CONSTRAINTS
(CRITICAL EXPERIMENTS VERSUS COMM REQUIREMENTS) .
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/10/87
COMM & TRACK
1064
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NSP CODING XMIT SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
NSP CODING XMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN GCIL PNL MODE THIS SWITCH PERMITS PNL ON/OFF CONTROL OF CODING
OF RL DATA. IN CMD, THE NORMAL MODE, SELECTION IS BY GCIL GND
CMD OR SSO KYBD. CMD MODE IS NORMAL OPNL MODE, WITH PNL MODE THE
ALTERNATE. A HARD SHORT TO GND IN SWITCH WOULD KILL PWR
FROM FLCA2 AND FLCA3, DISABLING NUMEROUS NSP CONFIGURATION PNL
CONTROL SELECTOR CIRCUITS (E.G., UL DATA SOURCE, NSP DATA RATE
XMIT AND RCV, NSP CODING XMIT AND RCV, NSP ENCRYPTION). IT WOULD
ALSO KILL "DATA XMIT ON NSP i" AND "DATA XMIT ON NSP 2"
SIGNALS REQUIRED BY XPNDRS 1 AND 2 FOR DL XMIT FOR PNL MODE.
LOSS OF PATHS FOR VCE COMM & SV UPDATES VIA NSP AND VIA UHF COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
Ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-65
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1065 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: NSP CODING RCV SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
NSP CODING XMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION : PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
WITH THE S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM IN THE GCIL "PNL" MODE THIS SWITCH
PERMITS PNL ON/OFF CONTROL OF DECODING OF FL DATA (VIA TDRS).
CODING REDUCES CHANNEL BIT ERROR RATES AND IMPROVES RF LINK
PERFORMANCE. CODING IS NOT USED FOR DIRECT UL FROM GSTDN, BUT IS
NORMALLY REQUIRED FOR RELAY VIA TDRS. IN "CMD" , THE NORMAL OPNL
MODE, SELECTION IS BY GCIL GROUND CMD OR SSO KEYBOARD. LOSS OF
SWITCH CONTROL (PNL MODE) WOULD REQUIRE USE OF THE OPERATIONALLY
REDUNDANT CMD MODE FOR FL. LOSS OF THAT REDUNDANCYCOIYLD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES AND THUS MISSION TERMINATION
BECAUSE OF CONFLICTING ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS (CRITICAL EXPERIMENTS
VERSUS COMM REQUIREMENTS).
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6111187
COMM & TRACK
1066
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NSP CODING RCV SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
NSP CODING RCV SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN GCIL PNL MODE THIS SWITCH PERMITS PNL ON-OFF CONTROL OF
DECODING OF FL DATA. IN CMD, THE NORMAL OPNL MODE, SELECTION IS
BY GCIL GND CMD OR SSO KYBD. CMD MODE IS NORMAL OPNL MODE, WITH
PNL MODE THE ALTERNATE. A HARD SHORT TO GND IN SWITCH WOULD
KILL PWR FROM FLCA2 AND FLCA3, DISABLING NUMEROUS NSP
CONFIGURATION PNL CONTROL SELECTOR CIRCUITS (E.G., UL DATA
SOURCE, NSP DATA RATE XMIT AND RCV, NSP CODING XMIT AND RCV, NSP
ENCRYPTION MODE). IT WOULD ALSO KILL "DATA XMIT ON NSP i" AND
"DATA XMIT ON NSP 2" SIGNALS REQUIRED BY XPNDRS 1 AND 2 FOR DL
XMIT FOR PNL MODE. LOSS OF PATHS FOR VCE COMM & SV UPDATES VIA
NSP AND VIA UHF COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-67
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 1067
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: UPLINK BLOCK SWITCH !_
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) UPLINK BLOCK SWITCH
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7262
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ -- ii_ii_
THIS THREE-POSIT_ON SWITCH_I_S H_CKING OR ENABLING OF UL
CMDS. "NSP BLK" INHIBITS ALL UL CMDS AT BOTH NSPS; "GPC BLK"
INHIBITS ALL 2-STAGE (CRITICAL) CMDS; "ENABLE" SIMPLY REMOVES
INHIBITS. I T I_!BITS UNAUTHORIZEDORUNDESIRED_S_EN SSO IS
NOT IN VALID RF UL COVERAGE ZONE, AND DURING CRITICAL PERIODS
(E.G., PLOPS, EVA OPS, MANEUVERS). LOSS OF SWITCH CONTINUITY
FOR EITHER BLOCK SIGNAL MAKES SSO VULNERABLE TO UNDESIRED CMDS.
UNLIKE REDUND_CY EXISTS FOR UL I_IBITSViA DPS UTILITY ...._
DISPALY 001 USING CRT AND KYBD. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
INHIBIT SPURIOUS CMDS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 1068 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: UPLINK BLOCK SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) UPLINK BLOCK SWITCH
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL C3
ME452-0102-7262
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THIS 3-POSITION SWITCH PERMITS BLOCKING OR ENABLING OF UL CMDS.
"NSP BLK" INHIBITS ALL UL CMDS AT BOTH NSPS; "GPC BLK" INHIBITS
ALL 2-STAGE CMDS; "ENABLE" SIMPLY REMOVES INHIBITS. IT INHIBITS
UNAUTHORIZED OR UNDESIRED CMDS WHEN SSO IS NOT IN A VALID
RF UL COVERAGE_ ZONE, KN_D_ DD'Ri}_G CRiTI_A_ PERIODS (E.G., PL :OPS,
EVA OPS, MANEUVERS). BINDING IN EITHER BLOCK POSITION OR HARD
BRIDGING SHORT IN EITHER PREVENTS RECEIPT/PROCESSING OF UL CMDS.
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY NORMALLY AVAILABLE WITH DPS UTILITY
DISPLAY 001 AND KYBD WOULD BE INOPERATIVE (EITHER INHIBIT FROM
SWITCH OVERRIDES UL ENABLE AND UL AUTO VIA KYBD/CRT). ONLY UHF
WOULD REMAIN FOR SV UPDATES. LOSS OF UHF COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
Ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/15/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1069 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: NSP POWER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
NSP POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PREI_UNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : ....._-/
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7206
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIOnS! _ _ _i_ _ ..........____ _ _i _:_
THIS swITcH _(NSPI/_0FF/NSP2) _PERMITS PNL CONTROL OF POWER TO THE
NSPS FROM FLCA2 AND FLCA3 WITH SYSTEM IN GCIL PNL MODE. OPNL
REDUNDANCY FOR PWR CONTROL EXISTS WITH SYS IN GCIL CMD MODE, THE
NORMAL OPNL MODE. FOR A SWITCH FAIL_ CAUSING OPEN CIRCUITS
IN BOTH DECKS (NO PNL CONTROL FOR EITHER NSP) GCIL CMD MODE WOULD
BE SELECTED. LOSS OF THAT REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE MISSION TERM
BECAUSE OF LOSS OF CMDS & TLM. ONLY UHF VOICE WOULD REMAIN FOR
sTATE _cTOROPDATE_AND_FO___G OPSSUPPORT' :_ LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY FOR SV UPDATES AND TWO-WAY VOICE FOR LANDING OPS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/15/87
COMM & TRACK
1070
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NSP POWER SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
3) SIGNAL PROCESSING
4) NSP POWER SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7206
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH (NSPI/OFF/NSP2) PERMITS PANEL CONTROL (CNTRL BUSSES
BCI & BC2) OF POWER TO THE NSPS FROM FLCA2 AND FLCA3 WITH THE
SYSTEM IN GCIL PNL MODE. OPNL REDUNDANCY EXISTS FOR PWR CONTROL
WITH SYSTEM IN GCIL CMD MODE, THE NORMAL MODE. FOR A HARD
SHORT IN THE SWITCH AFFECTING BOTH PNL CONTROL PATHS GCIL CMD
MODE WOULD BE SELECTED. BUSSES BCI & BC2 ARE PROTECTED IN PNL
MODE BY CURRENT-LIMITING RESISTORS AND IN CMD MODE BY FUSES.
LOSS OF CMD MODE CONTROL WOULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION
BECAUSE OF LOSS OF CMDS & TLM. ONLY UHF VOICE WOULD REMAIN FOR
STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND LANDING OPS SUPPORT. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR SV UPDATES AND TWO-WAY VOICE FOR LANDING OPS COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740229. VS70-740299; SSSH 16.1, 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 6, 27; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION
ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-71
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/22/s7
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
CNTLBCI BUS
IA FUSE F7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/311
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: _i_i _ i
LOSS OF COMMAND POWER TO GCIL CKTS CONTROLLING S-BAND POWER
AMPLIFIER 1 (PAl) STANDBY/OPERATE SIGNALS. PARTIAL REDUNDANCY
FOR THESE COMMANDS PROVIDED BY PNL SWITCHES. REDUNDANCY FOR
GROUND-_MMAN_ _ P_OVIDES FO___'O_'_!!I_! _i__--
STANDBY/OPERATE SIGNALS. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES PA AND
PRE_P OPERATION AND ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAN D ....
I
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COMMUNICATIONS. UHF OPE_TES AS _ACK_/P DURING MISSTO}_. HOWEVER,
LOSS OF ALL S-BAND REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION.
i
mm
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139 mm
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/22/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
2) CNTLBC2 BUS
3) IA FUSE FI4
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF COMMAND POWER TO GCIL CKTS CONTROLLING S-BAND POWER
AMPLIFIER 2(PA2) STANDBY/OPERATE SIGNALS. PARTIAL REDUNDANCY FOR
THESE COMMANDS PROVIDED BY PNL SWITCHES. REDUNDANT TO GROUND
COMMAND FUNCTION FOR CONTROL OF PAl STANDBY/OPERATE SIGNALS.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES PA AND PREAMP OPERATION AND
ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMMUNICATIONS. UHF
OPERATES AS BACKUP DURING MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-BAND
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-73
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/22/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
CNTLBCl BUS
1.2K RESISTOR AI5R3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES:--CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: _ ............................
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND POWER AMP£IFIER 1 (PAl)
STANDBY/OPERATE SIGNALS. GCIL CONTROL IS RETAINED. REDUNDANCY
FOR PNL SWITCH CONTROL IS PROVIDED FOR PA2 STANDBY/OPERATE
SIGNALS. _SS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES PA AND PREAMP OPERATION
AND ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMMUNICATIONS. UHF
OPERATES AS BACKUP DURING MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-BAND
R_DtrN-D_h_CYRESULTS IN LO_S OF MISSION. ....
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/22/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REgISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
CNTLBC2 BUS
1.2K RESISTOR AI5R4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER 2 (PA2)
STANDBY/OPERATE SIGNALS. GCIL CONTROL IS RETAINED. REDUNDANT TO
PNL SWITCH CONTROL FOR PAl STANDBY/OPERATE SIGNALS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DISABLES PA AND PREAMP OPERATION AND ALLOWS ONLY
STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMMUNICATIONS. UHF OPERATES AS BACKUP
DURING MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-BAND REDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
Z
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
CNTLBCI BUS
1.2K RESISTOR
PNL SWITCH Ii, 12
DIODE AI8CRI5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUC_L FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER 1
STANDBY/OPERATE SIGNALS. LOSS OF CMD POWER TO GCIL CKT
CONTROLLING PAl ON. REDUNDANCY PROVIDEDFORPNL SWITCH/GCIL
I
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DISABLES PA AND PREAMP OPERATION AND ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG
OF S-BAND COMM. UHF OPERATES AS BACKUP DURING MISSION. HOWEVER,
LOSS OF ALL S-BAND REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. M
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
CNTLBC2 BUS
1.2K RESISTOR
PNL SWITCH Ii, 12
DIODE AI8CRI6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 33/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER 2
STANDBY/OPERATE SIGNALS. LOSS OF CMD POWER TO GCIL CKT
CONTROLLING PA2 ON. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES PA AND
PREAMP OPERATION AND ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMM.
UHF OPERATES AS BACKUP DURING MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-
BAND REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: _ 3/2R
ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST_ E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
PWR AMP OPERATE SWITCH 12
DIODE AISCRI3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE .....
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER 1 OPERATE
CMD AND SIGNAL TO PREAM_PASSY. GCILCONTROL REMAINS, ADDITIONAL
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED FOR PNL SWITCH/GCIL CONTROL OF PA2_ LOSS OF
ALL _DUNDANCY DISABI_ES PA AND PREAMP OPERATION AND ALLOWS
ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMM. UHF OPERATES AS BACKUP
DURING MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-BAND REDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN _SS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
10/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1508 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
PWRAMP OPERATE SWITCH 12
DIODE AISCRI4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH CONTROL OFS-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER 2 OPERATE
CMD AND SIGNAL TO PREAMP ASSY. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DISABLES PA AND PREAMP OPERATION AND ALLOWS ONLY STDN
LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMM. UHF OPERATES AS BACKUP DURING
MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-BAND REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
CNTLBCI BUS
IA FUSE F6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: __ _...........
LOSS OF GCIL COMMAND POWER CONTROLLING APPLICATION OF 28VDC POWER
TO S-BAND PREAMP 1 AND HEATER. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PANEL
SWIT_7 ADDITI__D_q_CYPROVIDED_PNL .........
SWITCH/GCIL CONTROL OF PREAMP 2. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES
l
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PREAMP OPERATIONS AND ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMM.
UHF OPERATES AS BACKUP DURING MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-
BAND REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYSTSCHEMVS70-740139
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/sv
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
2) CNTLBCI BUS
3) IA FUSE FI3
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF GCIL COMMAND POWER CONTROLLING APPLICATION OF 28VDC POWER
TO S-BAND PREAMP 2 AND HEATER. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PANEL
SWITCH CONTROL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES PREAMP
OPERATIONS AND ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMM.
UHF OPERATES AS BACKUP DURING MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-
BAND REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
n
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
zo/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
CNTLBCI BUS
1.2K RESISTOR AILRI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P _] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL AiA2
PART _BER:
CAUSES: CO_FFAMINATION, PIE_ PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHSHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_T_ONAIm,
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH POWER CONTROLLING APPLICATION OF 28VDC POWER
TO S-BAND PRE_P I AND .EATER. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY GCIL
CONTROL. ADDITIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PNL SWITCH/GCIL
CONTROL OF PREAMi _ 2. LOlL RED[YNDANCYDISABLES PREAMP
I
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OPERATIONS AND ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMM. UHF
OPER/_TES AS BACKUP DURINGMISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-BAND
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION. I
m
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
CNTLBCI BUS
1.2K RESISTOR AI5R2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH POWER CONTROLLING APPLICATION OF 28VDC POWER
TO S-BAND PREAMP 2 AND HEATER. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY GCIL
CONTROL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES PREAMP OPERATIONS AND
ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMM. UHF OPERATES AS
BACKUP DURING MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-BAND REDUNDANCY
RESULTS IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-83
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1513
ITEM: FUSE, 10A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
FLC2 BUS
10A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI_OFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONT_INATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC TO S-BAND PREAMP 1 HEATER. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY
PARALLEL POWER SUPPLY TO PREAMP 2 HEATER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY DEGRADE/DISABLE PREAMP OPERATION AND CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
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REFERENCES-. SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
FLC3 BUS
10A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R"
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
LOSS OF 28VDC TO S-BAND PREAMP 2 HEATER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
MAY DEGRADE/DISABLE PREAMP OPERATION AND CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
FLC2 BUS
10A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION ."
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_TIONA_ _ _ _,_ ....
LOSS OF 28VDC TO S-BAND PREAMP I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY .....
PARALLEL POWER SUPPLY TO PREAMP 2. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
DISABLES PREAMP OPERATION AND CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION.
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REFERENCES-. SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/28/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
1516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
FLC3 BUS
10A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC TO S-BAND PREAMP 2. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
DISABLES PREAMP OPERATION AND CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
w
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1517
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
CNTLBCI BUS
1.2K RESISTOR
S-BAND PREAMP 1/2 SWITCH SI0
DIODE AI8CRII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 _- ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH POWE_R CONTROLLING APPLICATION OF 28VDC POWER
TO S-BAND PRE_P 1 AND HEATER. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY GCIL
CONTROL .....ADDITIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PNL SWITCH/GCIL
CONTROL OF PREAMP 2. LOSS OF ALL RED_D_CYDISABLES PREAMP
OPERATIONS AND ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMM. UHF
OPERATES AS BACKUP DURING MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-BAND
REDUNDANCY RESULTS iN _SS_ MISSION.
=__
I
mm
I
mm
[]
g
r
mm
m
mm
=--
I
mm
mm
l
u
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139 z
mm
g
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-88
I
u
uw_
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1518
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
CNTLBC2 BUS
1.2K RESISTOR
S-BAND PREAMP 1/2 SWITCH SI0
DIODE AI8CRI2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH POWER CONTROLLING APPLICATION OF 28VDC POWER
TO S-BAND PREAMP 2 AND HEATER. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY GCIL
CONTROL. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES PREAMP OPERATIONS AND
ALLOWS ONLY STDN LO CONFIG OF S-BAND COMM. UHF OPERATES AS
BACKUP DURING MISSION. HOWEVER, LOSS OF ALL S-BAND REDUNDANCY
RESULTS iN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.2, SYST SCHEM VS70-740139
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-89
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT:
1519 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, S16
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST : W.W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, S16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2SI6
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MIS_DLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH S16 ON PANEL AIA2 PERMITS SELECTION OF EITHER S-BAND PM
TRANSPONDER WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
TREE X_IT__LURES-_I_SS-_COMMAN_-RDDE UO}_"ROL OF
TRANSPONDER i, LOSS OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER, AND
UHF VOICE - COULD PREVENT STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND RESULT IN LOSS
OFCREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES'. VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o5/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1520
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, S16
FAILS SHORTED-TO-GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, S16
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2SI6
M_452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
SWITCH S16 ON PANEL AIA2 PERMITs SELECTION OF EITHER S-BAND PM
TRANSPONDER WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
THREE ADDITIONAL FAILURES - LOSS OF COMMAND MODE CONTROL OF
TRANSPONDER I, LOSS OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER, AND
UHF VOICE - COULD PREVENT STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND RESULT IN LOSS
OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER. ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1521
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI6CRI
FAILS OPEN
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AI6CRI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AI6CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4246
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
c[p]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRI PROVIDES PROTECTION FOR THE GCIL DRIVER AGAINST REVERSE
__- _GE FROM_THE'_GC_Z_DRi_R_IN C_AS_=_.SHQR_ TO GROUND
FAILURE OPEN OF CRI WOULD PREVENT POWERING UP TRANSPONDER NO. 1
IN PANEL MODE. OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY EXISTS IN GCIL COMMAND
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MODE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL POWER-UP FOR BOTH_
TRANSPONDERS IN EITHER PANEL OR COMMAND MODE PLUS LOSS OF UHF
VOICE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CAPABILITY FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND
COULD RESULT IN Loss OF CREW/VEHICLE, _ _
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1522
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI6CR2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER PANEL MoDE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AI6CR2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
°
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AI6CR2
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CR2 PROVIDES PROTECTION FOR THE GCIL DRIVER AGAINST REVERSE
CURRENT LEAKAGE FROM THE GCIL DRIVER IN CASE OF A SHORT TO GROUND
ON THE LOAD SIDE OF ASSOCIATED SWITCH S16.
FAILURE OPEN OF CR2 WOULD PREVENT POWERING UP TRANSPONDER NO. 2
IN PANEL MODE. OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY EXISTS IN GCIL COMMAND
MODE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL POWER-UP FOR BOTH
TRANSPONDERS IN EITHER PANEL OR COMMAND MODE PLUS LOSS OF UHF
VOICE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CAPABILITY FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-93
DATE. "
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT:
1523 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI6CRI
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER NO. 1 PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AI6CRI
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
]
36V73AIA2AI6CRI
JANTXVlN4246
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, _CHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRI PROVIDES PROTECTION FOR THE ASSOCIATED GCIL DRIVER
AGAINST REVERSE CURRENT LEAKAGE FROM THE DRIVER IN CASE OF A
_H_R_T-O GRO_ ON T_-E_--I_D _S_D_E_?=_S_D--CIAT_D S WIT_[-SI 6,_-_H_T
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CIRCUIT FAILURE OF CRI WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION
OR CREW/VEHICLE ....
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1524
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI6CR2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER NO. 2 PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AI6CR2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY sCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AI6CR2
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CR2 PROVIDES PROTECTION FOR THE ASSOCIATED GCIL DRIVER
AGAINST REVERSE CURRENT LEAKAGE FROM THE DRIVER IN CASE OF A
SHORT TO GROUND ON THE LOAD SIDE OF ASSOCIATED SWITCH S16.
CIRCUIT FAILURE OF CR2 WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION
OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/09/87
SUBSYSTEM: C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
MDAC ID: 1525
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IAMP, A2F8
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER NO. 1 COMMAND MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
FUSE, 1 AMP, A2F8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2F8
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES : MISHANDLING, _CHANICAL SHOCi(/VIBRATION
CONTAMINATION/CORROSiON/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
FUSE F8 PROVIDES OVERCURRENT PROTECTION TO THE GCIL "COMMAND"
DRIVER CONTROL CIRCUIT OF THE ASSOCIATED S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
POWER CIRCUIT. WITH FUSE F8_ FA__I_LED_ OPEN _P(3WER__ _O_rI"DED
TO ONE OF THE S-BAND PM TRANSPONDERS BY SOFTWARE COMMAND OR
KEYBOARD. SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
_D UHF WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY
WHICH COULD CAUSE LOSS oF C_W/VEHIC_.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1526
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IAMP, A2FI5
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER COMMAND MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
FUSE, 1 AMP, A2FI5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2FI5
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE FI5 PROVIDES OVERCURRENT PROTECTION TO THE GCIL "COMMAND"
DRIVER CONTROL CIRCUIT OF THE ASSOCIATED S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
POWER CIRCUIT. WITH FUSE FI5 FAILED OPEN POWER CANNOT BE
PROVIDED TO ONE OF THE S-BAND PM TRANSPONDERS BY SOFTWARE COMMAND
OR KEYBOARD. SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND PM
TRANSPONDER AND UHF WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF STATE VECTOR UPDATE
CAPABILITY WHICH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-97
w
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
C&T/EPD&C/S-B_D FLIGHT:
1527 ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-45)
_SS OF OUTPUT
LEAD _ALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
SUBSYS _AD: A.W. ADDIS
CO_NICATIONS _D T_CKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM T_SPONDER MODE SWITCH BUFFER
FORW_D AVIONICS BAY 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-45)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
_CATION: 82V76AI7(J4-45)
P_T _BER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: MIS_DLING, MEC_ICAL SHOCK/_B_TION, .........
CONT_INATION/CO_OSION/DETERIO_TION, T_PE__ LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/_TIONAL_.:
THIS HYBRID DRIER IS A BUFFER T_T PROVIDES POWER TO THE S-B_D
PM T_SPONDER MODE SWITCH _D THE NSP DATA _TE _CEI_ SWITCH
FROM THE T_S_NDER NO. 1 PO_R CIRCUIT. _SS OF OUTPUT OF THIS
HYBRID DRIER _SULTS IN _SS OF PO_R TO THE T_SPONDER
MODE SWITCH _D NSP DATA _TE _CE_ SWITCH FOR 1 OF THE
RED_D_ S-B_D T_SPONDERS. _..............................
A SU_EQUENT-_IN-ATION OF_-B_D PM/NSP _D_F VOI_E SYSTEMS
FAILU_S COULD _SULT IN _SS OF STATE _OR UPDATE CAPABILITY
_ICH COULD CAUSE _SS OF C_W/VEHIC_.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE S_TTLE SYSTEMS _DBOOK
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-98
i
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1528
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI8(J4-45)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS ANDTRACKING
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER MODE SWITCH BUFFER
FORWARD AVIONICS BAY 3A
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AIS(J4-45)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI8 (J4-45)
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED•
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IS A BUFFER THAT PROVIDES POWER TO THE S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER MODE SWITCH AND THE NSP DATA RATE RECEIVE SWITCH
FROM THE TRANSPONDER NO. 2 POWER CIRCUIT. LOSS OF OUTPUT OF THIS
HYBRID DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF POWER TO THE TRANSPONDER
MODE SWITCH AND NSP DATA RATE RECEIVE SWITCH FOR 1 OF THE
REDUNDANT S-BAND TRANSPONDERS.
A SUBSEQUENT COMBINATION OF S-BAND PM/NSP AND UHF VOICE SYSTEMS
FAILURES COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY
WHICH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE" a
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1529
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-45)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PMTRANSPONDER MODE SWITCH BUFFER
FORWARD AVIONICS BAY 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-45)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
• DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7(J4-45)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMiNATION/CO_OSION/D_ORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IS A BUFFER THAT PROVIDES POWER TO THE S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER MODE SWITCH AND THE NSP DATA RATE RECEIVE SWITCHES
FROM THE TRANSPONDER NO.I POWER CIRCUIT FOR PANEL MODE ....
INADVERTENT APPLICATION OF VOLTAGE TO THE S-BAND TRANSPONDER MODE
SWITCH AND NSP DATA RATE RECEIVE SWITCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF PANEL
SIGNAL STRENGTH METER INDICATION.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT ENDANGER MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
il/og/sv
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1530
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI8(J4-45)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER MODE SWITCH BUFFER
FORWARD AVIONICS BAY 3A
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AIS(J4-45)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7(J4-45)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IS A BUFFER THAT PROVIDES POWER TO THE S-BAND
TRANSPONDER MODE SWITCH AND THE NSP DATA RATE RECEIVE SWITCHES
FROM THE TRANSPONDER NO.2 POWER CIRCUIT FOR PANEL MODE.
INADVERTENT APPLICATION OF VOLTAGE TO THE S-BAND TRANSPONDER MODE
SWITCH AND NSP DATA RATE RECEIVE SWITCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF PANEL
SIGNAL STRENGTH METER INDICATION.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT ENDANGER MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-101
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE_
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1531
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A14R3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PS TRANSPONDER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
4) PANEL AIA2
5) RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI4R3
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
c[P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2A14R3
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211BR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED .... 7 _ ,_-_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTO_R__R3IBPIEgTS THE S-BAN_Dk_T_SpQNDER
POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT FROM CURRENT OVERLOADS WHEN THE GCIL IS IN
THE PANEL MODE. ......
RESISTOR R3 FAIL OPEN RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER UP THE
ASSOCIATED REDUNDANT T_SPONDERWHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL
MODE. suBSEQUENT FAILURE OF RESISTOR R4 (IOA 1514) WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF BOTH TRANSPONDERS IN THE PANEL MODE. LOSS OF
OPERATIONALLY REDUNDANT GCIL COMMAND MODE FOR BOTH S-BAND PM/NSP
STRINGS PLUS FAILURE OF UH_FVQ_CE_p__ULDCAUSE LOSS OF STATE
VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1532
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A14R4
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI4R4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AI4R4
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211BR
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR R4 PROTECTS THE S-BAND TRANSPONDER
POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT FROM CURRENT OVERLOADS WHEN THE GCIL IS IN
THE PANEL MODE.
RESISTOR R4 FAIL OPEN RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER UP THE
ASSOCIATED REDUNDANT TRANSPONDER WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL
MODE. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF RESISTOR R3 (IOA 1531) WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF BOTH TRANSPONDERS IN THE PANEL MODE. LOSS OF
OPERATIONALLY REDUNDANT GCIL COMMAND MODE FOR BOTH S-BAND PM/NSP
STRINGS PLUS FAILURES OF S-BAND PM/NSP AND UHF VOICE SYSTEMS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITY WHICH COULD
POSSIBLY RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-I03
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT:
1533 ABORT:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J5-Z)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, A17(J5-Z)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ p ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7JSZ
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER AND A REDUNDANT HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 (IOA
1229) INDEPENDENTLYCONTROL POWER TO THEIR RESPECT!VEREDUNDANT
T_SPO_NDERS. ...... _ ........... _ _ _..........
LOSS OF OUTPUT OF 1 HYBRID DRIVER CAUSES LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO
POWER UP ONE OT THE TWO REDUNDANT TRANSPONDERS. SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE OF THE SECOND HYBRID DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF S-BAND
CAPABILITY TO UPDATE STATE VECTORS.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF UHF CAPABILITY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO
UPDATE STATE VECTORS WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1534
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI8(J5-P)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(JS-P)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76A18J5P
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER AND A REDUNDANT HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 (IOA
1228) INDEPENDENTLY CONTROL POWER TO THEIR RESPECTIVE REDUNDANT
TRANSPONDERS.
LOSS OF OUTPUT OF 1 HYBRID DRIVER CAUSES LOSS OF THE ABILITY TO
POWER UP ONE OT THE TWO REDUNDANT TRANSPONDERS. SUBSEQUENT
FAILURE OF THE SECOND HYBRID DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF S-BAND
CAPABILITY TO UPDATE STATE VECTORS.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF UHF CAPABILITY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO
UPDATE STATE VECTORS WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-105
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1535
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, (JS-Z)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LC_)_2 -_-
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, (JB-Z)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/!R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7JSZ
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MEC_ICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIO_TION, TEMPE__ LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER AND A REDUNDANT HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 (IOA
1230) INDEPENDENTLY CONTROL POWER TO THEIR RESPECTIVE REDUNDANT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT: OF ONE OF THE REDUNDANT _HYBRID DRiVER_RE
IT COULD NOT BE DEACTIVATED WOULD HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT UNTIL
A SIMI_F_LURECAOSEbINADVERTENT APPLICATION OF PowER T6:THE
REDUNDANT XPONDERCAUSING OSCIL_ION_OF THE RF SWITCH. _:_
THE DOUBLE FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF S-BAND FOR STATE VECTOR
UPDATE AND A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF UHF COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.:_ ....
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-I06
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1536
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI8(J5-P)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM TRANSPONDER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI8(J5-P)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI8J5P
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER AND A REDUNDANT HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 (IOA
1229) INDEPENDENTLY CONTROL POWER TO THEIR RESPECTIVE REDUNDANT
TRANSPONDERS.
INADVERTENT OUTPUT OF ONE OF THE REDUNDANT HYBRID DRIVERS WHERE
IT COULD NOT BE DEACTIVATED WOULD HAVE NO HAZARDOUS EFFECT UNTIL
A SIMILAR FAILURE CAUSED INADVERTENT APPLICATION OF POWER TO THE
REDUNDANT XPONDER CAUSING OSCILLATION OF THE RF SWITCH.
THE DOUBLE FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF S-BAND FOR STATE VECTOR
UPDATE AND A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF UHF COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740129, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-I07
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1537
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(JL-T)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(JL-T)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO_ 3/2R
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARIII(J5-T)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 AND THE HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 (IOA
1233) CONTROL THE POWER TO THEIR RESPECTIVE S-BAN_D_P_I_E_AMPLIFIERS.
LOSS OF OUTPUT OF ONE HRBRID DRi_R RESULTS IN LOSS OF POWER TO
ONE OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND PREAMPLIFIERS. A SECOND LOSS RESULTS
IN LOSS OF S-BAND PM CAPABILITY. ............
LOSS O_S-BAND PM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION._
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1538
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(JS-T)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI8(J5-T)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI8ARIII(J5-T)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 AND THE HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 (IOA
1232) CONTROL THE POWER TO THEIR RESPECTIVE S-BAND PREAMPLIFIERS.
LOSS OF OUTPUT OF ONE HRBRID DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF POWER TO
ONE OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND PREAMPLIFIERS. A SECOND LOSS RESULTS
IN LOSS OF S-BAND PM CAPABILITY.
LOSS OF S-BAND PM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-I09
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1539
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J5-T)
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J5-T)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARIII(JS-T)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONA_:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 AND THE HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 (IOA
1235) CONTROL THE POWER TO THEIR RESPECTIVE S-BAND PREAMPLIFIERS.
INADVERTENT OUTPUT OF ONE HRBRID DRIVER RESULTS UNINTENTIONAL
POWER TO ONE OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND PREAMPLIFIERS. A SECOND
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF S-BAND PM CAPABILITY CAUSED BY
OSCILLATION OF THE RF SWITCH. •
LOSS OF S-BAND PM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
I
m
l
=
mm
mm
m
i
D
m
I
B
I
D
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-II0
I
L _
I
i
m
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1540
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI8(JS-T)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(J5-T)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI8ARIII(J5-T)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL sHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 AND THE HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 (IOA
1234) CONTROL THE POWER TO THEIR RESPECTIVE S-BAND PREAMPLIFIERS.
INADVERTENT OUTPUT OF ONE HRBRID DRIVER RESULTS UNINTENTIONAL
POWER TO ONE OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND PREAMPLIFIERS. A SECOND
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF S-BAND PM CAPABILITY CAUSED BY
OSCILLATION OF THE RF SWITCH.
LOSS OF S-BAND PM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSiON.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
u
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1541
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J5-D)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN CIRCUIT
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER HEATERS POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(JS-D)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARIII(J5-D)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/ViBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED ......
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 AND THE HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 (IOA
1237) CONTROL THE HEATER P0_R TO THEIR RESPECTIVE S-BAND
PREAMPLIFIERS WHEN IN THE STANDBY MODE_ ............
LOSS OF OUTPUT OF ONE HYBRID DRIVER WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THE SECOND HYBRID DRIVER COULD CAUSE
DEGRADED PERFORMANCE IN THE STDN HIGH POWER AND TDRS MODES.
LOSS OF S-BAND PM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1542
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(J5-D)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN CIRCUIT
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER HEATERS POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(J5-D)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AISARIII(JS-D)
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 AND THE HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 (IOA
1236) CONTROL THE HEATER POWER TO THEIR RESPECTIVE S-BAND
PREAMPLIFIERS WHEN IN THE STANDBY MODE.
LOSS OF OUTPUT OF ONE HYBRID DRIVER WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF THE SECOND HYBRID DRIVER COULD CAUSE
DEGRADED PERFORMANCE IN THE STDN HIGH POWER AND TDRS MODES.
LOSS OF S-BAND PM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1543
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(JS-D)
INADVERTENTOUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER HEATERS POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J5-D)
±
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARIII (J5-D)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 CONTROLS THE HEATER POWER TO ITS
ASSOCIATED S-BAND PREAMPLIFIER WHEN IT IS IN THE STANDBY MODE. _
INADVERTENT APPLICATIONOF_T_=POWER=BY ONE HYBRID DRIVER
FAILURE WOULD WASTE ENERGY.
THE IMPACT ON VEHICLE ENERGY WOULD HA_ TO BE ASSE_S_IN REAL_
TIME RELATIVE TO ENERGY MARGINS AND WOULD NOT BY ITSELF CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION OR AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS _DBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1544
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI8(J5-D)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM PREAMPLIFIER HEATERS POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, A18(JS-D)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI8ARIII(J5-D)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 CONTROLS THE HEATER POWER TO ITS
ASSOCIATED S-BAND PREAMPLIFIERS WHEN IT IS IN THE STANDBY MODE.
INADVERTENT APPLICATION OF HEATER POWER BY ONE HYBRID DRIVER
FAILURE WOULD WASTE ENERGY.
THE IMPACT ON VEHICLE ENERGY WOULD HAVE TO BE ASSESSED IN REAL
TIME RELATIVE TO ENERGY MARGINS AND WOULD NOT BY ITSELF CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION OR AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1545
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI7CR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM PREAMPLIFIER HEATERS POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSEMBLY (LCA) 2
DIODE, AI7CR
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC-
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AI7CR
JANTXVIN5551
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, _CHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS D_O_._A 2PROVIDES A PATH FOR PRE_PL_FIER .EATER POWER
wHEN THE ',_P 1 0.,' P_ScRETE Cq6_ i _ _p_E D_BUT _ PREVENTS
PREAMP POWER-UP FOR "STANDBY" (HEATER ON).
HEATER COULD BE TURNED ON BY ISSUING "STANDBY" COMMAND.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE A PREAMP COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVES FOR SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8 
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1546
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI8CR
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER HEATERS POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSEMBLY (LCA) 3
DIODE, AI8CR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76A18CR
JANTXVlN5551
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IN LCA 3 PROVIDES A PATH FOR PREAMPLIFIER HEATER POWER
WHEN THE "PREAMP 2 ON" DISCRETE COMMAND IS APPLIED BUT PREVENTS
PREAMP POWER-UP FOR "STANDBY" (HEATER ON).
HEATER COULD BE TURNED ON BY ISSUING "STANDBY" COMMAND.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE A PREAMP COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVES FOR SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-i17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/B7
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1547
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI7CR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM P_AMPf_IFIE R HEATERS POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSEMBLY (LCA) 2
DIODE, AI7CR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUN C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 83V76AI7CR
PART NUMBER: JANT_iN5551 _ z
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATiO"ALE:
THIS DIODE IN LCA 2 PROVIDES A PATH FOR PREAMPLIFIER HEATER POWER
WHEN THE "PREAMP 1 ON" DISCRETE COMMAND IS APPLIED BUT PREVENTS
PREAMP POWER-UP FOR "STANDBY". _-_ _ _;_ _ ...........
A SHORTED DIODE WOULD_CAUSE_THE PREAMPLIFIER TO BE TURNED ON WHEN
A "STANDBY" COMMAND IS GIVEN, AND THE TWO PREAMPS COULD CYCLE ON-
OFF. _ _ __ _
THE SYSTEM COULD BE RESTORED BY CANCELLING THE "STANDBY" CO_D.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE A PREAMP COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVES FOR s0_ FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1548
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI8CR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER HEATERS POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSEMBLY (LCA) 3
DIODE, AI8CR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
83V76AISCR
JANTXVlN5551
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DIODE IN LCA 3 PROVIDES A PATH FOR PREAMPLIFIER HEATER POWER
WHEN THE "PREAMP 2 ON" DISCRETE COMMAND IS APPLIED BUT PREVENTS
PREAMP POWER-UP FOR "STANDBY".
A SHORTED DIODE WOULD CAUSE THE PREAMPLIFIER TO BE TURNED ON WHEN
A "STANDBY" COMMAND IS GIVEN, AND THE TWO PREAMPS COULD CYCLE ON-
OFF.
THE SYSTEM COULD BE RESTORED BY CANCELLING THE "STANDBY" COMMAND.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE A PREAMP COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVES FOR SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-I19
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1549
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE _ODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI5RI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI5RI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
P_T NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AI5RI
RWRSOSI211BR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR R2 PROTECTS THE ASSOCIATED S-BAND
PREAMPLIFIER POWER CONTROLBUS FROMSHORT CIRCUIT CURRENT
OVERLOADS WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
RESISTOR R1 FAILING OPEN RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER UP
THE ASSOCIATED PREAMPLIFIER WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
THE PREAMP COULD BE USED IN THE OPERATIONALLY REDUNDANT COMMAND
MODE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO USE THE S-BAND PM SYSTEM IN HIGH
POWER MODE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES FOR SOME
FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/B?
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1550
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI5R2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
S)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI5R2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
• ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AI5R2
RWR80SI211BR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR R2 PROTECTS THE ASSOCIATED S-BAND
PREAMPLIFIER POWER CONTROL BUS°_?RoM SHORT CIRCUIT _NT
OVERLOADS WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
RESISTOR R2 FAILING OPEN RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER UP
THE ASSOCIATED PREAMPLIFIER WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
THE PREAMP COULD BE USED IN THE OPERATIONALLY REDUNDANT COMMAND
MODE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO USE THE S-BAND PM SYSTEM IN HIGH
POWER MODE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES FOR SOME
FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1551
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A2SI0
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A2SI0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2SI0
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MPPE_ SWITCH SIO PROVIDES POWE R TO
THE POWER HYBRID DRIVER ._D THE HEATERHYBRID DRIVER OF THE S-
BAND PREAMPLIFIERS.
FAILURE OF SWITCH SI0 TO TRANSFER WOULD NOT ALLOW PANEL CABILITY
TO ACTIVATE THE S-BAND HI-POWER MODE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
ACTIVATE THE PI_AMPLIFIERS IN EITHER PANEL OR COMMAND MODE COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/os/sv
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1552
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMMAND POLES)
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A2SI0
FAILS CLOSED, INADVERTENTLY CLOSED (DISCRETE
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A2SI0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2SI0
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE, SWITCH SI0 PROVIDES POWER TO
THE POWER HYBRID DRIVER AND THE HEATER HYBRID DRIVER OF THE S-
BAND PREAMPLIFIERS.
FAILURE OF SWITCH S-10 BY PANEL SWITCHING INADVERTENT CLOSURE OF
DISCRETE COMMAND CONTACTS WOULD NOT ALLOW PANEL SWITCHING TO THE
REDUNDANT PREAMPLIFIER.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE PREAMPLIFIERS COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
11/o9/sv
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1553
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POLES )
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A2SIO
FAILS CLOSED, INADVERTENTLY CLOSED (INTERLOCK
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A2SI0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2SI0
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE, SWITCH SI0 PROVIDES ABILITY
TO CO_D _WER ON TO THE POWER_ID DRIVER AND THE HEATER
HYBRID DRIVER OF THE S-BAND PREAMPLIFIERS.
FAILURE OF SWITCH S'I0 BY INADVERTENT C_SURE OF INTERLOCK
CONTACTS WOULD ALL6WTHEP_ _LIFIER TO BE TURNED ON WITH THE
OUTPUT MISROUTED IN THE PREAMPLIFIER.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OR ENDANGER
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1554
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI8CRII
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AISCRII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AI8CRII
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRII PROVIDES SHORT CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO THE GCIL DRIVER
IN CASE OF A SHORT TO GROUND IN SWITCH SI0. OPEN CIRCUIT FAILURE
RESULTS IN INABILITY TO POWER UP ONE OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND
PREAMPLIFIERS IN CASE OF A SHORT TO GROUND IN SWITCH SI0.
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF ANALOGOUS DIODE CRI2 CAUSES LOSS OF PANEL
CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE S-BAND HI-POWER MODE. LOSS OF UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY IN GCIL COMMAND MODE FOR BOTH STRINGS WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ALL ABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE HI-POWER MODE WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1555
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT::
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI8CRI2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AI8CRI2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AI8CRI2
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES : MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION, ....
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRI2 PROVIDES SHORT CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO THE GCIL DRIVER
IN CASE OF A SHORT TO GROUND IN SWITCH S IO . OPEN CIRCUIT .....
FAILURE_SULTS IN INABILITY TO POWER UP ONE OF THE REDUNDANT S-
BAND PREAMPLIFIERS.
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF DIODE ANALOGOUS CEIl _cAUsES LOss OF PANEL
CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE S-BAND HI-POWER MODE. LOSS OF UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY :_'N_ BCIL C6_D MODE FoR BOTH STRINGS W0[JLD CAUSE LOSS
OF ALL ABILITY TO ACTIVATE THE HI-POWER MODE WHICH
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1556
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI8CRll
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM PREAMPLIFIER PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AISCRII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AI8CRII
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRI3 PROTECTS AGAINST REVERSE CURRENT LEAKAGE FROM THE
ASSOCIATED GCIL DRIVER VIA PANEL CONTROL CIRCUIT IN CASE OF A
SHORT TO GROUND IN THE ASSOCIATED PANEL CONTROL SWITCH. FAILURE
OF CRI3 SHORTED WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-127
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/57
C&T/EPD&C/S-B_D
1557
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AISCRI2
FAI_ SHORTED
_AD _ALYST: W.W. ROBINSON
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
SUBSYS _AD: A.W. ADDIS
CO_ICATIONS _D T_CKING
EPD&C/S-B_D
PM P_PLIFIER P_EL MODE PO_R CONTROL CIR_IT
P_EL AIA2
DIODE, AI8CRI2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SC_ENS: A [ ]
_CATION: 36V73AIA2AISCRI2
P_T _BER: J_T_IN4246
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MIS_DLING, MEC_ICAL SHOCK/VIB_TION,
CONT_INATION/CO_OSION2DETERIO_TION, TEMPE__ LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._.:
DIODE CRI2 PROTEUS AGAINST _RSE __ T._._GE FROM THE
ASSOCIATED GCIL DRIER VIA P_EL CON_OL CIR_IT IN CASE OF A
SHORT TO GRO_D IN T_ ASSOCIATED P_EL CO_ROL SWITCH. FAILURE
OF CRI2 SHORTED WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION OR C_W/VEHIC_.
_FE_NCES: VS70-740139, SPACE S_TT_ SYSTEMS _DBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1558
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IAMP, A2F6
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER GROUND COMMAND POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
FUSE, 1 AMP, A2F6
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2F6
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE F6 PROTECTS THE GCIL COMMAND DRIVER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT OF
S-BAND PM PREAMPLIFIER i.
FUSE F6 FAILING OPEN CAUSES LOSS OF GROUND COMMAND AND KEYBOARD
CAPABILITY TO POWER UP PREAMP I. ON LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
ACTIVATE PREAMP 1 BY COMMAND, GCIL PANEL MODE WOULD BE AVAILABLE.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE PREAMPS 1 AND 2 EITHER BY
COMMAND OR PANEL CONTROL COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
FOR SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-129
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT:
1559 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1AMP, A2FI3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM PREAMPLIFIER GROUND CO_D POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
FUSE, 1 AMP, A2FI3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3_
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2FI3
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE FI3 PROTECTS THE GCIL COMMAND DRIVER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
OF S-BAND PM PREAMPLIFIER i. _
FUSE FI3 FAILING OPEN CAUSES Loss oF GROUNDCOMMAND AND KEYBOARD
CAPABILITY TO POWER UP PREAMP 2. ON LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
ACTIVATE PREAMP 2 BY COMMAND, GCIL PANEL MODE WOULD BE AVAILABLE.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO ACTIVATE PREAMPS 1 AND 2 EITHERBY
COMMAND OR PANEL CONTROL COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES
FOR SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o5/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1560
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC35
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
POWER CONTROL ASSY (PCA) 2
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC35
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 36V76A23RPC35
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-1200
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RPC 35 IN PCA 2 CONTROLS APPLICATION OF POWER TO S-BAND PM POWER
AMPLIFIER i.
LOSS OF OUTPUT BY THE RPC RESULTS IN LOSS OF USE OF PA I.
REDUNDANT SET RPC 44/PA 2 WOULD BE SELECTED.
LOSS OF S-BAND PM HI-POWER MODE (BOTH PA'S) COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o5/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1561
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC44
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
L
POWER CONTROL ASSY (PCA) 3
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC44
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V76A23RPC44
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-1200
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RPC 44 IN PCA 3 CONTROLS APPLICATION OF POWER TO S-BAND PM POWER
AMPLIFIER 2.
LOSS OF OUTPUT BY THE RPC RESULTS IN LOSS OF USE OF THE PA 2.
REDUNDANT SET RPC35/PA 1 WOULD BE SELECTED.
LOSS OF S-BAND PM HI-POWER MODE (BOTH PA'S) COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-132
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/os/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1562
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC35
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
4) POWER CONTROL ASSY (PCA) 2
5) REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC35
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V76A23RPC35
MC450-0017-1200
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RPC 35 IN PCA 2 CONTROLS APPLICATION OF POWER TO S-BAND PM POWER
AMPLIFIER I.
INADVERTENT OUTPUT OF THE RPC COULD APPLY POWER TO THE STANDBY S-
BAND PA, WASTING ABOUT 20 WATTS.
THE UNINTENTIONAL CONSUMPTION OF 20 WATTS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE
MISSION OR POSE A HAZARD TO CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-133
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/05/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1563 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: REMOTEPOWERCONTROLLER,20 AMP, RPC44
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENTOUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYSLEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) POUR CONTROL CiR_
POWER CONTROL ASSY (PCA) 3
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 20 AMP, RPC44
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING_ 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V76A23RPC44
MC450-0017-1200
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RPC 44 IN PCA 3 CONTROLS APPLICATION OF POWER TO THE S-BAND PM
POWER AMPLIFIER 2.
INADVERTENT OUTPUT OF THE RPC COULD APPLY POWER TO THE STANDBY S-
BAND PA, WASTING ABOUT 20 WATTS.
THE UNINTENTIONAL CONSUMPTION OF 20WATTS WOULD NOT AFFECT THE
MISSION OR POSE A HAZARD TO CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1564
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE II, A17(J4-127)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) OPERATE COMMAND
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE II, AI7(J4-127)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARII(J4-127)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 PROVIDES A 1 SECOND TIME DELAY FOR
THE OPERATE COMMAND TO THE S-BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIER.
LOSS OF OUTPUT BY THIS HYBRID DRIVER WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ONE
OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIERS. SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF
THE OTHER HYBRID DRIVER WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF THE S-BAND PM
DOWNLINK CAPABILITY IN THE S-BAND HI-POWER MODE.
LOSS OF DOWNLINK IN THE S-BAND HI-POWER MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-135
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1565
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE II, AI8(J4-127)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) OPERATE COMMAND
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE II, AI8(J4-127)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: .3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
I2tNDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI8ARII(J4-127)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 PROVIDES A 1 SECOND TIME DELAY FOR
THE OPERATE COMMAND TO THE S-BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIER.
LOSS OF OUTPUT _ THIS HYBRIDDRI_R WQULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ONE
OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIERS. SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF
THE OTHER HYBRID DRIER WO_LDD RESULT IN _SS OF THE S,BAND PM
DOWNLINK CAPABILITY IN THE S-BAND HI-POWER MODE ....
LOSS OF DOWNLINK IN THE S-BAND HI-POWER MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/sv
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1566
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE II, AI7(J4-127)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) OPERATE COMMAND
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE II, AI7(J4-127)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARII(J4-127)
MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS REDUNDANT HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 PROVIDES A I SECOND TIME
DELAY FOR THE OPERATE COMMAND TO THE S-BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIER.
INADVERTENT OUTPUT OF THIS HYBRID DRIVER WOULDRESULT IN
CONTINUOUS OPERATION OF THE S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER WHICH COULD BE
HALTED WITH REMOVAL OF THE STANDBY COMMAND TO THAT AMPLIFIER.
NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-137
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1567
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE II, A18(J4-127)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) OPERATE COMMAND
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE II, AI8(J4-127)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI8ARII(J4-127)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0262-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS REDUNDANT HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 PROVIDES A 1 SECOND TIME
DELAY FOR THE OPERATE COMMAND TO THE S-BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIER.
INADVERTENT OUTPUT OF THIS HYBRID DRIVER WOULD _SULT __ .....
CONTINUOUS OPERATION OF THE S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIER WHICH COULD BE
HALTED WITH REMOVAL OF THE STANDBY COMMAND TO THAT AMPLIFIER.
NO EFFE_ON MISSION oR CREW/VEHICLE' ..... _
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1568
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1 AMP, A2F31
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) POWER INDICATOR CIRCUIT
POWER CONTROL ASSY (PCA) 2
FUSE, 1 AMP, A2F31
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:_ 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: .3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2F31
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-0103
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE F31 PROVIDES OVERCURRENT PROTECTION TO ONE OF THE REDUNDANT
POWER AMPLIFIER POWER INDICATOR CIRCUITS AND IS REQUIRED FOR
NORMAL OPERATION OF THE PO_RAMPLIFIERS.
FAILURE OF F31 RESULTS IN LOSS OF OPERATION OF THE ASSOCIATED S-
BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIER. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF FII RESULTS IN
LOSS OF BOTH POWER AMPLIFIERS.
LOSS OF BOTH POWER AMPLIFIERS RESULTS IN LOSS OF DOWNLINK IN THE
S-BAND HI-POWER MODE AND COULD cAUSE MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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D
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1569
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1AMP, A2Fll
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S,BAND
3) PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) POWER INDICATOR CIRCUIT
POWER CONTROL ASSY (PCA) 3
FUSE, 1 AMP, A2FII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: ' 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2FII
PART NUMBER: ME451-0009-0103
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE FII PROVIDES OVERCURRENT PROTECTION TO ONE OF THE REDUNDANT
POWER AMPLIFIER POWER INDICATOR CIRCUITS AND IS REQUIRED FOR
NOPd_LO_TION OF THE-POWER AMPLIFIERS._- _ _ _ .....
FAILURE OF FII RESULTS IN LOSS OF OPERATION OF THE ASSOCIATED S-
BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIER. SUBSEQUENT_FAIL_U_gF F31 RESULTS IN
LOSS OF BOTH POWER AMPLIFIERS. -
LOSS OF BOTH POWER AMPLIFIERS RESULTS IN LOSS OF DOWNLINK IN THE
S-BAND HI-POWER MODE AND COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139_ SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/os/s7
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1570
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS," A3Si2
FAILS TO TRANSFER
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) OPERATE
PANEL AIA3
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A3S12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA3SI2
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH S12 PROVIDES A STANDBY COMMAND TO THE RPC IN THE
ASSOCIATED POWER AMPLIFIER POWER CIRCUIT AND AN OPERATE SIGNAL TO
THE RESPECTIVE HYBRID DRIVER WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
FAILURE OF S12 WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER UP ONE OR
BOTH OF THE S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIERS.
LOSS OF BOTH S-BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIERS AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF
GCIL COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1571
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A3S12
FAILS SHORTED, ADJACENT CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) OPERATE
PANEL AIA3
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, A3S12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 5/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCAT ION: 36V73 AIA3 S 12
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES : MISHAND£ING, _C_ICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUN_ON,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
SWITCH S12 PROVIDES A STANDBY COMMAND TO THE RPC IN THE
ASSOCIATED POWER AMPLIFIER POWER CIRCUIT AND AN QPE_E SIGNAL TO
THERESPECTIVE_BRID DRIVER WHEN THE GCIL IS IN _P_ MODe.
FAILURE OF S12 WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER DOWN ONE
OR BOTH OF THE S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIERS.
WITH BOTH Po_RJ_4PLIFIERS POWERED UP PANEL CONTIqO_IS LOST AND
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GCIL COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1572
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
ELIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-49)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) OPERATE INTERLOCK
PANEL AIA2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-49)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI(J4-49)
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER PROVIDES POWER TO THE INTERLOCK POLES
PREAMPLIFIER POWER SWITCH IN THE PANEL MODE.
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF POWER TO THE ASSOCIATED POWER
AMPLIFIER FROM THE PANEL. SUBLSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT
HYBRID DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSSDF PANEL CONTROL OF POWER
AMPLIFIERS.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF GCIL WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF S-BAND DOWNLINK IN
THE HI-POWER MODE WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1573
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
, FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI8(J4-49)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) OPERATE INTERLOCK
4) PANEL AIA2
5) HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI8(J4-49)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76AISARI(J4-49)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION, ......
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER PROVIDES POWER TO THE INTERLOCK POLES
PREAMPLIFIER POWER SWITCH IN THE PANEL MODE, ..........
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF POWER TO THE ASSQCIATED POWER _
AMPLIFIER FROM THE PANEL. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT
HYBRID DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF PANEL CONTROL OF POWER
AMPLIFIERS.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF GCIL WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF S-BAND DOWNLINK IN
THE HI-POWER MODE WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1574
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-49)
FAILS SHORTED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) OPERATE INTERLOCK
PANEL AIA2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI7(J4-49)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARI(J4-49)
MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER PROVIDES POWER TO THE INTERLOCK POLES OF THE
PREAMPLIFIER POWER SWITCH IN THE PANEL MODE.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION NOR ENDANGER
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-145
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1575
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI8(J4-49)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) OPERATE INTERLOCK
PANEL AIA2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE I, AI8(J4-49)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AISARI(J4-49)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER PROVIDES POWER TO THE INTERLOCK POLES OF THE
PREAMPLIFIER POWER SWITCH IN THE PANEL MODE.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION NOR ENDANGER
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/09/87
SUBSYSTEM: ,C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
MDAC ID: 1576
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2SI1
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) STANDBY COMMAND
PANEL AIA2
SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2SII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2SII
ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH SII PROVIDES THE STANDBY COMMAND TO THE RPC IN THE S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE
PANEL MODE.
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER UP THE S-
BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIER WHILE IN THE PANEL MODE.
FAILURE SUCH THAT NEITHER S-BAND PM POWER AMPLIFIER CAN BE
ENABLED AND SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GCIL COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1577
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2Sll
FAILS SHORTED, ADACENT CONTACTS
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) STANDBY COMMAND
PANEL AIA2
SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2Sil
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
36V73AIA2SII
ME452-0102-7203
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH SII PROVIDES THE STANDBY COMMAND TO THE RPC IN THE S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE
PANEL MODE.
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE AN UNPLANNED 20 WATT POWER DRAIN.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION NOR ENDANGER
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1578 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI8CRI3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AI8CRI3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R . AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AI8CRI3
JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRI3 IN THE PAl POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT PROTECTS THE GCIL
DRIVER FROM SWITCH SI0 SHORT TO GROUND ON THE LOAD SIDE CONTACT.
OPEN FAILURE OF CRI3 WOULD PREVENT PAl POWER-UP VIA PANEL SWITCH
SI0 (PANEL MODE). OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR PA 1 POWER
EXISTS IN GCIL COMMAND MODE, AND HARDWARE REDUNDANCY IN PA 2.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO POWER PA 1 OR PA 2 IN EITHER PANEL OR
COMMAND MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-149
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1579
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI8CRI4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2 ) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) PANEL MODE PA 2 POWER CONTROL
CIRCUIT
4 ) PANEL AIA2
5) DIODE, AI8CRI4
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 . TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AISCRI4
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRI4 IN THE PA2 POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT PROTECTS THE GCIL
DRIVER FROM SWITCH SI0 SHORT TO GRQ_DJQ_ THE LOAD S!DECONTACT.
OPEN FAILURE OF CRI4 WOULD PREVENT PA2 POWER-UP VIA PANEL SWITCH
SI0 (PANEL MODE). OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR PA 2 POWER
EXISTS IN GCIL COMMAND MODE, AND HARDWARE REDUNDANCY IN PA 2.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO POWER PA 1 OR PA 2 IN EITHER P_EL OR
COMMAND MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OFMISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1580
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI8CRI5
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) PANEL MODE PA 1 STANDBY POWER
CONTROL CIRCUIT
4) PANEL AIA2
5) DIODE, AISCRI5
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AISCRI5
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
DIODE CRI4 IN THE PA2 STANDBY POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT PROTECTS THE
GCIL DRIVER FROM SWITCH SI0 SHORT TO GROUND ON THE LOAD SIDE
CONTACT. OPEN FAILURE OF CRI4 WOULD PREVENT PA2 POWER-UP VIA
PANEL SWITCH SIO (PANEL MODE). OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR PA 2
POWER EXISTS IN GCIL COMMAND MODE, AND HARDWARE REDUNDANCY IN PA
I. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PLACE PAl OR PA2 IN STANDBY IN
EITHER PANEL OR COMMAND MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-151
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/B7
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1581
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI6CRI6
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) PANEL MODE PA 2 STANDBY POWER
CONTROL CIRCUIT
4) PANEL AIA2
5) DIODE, AI6CRI6
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AI8CRI6
J_IN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIOD_CRI5 IN THE PAl STANDBY POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT PROTECTS THE
GCIL DRIVER FROM SWITCH SI0 AND SII SHORT TO GRO_D ON THE LOAD
SIDE CONTACTS. OPEN FAILURE OF CRI5 WOULD PREVENT PA 1 STANDBY
VIA PANEL SWITCH SII (PANEL MODE).
OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR PA 1 STANDBY EXISTS IN GCIL COMMAND
MODE, AND HARDWARE REDUNDANCY IN PA 2. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
PLACE EITHER PA IN STANDBY TO WARM UP THE AMPLIFIER BEFORE POWER-
UP IN EITHER PANEL OR COMMAND MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1582
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AISCRI3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) PANEL MODE PA 1 POWER CONTROL
CIRCUIT
4) PANEL AIA2
5) DIODE, AISCRI3
6)
7)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AI8CRI3
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRI3 PROTECT THE GCIL DRIVER AGAINST REVERSE CURRENT
LEAKAGE FROM THE DRIVER IN CASE IF A SHORT TO GROUND ON THE LOAD
SIDE CONTACT OF SWITCH SI0. SHORT CIRCUIT FAILURE OF CRI3 WOULD
NOT AFFECT MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT:
1583 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AISCR14
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) PANEL MODE PA 2 POWER CONTROL
CIRCUIT
4) PANEL AIA2
5) DIODE, AI8CRI4
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AISCRI4
JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CR!4 PROTECT THE GCIL DRIVER AGAINST REVERSE CURRENT
LEAKAGE FROM THE DRIVER IN CASE IF A SHORT TO GROUND ON THE LOAD
SIDE CONTACT OF SWITCH Sl0. SHORT CIRCUIT FAILURE OF CRI4 WOULD
NOT AFFECT MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT:
1584 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI8CRI5
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) PANEL MODE PA 1 STANDBY POWER
CONTROL CIRCUIT
4) PANEL AIA2
5) DIODE, AI8CRI5
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AI8CRI5
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
DIODE CRI5 IN THE PA 1 STANDBY POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT PROTECTS THE
GCIL DRIVER AGAINST REVERSE CURRENT LEAKAGE FROM THE DRIVER IN
CASE OF SWITCH SI0 AND SII SHORT TO GROUND ON THE LOAD SIDE
CONTACTS. SHORT CIRCUIT FAILURE OF CRI5 WOULD NOT AFFECT
MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-155
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1585
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM-.
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AISCRI6
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) PANEL MODE PA 2 STANDBY POWER
CONTROL CIRCUIT
4) PANEL AIA2
5) DIODE, AI8CRI6
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AISCR16
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4246
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRI6 IN T_HEPA2 STANDBY POWER CONTROL CIRCU_[_RgTECTS THE
GCIL DRIVER AGAINST REVERSE CURRENT LEAKAGE FROM THE DRIVER IN
CASE OF SWITCH SIO AND SII SHORT TO GROUND ON THE LOAD SIDE
CONTACTS. SHORT CIRCUIT FAILURE OF CRI6 WOULD NOT AFFECT
MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE ....
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/B'7
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1586
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1AMP, A2F7
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) GROUND COMMAND POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
FUSE, 1 AMP, A2F7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] _ C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2F7
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE F7 PROVIDES OVERCURRENT PROTECTION TO THE S-BAND PM POWER
AMPLIFIER GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL) POWER CONTROL
CIRCUIT AND BUS BCI.
FAILURE OF FUSE F7 RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUND COMMAND CAPABILITY
TO APPLY POWER TO ONE OF THE S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIERS WHICH
RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CONTROL
PAs 1 AND 2 IN PANEL OR COMMAND MODE COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-157
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T_EPD&C/S-BAND
1587
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IAMP, A2FI4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CO_ICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) GROUND COMMAND POWER CoNTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
FUSE, 1 AMP, A2FI4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION : 36V73AIA2 F 14
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MIS_DLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION, -
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED •
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE FI4 PROVIDES OVERCURRENT PROTECTION TO THE S-BAND PM POWER
AMPLIFIER GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL) POWER CONTROL
CIR_IT_D_USBC2.
FAILURE OF FUSE FI4 RESULTS IN LOSS OF GROUND COMMAND CAPABILITY
TO APPLY POWER TO ONE OF THE S-BAND POWER AMPLIFIERS WHICH
RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANCY: LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY TO CONTROL
PAs 1 AND 2 IN PANEL OF COMMAND MOD_ COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT: 3/2R
1588 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2-W, AI5R3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) GROUND COMMAND POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2-W, AI5R3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AISR3
RWRSOSI211BR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR R3 PROTECTS BUS BCI AND THE S-BAND
POWER AMPLIFIER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT WIRING FROM CURRENT
OVERLOADS WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
RESISTOR R3 FAILING OPEN RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER UP
THE ASSOCIATED PREAMPLIFIER WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF RESISTOR R4 (IOA 1284) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
BOTH POWER AMPLIFIERS IN THE PANEL MODE. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO OPERATE PAl OR PA2 IN EITHER PANEL oR COMMAND
MODE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
_W
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1589
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2-W, AI5R4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
PM POWER AMPLIFIER (PA) GROUND COMMAND POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
RESISTOR, i. 2K OHM, 2-W, AI5R4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AI5R4
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211BR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION, :
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECT_RATIONALE:_. ,-
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR R4 PROTECTS BUS BC2 AND THE S-BAND
POWER AMPLIFIER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT WIRING FROM CURRENT ..........
oVER_A-_DS WHEN THE GCIL iS i_ T_ P_ MODE. _
RESISTOR R4 FAILING OPEN RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER UP
THE ASSOCIATED PREAMPLIFIER WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF RESISTOR R3 (IOA 1283) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
BOTH POWER AMPLIFIERS IN THE PANEL MODE. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO OPERATE PAl OR PA2 IN EITHER PANEL OR COMMAND
MODE COU--LD CAUSE LOSS OFMI_S_ON_. _I ......... _
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-160
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/B 
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1590
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J4-117)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS ANDTRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
FORWARD LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J4-117)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [N A ] c [ p ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARIII(J4-117)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DEDICATED HYBRID DRIVER IN FORWARD LCA 2 PROVIDES POWER TO
THE CONTROL LOGIC CIRCUIT OF THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND
SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ASSY (SBCA).
FAILURE OF THIS DEDICATED HYBRID DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE OF
THE LOGIC CIRCUITS CONTROLLING QUAD ANTENNA SELECTION SBCA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT DEDICATED HYBRID DRIVER
RESULTS IN LOSS OF ANTENNA SWITCHING CAPABILITY, EITHER BY GPC OR
PANEL CONTROL. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT IF QUAD ANTENNA
CONTROL IS LOST.
REFERENCES: VS70-740259, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-161
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1591 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI8(J4-117)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
FORWARD LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(J4-117)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI8ARIII(J4-117)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION, _
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: -
THIS DEDICATED HYBRID DRIVER IN FORWARD LCA 3 PROVIDES POWER TO
THE CONTROL LOGIC CIRCUIT OF THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND
SWITCH BEAM_ONTROL ASSY (_BCA). _ _ _ ..... _
FAILURE OF THIS DEDICATED HYBRID DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE OF
THE LOGIC CIRCUITS CONTROLLING QUAD_TE_A SELECTION S_BCA ....
SUBSEQUENT FAILU_ OF THE REDUND__DEDICATED HYBRID DRIVER .....
RESULTS IN LOSS OF ANTENNA SWITCHING CAPABILITY, EiTH_ BY GPC OR
PANEL CONTROL. LOSS OF MISSION COULD RESULT IF QUAD ANTENNA
CONTROL ISLOST.
REFERENCES: VS70-740259, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1592 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, A17(J4-117)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
FORWARD LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI7(J4-117)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARIII(J4&II7)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
] c [ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DEDICATED HYBRID DRIVER IN FORWARD LCA 2 PROVIDES PowER TO
THE CONTROL LOGIC CIRCUIT OF THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND
SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ASSY (SBCA)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT OF THIS HYBRID DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF
ABILITY TO TURN OFF THAT CONTROL LOGIC CIRCUIT. FAILURE OF BOTH
CONTROL LOGIC CIRCUITS COULD RESULT IN CONTINUOUS UNINTENTIONAL
POWER CONSUMPTION.
THE UNINTENTIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION IN ITSELF WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION OR ENDANGER CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740259, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-163
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/B7
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1593
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AI8(J4-117)
INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
FORWARD LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III, AIS(J4-117)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARIII(J4-117)
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS DEDICATED HYBRID DRIVER IN FORWARD LCA 3 PROVIDES POWER TO
THE CONTROL LOGIC CIRCUIT OF THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND
SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ASSY (SBCA) ...._ - .....
INADVERTENT OUTPUT OF THIS HYBRID DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF
ABILITY TO TURN OFF THAT CONTROL LOGIC CIRCUIT. FAILURE OF BOTH
CONTROL LOGIC CIRCUITS COULD RESULT IN CONTINUOUS UNINTENTIONAL
POWER CONSUMi_0N.
THE UNINTENTIONAL POWER CONSUMPTION IN ITSELF WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION OR ENDANGER CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: vS7O-74o259, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1594
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5 AMP, AI7(J4-117)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
FORWARD LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
FUSE, 5 AMP, AI7(J4-117)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V76AI7(J4-117)
PART NUMBER: ME451-0010-0121
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE IN FORWARD LCA 2 PROVIDES OVERCURRENT PROTECTION TO ONE
OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND SWITCH BEAM
CONTROL ASSEMBLY (SBCA) POWER CIRCUITS.
FAILURE OF THIS FUSE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE OF THE REDUNDANT S-
BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND SBCA POWER CONTROL CIRCUITS.
ANTENNA SWITCHING CAPABILITY IS LOST WITH FAILURE OF BOTH FUSES.
LOSS OF QUAD ANTENNA CONTROL COULD RESULT IN MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740259, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1595 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 5 AMP, AI8(J4-117)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
FORWARD LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
FUSE, 5 AMP, AI8 (J4-i17)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/_-
LIFTOFF: _ 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V76AI8(J4-117)
ME451-0010-0121
CAUSES : MIS_DLING, MECHANI_L_%HOCk/VIBRATION, i_ _ _
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS _
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE IN FORWARD LCA 3 PROVIDES OVERCURRENT PROTECTION TO ONE
OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND ANTENNA SW!TCHA_$Y _D_SWITC_ BEAM
CONTROL ASSEMBLY (SBC--A) POWER CIRCUITS'_ _ _ _!_ _ _ _ _
FAILURE OF THIS FUSE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ONE OF THE REDUNDANT S-
BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND SBCA POWER CONTROL CIRCUITS.
_TENNA SWITCHING CAPABILITY I_ST W_TH FAILURE OF BOTH FUSES.
LOSS OF QUAD ANTENNA CONTROL COULD RESULT IN MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES: VS70-740259, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1596
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2S5
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2S5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2S5
ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH $5 ON PANEL AIA2 PROVIDES THE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON EITHER
OF THE REDUNDANT SETS OF S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND SBCA
POWER CIRCUITS WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL MODE.
FAILURE OF $5 RESULTS IN LOSS OF REDUNDANCY IN THE S-BAND ANTENNA
SWITCH AND SBCA POWER CONTROL CIRCUITS WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE
PANEL MODE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF THE GCIL COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CONTROL OF
QUAD ANTENNA SWITCHING AND MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES:
HANDBOOK
VS70-740259, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-167
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1597
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2S5
FAILS SHORTED, FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) =ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PANEL AIA2
SWITCH, 2-POLE, 3-POS, A2S5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2S5
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH $5 ON PANEL AIA2 PROVIDES THE CAPABILITY TO TURN ON EITHER
OF THE REDUNDANT SETS OF S-BAND ANTE_ASWITCH A$S_AND SBCA
CONTROL CIRCUITS WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PAN_ MODE;_ ..........
$5 FAILED SHORTED RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER DOWN THE
SELECTED CONTRQL_G!CCIRCUIT IN THE PANE_MOD_ ........SUBSEQUENT_
FAILURE IN ASSOCIATED ANTENNA CONTROL ELECTONICS COULD PREVENT
ANTENNA SELECTION IN PANEL MODE. FAILURE COULD BE
COMPENSATED FOR BY SELECTING COMMAND MODE. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITYTO CONTROL ANTENNA SELECTION BY EITHER PANEL CONTROL
OR BY GPC COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS BECAUSE OF ATTITUDE
CONSTRAINTS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN S-BAND PM COMM.
REFERENCES:
HANDBOOK
VS70-740259, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1598 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI9CRI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AI9CRI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AI9CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4146
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRI PROTECTS THE GCIL DRIVER FROM SWITCH SHORTS. AN OPEN
CIRCUIT FAILURE OF CRI WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REDUNDANT CONTROL
LOGIC CIRCUIT.
A SUBSEQUENT OPEN FAILURE OF CR2 WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF PANEL
CONTROL FUNCTION.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF GCIL COMMAND MODE CONTROL COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740259, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1599
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, "AI9CR2
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AI9CR2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AIgCR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4146
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CR2 PROTECTS THE GCIL DRIVER FROM SWITCH SHORTS.
A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF ANALOGOUS DIODE CRI WOULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PANEL CONTROL FUNCTION.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF GCIL COMMAND MODE CONTROL COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740259, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1600
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, AI9CRI
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AI9CRI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AI9CRI
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4146
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CRI PROTECTS THE GCIL DRIVER FROM SWITCH SHORTS.
DIODE CRI WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
SHORTED
,mmm
REFERENCES: VS70-740259, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
il/O9/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1601
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE, CR2AI9
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
DIODE, AI9CR2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AI9CR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVlN4146
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION, ....
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE CR2 PROTECTS THE GCIL DRIVER FROM SWITCH SHORTS.
DIODE CRI WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE. ....
SHORTED
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REFERENCES: VS70-740259, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/09/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI9RI
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI9RI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2AI9R1
RWR80SI211BR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE" •
CURRENT LIMITING RESISTOR R1 PROTECTS THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH
ASSY AND SBCA POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT WIRING FROM CURRENT OVERLOADS
WHEN THE GCiL iS IN THE PANEL MODE.
RESISTOR R1 FAILING OPEN RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER UP
THE ASSOCIATED SWITCH ASSY AND SBCA WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL
MODE. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF RESISTOR R2 (IOA 1297) WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF THE ANTENNA SWITCHING FUNCTION.
SUBSEQUENT GCIL LOSS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
CONTROL QUAD ANTENNA SELECTION AND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-173
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 1603 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A19R2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA PANEL MODE POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA2
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, AI9R2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: -3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3 '
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 -
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2AI9R2
PART NUMBER: RWRSOSI211BR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION, .....
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
CURRENT LIMITING P.E_SISTORR2 PROTECTS THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH
ASSY AND SBCA POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT WIRING FROM CURRENT OVERLOADS
WHEN THE _CT-L IS IN THE PANEL_fOEEv -_ .....
RESISTOR R2 FAILING OPEN RESULTS IN LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER UP
THE ASSOCIATED SWITCH ASSY AND SBCA WHEN THE GCIL IS IN THE PANEL
MODE. SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF RESISTOR R1 (IOA 1296) WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF THE ANTENNA SWITCHING FUNCTION.
SUBSEQUENT GCIL LOSS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
CONTROL QUAD ANTENNA SELECTIO_--KND C_OULDCAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-740139, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1604 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IAMP, A2F5
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND PM/FM
3) ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA GROUND COMMAND POWER CONTROL
CIRCUIT
4) PANEL AIA2
5) FUSE, I AMP, A2F5
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA2F5
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE F5 ON PANEL AIA2 PROTECTS THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND
SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ASSY (SBCA) ELECTRONICS GROUND COMMAND POWER
CONTROL CIRCUIT FROM OVERCURRENT FAILURES.
FAILURE OF FUSE F5 WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF POWER TO THE S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND SBCA.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF FUSE FI2 WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF GROUND
COMMAND SWITCHING CAPABILITY. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL
ANTENNA SELECTION EITHER BY GPC CONTROL OR MANUALLY COULD IMPOSE
VEHICLE ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS CAUSING LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
HANDBOOK
VS70-740259, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-175
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
1605
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 1AMP, A2FI2
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
2) EPD&C/S-BAND
3) ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY & SBCA GROUND COMMAND POWER CONTROL
CIRCUIT
4) PANEL AiA2
5) FUSE, I AMP, A2FI2
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[NA] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA2FI2
ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE FI2 ON PANEL AIA2 PROTECTS THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY
AND SWITCH BEAM CONTROL ASSY (SBCA) ELECTRONICS GROUND COMMAND
POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT FROM OVERCURRENT FAILURES.
FAILURE OF FUSE FI2 WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF POWER TO THE S-BAND
ANTENNA SWITCH ASSY AND SBCA.
SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF FUSE F5 WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF GROUND COMMAND
SWITCHING CAPABILITY. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL ANTENNA
SELECTION EITHER BY GPC CONTROL OR MANUALLY COULD IMPOSE VEHICLE
ATTITUDE CONSTRAINTS CAUSING LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES:
HANDBOOK
VS70-740259, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-176
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/1s/s7
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1606
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2 ) CNTLBCl BUS
3) IA FUSE F9
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR ' AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF GCIL CMD PWR CONTROLLING NSPI PWR ON. PANEL
SW CONTROL REMAINS ACTIVE. FAILURE DISABLES ALL GCIL/PNL SW
CONTROL OF NSPI SYS CONFIG & ENCRYPTION CONFIG USING COMSEC I.
FULL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT SUPPLYING
28VDC TO CONTROL NSP2 & COMSEC 2. FAILURE ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS
OF 28VDC (NSPI ON) TO: S-BAND PM MODE SW & GCIL CMD PWR DISABLING
PNL SW/GCIL CONTROL OF THE S-BAND RL DATA ENABLE SIGNAL XPONDER 1
& 2; DATA SOURCE SELECTOR (RL OPS DATA) IN THE KU-BAND SIG
PROC; PILOT & MISSION SPECIALIST AUDIO PNL (SYS CONFIG CONTROL
BITS FOR AGI & AG2 COMM); &, UPLINK BLOCK PNL SWITCH (DISABLES
NSPI INHIBIT CMD). SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-177
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1607
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
CNTLBC2 BUS
IA FUSE Fi6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: . 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: cIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF GCIL CMD P_ CONTROLLING NSP2 PWR ON. PNL SW
CONTROL REMAINS ACTIVE. FAILURE DISABLES ALL GCIL/PNL SW CONTROL
OF NSP2 SYS CONFIG _ ENCRYPTIONCONFIGUSING COMSEC 2. PNL SW
CONTROL _MAI.S FOR BOTH NS;S PWR ON. ;AInURE ALSO RESULTS
IN LOSS OF 28VDC (NSPS ON) TO : S-BAND PM MODE SW & GCIL CMD PWR
DISABLING PNL SW/GCIL CONTROL OF S-BAND RL DATA ENABLE SIGNAL TO
XPONDE--R 1 & 2; SELECT OF RL OPS IN THE_-B-A_D=_G PROC; PLT & MS
AUD_OPNL_SYS=CONFIGCONTROL]TfTS=FOR AGI&A_2 COMM; &
UPLINK BLOCK PNL SW (DISABLES NSP2 INHIBIT CMD). LOSS OF CKT
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF S-BAND COMM & LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUND_tY(S_BAND_KU-BAND,_F) DISABLES STATE VECTOR
UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
m
11/18/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1608
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2) CNTBCI BUS
3) 1.2K RESISTOR AI4R2
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF NSPI PWR ON. GCIL
CONTROL OF NSPI REMAINS ACTIVE. FAILURE DISABLES ALL GCIL/PNL SW
CONTROL OF NSPI SYS CONFIG AND ENCRYPTION CONFIG USING COMSEC i.
FULL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PNL SWITCH/GCIL PWR
ON CONTROL OF NSP2 & COMSEC 2. FAILURE ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF
28VDC (NSPI ON) TO: S-BAND PM MODE SW & GCIL CMD PWR DISABLING
PNL SW/BCIL CONTROL OF THE S-BAND RL DATA ENABLE SIGNAL TO
XPONDER 1 & 2; DATA SOURCE SELECTOR (RL OPS DATA) IN THE KU-BAND
SIG PROC; PLT & MS AUDIO PNL (SYS CONFIG CONTROL BITS FOR AGI &
AG2 COMM); AND, UPLINK BLOCK PNL SW (DISABLES NSPI INHIBIT CMD).
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-179
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1609
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
CNTLBC2 BUS
1.2K RESISTOR AI4RI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ _=
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _.....
RESULTS IN LOSS OF PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF NSP2 PWR ON. GCIL
CONTROL OF NSP2 REMAINS ACTIVE. FAILURE DISABLES ALL GCIL/PNL SW
CONTROL OF NSP_SCQNF!G & ENCRYPT_ON_9ONFIG USING COMSEC 2.
FAILURE ALSO RESULTS IN _SS OF 28VDC (NSP2 0_) T_; S-BAND PM
MODE SW & GCIL CMD PWR DISABLING PNL SW/GCIL CONTROL OF THE S-
BAND RL DATA ENABLE SIGNAL TO XPONDER 1 & 2; DATA SOURCE SELECTOR
(RL OPS DATA)IN THE KU-BAND SIG PROC; PLT & MS AUDIO PNL (SYS_
CONFIG CONTROL B_=F_XGI & AG2 C_MM);_;__BLOCK R_L
SW (DISABLES NSP2 INHIBIT CMD). LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN LOSS OF SzBAND COMM& LOsS ogF MISSION. LOSSQF ALL REDUNDANCY
(S-B_D, KU-BAND,_F) DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES
WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1610
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:,
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
CNTLBCI BUS
1.2K RESISTOR
NSP POWER 1/2 ON/OFF SWITCH $23
DIODE AISCRI0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF PNL SW CONTROL OF NSPI PWR ON. GCIL CONTROL
OF NSPI REMAINS ACTIVE. FAILURE DISABLES ALL GCIL/PNL SW
CONTROL OF NSPI SYS CONFIG & ENCRYPTION CONFIG USINGCOMSEC i.
FULL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PNL SW/GCIL PWR ON CONTROL
OF NSP2 AND COMSEC 2. FAILURE ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC
(NSPI ON) TO: S-BAND PM MODE SW & GCIL CMD PWR DISABLING PNL
SW/GCIL CONTROL OF THE S-BAND RL DATA ENABLE SIGNAL TO XPONDER 1
& 2; DATA SOURCE SELECTOR (RL OPS DATA) IN THE KU-BAND SIG PROC;
PLT & MS AUDIO PNL (SYS CONFIG CONTROL BITS FOR AGI & AG2 COMM);
&, UPLINK BLOCK PNL SW (DISABLES NSPI INHIBIT CMD). SINGLE
FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
L
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-181
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/lO/SV
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1611
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
, FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2) DIODE AISCRI0
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/18/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1612
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2) CNTLBC2 BUS
3) 1.2K RESISTOR
NSP POWER 1/2 ON/OFF SWITCH $23
DIODE AI8CR9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF PNL SW CONTROL OF NSP2 PWR ON. GCIL CONTROL
OF NSP2 REMAINS ACTIVE. FAILURE DISABLES ALL GCIL/PNL SWITCH
CONTROL OF NSP2 SYS CONFIG & ENCRYPTION CONFIG USING COMSEC 2.
FAILURE ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC (NSP2 ON) TO: S-BAND PM
MODE SW & GCIL CMD PWR DISABLING PNL SW/GCIL CONTROL OF THE S-
BAND RL DATA ENABLE SIG TO XPONDER 1 & 2; DATA SOURCE SELECTOR
(RL OPS DATA) IN THE KU-BAND SIG PROC; PLT & MS AUDIO PNL (SYS
CONFIG CONTROL BITS FOR AGI & AG2 COMM) &, UPLINK BLOCK PNL SW
(DISABLES NSP2 INHIBIT CMD). LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN
LOSS OF S-BAND COMM & LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
(S-BAND,KUBAND,UHF) DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES
WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-183
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/io/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1613
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
DIODE AI8CR9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/sv
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1614
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
CNTLAB3 BUS
1.2K RESISTOR AIIRI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF 28VDC USED TO PWR ON COMSEC 1 AND 2.
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-185
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/8v
CO_ AND TRACK/EPD&C
1615
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_SISTOR, 1.2K
FAI_ OPEN
LEAD ANALYST : E .S . DAT._Y SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
NE_O_ SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
CNT_BI BUS
1.2K _SISTOR AIIR2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RT_:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/_NC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2' ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .... _
LOSS OF THE REDUNDANT PWR SUPPLY FOR COMSEC 1 AND 2. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY DISABLES ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES AND WOULD LIKELY
CAUSE LOSS OF A MISSION REQUIRING SECURE COMMUNICATIONS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1616
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RPC
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
2) MNA FPCI BUS
3) RPC 46
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 1
CAUSES: coNTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF 28VDC USED TO POWER ON COMSEC I.
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL RPC. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-187
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1617
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST : E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
S)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
MNA FPCl BUS
RPC 46
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 1
CAUSES: cONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
WOULD MAINTAIN 28VDC PWR SUPPLY TO COMSEC I.
NO EFFECTONMISSION/CREW/VEHiCLE.
FAILURE WOULD HAVE
REFERENCES". SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1618
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RPC
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
2) MNBFPC2 BUS
3) RPC 47
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANT SOURCE OF 28VDC USED TO PWR ON COMSEC i.
REDUNDANCY REMAINS TO PWR COMSEC 2. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
DISABLES ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES AND WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF A
MISSION REQUIRING SECURE COMMUNICATIONS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST sCHEM VS70-740229
F_ REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-189
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/23/B?
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1619
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
MNB FPC2 BUS
RPC 47
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWD PWR CONT ASSY 2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
WOULD MAINTAIN 28VDC PWR SUPPLY TO COMSEC I. FAILURE WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/24/sv
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1620
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RPC
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
2) MNA FPC 1 BUS
3) RPC 45
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF 28VDC TO PWR ON COMSEC 2. REDUNDANCY BY
PARALLEL RPC. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-191
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/24/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
1621
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3 :
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC
FAIL_ CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYSLEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) NETWORKSIGNAL PROCESSOR,COMSEC1/2
2) MNA FCP 1 BUS
3) RPC 45
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FWD PWR CONT ASSY 1
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : _ CO--N_AM-INATION, PfEC_--PKRT STRUCTURAi FA-IL_' VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _ _
WOULD MAINTAIN 28VDC PWR SUPPLY TO COMSEC 2.
NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
FAILURE WOULD HAVE
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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ww
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1622 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RPC
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
2) MNB FPC2 BUS
3) RPC 48
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...........
LOSS OF REDUNDANT SOURCE OF 28VDC USED TO PWR ON COMSEC 2. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES AND WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF A MISSION REQUIRING SECURE COMMUNICATIONS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-193
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/24/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1623
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
MNB FPC2 BUS
RPC 48
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORTFLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MAINTAIN 28VDC PWRWOULD ......................................SUPPLY TO COMSEC 2.
NO EFFECT ON MISSION CREW VEHICLE.
FAILURE WOULD HAVE
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/24/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1624
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
2) MNB FPC2 BUS
3) RPC 47
4) DIODE CRI6
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] S [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF 28VDC USED TO PWR ON COMSEC i. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY PARALLEL DIODE. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-195
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
11/24/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1625
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
MNB FPCI BUS
RPC 46
DIODE CR40
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD PWR CONT ASSY 2 _
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
LOSS OF REDUNDANT SOURCE OF 28VDC USED TO PWR ON_OMSE-C i.
REDUNDANCY REMAINS TO PWR COMSEC 2. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
DISABLES ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES AND WOULD LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF A
MISSION REQUIRING SECURE CO_ICATIONS.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/24/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1626
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
MNB FPC2 BUS
RPC 48
DIODE CRI7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF 28VDC TO PWR ON COMSEC 2. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY PARALLEL DIODE. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT
ON MISSION CREW VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-197
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/24/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1627
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
MNA FPCI BUS
RPC 45
DIODE CR 46
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD PWR CONT ASSY 2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_TIONALE;
LOSS OF REDUNDANT SOURCE OF 28VDC USED TO PWR ON COMSEC 72. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES AND WOULD
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF A MISSION REQUIRING SECURE COMMUNICATIONS.
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REFERENCES'. SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1628
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE(S)
FAILS SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, COMSEC 1/2
2) DIODES CR 16, 17, 40, 46
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEMATIC VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-199
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/ov/sv
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1629
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT" g
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
MNBFLC2 BUS
3A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, _CH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
RESULTS IN LOss OF PWR SOURCE TO DRIVER SUPPLYING 28VDC TO PNL
SWITCHES AND GCIL CMD PWR CONTROLLING NSPI SYS CONFIG &
ENCRYPTION CONFIG OF COMSEC I. FAILURE ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF
28VDC (NSPI ON) TO: S-BAND PM MODE SWITCH & GCIL CMD PWR
DISABLING PNL SW/GCIL CONTROL OF THE S-BAND RL DATA ENABLE SIGNAL
TO XPONDERI & 2; DATA SOURCE SELECTOR (RL OPS DATA) IN THE KU-
BAND SIG PROC; PLT & MS AUDIO PNL (SYS CONFIG CONTROL BITS FOR
AGI & AG2 COMM); &, UPLINK BLOCK PNL SWITCH (DISABLES NSPI
INHIBIT CMD). REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING
NSP2 AND COMSEC 2. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-200
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12107187
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1630
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2) MNCFLC3 BUS
3) 3A FUSE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF PWR SOURCE TO DRIVER SUPPLYING 28VDC TO PNL
SWITCHES & GCIL CMD PWR CONTROLLING NSP 2 SYS CONFIG & ENCRYPTION
CONFIG OF COMSEC 2. FAILURE ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC (NSP2
ON) TO : S-BAND PM MODE SWITCH & GCIL CMD PWR DISABLING PNL
SW/GCIL CONTROL OF THE S'BAND RL DATA ENABLE SIGNAL TO XPONDER 1
& 2; DATA SOURCE SELECTOR (RL OPS DATA) IN THE KU-BAND SIG PROC;
PLT & MS AUDIO PNL (SYS CONFIG CONTROL BITS FOR AGI & AG2 COMM);
&, UPLINK BLOCK PNL SWITCH (DISABLES NSP2 INHIBIT
CMD). LOSS OF ALL NSP REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF S-BAND COMM
& LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND,KU-BAND,UHF)
DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-201
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o7/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1631
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUSE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
MNBFLC2 BUS
FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION,PIECE,PART STRUCTURAL _
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIQNA_L _
RESULTS IN LOSS OF PWR SOURCE TO DRIVER SUPPLYING 28VDC TO PNL _
SWITCHES CONTROLLING NSPI SYSTEM CONFIGURATION AND ENCRYPTION
CONFIGU_RATION OF COMSEC I. GCIL CONTROL OF NSPI CONFIGURATION
REMAINS INTACT. RED_D_cY_VIDED_BY-_LEL CK"rCO_OLLiNG
NSP2 AND COMSEC 2. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/07/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1632
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: FUSE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
MNCFLC3 BUS
FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCH, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF PWR SOURCE TO DRIVER SUPPLING 28VDC TO PNL
SWITCHES CONTROLLING NSP2 SYSTEM CONFIGURATION AND ENCRYPTION
CONFIGURATION OF COMSEC 2. GCIL CONTROL OF NSP2 CONFIGURATION
REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL NSP REDUNDANCY RESULT IN LOSS OF
S-BAND COMMUNICATIONS AND LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
(S-BAND, KU-BAND, UHF) DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES
WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH i6.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-203
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o8/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1633
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
MNBFLC2 BUS
3A FUSE
DRIVER, TYPE ARIII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: -
RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC TO PNL SWITCHES AND GCIL CMD PWR
CONTROLLING NSPI SYSTEM CONFIGURATION AND ENCRYPTION
CONFIGURATION OF COMSEC I.__2AILURE ALSQ_SULTSI_Lg_SS_28VDC
(NSPI ON) TO: S-BAND PM MODE SWITCH AND GCIL CMD PWR DISABLING
PNL SW/GCIL CONTROL OF THE S-BAND RL DATA ENABLE SIGNAL TO
XPONDER 1 & 2; DATA SOURCE SELECTOR (RL OPS DATA) IN THE KU-BAND
SIG PROC; PLT & MS AUDIO PNL (SYS CONF CONTROL BITS FOR AGI & AG2
COMM); &, UPLINK BLOCK PNL SWITCH (DISABLES NSPI INHIBIT
CMD). REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP2 AND
COMSEC 2. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISsioN2cRE_E_CTLE_ ....................
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o8/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1634
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2) MNCFLC3 BUS
3) 3A FUSE
DRIVER, TYPE ARIII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C i P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC TO PNL SWITCHES AND GCIL CMD PWR
CONTROLLING NSP2 SYS CONFIG & ENCRYPTION CONFIG OF COMSEC 2.
FAILURE ALSO RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC (NSP2 ON) TO: S-BAND PM
MODE SWITCH AND GCIL CMD PWR DISABLING PNL SW/GCIL CONTROL OF THE
S-BAND RL DATA ENABLE SIGANL TO XPONDER 1 & 2; DATA SOURCE
SELECTOR (RL OPS DATA) IN THE KU-BAND SIG PROC; PLT & MS AUDIO
PNL (SYS CONFIG CONTROL BITS FOR AGI & AG2 COMM); &, UPLINK BLOCK
PNL SWITCH (DISABLES NSP2 INHIBIT CMD). LOSS OF ALL NSP
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF S-BAND COMM & LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND,KU-BAND,UHF) DISABLES STATE VECTOR
UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-205
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 1635 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
MNBFLC2 BUS
FUSE
DRIVER, TYPE ARI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3 _ !
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/!R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ _
B[P] C[P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD coNT ASSY 2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC TO PNL SWITCHES CONTROLLING NSPI SYSTEM
CONFIGURATION AND ENCRYPTION CONFIGURATION OF COMSEC i. GCIL
CONTROL OF NSPI CONFIGURATION REMAINS INTACT. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP2 AND COMSEC 2. SINGLE
FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740299 mm
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o8/8v
COMMA DN TRACK/EPD&C
1636
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
"ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
MNCFLC3 Bus
FUSE
DRIVER, TYPE ARI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC TO PNL SWITCHES CONTROLLING NSP2 SYSTEM
CONFIGURATION AND ENCRYPTION CONFIGURATION OF COMSEC 2. GCIL
CONTROL OF NSP2 CONFIGURATION REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL NSP
REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF S-BAND COMMUNICATIONS AND LOSS
OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND, UHF)
DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-207
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1637
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP POWER SWITCH $23
DRIVER, TYPE ARIII
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ _ _<
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC GCIL CMD PWR CONTROLLING NSPI SYSTEM "
CONFIGURATION. PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF NSPI CONFIG REMAINS INTACT.
FULL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING
NSP2. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/
VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-208
mm
I
i
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1638
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2) NSP POWER SWITCH $23
3) DRIVER, TYPE ARIII
4) DIODE
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY sCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCH, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC GCIL CMD PWR CONTROLLING NSP2 SYSTEM
CONFIGURATION. PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF NSP2 CONFIG REMAINS INTACT.
LOSS OF ALL NSP REDUNDANCY (GCIL AND PNL SWITCH CONTROL) RESULTS
IN LOSS OF S-BAND COMMUNICATIONS AND LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS
OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU'BAND, UHF) DISABLES STATE VECTOR
UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-209
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/sv
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1639
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP UPLINK DATA SELECT SWITCH $20
DIODE AI7CRI
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/IR
3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PiECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIQNA_:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND UPLINK DATA SOURCE
SELECTION SIGNAL TO NSPI MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL OF NSPI DATA
SOURCE SELECTION REMAINS INTACT. FULL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP2. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD
HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1640
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP UPLINK DATA SELECT SWITCH $20
DIODE AI7CR3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR . AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND UPLINK DATA SOURCE
SELECTION SIGNAL TO NSP2 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL OF NSP2 DATA
SOURCE SELECTION REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL S-BAND UPLINK DATA
SOURCE SELECTION REDUNDANCY WOULD RESTRICT UPLINK TO KU-BAND.
LOSS OF S-BAND/KUBAND UPLINK DATA SOURCE SELECTION COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND,
UHF) DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1641
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: _
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP UPLINK DATA SELECT SWITCH $20
DIODE AI7CR2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/_R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT:I 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
VIBRATION,MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE! _.... _;_o
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF KU-BAND UPLINK DATA SOURCE
SIGNAL TO NSPI MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL OF NSPI DATA SOURCE
SELECTION REMAINS INTACT. FULL FL'NCTIQNALREDUNDANCYpROVIDED BY
PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP2. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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l
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/av
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1642
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
q
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP UPLINK DATA SELECT SWITCH $20
DIODE AI7CR4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PREI&AUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
I2iNDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANE; AIA2
PART NUMBER:
B[F] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF KU-BAND UPLINK DATA SOURCE
SELECTION SIGNAL TO NSP2 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL OF NSP2 DATA
SOURCE SELECTION REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL KU-BAND UPLINK DATA
SOURCE SELECTION REDUNDANCY WOULD RESTRICT UPLINK TO
S-BAND. LOSS OF S-BAND/KU-BAND UPLINK DATA SOURCE SELECTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND,
KU-BAND, UHF) DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-213
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1643 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2) NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S18
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
B)
9)
DIODE AI7CR5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF DOWNLINK HDR SELECTION SIGNAL
TO NSPI MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. FULL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP2.
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE._
I
M
I
in
mm
m
I
g
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1644
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
, 3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S18
DIODE AI7CR7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF DOWNLINK HDR SELECTION SIGNAL
TO NSP2 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL
HDR TRANSMIT SELECTION REDUNDANCY WOULD RESTRICT TRANSMISSION TO
LDR. LOSS OF HDR/LDR SELECTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND, UHF)
DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-215
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1645
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST : E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S18
DIODE AI7CR6
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT _PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO : 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
SHOCK, T ER L STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...............
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF DOWNLINK LDR SELECTION SIGNAL
TO NSPI MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. FULL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CAT CONTROLLING NSP2.
SING_FAILUREWOULb=HAVENO EF_E_ONMISSION/C_W/VEHIC_. _
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1646
ITEM: DIODE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S18
DIODE AI7CR8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF DOWNLINK LDR SELECTION SIGNAL
TO NSP2 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL
LDR TRANSMIT SELECTION REDUNDANCY WOULD RESTRICT TRANSMISSION TO
HDR. LOSS OF HDR/LDR SELECTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND, UHF) DISABLES
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1647
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S19
DIODE AI7CR9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
PANEL AIA2LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RAtIOnAl:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH C0NTROL OF UPLINK HDR SELECTION SIGNAL
TO NSPI MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. FULL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP2.
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740299
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-218
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1648
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S19
DIODE AI7CRII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/iR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF UPLINK HDR SELECTION SIGNAL
TO NSP2 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL
HDR UPLINK SELECTION REDUNDANCY WOULD RESTRICT TRANSMISSION TO
LDR. LOSS OF HDR/LDR SELECTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND, UHF)
DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
i
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1649
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S19
DIODE AI7CRIO
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/iR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] _ B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ -_
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF UPLINK LDR SELECTION SIGNAL
TO NSPI MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. FULL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDEDBY_P_LLELCKT CONTROLLING NSP2.
SING_ FAILURE WOULD HA_NO--EFFECTON MISSION/C_w/vEHICLE-_
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/sv
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1650
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S19
DIODE AI7CRI2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/_R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURALL FAILURE,
VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF UPLINK LDR SELECTION TO NSP2
MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL LDR
UPLINK SELECTION REDUNDANCY WOULD RESTRICT TRANSMISSION TO HDR.
LOSS OF HDR/LDR SELECTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND, UHF) DISABLES STATE
VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-221
D
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1651
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S19
DIODE AI7CRI3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FA_VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND TRANSPONDER 1 HDR
UPLINK SELECTION. GCIL CONTROL OF TRANSPONDER 1 SELECTION
REMAINS INTACT. _££ _CTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BI_PARALLEL
CKT CONTROLLING T_SPONb_ 2.-- SINGLE FAILURE WOU-L-D HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1652
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S19
DIODE AITCRI5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER 2 HDR
UPLINK SELECTION. GCIL CONTROL OF TRANSPONDER 2 SELECTION
REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL HDR SELECTION ON TRANSPONDERS 1/2
WOULD RESTRICT UPLINK TO LDR. LOSS OF BOTH HDR/LDR SELECTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND,
KU-BAND, UHF) DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-223
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1653
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S19
DIODE AI7CRI4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/IR
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER 1 LDR
UPLINK SELECTION. GCIL CONTROL OF TRANSPONDER 1 SELECTION
REMAINS INTACT. FULL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL
CKT CONTROLLING TRANSPONDER 2. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1654
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2) NSP DATA RATE SELECT SWITCH S19
3) DIODE AI7CRI6
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART sTRuCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER 2 LDR
UPLINK SELECTION. GCIL CONTROL OF TRANSPONDER 2 SELECTION
REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL LDR SELECTION ON TRANSPONDERS 1/2
WOULD RESTRICT UPLINK TO HDR. LOSS OF BOTH HDR/LDR SELECTION
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND,
KU-BAND, UHF) DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-225
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1655
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP CODING SELECT SWITCH $21
DIODE AISCRI
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/ 3 TAL: 3/ 3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL O?DO_LINK CODING ON _ SIGNAL TO
NSP 1 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. FULL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP 2.
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1656
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP CODING SELECT SWITCH $21
DIODE AI8CR3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF DOWNLINK CODING ON SIGNAL TO
NSP2 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO SELECT DOWNLINK CODING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND, UHF) DISABLES
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
ram.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-227
DATE."
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/12/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1657 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP CODING SELECT SWITCH $21
DIODE AI8CR2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
• DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF DOWNLINK CODING OFF SIGNAL TO
NSP 1 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. FULL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP 2.
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1658
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2) NSP CODING SELECT SWITCH $21
3 ) DIODE AI8CR4
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF DOWNLINK CODING OFF SIGNAL TO
NSP 2 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO TURN OFF DOWNLINK CODING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND, UHF)
DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-229
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1659
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP CODING SELECT SWITCH $22
DIODE AI8CR5
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATiONALE_ _ _ ...... ........._ _'_ _
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF UPLINK CODING ON SIGNAL TO
NSP 1 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. FULL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP 2.
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/Bv
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1660
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP CODING SELECT SWITCH $21
DIODE AISCR7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF UNLINK CODING ON SIGNAL TO
NSP 2 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO SELECT UPLINK CODING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALLREDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND, UHF) DISABLES
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
m
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-231
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/12/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1661
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP CODING SELECT SWITCH $21
DIODE AISCR6
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF UPLINK CODING OFF SIGNAL TO
NSP i MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. FULL
FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP 2.
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299 mm
N
!
Q
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-232
i
B
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/12/87
COMI_ AND TRACK/EPD&C
1662
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAI_S OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP CODING SELECT SWITCH $21
DIODE AI8CR8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC PNL SWITCH CONTROL OF UPLINK CODING OFF SIGNAL TO
NSP 2 MODE CONTROL. GCIL CONTROL REMAINS INTACT. LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY TO TURN OFF UPLINK CODING COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-COMM, UHF) DISABLES
STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229, VS70-740299
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-233
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
1663
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE M.ODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SELECT SWITCH $25
DIODE AI3CRI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R .AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: _.........._ .....
WITH NSP 1 ON, RESULTS IN _SS 07 28VDC RECEIVE ENCRYPTED SIGNAL
TO NSP i. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS INPUT PROVIDED VIA DIODE AI3CR2,
BUT SWITCH25MUSTBE IN SELECT AND SWITCH 26 IN T/R QR RCV.
HOWEVER, THESE SW POSITIONS DISABLE_ RCD ENC_YPT_ON_G_L TO
NSP I. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/14/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1664
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SELECT SWITCH $25
DIODE AI3CR2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH NSP 1 ON, RESULTS IN REDUNDANT PATH LOSS OF 28VDC RECEIVE
ENCRYPTED SIGNAL TO NSP i. FULL FUNCTIONAL REDUNDANCY PROVIDED
BY PARALLEL CKT CONTROLLING NSP 2. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY
DISABLES ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES AND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-235
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/15/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1665
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SELECT SWITCH $25
DIODE AI3CR4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURALFAILURE, VIBRATION,
_MECH SHOCK, THERMAL _ STRES_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH NSP 2 ON, RESULTS IN LOSS OF 28VDC RECEIVE ENCRYPTED SIGNAL
TO NSP 2. REDUNDANCY FOR THIS INPUT PROVIDED VIA DIODE AI3CR3,
BUT SWITCH 25 MUST BE IN SELECT AND SWITCH 26 ON T/R OR RCV.
HOWEVER, THESE SWPOSITIONS DISABLE RCD ENCRYPTED SIGNAL
TO NSTP 2. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
r
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/lS/Sv
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
1666
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR, FORWARD/RETURN LINK
2) NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SELECT SWITCH $25
3) DIODE AI3CR3
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH NSP 2 ON, RESULTS IN REDUNDANT PATH LOSS OF 28VDC RECEIVE
ENCRYPTED SIGNAL TO NSP 2. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY DISABLES
ENCRYPTION CAPABILITIES AND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES-. SSSH 16.3, SYST SCHEM VS70-740229
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
5/14/87
COMM & TRACK
2001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND FM TRANSMITTER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND FM TRANSMITTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC478-0106-3001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE S-BAND FM SYSTEM PROVIDES A ONE-WAY WIDE-BAND CHANNEL FOR
TRANSMITTING DATA DIRECTLY TO NASA OR DOD GROUND STATIONS. THERE
ARE TWO IDENTICAL TRANSMITTERS, USED ONE AT A TIME. LOSS OF THE
S-BAND FM TELEMETRY LINK _W0--U-LD_NOT-CAUSE MIS_Zo_TERMINKTIoN
NOR POSE A THREAT TO CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCEs: SYST_ sCHE_MATIC=_S70-i40279; SSSH i6.1, 16.2, 16 8;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF Ii; JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/14/87
COMM & TRACK
2002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND FM TRANSMITTER
ERRATIC OPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND FM TRANSMITTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ i
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC478-0106-3001
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE S-BAND FM SYSTEM PROVIDES A ONE-WAY WIDE-BAND CHANNEL FOR
TRANSMITTING DATA DIRECTLY TO NASA OR DOD GROUND STATIONS. THERE
ARE TWO IDENTICAL TRANSMITTERS, USED ONE AT A TIME. LOSS OF THE
S-BAND FM TELEMETRY LINKWOULDNOT CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION
NOR POSE A THREAT TO CREW/VEHICLE.
w
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740279; SSSH 16.1, 16.2, 16.8;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF ii, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
w
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-239
-- i
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
5/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT:
2003 ABORT:
S-BAND FM RF TRANSFER SWITCH
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND FM RF TRANSFER SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3 _
3/
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: ME452-0152-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
LOSS OF INPUT, vIBRATION
c C ]
PIECE-PART FAILURE,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: i_i!_ ........ ;m_;_;_::_ ____i!_i!_ ]_,!!_i
THE TRANSFER SWITCH ACCEPTS THE RF OUTPUT OF EITHER S-BAND FM
XMTR 1 OR XMTR 2 AND ROUTES THE RF SIGNAL TO THE HEMI ANTENNA
SECTION OF THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY. LOSS OF TRANSFER
SWITCH FUNCTION WOULD NOT CAUSE MIS$ION TERMINATION NOR POSE A
THREAT TO VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259, VS70-740279; SSSH
16.1, 16.2, 16.8; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF ii, JSC-12820 FLIGHT
RULES SECTION Ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/19/87
COMM & TRACK
2004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND FM RF TRANSFER SWITCH
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND FM RF TRANSFER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: ME452-0152-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TRANSFER SWITCH ACCEPTS THE RF OUTPUT OF EITHER S-BAND FM
XMTR 1 OR SMTR 2 AND ROUTES THE RF SIGNAL TO THE HEMI ANTENNA
SECTION OF THE S-BAND ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY. LOSS OF TRANSFER
SWITCH FUNCTION WOULD NOT CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION OR POSE A
THREAT TO VEHICLE/CREW.
m
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259, VS70-740279; SSSH
16.1, 16.2, 16.8; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF ii, JSC-12820 FLIGHT
RULES SECTION ii
m_
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/19/87
COMM & TRACK
2005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND HEMI ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY"
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND HEMI ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC478-0106-4004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HEMI ANTENNA RF SWITCH ROUTES THE S-BAND FM RF SIGNAL TO
EITHER THE UPPER OR LOWER HEMI ANTENNA AND SIMULTANEOUSLY
CONNECTS THE HEMI NOT BEING USED FOR THE DOWNLINK FM RF TO THE
EMU TV RECEIVER, WHICH IS IN THE ORBITER MIDDECK AREA. THUS
WHILE THE LOWER HEMI IS IN USE FOR TELEMETRY TO GROUND, THE UPPER
HEM! IS AVAILABLE TORECE!_ RF MODU_TED BY TV SCENES FROM AN
EXTRA-VEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT, AND VICE VERSA. _SS OF SW_TC_
AsSEMBiY FUNCTION AND CONS_EQUEN--TLoss OF S_BKNDFM--DOWNLINK
RF SIGNAL AND/OR EMU TV SCENE WOULD NOT CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION
OR POSE A THREAT TO VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF I0, ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/19/87
COMM & TRACK
2006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND HEMI ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND HEMI ANTENNA SWITCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC478-0106-4004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HEMI ANTENNA RF SWITCH ROUTES THE S-BAND EM RF SIGNAL TO
EITHER THE UPPER OR LOWER HEMI ANTENNA AND SIMULTANEOUSLY
CONNECTS THE HEMI NOT BEING USED FOR THE DOWNLINK FM RF TO THE
EMU TV RECEIVER, WHICH IS IN THE ORBITER MIDDECK AREA. THUS
WHILE THE LOWER HEMI IS IN USE FOR TELEMETRY TO GROUND, THE UPPER
HEMI IS AVAILABLE TO RECEIVE RF MODULATED BY TV SCENES FROM AN
EXTRA-VEHICULAR MOBILITY UNIT, AND VICE VERSA. LOSS OF SWITCH
ASSEMBLY FUNCTION AND CONSEQUENT LOSS OF S-BAND FM DOWNLINK
RF SIGNAL AND/OR EMU TV SCENE WOULD NOT CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION
OR POSE A THREAT TO VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF I0, Ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-243
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2007 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FM (HEMI) RF SWITCH ELECTRONICS
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
RF COMM
HEMI SWITCH ELECTRONICS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC478-0106-4004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HEMI RF SWITCH IS CONTROLLED BY EITHER OF TWO (REDUNDANT)
CONTROL ELECTRONICS LOGIC CIRCUITS, EACH OF WHICH CONTROLS ONE OF
TWO (REDUNDANT) SETS OF SWITCH oPE_TING COILS. LOSS OF OUTPUT
OF A CONTROL/DRIVER CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ACTUATION
CAPABILITY FOR SELECTION OF THE ASSOCIATED SWITCH POSITION (AND
THUS CAPABILITY FOR SELECTION OF THE ASSOCIATED HEMI ANTENNA) BY
THAT ELECTRONICS SET. WITH LOSS OF ONE CONTROL CHANNEL, THE
REDUNDANT CHANNEL WOULD BE USED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
CONTROL SELECTION OF HEMI ANTENNAS WOULD NOT CAUSE MISSION
TERMINATION NOR WOULD IT POSE A THREAT TO VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF I0, ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/19/87
COMM & TRACK
2008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND HEMI ANTENNA
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND HEMI ANTENNAS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD FUSELAGE
ME481-0090-0003, 0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TWO HEMI ANTENNAS, USED ONE AT A TIME FOR THE DOWNLINK S-BAND
FM RF SIGNAL FOR TELEMETRY TO GROUND, ARE SELECTED EITHER UNDER
GPC CONTROL OR MANUALLY FOR OPTIMUM LOOK ANGLE TO A GROUND
STATION. WHILE THE LOWER HEMI IS BEING USED FOR TELEMETRY TO
GROUND, THE UPPER ONE CAN BE USED FOR RECEIPT OF RF MODULATED BY
AN EMU TV CAMERA SCENE, AND VICE VERSA. LOSS OF HEMI ANTENNA
FUNCTION AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF S-BAND FM DOWNLINK RF SIGNAL
AND/OR EMU TV SCENE WOULD NOT CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION OR POSE A
THREAT TO VEHICLE/CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF I0, ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-245
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/19/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2009 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND HEMI ANTENNA
ERRATIC OPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND FM SYSTEM
3 ) RF COMM
4) S-BAND HEMI ANTENNAS
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH : 3/ 3 RT LS : 3 / 3
LIFTOFF : 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA : 3/3
DEORBIT : 3/3 ATO : 3/3
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ME481-0090-0003, 0004
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE TWO HEMI ANTENNAS, USED ONE AT A TIME FOR THE DOWNLINK S-BAND
FM RF SIGNAL FOR TELEMETRY TO GROUND, ARE SELECTED EITHER UNDER
GPC CONTROL OR MANUALLY FOR OPTIMUM LOOK ANGLE TO A GROUND
STATION. WHILE T_HE LOWER HEMI IS...........BEING USED FQR TELEMETRY TO ._
GRO_D?-THE UPPER O_N-E CAN BE USED FQR RE EC_PT OF RF O_LATED BY
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AN EMU TV CAMERA SCENE, AND VICE VERSA. LOSS OF HEMI ANTENNA
FUNCTION AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF S-BAND FM DOWNLINK RF SIGNAL
AND/O__EMU TV SCENE_W-OULD NbT_CAUSEMI_S!O_TERM!NATIONORPOSE A
THREAT TO VEHI_E_/CREW_ _ ......_ _ "..................
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF i0, II
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-246
M
mm
u
I
w
ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
2010 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TO SWITCH
S-BAND FM POWER SWITCH
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND FM SYSTEM POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIR
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH HAS THREE POSITIONS: I/OFF/2. WITH THE GCIL SWITCH
(PANEL/COMMAND) IN "PANEL", THE FM SYSTEM PANEL POWER SWITCH HAS
CONTROL OF POWER APPLICATION TO FM XMTR I/FMSP 1 (POSITION i), FM
XM'fR 2/FMSP 2 (POSITION 2), OR TO NEITHER SET (OFF). IF
THE GCIL SWITCH IS IN "COMMAND," CONTROL OF POWER APPLICATION IS
VIA GCIL COMMAND OR SSO KYBD ONLY. WITH LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
CONTROL POWER TO THE S-BAND FM SYSTEM LRUS BY PANEL POWER SWITCH,
THE SYSTEM SELECTIONS WOULD BE MANAGED BY GROUND COMMAND,
WHICH IS THE NORMAL CONTROL MODE. COMPLETE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
CONTROL POWER TO THE SYSTEM IN EITHER "PANEL" OR "COMMAND" MODE
WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF i0, ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-247
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/2o/87
COMM & TRACK
2011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND FM POWER SWITCH
SHORTED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
?/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
RF COMM
S-BAND FM SYSTEM POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIR
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS THREE-POSITi0N SWITCH (I/OFF/2) CONTROLS POWER TO FM XMTR I,
FMSP I/(OFF)_ XMTR 2, FMSP 2 WHEN THE S-BAND _ SYSTEM IS iN
THE GCIL "PANEL" MODE. A SHORT TO GROUND IN THE SWITCH COULD
KILL LRU VOLTAGE FROM EITHER CONTROL BUS BCI (FOR FM LRU
STRING i) OR CONTROL BUS BC2 (STRING 2), OR POSSIBLY BOTH BUSSES,
BUT EACH BUS CIRCUIT IS PROTECTED BY__ !.2 K-QHMCURRENT-LIMITING
RESISTOR. HOWEVER, POWER FOR BOTH GCIL "PANEL" AND.COMMAND"
MODES coUL_BE LOST FOR EITHER STRING OR BOTH STRI_G_ -
COMPLETE LOSS OF BOTH STRINGS WOULD NOT CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO
..... _ ........
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259; SSSH 16.1, 16.2;
INCO/CONM SYSTEMS BRIEF 10, 11
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/2o/87
COMM & TRACK
2012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND FM SYSTEM PANEL/COMMAND GCIL SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC
S-BAND FM SYSTEM PANEL/COMMAND SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: _ 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIR
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PERMITS PANEL CONTROL OF THE S-BAND FM SYSTEM
CONFIGURATION BY THE CREW WHEN IT IS IN THE "PANEL" POSITION, AND
CONTROL BY GROUND GCIL COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD ENTRIES WHEN IT IS IN
THE "COMMAND" POSITION. A HARD INTERNAL SHORT TO GROUND COULD
TRIP CB44 (MNA) AND CB49 (MNC) ON PANEL RIS, DISABLING "COMMAND"
MODE FOR ALL FIVE COMM GCIL SYSTEMS AND CAUSING DEFAULT TO PANEL
MODE FOR THEM. LOSS OF OPERATIONAL REDUNDANCY FOR CONTROL OF THE
S-BAND FM SYSTEM BY PANEL SWITCHES ("PANEL" MODE) WOULD
NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE. HOWEVER, SUCH A
FAULT COULD BE CRITICAL TO OTHER SYSTEMS (E.G., SEE 142, S-BAND
PM/NSP SYSTEM PNL/CMD SWITCH) BECAUSE OF DEFAULT TO PNL MODE FOR
ALL FIVE C&T GCIL SYSTEMS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259, VS70-740299; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF I0, II
u
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/21/87
COMM & TRACK
2013
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND FM SYSTEM DATA SOURCE SELECTOR
ALL CREDIBLE MODES
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
DATA SOURCE SELECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIR
ME452-0093-5037
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ROTARY SWITCH PERMITS THE CREW TO USE PANEL SWITCHES TO
SELECT FROM AMONG SEVEN POSSIBLE DATA SOURCES WITH THE S-BAND FM
SYSTEM IN "PANEL" MODE, AND CONTROL BY GROUND GCIL COMMANDS OR
KEYBOARD ENTRIES WHEN IT IS IN "COMMAND" MODE. LOSS OF FUNCTION
OF THE SELECTOR SWITCH AND CONSEQUENT LOSS OF THE S-BAND FM
SYSTEM WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740259, VS70-740299; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF i0, Ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 2014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: S-BAND FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR
FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND FM SYSTEM
SIGNAL PROCESSING
S-BAND FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC478-0106-3501
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ACTIVE S-BAND FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR ACCEPTS DATA INPUTS
SELECTED BY THE DATA SOURCE SELECTOR ROTARY SWITCH WITH THE S-
BAND FM SYSTEM IN GCIL "PANEL" MODE, OR AS SELECTED BY GCIL
GROUND COMMAND OR BY KEYBOARD IN "COMMAND" MODE. INPUT SIGNALS
- ANALOG OR DIGITAL - ARE ROUTED TO SIGNAL CONDITIONING OR
FILTERING DEVICES AS APPROPRIATE AND THEN SENT TO THE FM XMTR.
UPON FAILURE OF THE ACTIVE FMSP, THE REDUNDANT STRING (FMSP/XMTR)
WOULD BE USED. LOSS OF BOTH FM STRINGS WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO
MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740269; SSSH 16.1, 16.8; INCO/COMM
SYSTEMS BRIEF ii; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-251
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/05/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN CIRCUIT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM TRANSMITTER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7ARIII(J6-A)
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 PROVIDES DEDICATED 28VDC POWER TO THE
ASSOCIATED S-BAND FM TRANSMITTERS.
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER TO ONE OF THE TWO
REDUNDANT FM TRANSMITTERS.
A SECOND FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF BOTH FM TRANSMITTERS.
HQWE_rR__THE FUNCTIQ _ OF THE _ TRANSMITTER IS NO _ CRITICAL TO
THE MISSION AND ITS LOSS WOULD NOT ENDANGER THE CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFE_NCES: VS70-740279, SPACE SHUTT_ SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
m
m
i
i
I
B
m
[]
a
m
B
B
__ i
m
B
B
M
N
J
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-252
=
n
l
Dm
u
w
L_
z
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o5/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM TRANSMITTER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AISARIII(J5-Z)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 PROVIDES DEDICATED 28VDC POWER TO THE
ASSOCIATED S-BAND FM TRANSMITTER.
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF POWER TO ONE OF THE TWO
REDUNDANT FM TRANSMITTERS.
A SECOND FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF BOTH FM TRANSMITTERS.
HOWEVER, THE FUNCTION OF THE FM TRANSMITTER IS NOT CRITICAL TO
THE MISSION AND ITS LOSS WOULD NOT ENDANGER THE CREW OR VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o5/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MgDE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III
FAILS SHORTED, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM TRANSMITTER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 .AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ ....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 82V76AI7ARIII(J6-A)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 2 PROVIDES DEDICATED 28VDC POWER TO THE
ASSOCIATED S-BAND FM TRANSMITTERS ..............._ ........................
THIS_ F_E_ WOUiD _sUhT _I_iLI_TO __ _A_ECTED
FMTRANSMITTER.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/05/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT'.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE III
FAILS SHORTED, INADVERTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM TRANSMITTER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
HYBRID DRIVER, TYPE IIi
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
• ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI8ARIII(J5-Z)
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS HYBRID DRIVER IN LCA 3 PROVIDES DEDICATED 28VDC POWER TO THE
ASSOCIATED S-BAND FM TRANSMITTERS.
THIS FAILURE WOULD RESULT IN INABILITY TO TURN OFF THE AFFECTED
FMTRANSMITTER.
THIS FAILURE WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-255
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3 AMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM RF POWER SWITCH CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 2
FUSE, 3 AMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI7(J4-121)
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE IN LCA 2 PROTECTS THE ASSOCIATED FM TRANSMITTER "POWER-
ON" INDICATION CIRCUIT.
FAILURE OF THIS FUSE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO USE THE
ASSOCIATED FM TRANSMITTER. A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF USE OF THE FM TRANSMISSION FUNCTION.
THE FM TRANSMITTER FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS NOT CRITICAL TO THE MISSION
OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3 AMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM RF POWER SWITCH CONTROL CIRCUIT
LOAD CONTROL ASSY (LCA) 3
FUSE, 3 AMP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT_ 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SA?ING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
82V76AI8(J4-121)
ME451-0010-I030
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS FUSE IN LCA 3 PROTECTS THE ASSOCIATED FM TRANSMITTER "POWER-
ON" INDICATION CIRCUIT.
FAILURE OF THIS FUSE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO USE THE
ASSOCIATED FM TRANSMITTER. A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE IN THE REDUNDANT
CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF USE OF THE FM TRANSMISSION FUNCTION.
THE FM TRANSMITTER FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS NOT CRITICAL TO THE MISSION
OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-257
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o5/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, $3
FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO TRANSFER
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM TRANSMITTER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA3
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, $3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA3S3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH $3 ON PANEL AIA3 PROVIDES THE CAPABILITY TO APPLY POWER TO
ONE OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND FM TRANSMITTERS.
FAILURE OF THIS SWITCH TO TURN ON POWER TO ONE OF THE _
TRANSMITTERS CAUSES LOSS OF USE OF THAT TRANSMITTER. THIS
FAILURE WOULD_ NOT BE CRITICAL TO THE MISSION OR THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, VS70-740269, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o5/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, $3
FAILS SHORTED TO GROUND
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM TRANSMITTER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA3
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, $3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA3S3
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURALMALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH $3 ON PANEL AIA3 PROVIDES THE CAPABILITY TO APPLY POWER TO
ONE OF THE REDUNDANT S-BAND FM TRANSMITTERS.
WITH THE SWITCH FAILED SHORTED TO GROUND THE FM TRANSMITTER
FUNCTION WOULD BE LOST.
LOSS OF THE S-BAND FM TRANSMITTER FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO
EITHER THE MISSION OR THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, VS70-740269, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-259
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/os/8v
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATION
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, S3
FAILS SHORTED CONTACT TO CONTACT, INADVERTENT
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM TRANSMITTER POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA3
SWITCH, 4-POLE, 3-POS, $3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA3S3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL/STRUCTURAL MALFUNCTION,
SHOCK/VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION CORROSION DETERIORATION,
TEMPERATURE LIMITS EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIg_A_: ....
SWITCH $3 ON PANEL AIA3 PROVIDES THE CAPABILITY TO APPLY POWER TO
ONE OFTH_ANT-S-_B_iNDFMTRANSMITTERS-WITHTHE FM SYSTEM
IN PANEL MODE. THIS FAILURE COULD CAUSE BOTH FM TRANSMITTERS TO
BE POWERED SIMULTANEOUSLY. THIS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF FUNCTION OF
BOTH TRANSMITTERS BECAUSE THE-RF T_SFERSWITCH WOULD CYCLE.
LOSS OF THE S-BAND FM TRANSMITTER FUNCTION IS NOT
CRITICAL TO EITHER THE MISSION OR THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, VS70-740269, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT"
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2R8
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR UNIT #i POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA3
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2R8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA3A2R8
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RESISTOR PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING PROTECTION TO THE
ASSOCIATED FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE POWER TO THE
FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR #I CONTROL CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF THE S-BAND FM SYSTEM FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO EITHER
THE MISSION OR THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, VS70-740269, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2R9
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FMTRANSMITTER #i POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA3
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2R9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA3A2R9
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RESISTOR PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING PROTECTION TO THE FM
TRANSMITTER #I POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE POWER TO FM
TRANSMITTER #i.
LOSS OF THE S-BAND FM TRANSMITTER FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO
EITHER THE_SS--iON OR THE CREW/VEHICLE, _i
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, VS70-740269, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
U
mR
m
mm
I
mm
m
mR
: =
mm
U
I
l
m
g
mm
g
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-262
w
I
mr
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2R10
FAILS OPEN °
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR UNIT #2 POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA3
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2RI0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
36V73AIA3A2RI0
RWRSOSI211FR
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RESISTOR PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING PROTECTION TO THE
ASSOCIATED FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT.
THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO PROVIDE POWER TO THE
FM SIGNAL PROCESSOR #2 CONTROL CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF THE S-BAND FM SYSTEM FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO EITHER
THE MISSION OR THE CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, VS70-740269, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
11/o9/87
C&T/EPD&C/S-BAND
2513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2RII
FAILS O2EN
LEAD ANALYST: W.W. ROBINSON SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMMUNICATIONS AND TRACKING
EPD&C/S-BAND
FM TRANSMITTER #2 POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
PANEL AIA3
RESISTOR, 1.2K OHM, 2W, A2RII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 36V73AIA3A2Ril
PART NUMBER: RWRSOSI211FR
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, MECHANICAL SHOCK/VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION/CORROSION/DETERIORATION, TEMPERATURE LIMITS
EXCEEDED.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RESISTOR PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING PROTECTION TO THE FM
TRANSMITTER #2 POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT.
THIS FA/_U!%E WOULD CAUSE_SS O=FABI_!Ty TO PRQVIDE_OWER TO THE
FMTRANSMITTER #2.
LOSS OF THE S-BAND FM TRANSMITTER FUNCTION IS NOT CRITICAL TO
EITHER THE _MISSi0N OR THE dREW/VEH_ ......
REFERENCES: VS70-740279, VS70-740269, VS70-740299, SPACE SHUTTLE
SYSTEMS HANDBOOK ....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/18/87
COMM & TRACK
3001
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD ANTENNA
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
RF COMM
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PL ANTENNA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
UPPER FWD FUSELAGE
MC481-0071-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PL ANTENNA IS USED BY THES-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATORS FOR
TWO-WAY RF COMM WITH COMPATIBLE PAYLOADS FOR PL COMMANDS VIA
FORWARD LINK AND PL TELEMETRY VIA RETURN LINK. LOSS OF ANTENNA
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES FOR SOME FLIGHTS.
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR THE PL ANTENNA.
REFERENCES: SYS. SCHEM. VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS
BRF 34, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE _2/31/87 C-265
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT:
3002 ABORT:
PAYLOAD RF TRANSFER SWITCH
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3) PL RF XFER SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[p]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0152-0001
B [NA ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RF SWITCH INTERCONNECTS EITHER OF TWO PAYLOAD INTERROGATORS
WITH EITHER OFTW-Oi_PU_S_0 T_ESINGLE PL AN_AL_O_ INPUT
FOR RIGHT HAND CIRCULARLY POLARIZED RADIATION AND ONE FOR LEFT
HAND CIRCULARLY POLARIZED RADIATION. THERE ARE TWO RF SWITCH
LINKS, 0NEOF WHICH CAN CONNECT EiTHER-_THENDRMALLY
USED RHCP RADIATING ASSEMBLY. WITH AN OPEN IN THE DESIRED PATH
(E.G. PI 1 TO RHCP), THE OTHER PATH (PI 2 TO RHCP), WOULD BE
USED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR RF CMD/TLM WITH A PAYLOAD COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: SYs. SCHEM. VS70-740239, SSSH i6.14, INCO/COMM SYS
BRF 34, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 2/2
3003 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TO SWITCH
PAYLOAD RF TRANSFER SWITCH
FAILS MID-TRAVEL, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3) PL RF XFER SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 2
ME452-0152-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RF SWITCH INTERCONNECTS EITHER OF TWO PAYLOAD INTERROGATORS
WITH EITHER OF TWO INPUTS TO THE SINGLE PL ANTENNA - ONE FOR
RIGHT HAND AND ONE FOR LEFT HAND CIRCULARLY POLARIZED RADIATION.
TWO LATCHING RELAY COIL SETS CONTROL THE RF BRIDGING LINK
PATHS. BINDING/JAMMING COULD PREVENT TRAVEL OF EITHER OF THE
MOVING CONTACTS POWERING THE OPERATING COILS OR EITHER OF THE
MOVING RF LINKS, EITHER PROBLEM COULD DISABLE THE NON'REDUNDANT
XFER SWITCH AND CAUSE LOSS OF PL RF COMM. LOSS OF RF COMM FOR
PLCMD/TLM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES AND LOSS
OF MISSION. ....
REFERENCES: SYS. SCHEM. VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS
BRF 34, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-267
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 30O4
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD RF TRANSFER SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PL RF XFER SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING:" 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/2 AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0152-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS RF SWITCH INTERCONNECTS EITHER OF THE TWO PAYLOAD
INTERROGATORS WITH EITHER OF TWO INPUTS TO THE SINGLE PL ANTENNA
- ONE FOR RIGHT HAND AND ONE FOR LEFT HAND CIRCULARLY POLARIZED
RADIATION. TWO LATCHING RELAY COIL SETS CONTROL THE RF BRIDGING
LINK PATHS. A HARD SHORT TO GROUND AFFECTING EITHER POWER TO THE
OPERATING COILS OR THE RF SIGNAL PATH COULD DISABLE THE NON-
REDUNDANT XFER SWITCH AND CAUSE LOSS OF PL RF COMM. LOSS OF RF
COMM FOR PL CMD/TLM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION
OBJECTIVES AND LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYS. SCHEM. VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS
BRF 34, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 3005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR FORWARD LINK
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3) PI FORWARD LINK
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: I 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 2
MC478-0105-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE" •
THE PI'S PROVIDE TWO-WAY RF COMM FOR FL COMMANDS TO AND RL
TELEMETRY FROM RF-COMPATIBLE PAYLOADS. WITH LOSS OF ACTIVE PI FL
FOR PL co_Ds THE REDUNDANT PIWOULD BE USED' LOTS_DF OUTPUT
(OPEN, SHORT, DE-TUNING) COULD BE CAUSED BY TEMPERATURE EXTREME,
CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART FAILURE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
SEND COMMANDS TO A PL VIA RF COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION
OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: SYS. SCHEM. VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS
BRF 34, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-269
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
6/22/87
COMM & TRACK
3006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR FORWARD LINK
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3 ) PI FORWARD LINK
4)
5)
6)
?)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDIq_G/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
S/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC478-0105-0001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ _ ._._ _ _.......
THE PIiS PROVIDE TWO-WAY RF COMM FOR FL COMMANDS TO _D RL
TELEMETRY FROM RF-COMPATIBLE PAYLOADS. WITH LOSS OF ACTIVE PI FL
FOR PLCOMMANDS THE REDUND_TPIWOULD BE USED. OUT zOF-TOLERANCE
PERFORMANCE (E.G., LOSS OF POWER, DE-TUNING) COULD BE CAUSED
BY TEMPERATURE EXTREME, CONTAMINATION, OR PIECE-PART FAILURE.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SEND COMMANDS TO A PL VIA RF COULD
REFERENCES: SYS. SCHEM. VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/C0_ sYS
BRF 34, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM" u
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
COMM & TRACK
3007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR FORWARD LINK
ERRATIC OPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3) PI RL
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 2
MC478-0105-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PI'SPROVIDE TWOCWAY RF COM_FORFL CMD'S TO AND RL TLM FROM
RF-COMPATIBLE PAYLOADS. ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION COULD BE
CAUSED BY CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE EXTREME, PART FAILURE, LOOSE
CONNECTION/VIBRATION. WITH LOSS OF ACTIVE PI FL FOR
PL CDM'S VIA RF THE REDUNDANT PI WOULD BE USED. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO SEND COMMANDS TO A PL VIA RF LINK COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES (SOME PL'S ARE CHECKED OUT PRE-LAUNCH
AND INITIALIZED VIA PI RF).
REFERENCES: SYS. SCHEM. VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS
BRF 34, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-271
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
6/23/87
COMM& TRACK
3008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOADINTERROGATORRETURNLINK
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYSLEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3) PI RETURN LINK
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC478-0105-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PI'S PROVIDE TWO-WAY RF COMM FOR FL COMMANDS TO AND RL
TELEMETRY FROM RF-COMPATIBLE PAYLOADS. WITH LOSS OF ACTIVE PI RL
FOR PL TELEMETRY THE REDUNDANT PI WOULD BE USED. LOSS OF OR
SEVERE DEGRADATION OF RECEIVER OUTPUT COULD BE CAUSED BY
TEMPERATURE EXTREME, DETUNING, OR PIECE-PART FAILURE. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO RECEIVE PL TELEMETRY AND CONVERT IT TO BASEBAND
FOR ROUTING TO PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR, CIU, OR KU-BAND SIGNAL
PROCESSOR COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES_ SYS. SCHEM. VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS
BRF 34, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
COMM & TRACK
3009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR RETURN LINK
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3) PI RETURN LINK
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 2
MC478-0105-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PI'S PROVIDE TWO-WAY RF COMM FOR FL COMMANDS TO AND RL
TELEMETRY FROM RF-COMPATIBLE PAYLOADS. WITH LOSS OF ACTIVE PI RL
FOR PL TELEMETRY THE REDUNDANT PI WOULD BE USED. OUT-OF-
TOLERANCE RECEIVER OUTPUT COULD BE CAUSED BY TEMPERATURE
EXTREME, DETUNING, OR PIECE-PART FAILURE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO RECEIVE TELEMETRY AND CONVERT IT TO BASEBAND FOR ROUTING TO
PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR, CIU, OR KU-BAND SIGNAL PROCESSOR COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES.
z
!
REFERENCES: SYS. SCHEM. VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS
BRF 34, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-273
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
CO_ & TRACK
3010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR RETURN LINK
ERRATIC OPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3) PI RETURN LINK
4)
5)
6)
7)
_)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
P__CH : 3/3 RT_ : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC478-0105-0001
S [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, PIECE-PART FAI_, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAL_:
THE PI'S PROVIDE _O-WAY RF CO_ FOR FL _DS TO AND RL T_ _OM
RF-COMPATIBT._ PAYLOADS. E_TIC/INTERMI_ENT OPERATION COULD BE
_USED BY CONT_INATION, TEMPERA_ E__, P_T FAIL_, LOOSE
CO_E_ION/VIBRATION. WI_ LOSS OF ACTI_ PI RL FOR PL T_
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VIA RF THE _E_D_D_ PI __BE USED. _SSOFALLCAPABILITY TO
RECEIVE PL T_ VIA RF LINK COULD CAUSE LOSS OF _OR MISSION
OBJECTIVES (SOME PL,SARE CHECKED OUT PRE-LAUNCH AND INITIALIZED
VIA PI RF AND TLM CONFIRMATION OF PL STATUS IS REQUIRED FOR
Z_UNCH) .
_FERENCES: SYS. SCHEM. VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/CO_ SYS
BRF 34, O_SD V74 FI_ III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
COMM & TRACK
3011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR FORWARD LINK
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PSP FL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 2
MC476-0138-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PSP'S PROVIDE TWO-WAY PROCESSING OF PL COMMANDS AND TELEMETRY
DATA. THE FL SECTION PROCESSES PL COMMANDS AND ROUTES THEM
EITHER TO THE ACTIVE PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR FOR RF FL (OR TO GSE
UMBILICAL) OR VIA HARDLINE FOR ATTACHED PAYLOADS. LOSS OF
OUTPUT COULD BE CAUSED BY TEMPERATURE EXTREME, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, SHORT OR OPEN, LOOSE CONNECTION/VIBRATION. ON LOSS OF
THE ACTIVE PSP FL, THE REDUNDANT UNIT WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO PROCESS/ROUTE PL CMDS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION Ii
g
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-275
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
;/Ol/8 
COMM & TRACK
3012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PARTIALOUTPUT
PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR FORWARD LINK
ERRATIC OPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION,
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
m
mm
i
D
B
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3) PSP FL
4)
5)
6) u
7)
8)
9) m
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
HDW/ NC
RTLS : 3/3 i
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO : 3/3 i
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
=m i
mm
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PSP'S PROVIDE TWO-WAY PROCESSING OF PL COMMANDS AND TELEMETRY
DATA. THE FL SECTION PROCESSES PL CO_DS AND ROUTES THEM _
EITHER TO THE_I_ PAY__T_R_OR FOR RF FL (OR TO GSE
UMBILICAL) OR VIA HARDLINE FOR ATTACHED PAYLOADS. PARTIAL OUTPUT
(E.G., PARTIAL DATA REGISTER FAILURE CAUSING BIT DROP-OUT) OR
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION COULD BE CAUSED BY TEMPERATURE
EXTREME, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, LOOSE
CONNECTION/VIBRATION. ON LOSS OF THE ACTIVE PSP FL, THE
REDUNDANT UNIT WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
PROCESS/ROUTE PL CMDS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-276
ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6129/87
COMM & TRACK
3013
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR RETURN LINK
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3) PSP RL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 2
MC476-0138-0001
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PSP'S PROVIDE TWO-WAY DATA PROCESSING (PL COMMANDS AND
TELEMETRY DATA). THE RL SECTION PROCESSES RF PL TELEMETRY DATA
AND ROUTES IT TO THE PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER. LOSS OF OUTPUT
COULD BE CAUSED BY TEMPERATURE EXTREME, PIECE-PART FAILURE, SHORT
OR OPEN, LOOSE CONNECTION/VIBRATION. ON LOSS OF THE ACTIVE PSP
RL, THE REDUNDANT UNIT WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO PROCESS/ROUTE PL TLM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
L
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-277
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/29/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK . FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3014 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT
PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR RETURN LINK
ERRATIC oPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION, PARTIAL
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
m
I
I
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM =
3) PSP RL u
4)
s)
6) u
7)
8)
9)
i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
AVIONICS BAY 2
MC476-0138-0001
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PSPIS PROVIDE TWO-WAY DATA PROCESSING (PL COMMANDS AND
TELEMETRY). THE RL SECTION PROCESSES RF PL TELEMETRY DATA AND
ROUTES IT TO THE PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER. PARTIAL OUTPUT
(REGISTER FAILURE CAUSING BIT DROP-OUT, FOR EXAMPLE) AND ERRATIC/
INTERMITTENT OPERATION COULD BE CAUSED BY TEMPERATURE EXTREME,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, LOOSE CONNECTION/VIBRATION.
ON LOSS OF THE ACTIVE PSP RL, THE REDUNDANT UNIT WOULD BE
SELECTED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PROCESS/ROUTE PL TLM COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH i6.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ll
z
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-278
n
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/29/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3015 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: S-BAND PAYLOAD SYSTEM PNL/CMD GCIL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
GCIL MODE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
MC452-0102-7201
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PNL/CMD SWITCH PERMITS PNL CONTROL OF THE PL SYSTEM IN PNL
POSITION AND CONTROL VIA GCIL GROUND CMDS OR KYBD ENTRIES IN CMD
POSITION. NORMAL OPNL MODE IS CMD. ON LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO
MANAGE SYSTEM IN CMD MODE, PNL MODE WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PL SYSTEM MODE/CONFIGURATION WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, 16.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
31, 34, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION Ii, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-279
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/29/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3016 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: S-BAND PAYLOAD SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH, S13
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:. 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS 3-POSITION SWITCH (I/OFF/2) PERMITS PANEL CONTROL OF POWER
TO SYS 1 OR SYS 2 WITH PL SYSTEM IN GCIL PNL MODE. OPNL
REDUNDANCY EXISTS WITH SYSTEM IN GCIL CMD MODE. UPON LOSS OF
POWER TO THE ACTIVE SYS, SWITCH COULD BE USED TO POWER REDUNDANT
SYS. ON LOSS OF BOTH SWITCH PATHS SYSTEMS COULD BE POWERED IN
GCIL CMD MODE (THE NORMAL MODE). LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO POWER
EITHER SYS EITHER BY PNL SWITCH OR GCIL GROUND CMD'S COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, 16.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
31, 34, JSC-i2820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION II, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-280
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/01/87
_OMM & TRACK
3017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PAYLOAD SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH, S13
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
SYSTEM SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] _ B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7403
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS 3-POSITION SWITCH (1/OFF/2) PERMITS PNL CONTROL OF PWR
(BUSSES BCI, BC2) TO SYS 1 OR SYS 2 WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE.
A HARD SHORT TO GROUND IN SWITCH COULD BLOW THE 1 AMP FUSE FROM
EACH BUS, DISABLING ALL PI/PSP FUNCTIONS IN PNLAND CMD MODES.
NOTE: THERE ARE TWO CONTACTS IN THE SWITCH WITH DIRECT PATHS TO
GROUND. THOSE CONTACTS PROVIDE GROUND FOR RECEIVED SIGNAL
STRENTH READINGS FOR PI 1 OR PI 2. LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO CONTROL
PL SYS LRU'S WOULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS BECAUSE ATTACHED AND
DETACHED PL CMD AND DETACHED PL TLM PATHS WOULD BE NON-
FUNCTIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, 16.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
31, 34, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION Ii, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-281
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM& TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDACID: 3018 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: S-BAND PL PI/PSP POWER SWITCH, S14
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL SYSTEM
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
PI/PSP POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7406
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS 3-POSITION SWITCH (INTRG/BOTH/PSP) PERMITS PNL SELECTIONOF
PI ONLY, PSP ONLY, OR BOTH WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE, WHEN PL
SYS SELECT EWITCH IS IN SYS I oR_SYs 2rPOSITION. OPNL REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR SAME CHOICES WITH PL SYS IN GCIL CMD MODE. ON
LOSS OF PNL CONTROL, SYS COULD BE OPERATED IN CMD MODE (THE _ _!
NORMAL_O-DE)' LOSSOFALL CAPABILITY TO POWER THE DESIRED LRUS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES AND COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, 16.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
31, 34, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION iI, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/02/87
COMM & TRACK
3019
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PL PI/PSP POWER SWITCH, S14
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) S-BAND PL COMM
3) PI/PSP POWER SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 . AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7406
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS 3-POSITION SWITCH (INTRG/BOTH/PSP) PERMITS PNL SELECTION OF
PI ONLY, PSP ONLY, OR BOTH WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE AND WHEN
PL SYS SELECT SWITCH IS IN SYS 1 OR SYS 2 POSITION. A HARD SHORT
TO GROUND IN THE SWITCH COULD BLOW THE 1 AMP FUSES FROM
BUSSES BCI, BC2, DISABLING ALL PI/PSP FUNCTIONS IN PNL AND CMD
MODES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PL SYS LRU'S WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION BECAUSE ATTACHED & DETACHED PL CMD AND
DETACHED PL TLM PATHS WOULD BE NON-FUNCTIONAL.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, 16.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
31, 34, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-283
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/02/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3020 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: S-BAND PL ANTENNA POLARIZATION SWITCH,S2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
ANTENNA POLARIZATION SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 . RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
36V73AIA2S2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PERMITS PNL SELECTION OF RIGHT-HAND CIRCULARLY
POLARIZED OR LEFT-HAND CP RF RADIATION/RECEPTION BY PLANTENNA
WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE. OPNL REDDi_DAi_2YEXI_S FOR .......
SELECTION WITH SYS IN GCIL CMD MODE (NORMAL OPNL MODE). ON LOSS
OF ABILITY TO SELECT POLARIZATION VIA PNL, CMD MODE COULD BE
USED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT POLARIZATION COMPATIBLE
WITH DETACHED PL COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES FOR
PL'S REQUIRING PRE-DEPLOY CHECKOUT AND POST-DEPLOY OPS VIA RF.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, 16.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
31, 34, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/02/87
COMM & TRACK
3021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PL ANTENNA POLARIZATION SWITCH, $2
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
ANTENNA POLARIZATION SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
36V73AIA3S2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH PERMITS PNL SELECTION OF RIGHT-HAND CIRCULARLY
POLARIZED OR LEFT-HAND CP RF RADIATION/RECEPTION BY ANTENNA WITH
PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE. A HARD SHORT TO GROUND IN THE SWITCH
COULD BLOW THE 3-AMP FUSES PROTECTING MNB, MNC OUTPUTS OF FLCA2,
FLCA3, DISABLING ALL MODE/CONFIGURATION CONTROLS FOR PL SYS IN
PNL AND CMD MODES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PL SYS
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, 16.15, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
31, 34, JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii, OMRSD V74 FILE III
in.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 c-285
h
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3022 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: PI TRANSMITTER RF PWR LEVEL SELECT SWITCH, $4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST : A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PI XMTR
POWER OUTPUT LEVEL SELECT SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/2R AOA:
3/3 ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7206
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......
THIS SWITCH PERMITS PNLSELECTION OF PI RF OUTPUT PWR LEVEL
(HIGH/MED/LOW) WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE. ALTERNATE SYS OPNL
MODE IS GCIL CMD MODE, GIVING SYS CONTROL TO GROUND OR SSO KYBD.
I
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WITH BINDING/JAMMING OR OPEN CIRCUIT PREVENTING PNL CONTR_;_"
GCIL CMD MODE WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
CONTROL RF PWR OUTPUT LEVEL OF PI XMTR COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR
MISSION OBJECTIVES FOR SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: INT SYS SCHEM VS70-974099; SSSHI6.14, 16.15;
INCO/COMM SYS BRFS 31, 34; JSC-12820 FLT RULES SECT ii; OMRSN V74
FILE III
I
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-286
l
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
7107187
COMM & TRACK
3023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2Z2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PI TRANSMITTER RF PWR LEVEL SELECT SWITCH, $4
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PI XMTR
POWER OUTPUT LEVEL SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
• ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7206
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
THIS SWITCH PERMITS PNL SELECTION OF PI RF OUTPUT PWR LEVEL
(HIGH/MED/LOW) WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE. ALTERNATE SYS OPNL
MODE IS GCIL CMD MODE, GIVING SYS CONTROL TO GROUND OR SSO KYBD.
A HARD SHORT TO GROUND IN THE SWITCH COULD BLOW THE 3"AMPFUSES
PROTECTING MNB, MNC OUTPUTS OF FLCA 2, FLCA 3, DISABLING ALL
MODE/CONFIG CONTROLS FOR PL SYS IN PNL & CMD MODES. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PL SYS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
_QUIRING RF COMM WITH A PL.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
r_
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-287
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHt: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3024 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: PL SYSTEM XMTR MODULATION ON/OFF SWITCH, $9
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PI XMTR
MODULATION ON/OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _ ......
WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE THIS SWITCH (MODULATION ON/OFF)
PERMITS CREW REMOVAL OF MODULATION ON PI FL RF TO ASSIST A PL
WITH RF S_EP RECEi_R:TO ACQUIRE AND-_CK ONTO THE PI _R
UNMODULATED FL RF CARRIER SIGNAL, AND TO PREVENT FALSE LOCK ON A
SIDEBAND. UPON LOSS OF PNL ON/OFF CONTROL OF MODULATION OF THE
FL RF CARRIER FOR BOTH PI'S GCIL CMD MODE WOULD BE SELECTED.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO REMOVE MODULATION ON THE FL RF COULD
PREVENT PL RCVR FROM ACQUIRING AND LOCKING ONTO THE SIGNAL, AND
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION REQUIRING RF COMM WITH A PL._
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OM]_SD
V74 FILE III, JSC12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/07/87
COMM & TRACK
3025
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PL SYSTEM XMTR MODULATION ON/OFF SWITCH, $9
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PI XMTR
MODULATION ON/OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] Bi ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE THIS SWITCH (MODULATION ON/OFF)
PERMITS CREW REMOVAL OF MODULATION ON PI FL RF TO ASSIST A PL
WITH RF SWEEP RECEIVER TO ACQUIRE AND LOCK ONTO THE PI XMTR
UNMODULATED FL RF SIGNAL. A HARD SHORT TO GROUND IN THE SWITCH
COULD BLOW THE 3-AMP FUSES PROTECTING MNB, MNC OUTPUTS OF FLCA 2,
FLCA 3, DISABLING ALL MODE/CONFIG CONTROLS FOR PL SYS IN PNL &
CMD MODES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PL SYS WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3026 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: S-BAND PL FREQUENCY SWEEP ON/OFF SWITCH, $8
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PI XMTR
FREQ SWEEP ON/OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7202
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE THIS SWITCH (SWEEP ON/OFF) PERMITS
CREW TO SWEEP FREQUENCY OF ACTIVE PI XMTR RF OUTPUT TO ALLOW NON-
SWEEP PL RCVR TO ACQUIRE/LOCK ONTO THE PI FL RF SIGNAL. UPON
LOSS OF PNL CONTROL OF FREQ SWEEP FOR BOTH PI'S GCIL CMD MODE
WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE FL RF FREQ
SWEEP COULD PREVENT PL RCVR FROM ACQUIRING & LOCKING ONTO THE
SIGNAL, AND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION REQUIRING RF COMM WITH A
PL.
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REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/07/87
COMM & TRACK,
3027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND FREQUENCY SWEEP ON/OFF SWITCH, S8
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PI XMTR
FREQ SWEEP ON/OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7202
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE THIS SWITCH (SWEEP ON/OFF) PERMITS
CREW TO SWEEP FREQUENCY OF ACTIVE PI XMTR RF OUTPUT TO ALLOW NON-
SWEEP PL RCVR TO ACQUIRE/LOCK ONTO THE PI FL RF SIGNAL. A HARD
SHORT TO GROUND IN SWITCH COULD BLOW THE 3-AMP FUSES
PROTECTING MNB, MNC OUTPUTS OF FLCA 2, FLCA 3, DISABLING ALL
MODE/CONFIG CONTROLS FOR PL SYS IN PNL & CMD MODES. LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PL SYS WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION Ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-291
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM.& TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3028 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: S-BAND PL PSP COMMAND OUTPUT SELECTOR SWITCH, S15
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR
OUTPUT ROUTING SELECTOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] SIP] C[P !
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201 +_
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE THIS SWITCH PERMITS PNL SELECTION OF
PSP COMMAND ROUTINGEITHER VIA PL UMB%LICAL FOR CMDS TO ATTACHED
PL'S VIA HARDLINE OR TO PI XMTR FOR CMD'S TO DETACHED PL'S VIA
RF. ALTERNATE OPNL MODE IS GCIL CMD MODE FOR ROUTING
SELECTION BY GROUND CMD,SORSSO KYBD. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY _
FOR SELECTION OF PL CMD ROUTiN-G BECAUSE OF OPEN OR J_iNG DuE TO
CONTAMINATION OR PART FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
FERE 0-740239SSSHRE NCES: VS7 i6.15,INCO/CO SYSBRF31,O SD
V74 FILE III, JSC12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 2/2
3029 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PL PSP COMMAND OUTPUT SELECTOR SWITCH, S15
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR
OUTPUT ROUTING SELECTOR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] ' B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE THIS SWITCH PERMITS PNL SELECTION OF
PSP COMMAND ROUTING EITHER VIA PL UMBILICAL FOR CMD'S TO ATTACHED
PLS VIA HARDLINE OR TO PI XMTR FOR CMD'S TO DETACHED PL'S VIA RF.
A HARD SHORT TO _ROUND IN SWITCHCOULD BLOW
THE 3-AMPFUSES PROTECTING MNB, MNC OUTPUTS OF FLCA 2, FLCA 3,
DISABLING ALL MODE/CONFIGURATION CONTROLS FOR PL SYS IN PNL AND
CMD MODES. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PL SYSTEM WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-940239, SSSH 16.15,: INCO/COMM SYs BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION II
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-293
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM& TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3030 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: S-BAND PL SYSTEM PI RF CHANNEL SELECT SWITCHES, $7
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
RF CHANNEL SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: ME452-0134-2009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE THE TWO SETS OF THUMB-WHEEL SWITCHES
PERMIT PNL SELECTION OF PI XMTR/RCVR RF CH FREQ PAIRS. ONE
SWITCH SET IS DEDICATED TO PI i, OTHER TO PI 2. ALTERNATE OPNL
MODE FOR RF CH SELECT IS WITH PL SYS IN GCIL CMD MODE GIVING
CONTROL TO GROUND OR SSO KYBD. ON LOSS OF PNL CONTROL OF ACTIVE
PI RF CH SELECT DUE TO OPEN CIRCUIT OR JAMMING, REDUNDANT SWITCH
SET (AND PI) WOULD BE USED. ON LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR PNL
CONTROL, CMD MODE WOULD BE USED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
CONTROL PI RF CH BY PNL OR CMD COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS FOR
FLIGHTS REQUIRING RF COMM WITH PL.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
3031 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
S-BAND PL SYSTEM PI RF CHANNEL SELECT SWITCHES
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
S-BAND PL SYSTEM
PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
RF CHANNEL SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
ME452-0134-2009
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH PL SYS IN GCIL PNL MODE THE TWO SETS OF THUMB-WHEEL SWITCHES
PERMIT PNL SELECTION OF PI XMTR/RCVR RF CH FREQ PAIRS. ONE
SWITCH IS DEDICATED TO PI i, THE OTHER TO PI 2. ALTERNATE OPNL
MODE FOR RF CH SELECT IS WITH PL SYS IN GCIL CMD MODE, GIVING
CONTROL TO GROUND OR SSO KYBD. ON LOSS OF PNL CONTROL OF ACTIVE
PI RF CH SELECT DUE TO SHORT IN SWITCH, REDUNDANT SWITCH SET (AND
PI) WOULD BE USED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PI RF CH BY
PNL OR CMD COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS FOR FLIGHTS
REQUIRING RF COMM WITH PL.
REFERENCES: VS70-740239, SSSH 16.14, INCO/COMM SYS BRF 31, OMRSD
V74 FILE III, JSC12820 FLIGHT RULES SECTION ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-295
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MNBFLC3 BUS
10A FUSE
DRIVER
3A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
P/L INTRG NO. 2WOULD BE POWERED ON BUT ASSOCIATED FUNCTIONS
CONTROLLED BY PNL SWITCHES AND GCIL LOST INCLUDE: INTRG 2
CHANNEL SELECTION; XMTR 1 PWR LEVEL SELECT; INTRG 2 MODULATOR PWR
AND XMTR FREQUENCY SWEEP INCLUDING GCIL SELECT OF WIDE AND
NARROW ALSO, PARTIAL LOSS OF S-BAND PAYLOAD ANTENNA POLARIZATION
CONFIG. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL FUSE SUPPLYING 28VDC TO
P/L INTRG 2. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF COMMAND/DATA FUNCTIONS OF PAYLOAD AND LIKELY RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST CHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-296
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O6/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3502
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
CNTLBCI BUS
IA FUSE, F4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL AIA2
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF P/L INTERROGATOR NO. 1 ON COMMAND FROM PANEL SWITCH AND
GCIL. LOSS OF: CAPABILITY TO CMD ON THE COMBINATION OF BOTH P/L
INTRG 1 AND P/L SIGNAL PROCESSOR 1; P/L INTRG 1 GCIL COMMAND
POWER SIGNALS; 28VDC P/L INTRG 1 SIGNAL TO KU-BAND SIGNAL
PROCESSOR AND THE P/L STATION DISTRIBUTION PANEL. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY PARALLEL FUSE SUPPLYING 28VDC TO CONTROL INTRG 2.
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION CREW VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/o6/87 '
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
CNTLBC2 BUS
iA FUSE, FII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIK2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF P/L INTERROGATOR NO. 2 ON COMMAND FROM PANEL SWITCH AND
GCIL. LOSS OF: CAPABILITY TO CMD ON THE COMBINATION OF BOTH P/L
INTRG 2 AND P/L SIGNAL PROCESSOR 2; P/L INTRG 2 GCIL COMMAND
POWER SIGNALS; 28VDC P/L INTRG 2 SIGNAL TO KU-BAND SIGNAL
PROCESSOR AND THE P/L STATION DISTRIBUTION PANEL. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF COMMAND/DATA FUNCTIONS OF PAYLOAD
ANDLI_LY _SULT IN LOSS OF MISSION,
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
Io/o8/57
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
CNTLBCI BUS
IA FUSE, F3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF P/L SIGNAL PROCESSOR NO. 1 ON COMMAND FROM PANEL SWITCH
AND GCIL. LOSS OF: PSP NO. 1 COMMAND POWER TO GCIL; CAPABILITY
TO CMD ON THE COMBINATION OF BOTH PSP NO. 1 AND P/L INTRG NO. I;
PANEL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF P/L INTRG OR P/L
UMBILICAL FOR THE PSP CMD OUTPUT. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY
PARALLEL FUSE SUPPLYING 28VDC TO P/L SIGNAL PROCESSOR NO. 2.
SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, 16.15, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-299
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
IO/O8/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
CNTLBC2 BUS
IA FUSE, FI0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
"DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF P/L SIGNAL PROCESSOR NO. 2 ON CO_DF_0M P_EL_W_TCH
AND GCIL. LOSS OF: PSP NO. 2 COMMAND POWER TO GCIL; CAPABILITY
TO CMD ON THE COMBINATION OF BOTH PSP NO. 2 AND P/L INTRGNO. 2;
PANEL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF P/L INTRG OR P/L
UMBILICAL FOR THE PSP CMD OUTPUT. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF COMMAND/DATA FUNCTIONS OF PAYLOAD AND LIKELY
RESULT IN _SSOF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, 16.15, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
MNBFLC2 BUS
10A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF P/L INTRG NO. 1 POWER SUPPLY. ALSO, LOSS OF: THE P/L
INTRG i SIGNAL TO K'U-BAND SIGNAL PROCESSOR; 28VDC TO P/L STATION
DISTRIBUTION PANEL; PARTIAL LOSS OF S-BAND P/LANTENNA
POLARIZATION CONTROL; AND, LOSS OF SWITCH CONTROL OF SEVERAL
FUNCTIONS WITHIN P/L INTRG I. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL
FUSE SUPPLYING 28VDC TO POWER P/L INTRG 2 AND ASSOCIATED
FUNCTIONS. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-301
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
io/o8/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST : E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
MNCFLC3 BUS
10A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE"
LOSS OF P/L INTRG NO. 2 POWER SUPPLY. ALSO, LOSS OF: THE P/L
INTRG 2 SIGNAL TO KU-BAND SIGNAL PROCESSOR; 28VDC TO P/L STATION
DISTRIBUTION PANEL; PARTIAL LOSS OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA
POLARIZATION CONTROL; AND, LOSS OF SWITCH CONTROL OF SEVERAL
FUNCTIONS WITHIN P/L INTRG 2. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF COMMAND/DATA FUNCTIONS OF PAYLOAD AND LIKELY RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/08/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
MNBFLC2 BUS
10A FUSE
DRIVER
3A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
I21NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
PART NUMBER:
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
P/L INTRG NO. 1 WOULD BE POWERED ON BUT ASSOCIATED FUNCTIONS
CONTROLLED BY PNL SWITCHES AND GCIL LOST INCLUDE: INTRG 1
CHANNEL SELECTION; XMTR 1 PWR LEVEL SELECT; INTRG 1 MODULATOR PWR
AND XMTR FREQUENCY SWEEP INCLUDING GCIL SELECT OF WIDE AND
NARROW. ALSO, PARTIAL LOSS OF S-BAND PAYLOAD ANTENNA
POLARIZATION CONFIG. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL FUSE
SUPPLYING 28VDC TO P/L INTRG 2. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-303
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O8/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
MNCFLC3 BUS
10A FUSE
DRIVER
3A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3 •
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONA_:
P/L INTRG NO. 2 WOULD BE POWERED ON BUT ASSOCIATED FUNCTIONS
CONTROLLED BY PNL SWITCHES AND GCIL LOST INCLUDE: INTRG 2
CHANNEL SELECTION; XMTR 1 PWR LEVEL SELECT; INTRG 2 MODULATOR PWR
__ FR__EWEEP IN_LU__ __E_CT_ WIDE _D:_ _ i_
NARROW. ALSO, PARTIAL LOSS OF S-BAND PAYLOAD ANTENNA
POLARIZATION CONFIG. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF COMMAND/DATA FUNCTIONS OF PAYLOAD AND LIKELY RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O9/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2) MNBFLC2 BUS
3) 10A FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG 1
USE. SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR POLARIZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
NO REDUNDANCY FOR THIS ITEM/FUNCTION (WITH INTRG i), HOWEVER,
BOTH LEFT/RIGHT POLARIZATION REMAIN AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
INTRG 2. FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION, CREW,
VEHICLE. FAILURE OF SECOND FUSE IN CIRCUIT SELECTING RHCP (WITH
INTRG 2) RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT RHCP
FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-305
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O9/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2) MNBFLC2 BUS
3) 10A FUSE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS2_TIONALE_ ,
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG 1
USE. SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR POLARIZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
NO REDUNDANCY FOR THIS ITEM/FUNCTION (WITH INTRG i), HOWEVER,
BOTH LEFT/RIGHT POLARIZATION REMAIN AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
INTRG 2. FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION, CREW,
VEHICLE. FAiLU_-OFS-ECOND-FUSE IN CIR_IT-SELECTING LHCP (WITH
INTRG 2) RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT LHCP
FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
10/09/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2) MNCFLC3 BUS
3) 10A FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
q
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG 2
USE. SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR POLARIZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
FAILURE OF THIS SECOND FUSE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
SELECT RHCP FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-307
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O9/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2) MNCFLC3 BUS
3) 10A FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT. CONT_INATION. PIECE PART STRUCTURAL _
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..... ..........
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG2
USE. SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR PO_IZATIQ _ REMAINS AVAILABLE.
FAILURE OF THIS SECOND FUSE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
SELECT LHCP FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O9/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3514
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2) MNBFLC2 BUS
3) 10A FUSE
4) DRIVER
5) DIODE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG 1
USE. SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR POLARIZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
NO REDUNDANCY FOR THIS ITEM/FUNCTi0N(WITH INTRG 1),HOWEVER,
BOTH LEFT/RIGHT POLARIZATION REMAIN AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
INTRG 2. FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION, CREW,
VEHICLE. FAILURE OF SECOND DIODE IN CIRCUIT SELECTING RHCP (WITH
INTRG 2) RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT RHCP
FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
i
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-309
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/09/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 3515 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
I
mm
gD
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: m
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2) MNBFLC2 BUS
3) 10A FUSE
4) DRIVER m
5) DIODE
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG 1
USE. SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR POLARIZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
NO REDUNDANCY FOR THIS ITEM/FUNCTION (WITH INTRG i), HOWEVER,
BOTH LEFT/RIGHT POLARIZATION REMAIN AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
INTRG 2. FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION, CREW,
VEHICLE. FAILURE OF SECOND DIQDE IN CIRCTJIT SE_LECTIN G LHCP (WITH
INTRG 2) RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT LHCP
FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/O9/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2) MNCFLC3 BUS
3) 10A FUSE
4) DRIVER
5) DIODE
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SE_CTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG 2
USE. SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR PO_IZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
FAILURE OF THIS SECOND DIODE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
SELECT RHCP FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-311
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/09/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3517
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MNCFLC3 BUS
10AFUSE
DRIVER
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF LEFT CI__
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG 2
USE. SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR POLARIZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
FAILURE OF THIS SECOND DIODE RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO
SELECT LHCP FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239 I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/13/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3518
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR
MNBFLC2 BUS
3A FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
PART NUMBER:
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC ON POWER TO P/L SIGNAL PROCESSOR (PSP) NO. 1.
ALSO, LOSS OF INPUT TO PNL SWITCH CONTROLLING SELECTION OF P/L
INTRG OR P/L UMBILICAL FOR THE PSP CMD OUTPUTS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY PARALLEL FUSE SUPPLYING 28VDC TO PSP 2 AND PNL
SWITCH. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NOEFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.15, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
m
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-313
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 10/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3519
t
ITEM: FUSE, 3A
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR
2) MNCFLC3 BUS
3) 3A FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC ON POWER TO P/L SIGNAL PROCESSOR (PSP) NO. 2.
ALSO, LOSS OF INPUT TO PNL SWITCH CONTROLLING SELECTION OF P/L
INTRG OR P/L UMBILICAL FOR THE PSP CMD OUTPUTS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF BOTH P/L SIGNAL PROCESSORS AND
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.15, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/14/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3520
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR
MNBFLC2 BUS
3A FUSE
DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC ON POWER TO P/L SIGNAL PROCESSOR (PSP) NO. i.
ALSO, LOSS OF INPUT TO PNL SWITCH CONTROLLING SELECTION OF P/L
INTRG OR P/L UMBILICAL FOR THE PSP CMD OUTPUTS. REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY PARALLEL DRIVER SUPPLYING 28VDC TO PSP 2 AND PNL
SWITCH. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.15, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1o/14/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3521
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD SIGNAL PROCESSOR
MNCFLC3 BUS
3A FUSE
DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC ON POWER TO P/L SIGNAL PROCESSOR (PSP) NO. 2.
ALSO, LOSS OF INPUT TO PNL SWITCH CONTROLLING SELECTION OF P/L
INTRG OR P/L UMBILICAL FOR THE PSP CMD OUTPUTS. FAILURE OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF BOTH P/L SIGNAL PROCESSORS AND
LIKELY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.15, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239 I
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i
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/14/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3522
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MNBFLC2 BUS
10AFUSE
DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/2R
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF P/L INTRG NO. 1 POWER SUPPLY. ALSO, LOSS OF: THE P/L
INTRG 1 SIGNAL TO KU-BAND SIGNAL PROCESSOR; 28VDC TO P/L STATION
DISTRIBUTION PANEL; PARTIAL LOSS OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA
POLARIZATION CONTROL; AND, LOSS OF SWITCH CONTROL OF SEVERAL
FUNCTIONS WITHIN P/L INTRG i. REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY PARALLEL
DRIVER SUPPLYING 28VDC TO POWER P/L INTRG 2 AND ASSOCIATED
FUNCTIONS. SINGLE FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-317
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
lO/14/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3523
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
MNCFLC3 BUS
10AFUSE
DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
- 3/3_
3/3
3/3
3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD CONTASSY 3
PART NUMBER:
B [ F ] c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, vIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF P/L INTRG NO. 2 POWER SUPPLY. ALSO, LOSS OF: THE P/L
INTRG 2 SIGNAL TO KU-BAND SIGNAL PROCESSOR; 28VDC TO P/L STATION
DISTRIBUTION PANEL; PARTIAL LOSS OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA
POLARIZATION CONTROL; AND, LOSS OF SWITCH CONTROL OF SEVERAL
FUNCTIONS WITHIN P/L INTRG 2. FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF COMMAND/DATA FUNCTIONS OF PAYLOAD AND LIKELY RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-318
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/14/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3524
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MNBFLC2 BUS
10AFUSE
DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG 1
USE. SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR POLARIZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
NO REDUNDANCY FOR THIS ITEM/FUNCTION (WITH INTRG i), HOWEVER,
BOTH LEFT/RIGHT POLARIZATION REMAIN AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
INTRG 2. FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION, CREW,
VEHICLE. FAILURE OF SECOND DRIVER IN CIRCUIT SELECTING RHCP
(WITH INTRG 2) RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT
RHCP FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-319
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE. "
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/14/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3525
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
MNBFLC2 BUS
10AFUSE
DRIVER
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/2R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 2
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ................. _ .....
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG 1
USE. SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR POLARIZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
NO REDUNDANCY FOR THIS ITEM/FUNCTION (WITH INTRG i), HOWEVER, _
BOTH LEFT/RIGHT POLARIZATION _IN AVAILABLE IN CONJUNCTION WITH
INTRG 2. FIRST FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION, CREW, ....
VEHICLE. FAILURE OF SECOND DRIVER IN CIRCUIT SELECTING LHCP
(WITH INTRG 2) RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT
LHCP FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE" i
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/14/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3526
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E .S . DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MNCFLC3 BUS
10AFUSE
DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE P_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OF S-BAND P/L ANTENNA IN CONJUNCTION WITH INTRG 2
USE. SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR POLARIZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
FAILURE OF THIS SECOND DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO SELECT RHCP FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-321
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
lO/14/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
3527
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) S-BAND PAYLOAD INTERROGATOR
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MNCFLC3 BUS
IOAFUSE
DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD LOAD CONT ASSY 3
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CO_T_iNATION, PIECE PART STRUC_LFAILURE_VIB_TION ,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _!_ _ _ _ _
LOSS OF PNL SWITCH AND GCIL SELECTION OF LEFT CIRCULAR
POLARIZATION OFS-BAN___DDPLL_TENNA IN CQ_JUNCTION WITH IN_G 2
USE. SELECTION OF RIGHT CIRCULAR POLARIZATION REMAINS AVAILABLE.
FAILURE-OF THIS SECOND DRIVER RESULTS IN LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
TO SELECT LHCP FOR S-BAND P/L ANTENNA AND MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.14, SYST SCHEM VS70-740239
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4001 ABORT:
ITEM: KU BD EA-I (INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) xu COMM
3) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) EA-I
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BAY 3A
EA-I MC403-0025-I001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIATWO S-BAND PM AND _SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV UPDATES PRESENTS
WORST CASE CONDITION. EA-I PROVIDES KU SYS CONTROL FUNCTIONS.
LOSS OF THIS UNIT RESULTS IN LOSS OF KU BD SYS AND POSSIBLE LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-323
I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
4002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD EA-2 (RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) COMM & TRACK
2) KU CO 4
3) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) EA-2
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BAY 3A
EA-2 MC403-0025-2001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORBUP AND DOWNLINK DATA; uP-VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) _DATES LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) EA-2 PROVIDES KU RADAR SIGNAL
PROCESSING FUNCTION. LOSS OF THIS UNIT DOES NOT AFFECT THE KU BD
COMM CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
4003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD SPA (SIGNAL PROCESSOR ASSY)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) Ku COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) SPA
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BAY 3B
KU SPA MC403-0025-4001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLEAND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV UPDATES PRESENTS
WORST CASE CONDITION. SPA PROCESSES DATA FOR KU BD TRANSMISSION
TO GND AND PROCESSES UPLINK KU BD DATA FOR ON BOARD DISTRIBVTION.
LOSS OF THIS UNIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF KU COMM CAPABILITY
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VECHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-325
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
COMM AND TRACK
4004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NSP (NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU COMM
KU-BANDCOMM/RADAR
NSP
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
_DiNG/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC476-0137-0001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _z_ .......
COMM_OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN .....
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PBqYATK INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUNDANCY VIA SECOND NSP, AND UNLIKE SYS REDUND VIA TWO S-
BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV
LOSS OF SV UPDAT'WORST CASE CONDITION. NSP PROCESSES KU BD
CHANNEL 1 DN LK AND THE UPLINK VO AND CMD DATA. LOSS OF THIS
UNIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF KU COMM SV UPDATE CAPABILITY RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VECHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-326
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
4005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM
3) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) DEA
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
KU DA MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV UPDATES PRESENTS
WORST CASE CONDITION. DEA PROVIDES RECEIVER/EXCITER ELECTRONICS
FOR TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION OF KU BD SIGNALS. FAILURE WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF KU COMM CAPABILITY RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VECHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-327
=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/29/87
COMMAND TRACK
4006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY)
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) DEA
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER:
SIP] C[P]
KU DA MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE! i_i .... __ i_i_ _ _ __ _ _i_
COMM SECT OF _LBD COMM/RDR SYS OPERA.S IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMD S AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE___REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO_,BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV UPDATES PRESENTS WORST CASE
CONDITION. DEA PROVIDES RCVR/EXCITER ELECTRONICS FOR
TRANSMISS_9_D RECE_ON OF KU BD SIGNALS. EXCEEDING TOLERANCE
LIMITS FOR RF SENS, S/N RATIO AND RF 0_ _VEL COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF KU COMM CAP RESULTING IN POSS LOSS OF VECHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-328 ....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 4007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM: KU BD DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY)
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
DMA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: KU DA MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV UPDATES PRESENTS
WORST CASE CONDITION. DMA PROVIDES ANTENNA AND GIMBAL MOTORS FOR
POINTING ANT. FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS ANTENNA POINTING AND
TRACKING CAP THUS KU COMM CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VECHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-329
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
4008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY)
FAILS TO START/STOP .....
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4 ) DMA
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
KU DA MC403-0025-3001
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANIC A L SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPE_RATURE _..... r
EFFECTS/RATI ONALE :
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE, REDUNDANCY EXISTS _ TWO S'BAND PM AND- _ SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV UPDATES PRESENTS
WORST CASE CONDITION. DMA PROVIDES ANTENNA AND GIMBAL MOTORS FOR
POINTING ANT. FAILURE TO START/STOP WOULD P-RE_NT ANTENNA ......
POINTING AND TRACKING THUS KU COMM CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-330
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
v/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
4009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY)
ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4 ) DMA
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY ScREENs: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: .PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: KU DA MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV UPDATES PRESENTS
WORST CASE CONDITION. DMA PROVIDES ANTENNA AND GIMBAL MOTORS FOR
POINTING ANT. ERRATIC OPERATION WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ANTENNA
POINTING AND TRACKING CAP THUS KU COMM CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-331
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
4010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: KU BD DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY)
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM
_-BANDCOMM/RADAR
DMA
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH. "
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCAT pN: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: KU DA MC403-0025-3001
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO : 3/3
3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAusEs-MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) LOSS OF SV UPDATES PRESENTS
WORST CASE CONDITION. DMA PROVIDES ANTENNA AND GIMBAL MOTORS FOR
POINTING ANT. BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT ANTENNA POINTING AND
TRACKING THUS KU COMM CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-332
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/16/87
COMMAND TRACK
4011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM UP/FWD LINK
MODE I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT , LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA (UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UNF SYS, AND UL VO AND CMDS VIA KU BD MODE 2.)
LOSS OF SV PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. MODE 1 UPLINK PROVIDES
FOR VO, CMDS (SV),PL CMDS AND TEXT AND GRAPHICS. LOSS OF MODE 1
AND SV UPDATES RESULT IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-333
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/16/87
COMMAND TRACK
4012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT'.
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMMUP/FORWARDLINK MODE1
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM UP/FWD LINK
MODE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT , LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND UL VO AND CMDS VIA KU BD MODE 2.)
LOSS OF SV PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. MODE 1 UPLINK PROVIDES
FOR VO, CMDS (SV),PL CMDS AND TEXT AND GRAPHICS.
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPS OF MODE 1 CAUSES LOSS OF SV UPDATES
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMITS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-334
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/87
COMM AND TRACK
4013
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 1
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM UP/FWD LINK
MODE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
. LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-1001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND UL VO AND CMDS VIA KU BD MODE 2.)
LOSS OF SV PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. MODE 1 UPLINK PROVIDES
FOR VO, CMDS (SV), PL CMDS AND TEXT AND GRAPHICS. LOW RCVR SEN
AND S/N RATIO COULD CAUSE LOSS OF SV UPDATES RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-335
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/16/87
COMMAND TRACK
4014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM UP/FWD LINK
MODE 2
_CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 AT0:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
. 3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD-
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, J VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT , LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN_SINGLE STRINGCQNFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WQRST CASE RESULT _N LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND UL VO AND CMDS VIA KU BD MODE 1.)
LOSS OF SV PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. MODE 2 UPLINK PROVIDES
FOR VO AND CMDS (SV). LOSS OF MODE 2 AND SV UPDATES RESULT IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-336
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/16/87
COMM AND TRACK
4015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE 2
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATIONS
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM UP/FWD LINK
MODE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT , LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLEAND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND UL VO AND CMDS VIA KU BD MODE i.)
LOSS OF SV PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. MODE 2 UPLINK PROVIDES
FOR VO AND CMDS (SV). ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATIONS OF MODE 2
CAUSES LOSS OF SV UPDATES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW.
REFERENCES_ SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-337
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 4016
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: KU BD COMM UP/FORWARD LINK MODE2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM UP/FWD LINK
MODE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
• LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3BLAND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-1001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: HEC_L SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE _SS OF _INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
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(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND UL VO AND CMDS VIA KU BD MODE i.)
LOSS OF SV PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. MODE 2 UPLINK PROVIDES
FOR VO AND CMDS (SV). LOW RF POWER OUTPUT OR FREQ SHIFT COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF SV UPDATES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-338
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/87
COMM AND TRACK
4017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1
FAILS OUT O k TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM DN/RTN LINK
MODE 1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-1 MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE, REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND DL VO _D TLM VIA KU BD MODE 2.)
LOSS OF SV PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. MODE 1 DOWNLINK
PROVIDES FOR VO, TLM (SV), PL, RCDR PB AND HI SPEED PL DATA. LOW
RF PWR OUTPUT OR FREQ SHIFT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MODE 2 (TLM) AND
SV UPDATES RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-339
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDAC ID: 4018
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1 CHANNEL1
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM DN/RTN LINK
MODE 1 CH 1 VOICE AND TELEMETRY (TLM)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/5
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFIN$: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LI--N-KBETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIOES oRB UP/%ND DOWN LI_K DAT_;_PVO__DN Z_L_I_ _
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
cOULD INT_E WORST CASERESULT iN _SS OF VEHI__DCREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND DL VO AND TLM VIA KU BD MODE 2.)
_SSQFSV PRESENT SWORS _ CASE CONDITION. MODE 1 CHANNEL 1
DOWNLINK PROVIDES FOR VO AND TLM (SV). LOSS OF MODE 2 CH 1 (TLM)
AND SV UPDATES RESULT IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740iO9, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-340
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/16/87
COMM AND TRACK
4019
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1 CHANNEL 2
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM DN/RTN LINK
MODE 1 CH 2 PL DATA OR RCDR PB DATA FOR PL/SSO
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO : 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND DL PL OR RCDR PB DATA VIA KU BD
MODE 2.) MODE 1 CHANNEL 2 DOWNLINK PROVIDES FOR PL OR RCDR PB
DATA. LOSS OF MODE 2 CH 2 RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-341
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
v/16/sv
COMM AND TRACK
4020
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 1 CHANNEL 3
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM DN/RTN LINK
MODE 1 CH 3 HIGH RATE (PL MAX) DATA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) uPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) MODE 1 CHANNEL 3 DOWNLINK
PROVIDES FOR HIGH RATE (PL MAX) DATA. LOSS OF MODE 1 CH 3
RESULTS IN LOSS OF HIGH RATE DATA CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE iIi, INCO/CO_/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-342
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/87
COMMAND TRACK
4021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM DN/RTN LINK
MODE 2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT iN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND DL VO AND TLM VIA KU BD MODE i.)
LOSS OF SV PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. MODE 2 DOWNLINK
PROVIDES FOR VO, TLM (SV), TV, PL AND RCDR PB DATA. LOW RF PWR
OUTPUT OR FREQ DRIFT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MODE 2 AND SV UPDATES
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-343
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/16/87
COMM AND TRACK
4022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT :
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 1
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM DN/RTN LINK
MODE 2 CH 1 VOICE AND TELEMETRY (TLM)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT .....
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUND_CY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PMAND FMSYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND DL VO AND TLM VIA KU BD MODE I.)
LOSS OF SV PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. MODE 2 CH 1 DOWNLINK
PROVIDES FOR VO AND TLM (SV). LOSS OF MODE 2 CH 1 AND SV UPDATES
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-186il BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-344
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
4023 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 2
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM DN/RTN LINK
MODE 2 CH 2 PL DATA AND RCDR PB (SSO/PL) DATA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: All] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403_0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND DL PL AND RCDR PB DATA VIA KU BD
DL MODE i.) MODE 2 CH 2 DOWNLINK PROVIDES FOR PL AND RCDR PB
DATA. LOSS OF MODE 2 CH 2 RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE IIi, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-345
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/16/87
COMM AND TRACK
4024
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD COMM DOWN/RETURN LINK MODE 2 CHANNEL 3
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD COMM DN/RTN LINK
MODE 2 CH 3 PL AND TV DATA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD _ _ _ _
PART NUMBER: EA-I MC403-0025-I001, SPA MC403-0025-4OO1, DA
MC403-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE LOSS OF I_T
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO_OI_A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB,_E _6_cT _
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDSKNDD_ I_ __
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD I_ THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, AND DL PL AND TV DATA VIA KU BD
DL MODE I') MODE 2 CH 3 DOWNLINK PROVIDES FOR PL AND TV DATA.
LOSS OF MODE 2 CH 3 RESULTS IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-346
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.INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
612318v
COMM AND TRACK
4025
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU A PWR SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
COM SECTION
KU A MODE SWITCH S12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S12 ME452-0102-7306
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW FUNC VIA GCIL CMD.) LOSS OF SV
UPDATES PRESENTS THE WORST CASE CONDITION. THE KU PWR SWITCH
SELECTS ON/OFF/STBY FOR KU COMM/RADAR SYSTEM. FAILURE WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF KU-BAND COMM CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-347
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
612318"7
COT_ AND TI_CK
4026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU A PWR SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
COM SECTION
KU A MODE SWITCH S12
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY sCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
S12 ME452-0102-7306
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM_C_r--__COMMTRDRSYS--OP_TES ___STRING CON?IG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK=DATA;=UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VOITLMI_/RCD_-_RP_B DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (S_V) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL-iTEKNS-FOR PROVIDING THIS-_KP VIA LIKT_ 2dND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW FUNC VIA GCIL CMD.) LOSS OF SV
UPDATES PRESENTS WORST CASE CONDITION. THE KU PWR SWITCH SELECTS
ON/OFF/STBY FOR KU COMM/RADAR SYS. OPEN/SHORT COULD IN WORDT
CASE PREVENT APPLICATION OF PWR TO KU-BD COMM AND COULD BLOW FUSE
RESULTING IN LOSS OF KU BD CAP.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6122187
COMM AND TRACK
4027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU A MODE SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM
3) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) COM SECTION
5) KU A MODE SWITCH S13
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
S13 ME452-0102-7406
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW FUNC VIA GCIL CMD.) LOSS OF SV
UPDATES PRESENTS THE WORST CASE CONDITION. THE KU MODE SWITCH
SELECTS RDR COOP/RDR PASSIVE/COMM. FAILURE TO SELECT COMM WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF KU-BAND COMM CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-349
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
COMM AND TRACK
4028
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU A MODE SW (REF NAVAIDS RR)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
COM SECTION
KU A MODE SWITCH S13
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
S13 ME452-0102-7406
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_SE_ OF KU-_ COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SING_ STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DAT_ INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES, LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE _D _LI_ REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW FUNC VIA GCIL CMD.) LOSS OF SV .......
UPDATES PRESENTS THE WORST CASE CONDITION. THE KU MODE SWITCH
SELECTS RDR COOP/RDR PASSIVE/CQ_ FAILURE TO SELECT COMM WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF KU-BAND COMM CAPABILITY. AN OPEN/SHORT WOULD
IN WORST CASE PREVENT SE_ _-BAND CON,
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
COMM AND TRACK
4029
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD SIG PROC HDR SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) SIG PROC ASSY
5) HDR SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S15
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP ViA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PMAND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW VIA UL GCIL CMD.) HDR SW
SELECTS INPUT TO DL KU BD CHANNEL 3; TV/PL DIG/PL ANL/PI/PL
MAX/OFF. FAILURE TO SW FROM OFF PRESENTS WORST CASE RESULTING
IN LOSS OF DOWNLINK TV AND PL DATA RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-351
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
7/Is/87
COMM AND TRACK
4030
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD SIG PROC HDR SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) SIG PROC ASSY
5) HDR SW
6)
7)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S15
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONF!G
TO PROVIDE A TDP.SS___--TH_E__DRB' _ _ECO_ SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE-_DUNDANCYEXISTSVIA TWO S-BANDPMAND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW VIA UL GCIL CMD.) _HDR SW _,_ _ ....... =_
SELECTS INPUT TO DL K'U BD CHANNEL 3; TV/PL DiG/PL ANL/PI/PL
MAX/OFF. OPEN/SHORT WOULD NEGATE SW FUNCTION RESULTING IN LOSS
OF DOWNLINK_ANDI_LDATA RESULTING IN POSSiB_ _SS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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l
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
COMM AND TRACK
4031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD SIG PROC LDR SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) SIG PROC ASSY
5) LDR SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW VIA UL GCIL CMD.) LDR SW
SELECTS INPUT TO DL KU BD CHANNEL 2; PI/PL DIG/OPS RCDR/PL
RCDR/OFF. FAILURE TO SW FROM OFF WOULD PRESENT THE WORST CASE
RESULTING IN LOSS OF DOWNLINK PL AND PL RCDR PB DATA AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-353
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
COMM AND TRACK
4032
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD SIG PROC LDR SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) K_ COMM
3) K'U-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) SIG PROC ASSY
5) LDR SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S16
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR _'YS OPE_RA_TES IN S_ING_ISTRiNG CONFIG
TO 'ISR_E___f.Ii_B_.__ _ ORB_ _e__
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
0F ALL MEANS FoR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LI_ AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S,B_D PM_AND _SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW VIA UL GCIL CMD.) LDR SW _
SELECTS _PUT TO D_ _ BD CHANNEL-_ ; _i/PL _IG/OPS RCDR/PL
RCDR/OFF. OPEN/SHORT WOULD NEGATE SW FUNCTION RESULTING IN LOSS
OF DOW_LI}_K PL _PL R6qYR PB_ RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION_
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o3/87
COMM AND TRACK
4033
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NSP GCIL UPLINK DATA SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) NSP/GCIL
5) UPLINK DATA SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AIA2
$20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES' LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUNDANCY VIA SECOND SW, AND UNLIKE SYS REDUND VIA TWO S-
BAND PM AND FM SYS PLUS VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW VIA GCIL CMD.)
SW SELECTS EITHER S-BD OR KU-BD DATA SOURCE. FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT KU BD DATA SELECTION AND LOSS OF SV UPDATE CAP RESULTING
IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
m
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-355
b
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 4034 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
NSP GCIL UPLINK DATA SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
u
D
g
DBREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4 ) NSP/GCIL "
5) UPLINK DATA SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ]
PANEL AIA2
$20
B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIQNALE_
COMM SECT OF KIq_-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPE_TES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BE_EN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL ME_R PROVIDING__AP vIA LIKE AND UNLI_ REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUNDANCY VIA SECOND SW, AND UNLIKE SYS REDUND VIA TWO S-
BAND PM AND FM_SYS PLUS VO ONLY_IA _F SYS, SW VIA GCIL CMb.) _':°_'
SW SELECTS EITHER S-BD OR KU-BD DATA SOURCE. OPEN/SHORT WOULD
P RE_VENT KU BD DATA SELECTIONAND LOSS OF SV UPDATE CAP RESULTING
IN POSSIB_ LOSS OF VEHI__C_W.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
?/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
4035
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
COM SECTION
KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
$7 ME452-0093-5025
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LI_ AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW FUNC VIA GND CMD.) KU BD STEERING SW
SELECTS GPC/GPC DESIG/AUTO TK/MAN SLEW. FAILURE WOULD PREVENT
SELECTING OPTIMUM ANT STEERING MODE. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-590109, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-357
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10187
COMMAND TRACK
4036
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
COM SECTION
KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
[
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/!R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $7 ME452-0093-5025
B [ P ] c[p]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LI___ THE GND AND ORB. THE _OMMSE_T
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE-_DUNDANCy EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PMAND_$YSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW FUNC VIA GND CMD.) LOSS OF SV UPDATES
PRESENTS THE W0_'T _ASE CONDITION. THE KU BDFUNcSWITCH S_LECTS
GPC/GPC DESIG/AUTO TK/MAN SLEW. SHORT COULD CAUSE FUSE TO=BLOW _
RESULTING IN LOSS OF KU BD CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VECHiCLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-590109, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE iII, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/13/8 
COMM AND TRACK
4037
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD ANT DEPLOY/STOW SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
COM SECTION
KU BD ANT DEPLOY/STOW SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI3
$8 ME452-0102-7102
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW FUNC VIA DIRECT STOW SW AND PYRO
SW.) FAILURE TO SELECT DEPLOY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF KU BD CAP.
FAILURE TO STOW COULD PREVENT CLOSURE OF PL BAY DOORS RESULTING
IN POSS LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-590109, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-359
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4038 ABORT:
ITEM: KU BD ANT DEPLOY/STOW SW
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
COM SECTION
KU BD ANT DEPLOY/STOW SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI3
$8 ME452-0102-7102
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT oF KULBD COMM/RDRSYS OPERATE SIN SING_S_G CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A _S-_IN_ B__N _HE GN_A_R_ _ _HE__EC_ "
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND _
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS, SW FUNC VIA DIRECT STOW SW AND PYRo -_-_
SW.) SHORTED*SW _ COULDBLOW FUSE DISABLING DEPLOY/STOW-CONTROL
FUNCTION CAUSING LOSS OF DEPLOY LOSING KU COMM CAP AND STOW IF IN
DEPLOYED POSITION _NT_NGCLOS_ OF PL BAY DOORS RESULTING IN
POSS LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-590109, SSSH
16_i & i6.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INC0/CO_/JSC-1861i BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-360
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
COMM AND TRACK
4039
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD ANT DIRECT STOW SW
FAIL TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) ANT DIRECT STOW SW
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE DIRECT STOW
SW CAN BE USED TO STOW DA IN THE EVENT THAT THE DEPLOY/STOW SW
DOES NOT PERFORM FUNC. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING
THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS
VIA PYRO SW.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD PREVENT DA STOW AND CLOSURE OF
PL BAY DOORS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-590109, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INco/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-361
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/15/87
COMM AND TRACK
4040
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD ANT DIRECT STOW SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM
3) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) ANT DIRECT STOW SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI3
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] c[p]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF i_J-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO _XT_S-LIN_BETW_ -T_AND ORB, _DIP.ECT STOW
SW CAN BE USED TO STOW DA IN THE EVENT THAT THE DEPLOY/STOW SW
FAILS TO STOW DA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS .......
CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA PYRO
SW.) OPEN/SHOR_T_WO_LD NEGATE SW Q_R_T_QN P p_VENTING_DA STOW CAP
P-RE_NTING-CLO_ _ __ __ __T_i_ _i-_i_O S-STB_ ......
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-590109. SSSH
16.1 & 16.°5, OMRS NSTS _ 08171 FiLE III, INco/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/10/87
COMMAND TRACK
4041
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/SAFE SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/SAFE SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AI4
S19
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE PYRO SW HAS
NO AFFECT ON KU COMM. PYRO ARM/SAFE SW PROVIDES POWER TO
JETTISON/SAFE SW FOR INITIATION OF GUILLOTINE TO SEPARATE
DEPLOYED ASSY IN CASE OF EMERGENCY. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR
PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST
CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA EVA PROCEDURE.) TWO SECTION SW PROVIDING POWER
FROM TWO SEPARATE PWR MAINS. FAILURE TO SW WOULD PREVENT
JETTISON OF ANT ASSY AND PL BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-590109, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-363
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
4042
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/SAFE SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD ANT A PYRO ARM/SAFE SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : -3/3
LI FTO_F : 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT : i/1 AOA : 3/ 3 '
DEORBIT : 3/3 ATO : 3/3
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: PANEL AI4
PART NUMBER: S19
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE PYRO SW HAS
NO AFFECT ON KU COMM. PYRO ARM/SAFE SW PROVIDES POWER TO
JETTISON/SAFE SW FOR INITIATION OF GUILLOTINE TO SEPARATE i
DEPLOYED ASSY IN CASE OF EMERGENCY, IXDSS OF AL]3MEANS FOR
PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST
CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF $EHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIt, REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA EVA PROCEDURE. ) TWO SECTION SW PROVIDING POWER__:_z_
FROM TWO SEPARATE P_ _INS.--OPE_/SHO_T OF ONES-ECTiON WOULD NOT
BE CAUSE FOR LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. IN WORST CASE OPEN/SHORT
OF BOTH SECT WOULD PREVENT JETTISON OF ANT ASSY AND PL BAY DOOR
CLOSURE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE Loss OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-590109, SSSH
16_i & 16.5, O_S NSTS 08i7i FILE III, INCO/CO_/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-364
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
4043
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD ANT A PYRO JETT/SAFE SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD ANT A PYRO JETT/SAFE SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A14
$20
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TOPROVIDE ATDRSSLINKBETWEEN-T}{E GND A/_D ORB. THE PYRO SW HAS
NO AFFECT ON KU COMM. PYRO JETT/SAFE SW PROVIDES POWER TO
GUILLOTINE TO SEPARATE DEPLOYED ASSY IN CASE OF EMERGENCY.
LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING-THIS _CAPVIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW. (UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA EVA PROCEDURE.) TWO
SECTION SW PROVIDING POWER FROM TWO SEPARATE PWR MAINS. FAILURE
TO SW WOULD PREVENT JETTISON OF ANT ASSY AND PL BAY DOOR CLOSURE
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-365
4-- _..
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 4044
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/1
3/3
ITEM: KU BD ANT A PYRO JETT/SAFE SW
FAILURE MODE: . ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
KU BD ANT A PYRO JETT/SAFE SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTI_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL AI4
$20
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RA_T_QNALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO-_ROVIDE AT_LINKBE_NTH_ GNDAND ORB_ _E-P_osw-_L_s
NO AFFECT ON KU COMM. PYRO JETT/SAFE SW PROVIDES POWER TO
GUILLOTINE TO SEPARATE DEPLOYED ASSY IN CASE OF EMERGENCY.
LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
U
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CREW. (UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA EVA PROCEDURE.) TWO
SECTION SW PROVIDING POWER FROM TWO SEPARATE PWR MAINS.
OPEN/SHORT OF ONE SECTION WOULD NOT BE CAUSE FOR LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. IN WORST CASE OPEN/SHORT OF BOTH SECT WOULD PREVENT
JETTISON OF ANT ASSY AND PL BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS 0F-VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-590109, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-366
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/87
COMMAND TRACK
4045
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD CONTROL SW (CMD/PNL)
FAILS TO SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) COM SECTION
5) KU BD CONTROL SW
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: _ 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE VECTOR (SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING THIS CAP VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE- REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S-BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) CONTROL SW SELECTS KU BD GCIL
PANEL OR COMMAND CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW WOULD PREVENT CHANGE
FROM SET POSITION CAUSING GCIL FUNC CONTROL VIA PNL ONLY OR CMD
ONLY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-367
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/87
COMMAND TRACK
4046
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD CONTROL SW (CMD/PNL)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4 ) COM SECTION
5) KU BD CONTROL SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT:__ ' 3/IR AOA: 3/3 ....
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 _
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $6
CAUSES : MECHANICAL sHOcK,_ VIB_TION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
C0_S-ECT-OFEI_-BD_COMM/RDR-SYS_OPE_TE__I_GLE_sTRING_60_G
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UP AND DOWNLINK DATA; UP VO/CMDS AND DN
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA INCLUDING STATE-VECT-0R(SV) UPDATES. LOSS
OF-A_LL____VIDING THIS CAPViALI}_D_DNL_RED_D
COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TWO S_BAND PM AND FM SYSTEMS PLUS
VO ONLY VIA UHF SYS.) CONTROL SW SELECTS KU BD GCIL ........
PANEL OR COMMAND CONTROL. SHORT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF GCIL FUNC
AND CONTROL OF KU BD SYS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-368
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
4047
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS HARDCOPIER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) HARDCOPIER
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
_DING/SAFING:" 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BAY 3B
AV14453 (GFE)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE" •
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA AND DOWNLINK
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TELEPRINTER FOR HARDCOPY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE.)
LOSS OF TAG HARDCOPY NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-369
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
4048
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS HARDCOPIER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) HARDCOPIER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: BAY 3B
PART NUMBER: AV14453 (GFE)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA AND DOWNLINK
VO/TLM/TV/R_TA. ___ MEANS FoR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS .......
(P_TIAL _LIKE _ DUND_ZC__S _°TE _ pR_ _ _L_RD_O py
TEXT _D_TW_S-BAND PM _ _ S_ _ORUPLI_K U_I_) ...........
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TAG CAP. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7123187
COMM AND TRACK
4049
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:,
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS HARDCOPIER
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) HARDCOPIER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BAY 3B
AV14453 (GFE)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA AND DOWNLINK
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TELEPRINTER FOR HARDCOPY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE.)
ERRATIC/INTERMITTANT OPERATION WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TAG
CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18 AND 25
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-371
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/23/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 4050
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
, FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/5
3/3
ITEM: TEXT AND GRAPHICS MASTER PWR SW
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) COMM & TRACK
2) KU COMM
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) MASTER PWR SW
i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TAG HARDCOPIER
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS_d_I_fG_D_TA AND DOWNLINK
VO/T_TV/RCDR PB DATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROV_ING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY ExISTs VI--ATE_PRINTER FOR HARDCOPY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE,
SW VIA GND CMD.) MOMENTARY MASTER PWR SW ENABLES TAG HARDCOPIER.
FAILURE TO SW WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TAG CAP. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, O_S NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-372
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
4051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS MASTER PWR SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) MASTER PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TAG HARDCOPIER
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA AND DOWNLINK
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TELEPRINTER FOR HARDCOPY
TEXT AND TWOS-B_D PM ANDUHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE,
SW VIA GND CMD.) MOMENTARY MASTER PWR SW ENABLES TAG HARDCOPIER.
OPEN/SHORT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TAG CAP. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-373
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
4052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS PAPER ADVANCE SW
FAI_ TO SWITCH _
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR : :
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) PAPER ADVANCE SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TAG HARDCOPIER
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: _CHANTCAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONT_INATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TD_S LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK V07_P_ _=TAG _D_TA AND _WNLINK _ ;_ i_i =_i_
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB_DATA_= :_ss OF A_L _S FO_ _ROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
_SS OF HARDCO_Y TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL_LIKE REDUNDANCY _TS_FIg___ FOR HARI)COPY =_
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE,
SW VIA GND CMD.) MOMENTARY PAPER ADVANCE SW ALLOWS MANUAL
CONTROL OF TAG _DCOPIER PAPER MOVEMENT. FAILURE TO SW COULD
CAUSE SOME INCONVENIENCE. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, O_NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JEC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-374
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7123187
COMM AND TRACK
4053
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS PAPER ADVANCE SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
K'J-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) PAPER ADVANCE SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TAG HARDCOPIER
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA AND DOWNLINK
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TELEPRINTER FOR HARDCOPY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE,
SW VIA GND CMD.) MOMENTARY PAPER ADVANCE SW ALLOWS MANUAL
CONTROL OF TAG HARDCOPIER PAPER MOVEMENT. OPEN/SHORT COULD CAUSE
SOME INCONVENIENCE. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-375
L
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:,
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
4054
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS LAMP TEST SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) LAMP TEST SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ !] S [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TAG HARDCOPIER
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA AND DOWNLINK
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNL_UNDANCY EXISTS VIA TELEPR_N_ER_FOR HARDCOpY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE.)
MOMENTARY LAMP TEST SW ALLOWS LIGHT AND INDICATOR CHECK OF TAG
HARDCOPIER. FAILURE TO SW WOULD PREVENT CHECK AND COULD RESULT
INFA_E INDICA_N_= N0 CAUSE FOR IJ0SS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70"740109 AND VS70-740199, sssH
16.1 & 16.5, O_NSTS 08171 FI_ IIi, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-376
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
COMMAND TRACK
4055
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS LAMP TEST SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) LAMP TEST SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: TAG HARDCOPIER
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA AND DOWNLINK
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TELEPRINTER FOR HARDCOPY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE.)
MOMENTARY LAMP TEST SW ALLOWS LIGHT AND INDICATOR CHECK OF TAG
HARDCOPIER. OPEN/SHORT COULD PREVENT CHECK AND RESULT IN FALSE
INDICATIONS. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-377
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4056 ABORT:
ITEM: TEXT AND GRAPHICS BRIGHTNESS CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH ....
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR _-_
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) BRIGHTNESS CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TAG HARDCOPIER
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:. i_ ...... _ :
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPE_TES IN sING_ STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINKVO/_S_/_D TAGDATA_DOWNLINKI _ _:....._...._
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE RED UND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TELEPRINTER FOR HARDCOPY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE.)
BRIGHTNESS CONTROL ALLOWS LIGHT LEVEL CONTROL OF TAG HARDCOPIER
CRT. _ILURE TO SW COULD=PREVENT OPTIMIZA_ON OF TAG HARDCOPIES.
NO CAUSE ?OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-378
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
4057
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS BRIGHTNESS CONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) BRIGHTNESS CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
_EDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA : 3/ 3
AT O : 3/3
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TAG HARDCOPIER
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA AND DOWNLINK
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PBDATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TELEPRINTER FOR HARDCOPY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE.)
BRIGHTNESS CONTROL ALLOWS LIGHT LEVEL CONTROL OF TAG HARDCOPIER
CRT. OPEN/SHORT COULD PREVENT USE OF TAG. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-379
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
4058
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS GAMMA CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) GAMMA CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TAG HARDCOPIER
CAUSES:MEC_CA_ SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RA_: ................
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA_D DOWNLI_II_I_
VO/TLM/TV_R-d_R_PB DATA. LOS_OF ALL ME_S_FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(P_TIAL_U_IKE ___ __ _ _TELEPRINTER FO_'_DCOPY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE.)
GAMMA CONTROL ALLOWS WHITE/DARK ENHANCEMENT OF TAG HARDCOPIER
CRT. FAILURE TO SW WOULD PREVENT OPTIMIZATION OF TAG BLACK/WHITE
CONTENT. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
RE?ERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70_740-1Og_D_VS_0'740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16,5, 0MR°S NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COM_/_JSC_I8611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-380
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE" •
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/8?
COMM AND TRACK
4059
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS GAMMA CONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) GAMMA CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
pRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: TAG HARDCOPIER
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA AND DOWNLINK
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TELEPRINTER FOR HARDCOPY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE.)
GAMMA CONTROL ALLOWS WHITE/DARK ENHANCEMENT OF TAG HARDCOPIER
CRT. OPEN/SHORT COULD PREVENT USE OF TAG. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-381
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/23/sv
COMM AND TRACK
4060
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS CONTRAST CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) CONTRAST CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 '
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] .....
LOCATION: TAG HARDCOPIER
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: ....__ICAL SHOCK, VIB_TiON, _ CONT_INATION, _ PIECE P_T
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATiONALE: _ _>__._a_:_::
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND-TAG DATA-AND-DOWNLINK _
VO/TLMTTV=/R_L_R:_ DATA._S:0? ALL__Y_ORPRO_IDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, S_FEMATICS_ MAI_ANT_ PHOTOGRA_PI_ ._ _$i_ _
(PA_TTALUNLIKE_DD_-E_XI_T_J-VTA--Tk"7_"_qTT___D_OPY -Z
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE.)
CONTRAST CONTROL ALLOWS WHITE/DARK BLENDING OF TAG HARDCOPIER
CRT. ?AILURE TO: SW WOULDPREVENT OPTIMIZATION OF TAG _DcOPY.
NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES :_ S YSTE_M S_CHEMATi C v-s7_ _ 7_ 0io§ _ AND VS_7 O" 740199 _, sS-S_H
i6.i_& i6.5, o_S _NSTS 08_71 _FILE IXI, INCO/tOMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-382
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
4061
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEXT AND GRAPHICS CONTRAST CONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
KU COMM
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
TEXT AND GRAPHICS (TAG) CONTRAST CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: _ 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TAG HARDCOPIER
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMM SECT OF KU-BD COMM/RDR SYS OPERATES IN SINGLE STRING CONFIG
TO PROVIDE A TDRSS LINK BETWEEN THE GND AND ORB. THE COMM SECT
PROVIDES ORB UPLINK VO/CMDS AND TAG DATA AND DOWNLINK
VO/TLM/TV/RCDR PB DATA. LOSS OF ALL MEANS FOR PROVIDING TAG
DATA VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE RESULT IN
LOSS OF HARDCOPY TEXT, SCHEMATICS, MAPS AND PHOTOGRAPHS.
(PARTIAL UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA TELEPRINTER FOR HARDCOPY
TEXT AND TWO S-BAND PM AND UHF SYS FOR UPLINK UOICE.)
CONTRAST CONTROL ALLOWS WHITE/DARK BLENDING OF TAG HARDCOPIER
CRT. OPEN/SHORT COULD PREVENT USE OF TAG. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 AND VS70-740199, SSSH
16.1 & 16.5, OMRS NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF
SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-383
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/26/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
4501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
X)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
KU-BAND
MNC BUS
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (KU SIG PROC) CB31
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 " TAL: 3/3 _:*
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ p ] c [ p ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE P_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28 VDC POWER SUPPLY FROM MNC TO THE HIGH DATA RATE AND
LOW DATA RATE SELECTOR SWITCHES. LOSS OF 28 VDC POWER SUPPLY TO
THE LOW VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY WITHIN THE COMM SIGNAL PROCESSOR
WHICH DIS--ABLE--S-K-BAND FORWARD/RETURN LINK _TDRS.
LOSS OF FORWARD LINK DATA CAUSES AUTO SWITCH TO S-BAND. FAILURE
WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE. LOSS OF ALL
REDUND_YY _B--_--O, i'U-BAND, UHF) DISABLES STATE VECTORUPDATE
CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 REV. E.
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-384 .... _ _ _ _:_
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/26/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND
MNC BUS
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (KU SIG PROC) CB31
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: -3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 ' AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COULD NOT DISCONNECT 28 VDC POWER SUPPLY TO THE LOW VOLTAGE POWER
SUPPLY WITHIN THE COMM SIGNAL PROCESSOR (SPA). POWER TO THE SPA
DATA RATE SELECTOR SWITCHES IS VIA THE KU-BAND POWER SWITCH WHICH
PROVIDES ON/OFF/STBY CONTROL. CLOSED IS THE NORMAL
ON-ORBIT CONFIGURATION. FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 REV. E.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-385
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/26/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 15A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND
MNB BUS
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 15A (KU A ELEC) CB23
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI5
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RAT_NALE_ .... _....
LOSS OF_8 VDC TO POWER ON _'B_D _SYSTEM (CO_AND_RKDAR _ _
OPERATIONS). INABILITY OF RADAR ACQUISITION/TRACKING OF TDRS
RESULTING IN ADDITIONAL LOSS OF S'BAND PM TRANSMiSSOION VIA TDRS.
DIRECT A/G S-BAND PM & FM UNAFFECTED. INABIL_bF-RA--DzUSAGE
FOR PAYLOAD RENDEZVOUS. IF MISSION PRIME OBJECTIVE WAS P/L
RETRIEVAL, FAILURE OF THIS ITEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND, UHF) DISABLES STATE
VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 REV. E.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/26/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 15A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU- BAND
MNB BUS
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 15A (KU A ELEC) CB23
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL Rl5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO REMOVE 28 VDC TO THE LOW VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLIES WITHIN
THE RADAR/COMM INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT (EA-I) AND THE RADAR
SIGNAL PROCESSOR (EA-2). UNABLE TO REMOVE 28 VDC TO THE DEPLOYED
ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY LOW VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY AND KU-BAND
TRANSMITTER. REMAINDER OF POWER CONTROLLED BY KU-BAND
ON/OFF/STBY SWITCH. THIS CB NORMALLY CLOSED ON-ORBIT. FAILURE
WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE. IN THE CASE OF DA
JETTISON, HOT CABLES WOULD BE SEVERED PROBABLY BLOWING ASSOCIATED
FUSES.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109 REV. E.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-387
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/26/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
KU-BAND
MNB BUS
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5A (KU A ANT HTR) CB24
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT :
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS :
3/3 TAL:
2/2 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
2/2
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI5
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28 VDC CONTROLLING HEATER POWER TO ALPHA GIMBAL, BETA
GIMBAL, RATE GYRO, AND FEED OF THE ANTENNA ASSEMBLY. DEPENDING
ON TIME OF FAILURE, LOSS OF THESE TEMP MEASUREMENTS (PLUS XMTR &
RCVR TEMPS) TO TLM OCCURS. ALSO, LOSS OF]TEATERS WITHIN _
DEPLOYED ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY. EXCESSIVE COLD TEMPS COULD
DEGRADATE/INHIBIT ANTENNA OPERATIONS TO THE POINT OF LOSS OF
MISSION.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYST SCHEM VS70-740109
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/26/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHt:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND
MNB BUS
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5A (KU A ANT HTR) CB24
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI5
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO REMOVE 28 VDC ON FOUR ANTENNA HEATERS
(THERMOSTATICALLY - CONTROLLED) AND FOUR DEA HEATERS WITHIN THE
DEPLOYED ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY. THIS CB NORMALLY CLOSED ON-ORBIT.
FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE. IN THE
CASE OF DA JETTISON, HOT CABLES WOULD BE SEVERED PROBABLY BLOWING
ASSOCIATED FUSES.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYST SCHEM VS70-740109
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-389
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/26/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
4507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
, FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER_ 3A
FAILS OPEN; CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
KU-BAND
MNB BUS
RI5 PANEL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (KU A CABLE HTR)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER IS UNUSED.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 10A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) KU-BAND
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MNC BUS
RPC 53
EA-I PWR SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28 VDC FROM MNC TO THE LOW VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY WITHIN
THE RADAR/COMM INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT (EA-I). CAUSES LOSS OF
COMM DATA PROCESSOR AND ANTENNA CONTROL ELECTRONICS. LOSS OF
RADAR CAPABILITY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYST SCHEM VS70-740109
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-391
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/28/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
RPC, IOA
FAI_ C_SED
_AD _ALYST: E.S. DAVY SUBSYS _AD: A.W.ADDIS
B_AK_ HIE_CHY :
1 ) _-BAND
2) MNC BUS
3) RPC 53
4) EA-I P_ SUPPLY
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 ,,_
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_D_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
FWD PWR CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONT_NATION, PIECE P_T STRUC_L FAiL_, VIB_TION,
_CH SHOCK, THE_L STRESS
EFFECTS/_T!ONA_! _ _ _ i _ :
WOULD _INTAIN _C 28 VDC SUPPLY TO THE _W VOLTAGE PO_R SUPPLY
WITHIN _D_/CO_ INTERFACE AND CO_ROL WIT (EA-I). FAIL_
WOULD _ _ NO EFFECT oN_MISSiON/C__HIC T._........
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/28/87
COMM.AND TRACK/EPD&C
4510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) KU-BAND
2) MNB BUS
3) CB 15A (KU A ELEC )
4) FUSE F1 (3A)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] 'B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI5
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO SOURCES PROVIDING POWER ON CAPABILITY OF THE
KU-BAND SYSTEM. LOSS OF 28 VDC COMMANDING A STANDBY CONDITION OF
KU-BAND SYSTEM. ALSO, LOSS OF SINGLE SOURCE 28 VDC TO THE LOW
VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY WITHIN THE RADAR/COMM INTERFACE AND
CONTROL UNIT (EA-I). CAUSES LOSS OF COMM DATA PROCESSOR AND
ANTENNA CONTROL ELECTRONICS. LOSS OF RADAR CAPABILITY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (S-BAND, KU-BAND,
UHF) DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109
w
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-393
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 4511 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST : E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
i
m
I
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : "
1 ) KU-BAND
2 ) MNB BUS
3) CB 15A (KU A ELEC) ..
4) FUSE F2 (3A)
5)
6)
7) "
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
PANEL RI5LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, :PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF TWO 28 VDC SOURCES OF POWER ON. REDUNDANT FUSE
(Fi) FAI_W__Q_LDCAUSE LOSS OF POWER ON _9TION_QKU-B_p
SYST_ INCLUDING RADAR. LOSS OF RADAR CAPABILITY COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS O? ALL RED_A/TCY (S-BAND, KU-BKND, UHF)
I
i
i
l
I
I
z ±
DISABLES STATE VECTOR UPDATE CAPABILITIES WHICH COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-394
m
m=
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/31/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) KU- BAND
2 ) MNB BUS
3) CB 15A (KU A ELEC)
4) FUSE F5 (3A)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LocATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI5
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LoSS OF 28 VDC TO RELAY K1 WITHIN MPCA'2, RESULTS IN LoSS OF MNB
28 VDC TO LoW VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY AND KU-BAND TRANSMITTER WITHIN
THE DEPLOYED ELECTRONICS ASSEMBLY. LOSS OF RADAR CAPABILITIES
COULD RESULT IN LoSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYST SCHEM VS70-740109
L
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-395
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/Ol/8V
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (ANTENNA PYRO)
2) CNTL ABI BUS
3) FUSE F38 (3A)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNtH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2 _
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
mUSES: CIRCU__RT, CONT__, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION. _CH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF 28 VDC _OM CNTL ABi _A SAFE POSITION OF_P_Y_O SWITCH 19
TO CONTACTS OF K2 RELAY IN MPCA-2. RESULTS IN LOSS OF DEPLOYED
ELECTRONICS AE_ TO TIll. _LL HEATERS _L _ THERMOSTATICALLY
CONTROLLED BUT LOSS OF TLM WOULD MASK AN UNDER/OVERTEMP
CONDITION. EXCESSIVE TEMP EXTREMES COULD DEGRADATE/INHIBIT
TRANSMITTER OR RECEIVER AND ANTENNA OPS TO THE POINT OF LOSS OF
MISSION.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 16.5, SYST SCHEM VS70-740109
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-396
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/03/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND
PRYO JETT SYS A
MNA BUS
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A, CB26
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF DUAL 28 VDC SUPPLIES TO PYRO KU ANT A/B ARM/SAFE
SWITCH. DISABLES THE ASSOCIATED FORWARD LOAD CONTROL RESULTING
IN LOSS OF KU-BAND ANTENNA JETTISON SYSTEM A/B. THESE TWO CBS
ARE NORMALLY OPEN UNTIL JETTISON IS NECESSARY). FAILURE OF
THE REDUNDANT ITEM IS NOT READILY DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT.
ANTENNA JETTISON (DUAL STRING) IS LAST RESORT FOLLOWING FAILURE
OF BOTH NORMAL STOW OPS AND DIRECT STOW OPS. ANTENNA ASSY MUST
BE STOWED OR JETTISONED TO CLOSE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS. FAILURE TO
ACCOMPLISH RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-397
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/03/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (PYRO JETT SYS A/B
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
K'J-BAND
PRYO JETT SYS A
MNA BUS
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A, CB26
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBI_T: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ _ _
' REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL ML86
PART NUMBER:
.......... _ ................ i_ii_ _ ................. ........ _ _ _ _,_ _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _E_,i_,_ii ......_ .... _,_
WOULD MAINTAIN 28 VDC POWER TO NORMALLY OPEN CONTACTS OF THE KU
ANT ARM/SAFE SWITCH. FAILURE WOULD HAVE_NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE. _......
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REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7 ms
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-398
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/03/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU BAND (ANTENNA PYRO)
MNC BUS
PANEL ML86
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (PYRO JETT SYS B) CB30
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ML86
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE OF DUAL 28 VDC SUPPLIES TO PYRO KU ANT A ARM/SAFE
SWITCH. DISABLES THE FORWARD LOAD CONTROL ASSY 2 RESULTING IN
LOSS OF KU-BAND ANTENNA JETTISON SYSTEM B. SYSTEM A POWER IS
SUPPLIED VIA CB 26. THESE TWO CBS ARE NORMALLY OPEN (UNTIL
JETTISON IS NECESSARY). FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT ITEM IS NOT
READILY DETECTABLE DURING FLIGHT, THEREFORE, A CRITICAL ITEM.
ANTENNA JETTISON (DUAL STRING) IS LAST RESORT FOLLOWING FAILURE
OF BOTH NORMAL STOW OPS AND DIRECT STOW OPS. ANTENNA ASSYMUST
BE STOWED/JETTISONED TO CLOSE P/L BAY DOORS. FAILURE TO
ACCOMPLISH RESULTS IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-399
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
91o3187
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4517
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3 =
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
KU BAND (ANTENNA PYRO)
MNC BUS
PANEL ML86
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (PYRO JETT SYS B) CB30
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL ML86
PART NUMBER:
..................._ _ _ LURE, VIBRATION,CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, P_I_.CE PKRT STRU_L FAI
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..... _ ........;_ , .
WOULD MAINTAIN 28 VDC FROM MNCTO NORMALLY OPEN CONTACTS OF THE
KU ANT ARM/SAFE SWITCH. FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE. _.....
_CES: SSEH i5_7 " > _ _:....
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-400
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT:
4518 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
KU BAND (DEA)
AC3 MMC2 BUS
PANEL MA73
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (MCA POWER AC3 3-PHASE MID2) CBI2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL MA73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 3-PHASE PWR SUPPLY TO MOTOR 1 WHICH DRIVES ANTENNA ASSY
FOR DEPLOY/STOW OPS. BACKED BY CB9 SUPPLYING 3-PHASE PWR TO
MOTOR 2. EITHER STRING ALONE WILL PERFORM THE REQUIRED
OPERATION. ADDITIONAL FAILURE (OF REDUNDANT CB9) CAUSES LOSS OF
E-PHASE PWR TO MOTOR 2 RESULTING IN LOSS OF DEPLOYMENT, NORMAL
STOW, AND DIRECT STOW OPS. EARLY LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF ANTENNA ASSY DEPLOY CAPABILITY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION. A LATER FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN
HAVING TO JETTISON THE DEPLOYED ASSY TO CLOSE PL BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
i
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-401
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT:
4519 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND (DEA)
AC3 MMC2 BUS
PANEL MA73
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (MCA POWER AC3 3-PHASE MID2) CBI2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL MA73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_T_0NALE_ _ _:_:........_-_:_
WOULD MAINTAIN 3-PHASE POWER TO MMC 2 NORMALLY OPEN RELAY
CONTACTS. POWER APPLICATION CONTROLLED BY PL BAY MECH POWER
SYSTEM 10N/OFFSWITCH. FAILURE WOUL D HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES : SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-402
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
9/03/87
COMM AND TRACKIEPD&C
4520
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: 3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND (DEA)
AC3 MMC4 BUS
PANEL MA73
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (MCA POWER AC2 3-PHASE MID4) CB9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL MA73
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUC_LFAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 3-PHASE PWR SUPPLY TO MOTOR 2 WHICH DRIVES ANTENNA ASSY
FOR DEPLOY/STOW OPS. REDUNDANT WITH CBI2 SUPPLYING 3-PHASE PWR
TO MOTOR I. EITHER STRING ALONE WILL PERFORM THE REQUIRED
OPERATION. ADDITIONAL FAILURE (OF CBI2) CAUSES LOSS OF 3-PHASE
TO MOTOR 1 RESULTING IN LOSS OF DEPLOYMENT, NORMAL STOW, AND
DIRECT STOW OPS. EARLY LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF ANTENNA ASSY DEPLOY CAPABILITY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
A LATER FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD RESULT IN HAVING TO
JETTISON THE DEPLOYED ASSY TO CLOSE PL BAY DOORS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
m
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-403
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/os/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4521
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
. 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
_)
s)
9)
KU-BAND (DEA)
AC3 MMC4 BUS
PANEL MA73
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (MCA POWER AC2 3-PHASE MID4) CB9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3.:_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL MA73
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ ;_ ...._=_
WOULD MAINTAIN 3-PHASE POWER TO MMC 4 NORMALLY OPEN RELAY
CONTACTS POWER APPLICATION CONTROLLED BY PL BAY MECH PWR SYS 2
ON/OFF SWITCH• FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES : SSSH 15.7
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/08/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4522
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) MNC MPC3 BUS
3) RPC 5A
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PWR CONT ASSY 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28 VDC FROM MNC TO THE MCA LOGIC CIRCUITS (DUAL STRING
CIRCUITRY). WHEN ANTENNA ASSY IS FULLY DEPLOYED, LOSS OF THIS
ITEM RESULTS IN LOSS OF SIGNAL (i OF 2) THAT ENABLES THE K-BAND
TRANSMITTER AND EA-I ANTENNA SCANNING CIRCUITS. ALSO CAUSES
LOSS OF TALK-BACK AND LOSS OF TLM (i OF 2) SHOWING ANTENNA
DEPLOYED POSITION, AND THE LOSS OF BOOM STOW ENABLE 2 EXCITATION
SIGNAL (i OF 2). FAILURE OF THIS ITEM PLUS THE REDUNDANT RPC
WOULD DISABLE K-BAND TRANSMITTER (NO RADAR) AND WOULD REQUIRE THE
ALTERNATE DIRECT STOW OPERATION. LOSS OF K-BAND XMTR COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-405
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/08/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4523
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) MNC MPC3 BUS
3) RPC 5A
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
MID PWR CONT ASSY 3LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WOULD MAINTAIN 28 VDC FROM MNC TO THE MCA LOGIC CIRCUITS. RPC IS
CONTROLLED ON/OFF BY PANEL SWITCH. FAILURE WOULD NOT AFFECT
CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION . ......
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/08/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4524
m
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) MNB MPC2 BUS
3) RPC 5A
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
I2tNDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PWR CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28 VDC FROM MNB TO THE MCA LOGIC CIRCUITS (DUAL STRING
CIRCUITRY). WHEN ANTENNA ASSY IS FULLY DEPLOYED, LOSS OF THIS
ITEM RESULTS IN LOSS OF SIGNAL (I OF 2) THAT ENABLES THE K-BAND
TRANSMITTER AND EA-I ANTENNA SCANNING CIRCUITS. ALSO CAUSES
LOSS OF TALK-BACK AND LOSS OF TLM (I OF 2) SHOWING ANTENNA
DEPLOYED POSITION, & THE LOSS OF BOOM STOW ENABLE 2 EXCITATION
SIGNAL (i OF 2). AN ADDITIONAL FAILURE OF THIS REDUNDANT RPC
WOULD DISABLE K-BAND TRANSMITTER (NO RADAR) AND WOULD REQUIRE THE
ALTERNATE DIRECT STOW OPERATION. LOSS OF K-BAND XMTR COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-407
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/os/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4525
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RPC, 5A
FAILS CLOSED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) MNB MPC2 BUS
3 ) RPC 5A
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID PWR CONT ASSY 2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WOULD MAINTAIN 28 VDC FROM MNB TO THE MCA LOGIC CIRCUITS. RPC IS
CONTROLLED ON/OFF BY PANEL SWITCH. FAILURE WOULD NOT AFFECT
CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/09/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4526
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLCA2 BUS
3) F23, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28 VDC WHICH ENABLES GPOUND CMD AND PANEL CMD OF ANTENNA
ASSY DEPLOY BY MOTOR I. LOSS OF 28 VDC WHICH ENABLES STOW
(NORMAL) OPS BY MOTOR i. REDUNDANT SIGNALS CONTROLLING MOTOR 1
ARE SUPPLIED VIA REDUNDANT FUSE F20. ADDITIONAL REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY FUSES F7 & F25 SUPPLYING POWER TO CONTROL MOTOR 2.
EARLY LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ANTENNA ASSY
DEPLOY CAPABILITY AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF STOWAGE
CAPABILITY WOULD BE OVERRIDDEN BY DIRECT STOW OPS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-409
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/o9/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4527
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLCAI BUS
3) F20, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, C0NTAMiNATiON, _ PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO FUSE F23. ALSO, LOSS OF 28 VDC SIGNAL
ENABLING EA-I TO POSITION THE ANTENNA INTO A STOW CONFIG. ALL
SIGNALS/CMDS VIA FUSES F23 & F20 ARE DUPLICATED VIA FUSES F7 &
F25 FOR ANTENNA DEPLOY/STOW BY MOTOR 2. EARLY LOSS OF ALL
REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ANTENNA ASSY DEPLOY CAPABILITY AND
POSSIB_SS OFkMIS$ION__LO$S OF S_OWA_ECAPABILITY WOULD BE
OVERRIDDEN BY DIRECT STOW OPS._ ....... ......
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REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-410
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/09/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4528
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLBCl BUS
3) F7, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2 R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO FUSES F20 AND F25. ALSO, LOSS OF 28 VDC
SIGNAL ENABLING EA-I TO POSITION THE ANTENNA INTO A STOW CONFIG.
ALL SIGNALS/CMDS VIA FUSES F7 & F25 ARE DUPLICATED VIA FUSES F20
& F23 FOR ANTENNA DEPLOY/STOW BY MOTOR i. EARLY LOSS OF
ALL REDUNDANCY WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ANTENNA ASSY DEPLOY CAPABILITY
AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF STOWAGE CAPABILITY WOULD
BE OVERRIDDEN BY DIRECT STOW OPS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-411
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDACID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/09/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4529
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
312R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLBC2 BUS
3) F25, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART _BER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:i_ .............
LOSS OF 28 VDC _ICH ENAB_S_GROUND CMD AND PANELleD O?_E_A
ASSY DEPLOY BY MOTOR 2. LOSS OF 28 VDC WHICH ENABLES STOW
(NORMAL) 0PS BY MOTOR 2. REDUNDANT SIGNA_ CONTROLLING MOTOR 2_
ARE SUPPLIED VIA _DUNDANT FUSE F7, __E_ARLY LOSS OF _DUNDANCY_
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ANTENNA ASSY DEPLOY CAPABILITY AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF STOWAGE CAPABILITY WOULD BE OVERRIDDEN
BY DIRECT STOW OPS.
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REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-4i2
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/10/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4530
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLCA2 BUS
3) F24, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28 VDC TO MMC2 TO INITIATE ANTENNA STOWAGE OPS (BACKUP)
USING MOTOR i. BOTH FUSES F24 AND FI9 NEEDED TO ACTIVATE MOTOR
I. LOSS OF MOTOR 1 ACTUATION OF DIRECT STOWAGE OF THE DEPLOYED
ASSY. COMPLETE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MOTOR 2 VIA FUSES F8 &
F26. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WITHIN THIS BACKUP SYSTEM WOULD
CAUSE INITIATION OF ANTENNA JETTISON OPS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-413
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4531
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLCAI BUS
3) FI9, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
LOSS OF 28 VDC TO MMC2 TO INITIATE ANTENNA STOW_EO-P_(BACKUP)
USING MOTOR I. BOTH FUSES F24 AND FI9 NEEDED TO ACTIVATE MOTOR
i. Loss OF MOTOR=I AC_ATIQNQFDI_ STOWAGE OF THE DEPLOYED
ASSY. COMPLETE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY MOTOR 2 VIA FUSES F8 &
F26. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WITHIN THIS BACKUP SYSTEM WOULD
CAUSE INITIATION OF ANTENNA JETTISON OPS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/1o/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4532
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST : E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLBCI BUS
3) FS, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28 VDC TO MMC4 TO INITIATE ANTENNA STOWAGE OPS (BACKUP)
USING MOTOR 2. BOTH FUSES F8 AND F26 NEEDED TO ACTIVATE MOTOR 2.
LOSS OF MOTOR 2 ACTUATION OF DIRECT STOWAGE OF THE DEPLOYED ASSY.
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY WITHIN THIS BACKUP SYSTEM WOULD
CAUSE INITIATION OF ANTENNA JETTISON OPS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-415
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/10/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4533
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND (DEA)
CNTLBC2 BUS
F26, IA FUSE
S12, KU ANT DIRECT STOW ON/OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
.LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATI ONALE:_ _ .........._ ..... _
LOSS OF_8 VDC TO _C4 TO INITIATE ANTE_A STOWAGE OPS (BACKUP)
USING MOTOR 2. BOTH FUSES F26 AND F8 NEEDED TO ACTIVATE MOTOR 2.
LOSS OF MOTOR 2 ACTUATION OF DIRECT STOWAGE OF THE DEPLOYED ASSY.
COMPLETE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BYq_OTOR_VIA FUSES F2_ ....
& FI9. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WITHIN THIS BACKUP SYSTEM WOULD CAUSE
INITIATION OF ANTENNA JETTISON OPS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/11/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4534
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLABI BUS
3) FI, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF 28 VDC TO MMC2 CONTROLLING APPLICATION OF
3-PHASE POWER TO MOTOR i. THE REDUNDANT SIGNAL IS APPLIED VIA
FUSE FI6. FAILURE OF BOTH FUSES RESULTS IN LOSS OF MOTOR 1
ACTUATING DEPLOY/STOW OF ANTENNA ASSY. COMPLETE REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY SYSTEM 2 ON/OFF SWITCH CONTROLLING MOTOR 2 VIA FUSES
F28 & F6. HOWEVER, FAILURE OF EITHER OF THESE TWO FUSES DISABLES
MOTOR 2. EARLY FAILURE OF ALLREDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF
ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF
STOWAGE CAPABILITY WOULD BE OVERRIDDEN BY JETTISON OPS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-417
b
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/11/s7
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4535
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLCAI BUS
3) FI6, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3 / 3
LI_OFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO FUSE FI. FAILURE OF BOTH FUSES DISABLES
MOTOR 1 ACTUATION OF DEPLOY/STOW OF ANTENNA ASSY. COMPLETE
REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY SYSTEM 2 ON/OFF SWITCH CONTROLLING MOTOR 2
VIA FUSES F28 & F6. HOWEVER, FAILURE OF EITHER OF THESE TWO
FUSES DISABLES MOTOR 2. EARLY FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN LOSS OF ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS
OF STOWAGE CAPABILITY WOULD BE OVERRIDDEN BY JETTISON OPS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4536
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLBA2 BUS
3) F33, IA FUSE
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF 28 VDC TO MMC2 CONTROLLING APPLICATION OF
3-PHASE POWER TO MOTOR i. THE REDUNDANT SIGNAL IS APPLIED VIA
FUSE F34' FAILURE OF BOTH FUSES RESULTS IN LOSS OF MOTOR 1
ACTUATING DEPLOY/STOW OF ANTENNA ASSY' COMPLETE REDUNDANCY
PROVIDED BY SYSTEM 2 ON/OFF SWITCH CONTROLLING MOTOR 2 VIA FUSES
F28 & F6. HOWEVER, FAILURE OF EITHER OF THESE TWO FUSES DISABLES
MOTOR 2. EARLY FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF
ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF
STOWAGE CAPABILITY WOULD BE OVERRIDDEN BY JETTISON OPS.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-419
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/11/s7
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4537
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST : E. S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLCA2 BUS
3) F34, IA FUSE
SI, PL BAY MECH PWR, SYSI ON/OFF SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO FUSE F33. FAILURE OF BOTH FUSES DISABLES
MOTOR 1 ACTUATION OF DEPLOY/STOW OF ANTENNA ASSY. COMPLETE
REDUNDKNCYPROVIDED BY SYSTEM 2ONT0?F SWITCH CONTROLLiNG_ MOTQR 2
VIA FUSE_ F28 & _6_ _- HOWE$_.-;AIL_F EITHER OF THESE TWO_
FUSES DISABLES MOTOR 2. EARLY FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS
IN LOSS OF ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS
OF STQWAGECApABILIT¥ WOULD BE OVERRIDDEN BY JETTISON OPS.
REFERENCES: _ SSSH 15.7 _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4538
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT"
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLAB2 BUS
3) FI2, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE SOURCE OF 28 VDC TO TLM SIGNAL SHOWING ON/OFF STATUS
OF MECH PWR SYSTEM 2. REDUNDANT SIGNAL IS APPLIED VIA FUSE F31.
WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-421
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/11/sv
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4539
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLCA2 BUS
3) F31, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIR_IT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONA_:
LOSS OF REDUNDANCY TO FUSE FI2. FAILURE OF BOTHFUSES CAUSES
LOSS OF TLM SIGNAL. DOES NOT AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE/MISSION.
REFERENCES-. SSSH 15.7
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
4540
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLBC2 BUS
3) F28, IA FUSE
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28 VDC TO MMC4 CONTROLLING APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE PWR TO
MOTOR 2. LOSS OF MOTOR 2 ACTUATING DEPLOY/STOW OF ANTENNA ASSY.
EARLY FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF ANTENNA
DEPLOYMENT AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF STOWAGE
CAPABILITY WOULD BE OVERRIDDEN BY JETTISON OPS. (BOTH FUSES F28
& F6 ARE REQUIRED FOR APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE PWR TO MOTOR 2,
WHICH IS REDUNDANT TO MOTOR I).
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-423
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 4541 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
mm
mm
mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLBCl BUS
3) F6, 1A FUSE
4)
S)
6)
7) i
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CIRCUIT SHORT, CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : .......
LOSS OF 28 VDC TO _C4 CONTROLLING APPLICATION OF 3-PHASE PWR TO
MOTOR 2. LOSS OF MOTOR 2 ACTUATING DEPLOY/STOW OF ANTENNA ASSY.
EARLY FAILURE OF ALL REDUNDANCY RESULTS IN LOSS OF ANTENNA
DEPLOYMENT AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. LOSS OF STOWAGE .....
CAPABILITY WOULD BE OVERRIDDEN BY JETTISON OPS. (BOTH FUSES F6 &
F28 ARE .............REQUIRED FOR APPLICATION OF 3-pHASE PWR TO MOTOR 2, WHICH
IS REDUNDANT TO MOTOR I) .
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4542
m
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: E.S. DALEY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) KU-BAND (DEA)
2 ) CNTLCA3 BUS
3) i. 2K RESISTOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE"
LOSS OF 28 VDC TO MCA LOGIC CIRCUITS (DUAL STRING CIRCUITRY).
WHEN ANTENNA ASSY IS FULLY DEPLOYED, LOSS OF THIS ITEM RESULTS IN
LOSS OF ONE SIGNAL ENABLING K-BAND XMTR AND EA-I ANTENNA SCANNING
CIRCUITS. ALSO CAUSES LOSS OF ONE TLM SIGNAL AND TALK-BACK
SHOWING ANTENNA DEPLOYED POSITION, AND THE LOSS OF ONE SIGNAL
ENABLING BOOM STOW 2 EXCITATION. FAILURE OF THIS ITEM PLUS
REDUNDANCY WOULD DISABLE K-BAND XMTR (NO RADAR) AND WOULD REQUIRE
THE ALTERNATE DIRECT STOW OPERATION. LOSS OF K-BAND XMTR COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION•
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-425
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
9/15/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
4543
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
LEAD ANALYST: E. S. DALEY SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) KU-BAND (DEA)
2) CNTLBC3 BUS
3) 1.2K RESISTOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/_IONALE: ............................_:_---z_:_ ....
LOSS OF 28 VDC TO MCA LOGIC CIRCUITS (DUAL S_ITRY)$-_
WHEN ANTENNA ASSY IS FULLY DEPLOYED, LOSS OF THIS ITEM RESULTS IN
LOSS OF ONE SIGNAL ENABLING K'BAND XMTR AND EA-I ANTENNA SCANNING
CIRCUITS. ALSO CAUSES LOSS OF ONE TLM SIGNAL AND TALK-BACK
SHOWING ANTENNK DEPLOYED POSITION, AND THE LOSS OF ONE SIGNAL
ENABLING BOOM STOW 2 EXCITATION. FAILURE OF THIS ITEM PLUS ....
PRIMARY CKT WOULD DISABLE K-BAND XMTR (NO RADAR) _D WOULD
_Q_RE :THE A_--TE_TE_Diq_ECTSTOW OPERATION. LOSS OFK-BAND XMTR
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH 15.7
m
I
mm
mm
[]
I
[]
I
l
I
m
m
mm
i i
m
I
mm
m
mm
mm
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-426
I
m
um
r-
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 5001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/2
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: UHF EVA/ATC EXTERNAL ANTENNA
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
UHF SYSTEM
UHF EXTERNAL ANTENNA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFI_G: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/1R
3/1R
C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LOWER FORWARD FUSELAGE
MC481-0066-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
THE ANTENNA IS USED BY THE SSO UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM FOR TWO-WAY RF
COMM WITH GROUND AND WITH EVA ASTRONAUTS. FAILURE DURING EVA OPS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION O_ECTIVES DUE TO LOSS OF COMM
BIOMED DATA. UNAVAILABILITY DURING DE-ORBIT/RETURN OR
ABORTS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE BECAUSE UHF IS BACKUP FOR
S-BAND PM VOICE COMM AND FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES, PARTICULARLY
FOR SUPPORT OF LANDING OPERATIONS. NOTE: THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY
FOR THE ANTENNA ITSELF WITHIN THE UNF SYSTEM; HOWEVER,
IS REDUNDANCY FOR THE FUNCTION OF THE UHF SYSTEM FOR AIR-TO-
GROUND VOICE COMM.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-427
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/23/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM& TRACK
MDAC ID: 5002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: UHF AIRLOCK ANTENNA
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
UHF AIRLOCK ANTENNA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
8NORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AIRLOCK
PART NUMBER: V075-730513-001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_T_O_A_ i_i_i ........ _................................_
THE AIRLOCKANTENNA IS INTENDED TO BE USED FOR_K_-EVA-RF LINK
CHECKOUT OF THE EVC EQUIPMENT. LOSS OF ANTENNA OUTPUT WOULD NOT
BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE. EVC LINKS BETWEEN
ASTRONAUTS CAN BE CHECKED_=I_--E_7_FOq_LL___
OPERATIONAL MODES (MODE A, MODE B, AND BACKUP MODE), AND
OPERABILITY OF SSO/EVC LINKS COULD BE INFERRED, AT LEAST FOR
S;_M_P_LEXCOMM, FROM PRE'EVAVOICE CHECKS WiTH GROUND.
REFERENCES: _CHEMATIC VS701740i19, SSSH 16.9, INCO/_OMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE" •
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
COMM & TRACK
5003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UHF EVA/ATC TRANCEIVER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
UHF XCVR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
RCA 8379452
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE XCVR PROVIDES SSO/ASTRONAUT COMM FOR EVA; ATC FOR LANDING
OPS; BACKUP AIR-TO-GROUND VOICE FOR ALL MISSION PHASES. UHF RF
LOSS FOR EVA OPS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES
(LOSS OF TWO-WAY VOICE COMM PLUS LOSS OF BIOMED DATA FROM EVA
ASTRONAUTS), AND THUS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. FAILURE COULD
BE CAUSED BY RF PATH SPF'S (E.G., OPEN OR SHORT IN RF PATH, RF
PIN DIODES, LO-PASS FILTER) OR CONTROL PATH SPF'S (E.G., PA
ON/OFF LOGIC). NOTE: SEE MDAC ID 854 FOR A/G OPS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
n
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-429
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
COMM & TRACK
5004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UHF EVA/ATC TRANSCEIVER
LOSS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) UHF XCVR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
RCA 8379452
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ii .........i_ _z
THE XCVR PROVIDES SSO/ASTRONAUT COMM FOR EVA; ATC FOR LANDING
OPS; BACKUP A/G VCE COMM, ALL MISSION PHASES. UHF RF LOSS FOR
A/G C0_ COULD BE CAUSED BY RF PATH SPF'S (E.G., OPEN,_SHOI_T _
RF PATH, RF PIN DIODES, PA, LO-PASS FILTER) OR COBOL PATH
SPF'S (E.G., PA ON/OFF LOGIC). UHF A/G VCE IS BACKUP FOR S-BAND
PM AND KU-BAND TWO-WAY VCE FOR ONORBIT OPS AND FOR S-BAND PM AND
KU-BAND _O'WAYVCEFOR ORBIT OPS ANb FOR S-BAND PM VCE FOR ALL
PHASES, AND ALSO FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES FOR ALL PHASES.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR SV UPDATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. NOTE: SEE MDAC ID 853 FOR EVA OPS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/o3/87
COMM & TRACK
5005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UHF EVA/ATC TRANSCEIVER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3 ) UHF XCVR
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA_ /
DEORBIT: / ! ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
RCA 8379452
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE XCVR PROVIDES SSO/ASTRONAUT COMM FOR EVA; ATC FOR LANDING
OPS; BACKUP AIR-TO-GROUND VOICE FOR ALL MISSION PHASES. UHF RCV
VOICE LOSS FOR EVA OPS COULD BE CAUSED BY SPF'S IN THE RCV AUDIO
(E.G., HI-PASS FILTER, AUDIO AMP, AUDIO POWER AMP); XMIT
VOICE LOSS BY SPF'S IN XMIT AUDIO OR KEY CONTROL (E.G., SHORT OR
OPEN IN KEY CIRCUIT OR KEY AMP). UHF RCV BIOMED DATA LOSS FOR
EVA COULD BE CAUSED BY SPF'S IN BIOME D SUBC_IER_MODULE OR IN
BIOMED ENABLE CONTROL LINE TO SUBCARRIER MODULE. UHF
AUDIO/BIOMED DATA LOSS FOR EVA OPS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR
MISSION OBJECTIVES AND THUS LOSS OF MISSION. SEE MDAC ID 856 FOR
A/G oPs.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87
C-431 _-/"
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/03/87
COMM & TRACK
5006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UHF EVA/ATC TRANSCEIVER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
UHF XCVR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: RCA 8379452
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MIS_DLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FIALURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATiONA :
THE X_ PROVIDES SSO/ASTRONAUT COMM FOR EVA; AT_FOR LANDING
OPS; BACKUP AIR-TO-GROUND VOICE FOR ALL MISSION PHASES. UHF RCV
VOICE LOSS FOR A/G COMM COULD BE CAUSED BY SPF'S IN THE RCV AUDIO
(E.G., HI-PASS FILTER, AUDIO AMP, AUDIO POWER AMP); XMIT
AUDIO OR KEY CONTROL (E.G., SHORT OR OPEN IN KEY CIRCUIT OR KEY
AMP). LOSS OF UHF TWO-WAY VOICE AS BACKUP FOR OPERATIONAL VOICE
AND FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE._:._
SEE _ MDAC ID 855F_OR EVA OPS. :
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REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/04/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 5007
Q
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: UHF SIMPLEX PA PWR SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) PA POWER SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 06
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH ENABLES A LOGIC GATE TO ALLOW MNA POWER TO BE APPLIED
TO THE PA FOR SIMPLEX A/G AND ATC COMM. LOSS OF SWITCH FUNCTION
COULD DISABLE THE PA. UHF IS USED IN HI-PWR MODE FOR A/G COMM
FOR ALL MISSION PHASES AND FOR ATC LANDING OPS AS BACKUP
FOR OPERATIONAL VOICE VIA S-BAND (ALL PHASES) AND KU-BAND (ORBIT
PHASE), AND ALSO AS BACKUP FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATES AND VOICE COMM FOR LANDING
OPS SUPPORT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHCILE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-433
INDEPENDENT,ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET.... 7
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
I
8/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM & TRACK FLIGHT:
5008 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UHF SIMPLEX PWR SWITCH
SHORTED ........ _ _
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) UHF XCVR PA
4) PA POWER SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3;_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3::-
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL 06
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ ._........_ _ ::_: _:_
THIS SWITCH ENABLES A LOGIC CIR_IT BY GROUNDING A LOGIC GATE i_
INPUT TO ALLOW POWER TO PIN DIODES THAT SWITCH THE PA INTO THE RF
PATH. CONTROL BUS CA1 VOLTAGE SHORTED TO THE GROUNDED CONTACTS
IN THE $_TtH_W_[gAUS9 THE SYSTEMTOISTAY IN THE PA_PASS
POSITION, KEEPING THE _F SYSTEM IN THE LO-PWRMODE, POSSIBLY
--_=
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[]
PREVENTING SOLID UHF COMM FOR SSO/GROUND UHF VOICE, BUT UL VOICE
WOULD BE UNAFFECTED FOR UHF BACKUP TO S-BAND FOR STATE VECTOR
UPDATE. NOTE;__BUSCAI IS PROTECTED BY A CU_NT'LIMITING
RESISTOR - NO EFFECT ON BUS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5009 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: UHF SIMPLEX POWER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) UHF XCVR PA
4) PA POWER SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL 06
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THE "ON" POSITION THIS SWITCH GROUNDS A LOGIC GATE INPUT TO
ENABLE POWER TO PIN DIODES TO SWITCH THE PA INTO THE RF PATH FOR
UHF A/G DOWNLINK VOICE. IN THE "OFF" POSITION IT PERMITS PA
BYPASS (UHF SYSTEM IN LOW POWER MODE) FOR UHF SIMPLEX OPS.
A SWITCH FAILURE (OPEN, OR EQUIVALENT TO OPEN) WOULD DISABLE THE
PA FOR ALL UHF MODES. UHF IS BACKUP FOR S-BAND PM VCE (ALL
PHASES) INCLUDING STATE VECTOR UPDATE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR TWO-WAY VCE SUPPORT OF LANDING OPS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-435
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
_/o7/87
COMM & TRACK
5010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
,3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UHF SIMPLEX POWER SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) tmF XCVR PA
4) PA POWER SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL 06
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_
IN THE "ON" POSITION THIS SWITCH ENABLES P_ TOPIN DIODES THAT
SWITCH THE PA INTO THE RF PATH FOR UHF A/G DOWNLINK VCE. IN
"OFF" POSITION IT PERMITS PA BYPASS (UHF SYSTEM IN LO-PWR MODE)
FOR UHF SIMPLEX OPS. SW_TC_NO__Y'IN "O_N'!._OUGHoUTMiSSION.
BRIDGING SHORT EQUIVALENT TO "ON" POSrrXO_WOULD PREVENT PA
BYPASS FOR SIMPLEX oes IN CASE OF PA FAILURE, CAUSING LOSS OF UHF
COMM EVEN FOR THE LIMITED CAPABILITY OF LO-PWR SIMPLEX FOR A/G
VCEOPS, SUCH A SHORT WOULD NOT BE DETECTABLE IN FLIGHT. UHF
IS BACKUP FOR S-BAND PM VCE (ALL PHASES). LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR TWO-WAY VCE SUPPORT OF LANDING OPS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/_HICLE. :}
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/10/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 5011 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: UHF SIMPLEX POWER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) UHF XCVR PA
4) PA POWER SWITCH
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL 06
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAusEs: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH ENABLES USE OF i0 WATT PA FOR SSO UHF XMIT (ON) OR
CAUSES IT TO BE BYPASSED (OFF) FOR UHF SIMPLEX OPS. SWITCH IS
NORMALLY IN "ON" THROUGHOUT MISSION. ONE SET OF CONTACTS ENABLES
TLM INDICATION THAT PA IS OFF WHEN SWITCH IS IN "OFF"
POSITION. OPEN OR FAULT EQUIVALENT TO OPEN IN THOSE CONTACTS
WOULD KILL TLM MEASUREMENT VI4S2016E (PA OFF). BRIDGING SHORT OF
THOSE CONTACTS FOR "ON" POSITION WOULD GIVE FALSE INDICATION THAT
PA IS OFF. NEITHER FAILED CONDITION WOULD POSE A THREAT TO
MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-437
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 5012 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: UHF XMIT FREQUENCY SELECT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL),
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) UHF XCVR PA
PA POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 06
ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS SWITCH SELECTS EITHER 296.8 MHZ OR 259.7 MHZ AS SSO UHF A/G
XMIT FREQ. WITH OPEN IN SWITCH FOR PRIME FREQ POSITION (259.7)
FOR ORBIT OPS, THE ALTERNATE WOULD BE SELECTED. JAM OR MID-
TRAVEL FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF XMIT CAPABILITY FOR UHF 2-WAY
VCE OPS. EMERGENCY ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO SELECT "G T/R" ON UHF
MODE ROTARY SELECTOR ("G" IS "GUARD", THE INTERNATIONAL 243 MHZ
DISTRESS FREQUENCY). UHF IS BACKUP FOR S-BAND PM (ALL PHASES)
AND FOR KU-BAND (ON ORBIT). LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR STATE
VECTOR UPDATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/07/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK . FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 5013 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: UHF XMIT FREQUENCY SELECT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, FAILS MID-TRAVEL,
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) UHF XCVR PA
4) PA POWER SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL 06
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION , PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
THIS SWITCH SELECTS EITHER 296.8 OR 259.7 MHZ AS SSO UHF A/G XMIT
FREQ, WITH 296.8 BEING PRIME FOR NORMAL FULL DUPLEX COMM FOR EVA
OPS. WITH OPEN IN SWITCH FOR PRIME FREQ POSITION 259.7 WOULD BE
SELECTED. JAM OR MID-TRAVEL FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
XMIT CAPABILITY FOR UHF 2-WAY EVA VCE OPS. LOSS OF EVA COMM
COULD CAUSE EVA TERMINATION AND LOSS OF MISSION FOR SOME FLIGHTS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740!19, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-439
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE. "
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
8/1o/87
COMM & TRAOK
5014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILUREMODE:
UHF XMIT FREQUENCY SELECT SWITCH
SHORTED _ •
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDISLEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
UHF XCVR
XMIT FREQUENCY SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL 06
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7201
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS-S-WITCH SELECTS EITHER 259.7 OR 296.8 MHZ AS SSO _F A/G XMIT
FREQ. WITH SHORT IN swITcH ?OR PRIME FREQUENCY POSITION (259.7)
FOR ORBIT OPS, THE ALTERNATE FREQUENCY WOULD BE SELECTED. FOR
SHORT IN BOTH DECKS BOTH XCVR'S WOULD TRANSMIT _ _ _ _
s_m_Z_E6_S Ly. ___U_U_D _0_ _:=___ _ _bF=_F
UPLINK (A/G RCV), AND TWO-WAY UHF A/G VOICE COMM WOULD BE
AVAILABLE. SHORT COULD ALSO KILL TELEMETRY MEASUREMENT _
V74S2040E, "UHF XMIT FREQ 296.8 SELECT." LOSS OF MEASUREMENT
WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
_FERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740i19, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, O_SD V74 FILE Iii
,B
I
,=.
I
m
w
i
!
m
mm
mm
mm
|
I
m
I
I
mm
W
U
l
m
I
m
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-440
u
I
I
wL
w
u
=
l
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 5501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, UHF, MNA
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) UHF XCVR
4) CBI3, MNA PWR
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION. -
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI5
MC454-0026, -2075
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CBI3 PROVIDES MNA PWR TO THE XCVR. ALTHOUGH THE COUNTERPART CBI8
ALSO PROVIDES MNC PWR TO THE XCVR, ONLY MNA PWR IS PROVIDED TO
THE 10-WATT PWR AMp REQUIRED FOR TWO-WAY VCE COMM WITH GROUND.
UHF A/G VCE IS BACKUP FOR S-BAND PM VCE FOR ALL PHASES, AND
ALSO FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE FOR ALL PHASES. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR SV UPDATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-441
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/29/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 5502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, UHF, MNC
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED' PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
l) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) CBIS, MNC PWR
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / - RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI5
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026, -2075
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
CBI8 PROVIDES MNC POWER TO THE UHF XCVR (BUT NOT TO THE 10-WATT
PA REQUIRED FOR VOICE COMM WITH GROUND). THE COUNTERPART CBI3
PROVIDES MNA POWER TO THE XCVR (AND TO THE PA). THE XCVR IS USED
IN LO-PWR MODE (NO PA) FOR _0-WAY SSO/EVA ASTRO_UT_ .....
COMM (AND FOR RECEPTION OF BIOMED DATA DURING NORMAL EVA OPS).
LOSS OF CBI8 (FAILS OPEN) COULD NOT BE DETECTED (NO BITE, NO
TLM). LOSS OF BOTH PATHS (cBi8, CBI3) FOR XCVR POWER (MNC, MNA)
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MAJOR MISSION OBJECTIVES FOR FLIGHT
REQUIRING EVA OPS. NOTE: SEE MDAC ID 8503 FOR A/G OPS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM & TRACK
MDAC ID: 5503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, UHF, MNC
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSED, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) UHF EVA/ATC SYSTEM
3) CBIS, MNC PWR
4)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI5
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026, -2075
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CBI8 PROVIDES MNC POWER TO THE UHF XCVR (BUT NOT TO THE 10-WATT
PA REQUIRED FOR VOICE COMM WITH GROUND). THE COUNTERPART CBI3
PROVIDES MNA POWER TO THE XCVR (AND TO THE PA). THE XCVR IS USED
IN LO-PWRMODE (NO PA) FOR TWO-WAY SSO/EVA ASTRONAUT VCE
COMM (AND FOR RECEPTION OF BIOMED DATA DURING NORMAL EVA OPS).
LOSS OF CBI8 (FAILS OPEN) COULD NOT BE DETECTED (NO BITE, NO
TLM). LOSS OF BOTH PATHS (CBI8, CBI3) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF UHF AS
BACKUP FOR VOICE COMMAND FORSTATE VECTOR UPDATE. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY FOR A/G VCE COMM AND SV UPDATE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. NOTE: SEE MDAC ID 8502 FOR EVA OPS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-740119, SSSH 16.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRF
17, OMRSD V74 FILE III
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-443
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/o5/87
CO_ AND TRACK
7001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/IR
3/!R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TACAN
LOSS OF OUTPUT
: = = ±
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) CO_ & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3 ) TACAN
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
_DiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 'i UNIT BAY i, 1 UNIT BAY 2, 1 UNIT BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC409-0014-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/_I_I iiiii_ii: ;; ; _!!!_ _ _ _ _ _z
THE TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS,
OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE AND BEARING
INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN TO 1500
FEET ALT O_i5_ FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR _
DETERMINING
RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF _HICLE AND CREW. - (Li_REDUNDANCY_ TWO _fi_ii_
OTHER TACAN UNITS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR DETERMINING RANGE
AND BEARING EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND STARTING 15 NM
?ROM LANDING VIA THE MEB_S?) Loss OF A TACAN COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
RANGE PLUS BEARING CAPABILIT_FOR_THATUNIT. LOSS OF A
TRANSMITTER WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF RANGE ONLY.
REFERENCe: SYSTEM SCHE_TIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 1
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-444
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/05/87
' SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 7002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TACAN
INTERMITTENT AND ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAI DS
3 ) TACAN
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
'i UNIT BAY i, 1 UNIT BAY 2, 1 UNIT BAY 3A
MC409-0014-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS, OPERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE AND BEARING INFORMATION
DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN TO 1500 FEET ALT OR 15
NM FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING
RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO
OTHER TACAN UNITS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR DETERMINING RANGE
AND BEARING EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM
AND STARTING 15 NM FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) INTERMITTENT OR
ERRATIC DATA WOULD BE THROWN OUT SO THAT RANGE AND BEARING WOULD
BE LOST FOR THIS TACAN UNIT.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 1
r
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-445
INDEPENDENT ORBITER-ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/05/87
CO_ AND TRACK
7003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TACAN
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE ........ _
T._.AD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS T._.AD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CO_ & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3 ) TACAN
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/_C
RT_: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 1 UNIT BAY i, 1 UNIT BAY 2, 1 UNIT BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC409-0014-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: L_ =z_-_:=;.L. _: .....
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS, OPERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDES__LANT _RAN_GE_D_B_E_G_NF0_TION
DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN TO 1500 FEET ALT OR 15
NM FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR DET_NG ....
RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO:
OTHER TACAN UNITS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR DET__GE_
AND BEARING EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND STARTING 15 NM
FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) OUT OF TOLERANCE DATA IS THROWN OUT
SO THAT BEARING AND RANGE WILL BE LOST FOR THIS TAC__T, _'_
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, O_S NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 1 .........
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/05/87
COMM AND TRACK
7004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MODE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) TACAN
4) MODE SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION"
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 07
PANEL 07, V070-730245 SI, $3, $5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE
AND BEARING INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN
TO 1500 FEET ALT OR 15 NM FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA
LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER TACAN UNITS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY
FOR DETERMINING RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM
AND STARTING 15 NM FROM LANDINGVIA THE MSBLS.) THE MODE SW
MANUALLY SELECTS OFF, RCV, T/R, OR GPS CMD MODE. FAILURE TO
SELECT T/R OR GPC MODE WOULD CAUSE SW TO REMAIN IN OFF OR RCV
RESULTING IN LOSS OF TACAN CAPABILITY.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 1
F_J
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-447
E
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
5/o5/s7
COMM AND TRACK
7o05
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MODE SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NAVAIDS
TACAN
MODE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 07
PANEL 07, V070-730245 SI, $3, $5
CAUSES: MECHNICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICA_TEb CONTROLS/-OPERATE_SIMULTA_OUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE
AND BmmING INFORHATION D_I.G DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN
T_ 15QO F_E_LT OR 15 NM _RO_M _D_. LOSS OF AL_ _ ....
RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY V_A LIKE AND_UNLIKE REDU_W_CY
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO
OTHER TACAN STRINGS, AND UNLIKE VIA GPCV CMD AND FOR DETERMINING
RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE GN&C _S_/STEM _A___I5 _ _
FROM_LAN_ING VIA THE MSBLS. ) THE MODE SW MANUALLY SELECTS OFF,
RCV, T/R OR GPC CMD MODE. AN OPEN MODE SWITCH WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF RANGE AND _ BEARING FROM T_HE A$$QCIATED TACAN UNIT.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 1 _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/05/87
COMM AND TRACK
7006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANTENNA SELECT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) TACAN
4) ANTENNA SELECT SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 07
PANEL 07, V070-730245 $2, $4, $6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SI_LTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE
AND BEARING INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN
TO 1500 FEETALT OR 15 NMI_ROM-LANDING. LOSS OF ALL
RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO
OTHER TACAN STRINGS, AND UNLIKE VIA GPC CMD AND FOR DETERMINING
RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND STARTING 15 NM
FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) SW SELECTS UPPER, AUTO OR LOWER
ANT. FAILURE TO SWITCH FROM UPPER ANTENNA COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
RANGE AND BEARING DATA DUE TO INTERMITTENT SIGNAL RECEPTION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 1
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-449
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT:
7007 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: ANTENNASELECT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) TACAN
4) ANTENNASELECT SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUN_: 313
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANb_G/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS :
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL 07
PART NUMBER: PANEL 07, V070-730245 $2, $4, $6
C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: :_._ ....
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TAC_UNITSj__IN_THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE'SLANT RANGE
AND BEARING INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN
TO 1500 FEET ALT OR 15 NM FROM LANDING .... _LOSS OF ALL_ _±_
RANGE PLUS BE_N_ b_ RANG_ _L_ _ LI=KE AN__DUNDAN_
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO
OTHER TACAN STRINGS, AND UNLIKE VIA GPC CMD AND FOR DETERMINING
_GE AND BEARING vIATHE _N&C SUBSYST-EMA_DSTARTING 15-NM _
FROM LANDING VfA_THEMSB_. ")..... _S_CTS UPPER, AtTTO OR'_I_OWER ....
ANT. AN OpEN/SHORTWOULDP_REVENTSIGNAL RECEPTION RESULTING IN
LOSS OFTAC-_W-_CAPABILIT_! _ _
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 1
RE ORT DATE12/31/87 C-45Q_ _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/8?
COMM AND TRACK
7008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CHANNEL SELECT SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) TACAN
4) CHANNEL SELECT SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 07
PANEL 07, V070-730245 $7, $8, $9
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE
AND BEARING INFORMATION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALT DOWN
TO 1500 FEET ALT OR 15 NM FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL
RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO
OTHER TACAN STRINGS, AND UNLIKE VIA GPC CMD AND FOR DETERMINING
RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND STARTING 15 NM
FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) AN OPEN/SHORT WOULD PREVENT CHANNEL
OR X/Y MODE SELECTION CAUSING LOSS OF REQUIRED TACAN GROUND
STATION SIGNALS RECEPTION RESULTING IN LOSS OF TAQCAN DATA.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 1
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-451
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/05/87
CO_ AND TRACK
7009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
C_NEL SELECT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
T._AD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) TACAN
4) C_EL SELECT SWITCH
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC ,
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 07
PANEL 07, V070-730245 $7, $8, $9
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _.............
TRIPLE REDUNDANT TACAN UNITS, INST--:SINGLE sTRINGS_CLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROl, OPE_TE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE
AND BEARING INFO_TION DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 _ET ALT DOWN
TOI500 FEET ALT OR 15 NM FROM LANDING_ _LOSS OF ALL ._C_i-_
RANGE PLUS BEARING OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND _LI-KE REDUNDANCY
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO
OTHER TACAN STRINGS, AND UNLIKE VIA GPC CMD AND FOR DETERMINING
RANGE AND BEARING- VIA I_HE 10N&C_SUBSYS_TEMI_D STARTIN_G'_I5 NM
FROM LANDING VIA THE MSBLS.) FAILURE TO SELECT CORRECT CHANNELS
OR X/Y MODE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF REQUIRE D TACAN GROUND STATION
SIGNALS RECEPTION RESULTING IN LOSS OF TACAN DATA;_=:_::: _ :i_;
REFE_NCES: SYSTEM SCHE_TIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, O_S NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 1 _:_ :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/05/87
COMM AND TRACK
7010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MSBLS
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) MSBLS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 1 SET BAY I, 2 SETS IN BAR 2
PART NUMBER: MC409-0017-0007 RF ASSY, MC409-0017-0003 RF ASSY,
MC409-0017-0008 DECODER ASSY, MC409-0017-0006 DECODER ASSY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF
INPUT. MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS, OPERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION
ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER
MSBLS SETS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM,
SLANT RANGE AND BEARING DOWN TO 1500 FT VIA THE TACAN AND
ALTITUDE VIA THE _RADAR AND RAROMETRICALTIMETERS FROM 50OOFT TO
TOUCHDOWN.) THE GPC SOP WILL BLOCK USE OF DATA FROM AN MSBLS SET
WHEN OUT OF TOLERANCE ERRORS EXCEED LIMITS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-453
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
7011 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: MSBLS RF ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT ......
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3 ) MSBLS
4 ) RF ASSEMBLY
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 1 SET BAY i, 2 SETS IN BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC409-0017-0007 RF ASSY, MC409-0017-0003 RF ASSY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF
INPUT. MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN T_E SINGLE STRINGS, OPERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION
ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH LANDING. LOS_SS_QFALLCAPAB_L_TY
FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER
MSBLS SETS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM,
sU__G_ _D BE__ TO IS00 FT_ViA...................THE TA_,I__ _i
ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETRIC ALTIMETERS FROM 5000 FT
TO TOUCHDOWN.) THE GPC SOP WILL BLOCK USE OF DATA FROM AN MSBLS
SET WHEN RANGE DATA IS LOST. LOSS OF RF ASSEMBLY RESULTS IN LOSS
OF MSB_DATA_ .....
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
COMM AND TRACK
7012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MSBLS RF ASSEMBLY
INTERMITTENT AND ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) MSBLS
4) RF ASSEMBLY
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR "
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:_ 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
1 SET BAY i, 2 SETS IN BAR 2
MC409-0017-0007 RF ASSY, MC409-0017-0003 RF ASSY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF
INPUT. MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS, OPERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION
ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER
MSBLS SETS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM,
SLANT RANGE AND BEARING DOWN TO 1500 FT VIA THE TACAN AND
ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETRIC ALTIMETERS FROM 5000 FT TO
TOUCHDOWN.) THE GPC SOP WILL BLOCK INTERMITTENT OR ERRATIC DATA
FROM AN MSBLS SET. RF ASSEMBLY PROVIDES TRANSMITTER FOR RANGING
_DG_D STATIONINTERROGXTION_ .........................
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-455
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 7013 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MSBLS TRACKER/DECODER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
m
mm
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : i
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3 ) MSBLS
4 ) TRACKER/DECODER "
5)
6)
7) _-
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 1 SET BAY i, 2 SETS IN BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC409-0017-0008 DECODER ASSY, MC409-0017-0006
DECODER ASSY
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF
INPUT. MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS, OPERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE, A_I_TH_ANDELEVA___TIgN
ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH LANDING' LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER
MSBLS SETS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM,
SLANT RANGE _D BEARING _ DO_WNT0 1500 FT VIA THE TA_AN, AND
ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETRIC ALTIMETERS FROM 5000 FT
TO TOUCHDOWN.) THE GPC SOP WILL BLOCK USE OF DATA FROM AN MSBLS
SET WHEN RANGE DATA IS LOST. LOSS OF TRACKER/DECODER RESULTS IN
LOSS OF MSBLS DATA.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
C-456REPORT DATE 12/31/87
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
COMM AND TRACK
7014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MSBLS TRACKER/DECODER
INTERMITTENT AND ERRATIC OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3) MSBLS
4 ) TRACKER/DECODER
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DECODER ASSY
1 SET BAY I, 2 SETS IN BAR 2
MC409-0017-0008 DECODER ASSY, MC409-0017-0006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF
INPUT. MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS, OPERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION
ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY
FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER
MSBLS SETS, AND UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY EXIST VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM,
SLANT RANGE AND BEARING DOWN TO 1500 FT VIA THE TACAN AND
ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETRIC ALTIMETERS FROM 5000 FT TO
TOUCHDOWN.) THE GPC SOP WILL BLOCK INTERMITTENT OR ERRATIC DATA
FROM AN MSBLS SET. TRACKER/DECODER PROVIDES DATA PROCESSING TO
DERIVE TRACKING PARAMETERS.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-457
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
COMM AND TRACK
7015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLS POWER SWITCH
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NAVAIDS
MSBLS
MLS PWR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/!R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 08
$8, $9, SI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT
RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH
LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA
LIKE .............
AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER MSBLS STRINGS, AND UNLIKE VIA THE
GN&C SUBSYSTEM, SLANT RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE TACAN DOWN TO
15OO _ FTkND ALTi--TU-DE VIA T_HE-RAD/_R_D=B-AR0_TRIC ALTIMETERS FROM
5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.) FAILURE TO CLOSE THE MLS PWR SW WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MSBLS DATA. NO GPC BYPASS MOD E •
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-458
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
COMM AND TRACK
7016
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLS POWER SWITCH
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) MSBLS
4) MLS PWR SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: ' 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 08
$8, $9, SI0
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT
RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH
LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA
LIKE
AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER MSBLS SETS, AND _LIKE-REDUNDANCY
EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM, SLANT RANGE AND BEARING DOWN TO
1500 FT VIA THE TACAN AND ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETRIC
ALTIMETERS FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.) FAILURE OF THE MLS PWR SW
TO REMAIN CLOSED WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MSBLS DATA. NO GPC
BYPASS MODE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-459
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/27/87
COMM AND TRACK
7017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLS POWER SWITCH
OP -/ _-T_EN SHOR _ELECTRICAL
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3 ) MSBLS
4) MLS PWR SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 08
$8, $9, SIO
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
TRIP.REDUNDANT MSB_ SETS,_ T_E SINGLE STRING__S _CLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT
RANGE. AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH
LANDING. LOSS OF ALL _PABILITY FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA
LIKE_-_ ....._ ......................................
AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO O_ER MSBLS STRINGS, AND UNLIKE VIA THE
1500 FT AND ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETRIC ALTIMETERS FROM
5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.) OPEN/SHORTWOULD PREVENT USE OFM_P _
SW RESULTING IN LOSS OF MSBLS DATA. NO GPC BYPASS MODE
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REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
mm
il
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-460
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/05/87
COMM AND TRACK
7018
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MLS CHANNEL SELECT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) MSBLS
4) MLS CHANNEL SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
c[P]
LOCATION: PANEL 08
PART NUMBER: SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT
RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH
LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA
LIKE
AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER MSBLS STRINGS, AND UNLIKE VIA THE
GN&C SUBSYSTEM, SLANT RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE TACAN DOWN TO
1500 FT AND ALTITUDE VIA THE RADAR AND BAROMETRIC ALTIMETERS
FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.) THE MLS CH SELECT SW PICKS THE
OPERATIONAL MSBLS CH. FAILURE TO SW WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MSBLS CAP. NO GPC BYPASS MODE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-461
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 7019 ABORT:
ITEM: MLS CHANNEL SELECT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
I
UB
U
i
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : ..
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3) MSBLS
4 ) MLS CHANNEL SWITCH m
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL 08
PART NUMBER: SII
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHORT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TRIPLE REDUNDANT MSBLS SETS, IN THREE SINGLE STRINGS INCLUDING
DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT
RANGE, AZIMUTH AND ELEVATION ANGLES FROM 15 NM OUT THROUGH
LANDING. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS VIA
LIKE _----- ..............................
AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUNDANCY, TWO OTHER MSBLS STRINGS, AND UNLIKE VIA THE
GN&C SUBSYSTEM, SLANT RANGE AND BEARING VIA THE TACAN DOWN TO
1500 FT AND ALTITUDE VIA THE I_D-AI_q_BA_OMETRIT:_A_ETI"HETE!_S ......_
FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.) THE MLS CH SELECT SW USED TO PICK
MSBLS OPERATIONAL CH. OPEN/SHORT WOULD P REYE_ CH SELECT!QN ....
CAUSING _SS_OF MSBLS CAP, NO GPCBYPASS MODE. ........._ _ _ _
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2. .....
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-462
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/06/87
COI,_[ AND TRACK
7020
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
, FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RADAR ALTIMETER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) RADAR ALTIMETER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 1 UNIT BAY i, 1 UNIT IN BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC409-0015-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL REDUNDANT RADAR ALTIMETER UNITS, IN TWO SINGLE STRINGS,
OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE ALTITUDE DURING THE DEORBIT
PHASE FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR
DETERMINING ALTITUDE VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA ANOTHER
RADAR ALTIMETER UNIT, AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY FOR DETERMINING
ALTITUDE EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND THE BAROMETRIC
ALTIMETER.)
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740159, SSSH 9.3, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 3.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-463
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/06/87
CO_ AND TRACK
7021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RADAR ALTIMETER
FAI_ OUT OF TOLERANCE
_AD ANALYST: W.C. _NG SUBSYS _AD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDO_ HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) RADAR ALTIMETER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART _BER:
I UNIT BAY i, i UNIT IN BAY 2
MC409-0015-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, TEMPERATE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MEDICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFE_S/RATIONA_: .....
DUAL _DUND_T _D_ ALTIMETER _ITS_ _TWO SING__NGS' ....
OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE ALTITUDE DURING THE DEORBIT
PHASE FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR
DETE_INI%G=ALTI_DE_VIA LIKEOR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE;
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA ANOTHER
RADAR%LTIMETER UNIT, AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY FOR DETERMINING
ALTITUDE EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND THE BARO_TRIC
ALTIMETER.) OUg:0_90_CE MEASUREMENTS WILL CAUSE AVVI FLAG
TO
REGISTER DATA BAD. THE SIGNAL/ALTITUDE MEASUREMENT FOR THIS RA
WILL BE BLOCKED OUT BY THE GPC SOP. ;_I_
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740159, SSSH 9.3, OMRS NSTS
08171 FI;._ III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 3.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/06/87
COMM AND TRACK
7022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RADAR ALTIMETER
INTERMITTENT AND ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NAVAIDS
RADAR ALTIMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: I UNIT BAY i, I UNIT IN BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC409-0015-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, NOSE WHEEL REFLECTIONS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL REDUNDANT RADAR ALTIMETER UNITS, IN TWO SINGLE STRINGS,
OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE ALTITUDE DURING THE DEORBIT
PHASE FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR
DETERMINING ALTITUDE VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNCY COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA ANOTHER
RADAR ALTIMETER UNIT, AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY FOR DETERMINING
ALTITUDE EXISTSVIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM AND THE BAROMETRIC
ALTIMETER.) INTERMITTENT OR ERRATIC DATA RESULTS IN LOSS OF
ALTITUDE DATA FROM THIS RADAR ALTIMETER.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740159, SSSH 9.3, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 3.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-465
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
5/06/87
COMM AND TRACK
7023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RA PWR SWITCH
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) RADAR ALTIMETER
4) RA PWR SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/iR _
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL 08
PART NUMBER: V070-730296 $4, $5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL REDUNDAN_DARALTIMETER UNITS, IN TWO SINGLE STRINGS
INCLUDING DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE
ALTITUDE DURING THE DEORBIT PHASE FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING ALTI"fUDE VIA LIKE OR ---
UNLIKE-RE-=D_t_b_ COULD CAUSE I.O_ OF _HICT._ AND CREW. (LI_
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REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA ANOTHER RADAR ALTIMETER UNIT, AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY FOR DETERMINING ALTITUDE EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM
AND THE BAROMETRIC ALTIMETER.) NO ALTERNATE GPC CONTROL
MODE. FAILURE TO APPLY PWR WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ALTITUDE DATA
FROM THE _SOCIATED RA.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIc VS70£740i59, SSSH 9.3, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 3.
u
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C_466 _ _
nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/06/87
COMM AND TRACK
7024
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RA PWR SWITCH
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W. C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) RADAR ALTIMETER
4) RA PWR SWITCH
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 08
V070-730296 $4, $5
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL REDUNDANT RADAR ALTIMETER UNITS, IN TWO SINGLE STRINGS
INCLUDING DEDICATED CONTROLS, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE
ALTITUDE DURING THE DEORBIT PHASE FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING ALTITUDE VIA LIKE OR
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. (LIKE
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA ANOTHER RADAR ALTIMETER STRING, AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY FOR DETERMINING ALTITUDE EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM
AND THE BAROMETRIC ALTIMETER.) NO ALTERNATE GPC CONTROL
MODE. FAILURE OF PWR SW TO REMAIN CLOSED WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
ALTITUDE DATA FROM THE ASSOCIATED RA.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740159, SSSH 9,3, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 3.
b
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-467
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/27/87
COMM AND TRACK
7025
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RA PWR SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) RADAR ALTIMETER
4) RA PWR SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS':
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
3/3 TAL: 3/IR
3/3 AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/3 ,,
A [ 2 ]
PANEL 08
V070-730296 $4, $5
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL REDUNDANT RADAR ALTIMETER UNITS_ ZN_Q SINGLE $_INGS _
INCLUDING DEDICATED CONTROLS _, OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE
ALTITUDE DURING THE DEORBIT PHASE FROM 5000 FT TO TOUCHDOWN.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR PETERMINING ALTITU=DE VIA L!_K_ OR i_i_
_£I_----_-bS-N6_---6_=_C6_D_-AUS--__ _ _V_- _,N6_CREW_ _LIkE ?
REDUNDANCY EXISTS VIA ANOTHER RADAR ALTIMETER UNIT, AND UNLIKE
REDUNDANCY FOR DETERMINING ALTITUDE EXISTS VIA THE GN&C SUBSYSTEM
....._b_°T-3____ _T__.TI_ N_-_ATE _GP_ c_oL _ _-
MODE. OPEN/SHORT PWR SWIWOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF ALTITUDE DATA
FROM THE ASSOCIATED RA.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740159, SSSH 9.3, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 3.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/o6/8 
COMM AND TRACK
7026
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: EAI MC409-0025-I001, EA2 MC409'0025-2001, DA
MC409-0025-3001, KU SPA MC409-0025-4001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF TNE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OFRKNGE_RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) LOSS OF RADAR DATA WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF TRACKING CAPABILITY RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70"740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-469
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/o6/87
COMM AND TRACK
7027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A, BAY 3B, AND PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: EAI MC409-0025-iOO1, EA2 MC409-0025-2001, DA
MC409-0025-3001, KU SPA MC409-0025-4001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLQAD RECOVERY C APA_LITYWHICH COULD-RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUND_9 FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) RADAR DATAEXCEEDING TOLERANCE
LIMITS COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF TRACKING CAPABILITY AND SUBSEQUENT
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES ....:SYSTEM SCHE_TId=VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS_o
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-470
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/2
7028 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RR EA-1 (INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT) [REF KU COMM]
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR (RR)
EA-I INTERFACE AND CONTROL UNIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
:=
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
BAY 3A
EAI MC409-0025-I001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA
THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) FAILURE OF EA-I RESULTS IN LOSS OF
RR CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-471
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o6/87
COMM AND TRACK
7029
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RR EA-2 (RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAI DS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR (RR)
EA-2 RADAR SIGNAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
12%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: EA2 MC409-0025-2001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND CO_/_DAR sYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES T_GET D-ATA CONSISTING OF i_%N_E, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA . _::_:: ._
THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS. ) FAILURE OF EA-2 RESULTS IN LOSS OF
RR CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/06/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/2
7030 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RR DEA (DEPLOYED ELECTRONIC ASSY) [REF KU COMM]
LOSS, OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4 ) RENDEZVOUS RADAR (RR)
5) DA
6 ) DEA
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: -3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
DA MC409-0025-3001
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, ViBR?ATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........................
' THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA
THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE DEA CONTAINS THE TRANSMITTER AND
RECEIVER. FAILURE OF DEA RESULTS IN LOSS OF RR CAP AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-473
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
7/27/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/2
7031 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RR DEA (DEPLOYEDELECTRONICASSY) [REF KU COMM]
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAI DS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR (RR)
DA
DEA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
DA MC409-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO S_CH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING_I_E. RANGE RATE, _GLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL ....
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF_
MISSION. (UNLI_'E-'@.EDb_NDANCY _OR-OBTAIq_N_ T_GET _G_E_S_EXISTS
VIA
THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE DEA CONTAINS THE TRANSMITTER AND
RECEIVER. EXCEEDING TOLERANCE LIMITS OF RCVR SENS/S/N RATIO_°_D
LOW RF PWR OUTPUT COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF RR CAP AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE iII, INCO/COMM/JSCrI8611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-474
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
7032 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RR DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY) [REF KU COMM]
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
J...
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4 ) RENDEZVOUS RADAR (RR)
5) DA
6) DMA
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
DA MC409-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA
THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE DMA CONTAINS ANT GIMBAL MOTORS
AND POINTING SENSORS. LOSS OF DMA OUTPUT PREVENTS TARGET
POINTING DATA FEEDBACK FOR TRACKING. WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF RR CAP
AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-475
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
7/o6/87
COMM AND TRACK
7033
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RR DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY)
PHYSICAL BINDING/J_iNG
[REF KU COMM]
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) RENDEZVOUS RADAR (RR)
5) DMA
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: DA MC409-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICALSHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......
THE R_NDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE _rJ-B_D C6_?_b_#_M_::
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRA._.CK DETACH F.L_D=P__ADS WITHIN 12___QF.THE ORB_TER:__ TH__ERADAR_
PROVIDESTARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, _GE RATE, ANG_: _:
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAY_AD _COVERY CAPABILITY _WH_H COULD RE$_TI _N _SS QF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA
THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.)__THEpMACONTAINS_T GIMBALMOTORS
ANT POINTING SENSORS. FAILURE OF D_WQULDPBEVENTTARGET :;_:_:
TRACKING. WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF RR CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-476
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/2
7034 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RR DMA (DEPLOYED MECHANICAL ASSY) [REF KU COMM]
FAILS TO START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) RENDEZVOUS RADAR (RR)
5) DA
6) DMA
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY
DA MC409-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF _GE, RANGE RAN,
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE DMA CONTAINS THE ANT GIMBAL
MOTORS AND POINTING SENSORS. FAILURE TO START/STOP WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF DMA OUTPUT PREVENTING ANT TARGET TRACKING. WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF RR CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-477
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/28/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/2
MDAC ID: 7035 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RR DMA (DEPLOYEDMECHANICALASSY) [REF KU COMM]
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4 ) RENDEZVOUS RADAR (RE)
5) DA
6) DMA
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABg_T HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANbING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: DA MC409-0025-3001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEI ........ :.......
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
T RAC_ DETACHE_D+PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, _LE ....
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF i_i
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE DMA_CONTAIN S ANT GIMBAL
MOTORS ANT POINTING SENSORS. ERRATIC OPERATION WOULD CAUSE LOSS
oF D-MA OUTPUT AND ANT TRACKING_ _O_LD--CAUSE _SS 6?_C_-Ih'_'I5
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHE_TIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-478
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5106187
COMM AND TRACK
7036
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU-BAND POWER SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAI DS
KU-BAND A COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
KU-BAND POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE KU-BAND POWER SWITCH SELECTS
ON/STBY/OFF PWR TO THE KU-BAND SYSTEM. FAILURE TO CLOSE WOULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF RENDEZVOUS RADAR DATA.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-479
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/28/87
COMM AND TRACK
7037
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU-BAND POWER SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) KU-BAND A COMM/RADAR
4) RENDEZVOUS RADAR
5) KU-BAND POWER SWITCH
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S12
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, _G_ ....
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS_E_RS' LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
Q_ pAY_AD RECOVER!_gAPABILITyWHICH COULD RESULT IN_SSOF_
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE KU-BAND POWER SWITCH SELECTS
ON/STBY/OFF PWR TO THE KU-BAND SYSTEM. OPEN/SHORT SW WOULD
RESULT IN LOSSOF RENDEZVOUS/_DAR CAPABILITY. _ _:
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18 ....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/o6/87
COMM AND TRACK
7038
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU-BAND POWER SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) RENDEZVOUS RADAR
5) KU-BAND POWER SWITCH
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S12
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS VIA
THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE KU-BAND POWER SWITCH SELECTS
ON/STBY/OFF POWER TO THE KU-BAND SYSTEM. FAILURE TO REMAIN
CLOSED WOULD PROVIDE ERRATIC DATA RESULTING IN LOSS OF RENDEZVOUS
RADAR DATA.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-481
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 5/06/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDACID: 7039
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU A MODE SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
FAILS TO SWITCH
T
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) NAVAIDS
3 ) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4 ) RENDEZVOUS RADAR
5) KU A MODE SWITCH
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE •"
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERA_ IN A SINGLE sTRING C_FIG_TION TO _SE-AR_}_, A_QUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MIS-SION'-- (UNL_KE-RED=UNDANCY_Yo_F_OR_ OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES IEXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER _b_coAs-) _ THE_KTJM0[)E_SW_ITC}{ SELECTS RDR
COOP/RDR PASSIVE/COMM. FAILURE TO SELECT RADAR WOULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF RENDEZVOUS RADAR DATA. ...................
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
mm
i
mm
mm
ms
I
mm
I
m
ms
I
mm
l
mm
B
l
I
I
mm
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-482
mm
mw
i
=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
COMMAND TRACK
7040
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU A MODE SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
4) RENDEZVOUS RADAR
5) KU A MODE SWITCH
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S13
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE KU MODE SWITCH SELECTS RDR
COOP/RDR PASSIVE/COMM. AN OPEN/SHORT WOULD PREVENT MODE
SELECTION. FAILURE TO SELECT RADAR WOULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
RENDEZVOUS RADAR DATA.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-483
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
COMM AND TRACK
7041
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KU BD A ANT STEERING SW (REF KU BD COMM)
FAILS TO SWITCH_ _I_I
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
KU BD A ANT STEERING SW
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $7
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12_NMOF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONS!STING OF _E, _ RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS 09 ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS, SW FUNC VIA GND CMD.) THE ANT
STEERING SW SELECTS GPC/GPC DESIG/AUTO TK/_SLEW_ ......FAILURE TO
SW WOULD PREVENT SELECTION OF OPTIMUM ANT STEERING MODE. NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHE_TIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
COMM AND TRACK
7042
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RADAR OUTPUT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND A COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
RADAR OUTPUT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S14
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS,) RADAR OUTPUT SWITCH SELECTS
HIGH/MED/LOW POWER MODE. FAILURE TO SELECT HIGH POWER WOULD
REDUCE OPERATIONS TO SHORT RANGE ONLY. THIS COULD MAKE
RENDEZVOUS IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOSS OF PRIMARY MISSION
OBJECTIVE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 11/31/87 C-485
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
COMM AND TRACK
7043
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RADAR OUTPUT SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAI DS
KU-BAND A COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
RADAR OUTPUT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 "AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: S14
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/_DAR SYSTEM
OPERATES_:A_G_ STRING CON?_G_TION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS -MAN_/VERS. LOSS OF A_L
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLI_TRED_DANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIATHE STAR TRACER _O COAS.) RAD_ouTPUT SWITCH SELECTS
HIGH/MED/LOW RF TRANSMIT POWER MODE. AN OPEN/SHORT WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF RADAR. THIS COULD MAKE RENDEZVOUS IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING
IN LOSS OF PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-486
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/22/87
COMM AND TRACK
7044
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEW AZIMUTH CONTROL SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
SLEW AZIMUTH CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ i C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLESTRINGCONFIGURATiON TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY VIA GPC AND GPC DESIGNATE AND FOR
OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE SLEW
AZIMUTH SWITCH MOVES ANTENNA LEFT OR RIGHT FOR POINTING. FAILURE
OF SLEW SWITCH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TARGET TRACKING RESULTING IN
LOSS OF RENDEZVOUS CAP AND PRIMARY MISS OBJECTIVE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-487
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
6/22/87
COMMANDTRACK
7045
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEWAZIMUTH CONTROLSWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
SLEW AZIMUTH CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $2
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION _-
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/_SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. =_(_Li_-REDUND_CY VIA GPC AND GPC DESIGN_ATE AND FoR
OBTAi  G ebb) sLEw
AZ SW MOVES ANTENNA LEFT OR RIGHT FOR POINTING. AN OPEN/SHORT
FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TARGET TRACKING RESULTING IN LOSS OF
REND_--ZVOU_ _CAP AND P_I_MI_O-BJ_CTiVE. _ _
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-488
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
7046
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEW ELEV CONTROL SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAI DS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
SLEW ELEV CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY VIA GPC AND GPC DESIGNATE AND FOR
OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE SLEW
ELEV SWITCH MOVES ANTENNA UP OR DOWN FOR POINTING. FAILURE OF
SLEW SWITCH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TARGET TRACKING RESULTING IN LOSS
OF RENDEZVOUS CAPABILITY AND PRIMARY MISS OBJECTIVE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-489
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
6/23/87
COMMAND TRACK
7047
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEWELEV CONTROLSWITCH(REF KU-BAND COMM)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM& TRACK
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUSRADAR
SLEWELEV CONTROLSWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL sHoCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _ .....
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RA_DAR_SySTEM _
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AN_ _ RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS.-LOSS_F _ALL _
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNL_REDUND_CY_F_OBTAIN_NG TARGET_K/_G_S_ISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKING AND COAS.) THE SLEW ELEV SWITCH MOVES
ANTENNA UP OR DOWN FOR POINTING. AN OPEN/SHORT FAILURE OF sLEw
SWITCH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TARGET TRACKING RESULTING IN LOSS OF
RENDEZVOUS CAPABILITY AND LOSS OF PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INco/COMM/JSC-1861i BRIEF SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
7048
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEW RATE CONTROL SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAI DS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
SLEW RATE CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $4
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER_U_COAS.) THE SLEW RATE SWITCH CONTROLS
RATE OF ANTENNA SLEWING FAST OR SLOW. FAILURE TO SWITCH WOULD
PREVENT SLEWING RATE CHANGES. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-491
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
7049
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SLEW RATE CONTROL SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
SLEW RATE CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $4
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ ________=.........
THE NDEZVO  D SECTION W-BAND CO /RAD a
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE D_ING RENDE_OUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF°ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUN_ FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES EXISTS
VIA THE STAR TRACKER AND COAS.) THE SLEW RATE SWITCH CONTROLS
RATE OF ANTENNA SLEWING FAST OR SLOW. AN OPEN/SHORT FAILURE OF
SLEW SWITCH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ANT S_WING/POINT_AP _!_
RESULTING IN LOSS OF _NDEZVOUS CAP AND PRIMARY MISS OBJECTIVE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
7050
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANT SEARCH SELECT SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
ANT SEARCH SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY VIA GPC DESIGNATE AND MANUAL SLEW
CONTROLS AND FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES VIA STAR TRACKER AND
COAS.) THE SEARCH SW INITIATES KU-BAND ANT SEARCH WHEN IN AUTO
TRACK MODE. FAILURE TO SW PREVENTS SELECTION OF AUTO SEARCH CAP.
NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16,5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-493
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
7051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ANT SEARCH SELECT SWITCH (REF KU-BAND COMM)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAIDS
KU-BAND COMM/RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
ANT SEARCH SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAHNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: ' 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A1
PART NUMBER: $8
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE RENDEZVOUS RADAR SECTION OF THE KU-BAND COMM/RADAR SYSTEM
OPERATES IN A SINGLE STRING CONFIGURATION TO SEARCH, ACQUIRE, AND
TRACK DETACHED PAYLOADS WITHIN 12 NM OF THE ORBITER. THE RADAR
PROVIDES TARGET DATA CONSISTING OF RANGE, RANGE RATE, ANGLE
AND ANGLE RATE DURING RENDEZVOUS MANEUVERS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING THIS INFORMATION COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF PAYLOAD RECOVERY CAPABILITY WHICH COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF
MISSION. (UNLIKE-REDUNDANCY VIA GPC DESIGNATE AND MANUAL SLEW
CONTROLS AND FOR OBTAINING TARGET ANGLES VIA STAR TRACKER AND
COAS.) THE SEARCH SW INITIATES KU-BAND ANT SEARCH WHEN IN AUTO
TRACK MODE. AN OPEN/SHORT FAILURE PREVENTS USE OF AUTO SEARCH
CAP. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: sYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740109, SSSH 16.1 & 16.5, OMRS
NSTS 08171 FILE III, INCO/COMM/JSC-18611 BRIEF SECTION 18
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
7501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (31V73A4CB58, 61 & 64)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAI DS
TACAN
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A (31V73A4CB58, 61 & 64)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL L4
31V73A4CB58, 61 & 64.
CAUSES: CONT_iNATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHINACAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF AC BUS I, 2 OR 3 (IISVAC 400 CYCLES) WHICH PROVIDES POWER
TO TACAN i, 2 OR 3. THE TACAN DATA IS REQUIRED TO UPDATE THE G&N
STATE-VECTOR TO BRING THE ORBITER TO THE TERMINAL AREA AND THE
HEADING ALIGNMENT CIRCLE/CYLINDER. THE TACANS ARE
TRIPLE REDUNDANT WITH DEDICATED CONTROLS AND OPERATE
SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE SLANT RANGE AND BEARING INFORMATION
DURING DEORBIT FROM 160,000 FEET ALTITUDE DOWN TO 1500 FEET
ALTITUDE OR 15 NAUTICAL MILES FROM LANDING. LOSS OF ALL RANGE
PLUS BEARING
OR RANGE ONLY VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW (IR).
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION i.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-495
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
7502
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION RESISTOR,
FAILS OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
(33V73A7AIRI, 2 & 3)
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST : H. J • LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) TACAN
4) ISOLATION RESISTOR,
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
(33V73A7AIRI, 2 & 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL 07
PART NUMBER: 33V73A7AIRI, 2 & 3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE P_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS.
ErFECTS/RATIONA : .....
PROVIDES GPC CONTROL (AND MODE SWITCH POSITION SCAN TELEMETRY
INPUTS TO MDM'S OF4 AND LFI) FOR ASSOCIATED TACAN'S i, 2, 3_
LOSS OF AIR1, AIR2/Ai__ R3 WQULD CAUSE_SS OFGPC MQDE_ 9QN_RQD OF
LRU'S 1, 2, 3, _SPECTYVELY' LOSS6?OPE_TIONALLY RED_D_T
PANEL MODE CONTROL ON THE AFFECTED UNIT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THAT
TACAN LRU. L_3SS OF ANY TWO TACAN '__DR__ S WOUDDCAUSE _$8 OF TACAN
UPDATES TO THE NAV FILTER AND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHIC_
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REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740179, SSSH 9.2, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION i. N
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-496
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
9/23187
COMM AND TRACK
7503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
AI6CBI8)
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (33V73AI4CB25, AI5CB24 &
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAIDS
MSBLS
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (33V73AI4CB25, AI5CB24 & AI6CBI8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 14, 15 & 16
33V73AI4CB25, AISCB24 & AI6CBI8
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC MAIN BUS A, B OR C WHICH PROVIDES POWER TO MSBLS i,
2 OR 3. THE MSBLS ARE TRIPLE REDUNDANT WITH DEDICATED CONTROLS
AND OPERATE SIMULTANEOUSLY TO PROVIDE AZIMUTH, ELEVATION ANGLES
AND SLANT RANGE DATA TO ORBITER G&N FOR DETERMINING
VEHICLE POSITION WITH REGUARDS TO SELECTED RUNWAY FROM 20
NAUTICAL MILES THROUGH LANDING. MSBLS DATA IS REQUIRED TO UPDATE
THE G&N STATE-VECTOR TO EFFECT A SAFE, DAMAGE FREE LANDING. DATA
GENERATED BY MSBLS IS CONSIDERED A BACKUP TO THE RADAR
ALTIMETER FOR PRECISE ALTITUDE/SINK-RATE INFORMATION. LOSS OF
ALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING PARAMETERS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
VEHICLE/CREW (IR).
REFERENCES" SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-497
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK , FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 7504 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: ISOLATION RESISTOR, (33V73A8A5RI, A6RI & A7RI)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORT-TO-GROUND BETWEEN THE RESISTOR AND
MSBLS POWER SWITCH.
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) MSBLS
4) ISOLATION RESISTOR,
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
(33V73A8A5RI, A6RI & A7RI)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL 8
PART NUMBER: 33V73A8A5RI, A6RI & A7RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 28VDC ESS BUS IBC, 2CA OR 3AB WHICH PROVIDES CONTROL
POWER TO THE SWITCHES THAT ARE ESSENTIAL TO RESTORE POWER TO A
FAILED MAIN OR AC BUS AND TO ESSENTIAL NON-EPS ELECTRICAL LOADS _
_D _I_C_E_S_. ....S_----O_THE=_SE_CTED CREW SWITCHES AND LOADS THAT
COULD BE WITHOUT POWER ARE EPS SYSTEM SWITCHES, GPC SWITCHES,
TACAN MODE SWITCHES, RADAR ALTIMETER AND MSBLS POWER SWITCHES,
C&W SYSTEM_ EMERGEI_CYLIGHTI_,_O_ONTROL__DMASTER
TIMING UNIT. ESSENTIAL BUSES ARE AISO USED FOR SWITCHING
DISCRETES TO MDMS. LOSS OF THESE SYSTEMS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
_HICLE/CREW(IR)I_= NOTE: THESE RESISTORS ARE ON LOAD SIDE OF
ASSOCIATED SWITCHES INSTEAD OF BUS SIDE, SO BUSSES ARE NOT
PROTECTED AGAINST SWITCH SHORTS TO GROUND.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-498
m
n
m
D
u
m
j i
U
m
=
mm
m
mR
=
U
Im
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/08/87
COMM AND TRACK
7505
t
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ISOLATION RESISTOR 33V73A8A5RI, A6RI, A7R1
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) NAVAIDS
3) MSBLS
4) ISOLATION RESISTOR
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 08
33V73ASA5RI, A6RI, A7RI
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SWITCH SCAN TELEMETRY INPUTS TO MDM'S LFI, OF4 FOR
POSITION OF POWER SWITCHES $8, $9, SIO, RESPECTIVELY, WHICH
PROVIDE POWER TO MSBLS DECODER i, 2, 3, RESPECTIVELY. FAILURE
WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION OR ENDANGER CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740569, SSSH 9.4, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GNC SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 2.
u
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-499
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/23/87
COMM AND TRACK
. 7506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A(33V73AI4CB24 & AI5CB23)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
NAVAIDS
RADAR ALTIMETER
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A(33V73AI4CB24 & AI5CB23)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/iR
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 14 & 15
33V73AI4CB24 & AI5CB23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ :-_ .... _.... =_ -;.:-;-_;
LOSS 6F 28VDC _N BUS A OR BWHICH:P_OVIDES PO_R_T_;THE_ RADAR
ALTIMETER. THE RADAR ALTIMETER IS DUAL REDUNDANT WITH DEDICATED
CONTROLS AND PROVIDES PRECISION ALTITUDE DATA TO DRIVE CREW
DISpmYSFROMANALTITUDEOF5000FEET TOUeH  . THERADAR
ALTIMETER DATA IS REQUIRED FOR PRECISE ALTITUDE/SINK-RATE
INFORMATION. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR DETERMINING ALTITUDE
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VEHICLE/CREW (1R).
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REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS 70-740159, SSSH 9.3, OMRS NSTS
08171 FILE III, GN&C SYSTEM BRIEF JSC 18863 SECTION 3. mm
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-500
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/07/87
COMM AND TRACK
8001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
F_ILURE MODE:
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO CONTROL UNIT (VCU)
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT (VSU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[1] B[p] C[p]
LOCATION: RI7
PART NUMBER: 2294823
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) THE VSU LRU PRIMARILY PROVIDES
IN/OUT VIDEO SWITCHING. FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV
FUNCTIONS AND CAP TO MONITOR RMS MOTION RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-501
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/12/8v
COMM AND TRACK
8002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO CONTROL UNIT (VCU)
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT (VSU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ p ] C [ p ]
LOCATION: RI7
PART NUMBER: 2294823
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTAC_P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV ....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS_
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) THE VSU LRU PRIMARILY PROVIDES
IN/OUT VIDEO SWITCHING. FAILURE TO SW WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC
SELECTION _D_CAP-TO MONITOR RMS MOTION RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFE_NCES: _FLTRULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
8003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO CONTROL UNIT (VCU)
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT (VSU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ p ] C [ p ]
LOCATION: RI7
PART NUMBER: 2294823
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND cOASFORCREw VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) THE VSU LRU PRIMARILY PROVIDES
IN/OUT VIDEO SWITCHING. OPEN/SHORT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC
_SELECTION AND CAP TO MONITOR RMS MOTION RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-503
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO CONTROL UNIT (VCU)
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT (RCU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ p ] C [ p ]
LOCATION: RI8
PART NUMBER: 2294824
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD INTHE woRST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE,REDUN _ CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) RCU LRU PRIMARILY PROVIDES TV
CAM (TVC) MASTER SYNC S!GNALSAND PROCESSES CCTV SYS CMDS .......
FAILURE WoULD_C_°_SSOF _C_SELECTION_DCAP TO M_NITOR_S
MOTION RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH_
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-504
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
5/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO CONTROL UNIT (VCU)
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT (RCU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ p ] C [ p ]
LOCATION: RIB
PART NUMBER: 2294824
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) RCU LRU PRIMARILY PROVIDES TV
CAM (TVC) MASTER SYNC SIGNALS AND PROCESSES CCTV SYS CMDS. AN
OPEN/SHORT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC SELECTION AND CAP TO MONITOR
RMS MOTION RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-505
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/10/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TV CAMERA (FLT DECK) .....
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE_ HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3 !_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: CABIN FLIGHT DECK
PART NUMBER: 2294819
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPE__, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES_ SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY_RI_TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN ccTv
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING_IN _LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-R_DUND IrA CREW VIEWING, RM$
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FORR_E=NpE z _A/_D STA/KEEP.) FAILURE WOULDCAUS E Loss OF IN
CABIN_ FLT_____DECK=_SCENES _9_ TR_SMI$SIONTO GROUND. NOT CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-506
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
8007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA (MID DECK)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN MID DECK
2294819
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.(UNLIKE-REDUND IVA CREW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF IN
CABIN MID DECK SCENES FOR TRANSMISSION TO GROUND. NOT CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-507
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/lO/87
CO_ AND TRACK
8008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/!R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA A (FWD P/L BAY)
_SS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. _NG SUBSYS _AD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFiNG: 3/3
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_CATION: _D PAYLOAD BAY
PART _BER: 2294819
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, _SS OF INPUT, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, PIECE PART FAILU_
EFFECTS/RATIONAT._-:
C_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK T0__NT ONORBiT
ACTIVITIES, SUP_RT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/_EP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAy__0R_TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
MS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CC_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIK_ AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
P_VENT RMS STOW AND P/L B___AYDQOR C_S_E _SULT!_. NG_N _$S OF
VEHIC-_ _D _cREWV--(UNLI_-REDUND C_W WINDOW VIEWINg{ _S _!J
JETTISON_ EVA AND CO_ FOR CR_ VfSUAL INSPECTION _D _ BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP. ) FAILURE OF TV CAM (_C) COULD
CAUSE _SS OF CCTV cap TO MONITOR RMS MOTION RESULTING IN
POSSIBT._. _SS OF _HICLE _...... _ __
REFERENCES: FLT RU_S, S_TT_ FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
8009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA B (KEEL/EVA)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) E CAMERA (TVC)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
.ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY KEEL/EVA POSITION
PART NUMBER: 2294819
c[p3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND _
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF TV CAM (TVC) COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV CAP TO MONITOR RMS MOTION RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW,
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC'12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-509
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
8010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA C (AFT P/L BAY)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 2294819
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ _ _ ! _....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP _ CCTV
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FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW, (_LI_C_DUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _D KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF TV CAM (TVC) COULD
cAUSE-Lb-SSOFCCTV CAP -TbM_NI_0_R_S_0TION RESUlTInG IN
POSSIB_ LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. .........
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FL T 0PS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740i89, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
B/lO/87
COMMAND TRACK
8011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA D (RMS STBD POSITION FWD)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) cCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RMS STBD POSITION FWD PAYLOAD BAY
PART NUMBER: 2294819
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE_REDUND cREW -WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF TV CAM (TVC) COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV CAP TO MONITOR RMS MOTION RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-511
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
8012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3 :;
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA RMS WRIST
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: RMS ARM
PART NUMBER: 2294819
A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATI ONALE :
CCTV SYS PROVIDES' ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK To __T ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RES_ULT_NG IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, zRMS__ _ i
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP _D _S ELBOW TVC TO VIEW RMS
ACTIVITY. ) _I_ILURE OF RMS _!_ST _¢ COULD_REDUCE CAP TO VIEW
RMS WORK RESUL--TING IN_POS'SIB_ _SS 6?_M_SEION. = _ ......
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
E
I
mm
mm
B
Z
I
I
U
M
l
I
I
m
mm
I
m
_I
m
U
g
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-512 R
g
R
mm
r
i
i
w
=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
8013
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA RMS ELBOW
LOST OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R • AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ARM
2294819
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT.
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP AND RMS WRIST TVC TO VIEW RMS
ACTIVITY.) FAILURE OF RMS ELBOW TVC COULD REDUCE CAP TO VIEW
RMS WORK RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-513
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
8014
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/_ ....
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PAYLOAD BAY PORT POSITION (TVC A)
2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz -_ _.........._ _
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUME_ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES,...... ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO _ CCTV _ _
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKErRED_DoCREW WINDOW VIEWING,.....................RMS_.
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "A" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "A" P/T RESULTS IN LOSS OF TARGET
TRACK CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-514 ....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/10/87
COMM AND TRACK
8015
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
FAILS TO START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD PAYLOAD BAY PORT POSITION (TVC A)
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "A" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "A" P/T RESULTS IN LOSS OF TARGET
TRACK CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-515
l
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/lO/87
COMMAND TRACK
8016
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC A POSITION)
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD PAYLOAD BAY PORT POSITION (TVC A)
2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : :_ _-_ ....
CCTV SYSP-ROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TODO-_i_T ONORBiT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING,_RMS_i
ANDJETTISON, EVA AND c oAS_F-0R_C_REW_ISUAL _iNS_ECTIO=N ........KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP. ) PTU PROVIDES TVC "A" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "A" P/T RESULTS iN LOSS OF TARG_ET _
TRACK CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS MANUAL.........JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-516
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
8017
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT PAYLOAD BAY KEEL/EVA (TVC B POSITION)
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "B" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "B" P/T RESULTS IN LOSS OF TARGET
TRACK CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTVCOVERAGEQF RMS MOTION
RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-517
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
8018
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
FAILS TO START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT PAYLOADBAY KEEL/EVA (TVC B POSITION)
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF KL_-_T_DBT_CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-_DUND CREW WINDOW VI_NG_ _s _
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW vISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "B" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "B" P/T RESULTS IN LOSS OF T_GET
TRACK-CAPABILITY AND EFFECTI_C_tO_/_AGE RESULTInG IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTT_ FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-518
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/1o/87
COMM AND TRACK
8019
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC B POSITION)
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMI4 & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT PAYLOAD BAY KEEL/EVA (TVC B POSITION)
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOWAND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "B" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "B" P/T RESULTS IN LOSS OF TARGET
TRACK CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTT_ FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-519
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/8v
COMM AND TRACK
8020
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 _ RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT PAYLOAD BAY TVC C POSITION
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES:CONT INATION,TEMPE  E,  OSSOr INPUT, C ICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .... :_&i_i
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITORP/L BAY DOORLATCHES_ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WI_D(_WVI_, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTUPROVIDE S TVC"C" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "C" P/T RESULTS IN !_SS OF TARGET
TRACK:CAPABILITY_D_EFFE_TI_ cC_ COVERAGE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-520 ...........
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
FAILS TO START STOP
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT PAYLOAD BAY TVC C POSITION
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIALVISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE ANDCREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "C" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "C" P/T RESULTS IN LOSS OF TARGET
TRACK CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-521
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8022
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM: PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC C POSITION)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC/INTERMI_ENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT PAYLOAD BAY TVC C POSITION
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
shocK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
E FFECTS/RAT i_NALE_ I ....ii_ii _ _......._.......
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL F-EEDBACK TO __NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV .....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR C_S_E RESULTING....... IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKErREDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RIMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR C_W VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAgD
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "C" POINTING
t! 11CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC C P/T RESULT S I N Loss OF TARGET
TRACK CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C'522
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8023
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
pHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: _ 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD P/L BAY STBD RMS TVC D POSITION
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "D" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "D" P/T RESULTS IN LOSS OF TARGET
TRACK CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-523
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8024
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
FAILS_O START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PREI2iUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD P/L BAY STBD RMS TVC D POSITION
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITORp/LBAYD00 R LATCHES,_pR9 EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR C LQSURE RESULTINGINLOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PT_UPRQVIDES_TVC "D" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "D" P/T RESULTS IN LOSS OF TARGET
TRACK- CAPABILITY AND EF-?ECTIVE CCTV C0_FERAGE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-524
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8025
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (TVC D POSITION)
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING_ 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ p ]
FWD P/L BAY STBD RMS TVC D POSITION
2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) PTU PROVIDES TVC "D" POINTING
CAPABILITY. FAILURE OF TVC "D" P/T RESULTS IN LOSS OF TARGET
TRACK CAPABILITY AND EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-525
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/11/87
CO_ AND TRACK
8026
HIGHEST'CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 5/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ p ]
LOCATION: RMS ARM
PART NUMBER: 2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV --
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND PIL BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF_
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNL!KEt_D_UND _CREW WINDOW _NG _i RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ ANDSTA/KEEP AND RMS WRIST TVC TO VIEW RMS
ACTIVITY.) PTU PROVIDES RMS ELBOW TVC POINTING CAPABILITY .....
FAILURE OF P/T RESULTS IN LOSS OF TARGET TRACK CAPABILITY AND
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-526
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8027
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
FAILS TO START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD : A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ p ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ARM
2294822
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP AND RMS WRIST TVC TO VIEW RMS
ACTIVITY.) PTU PROVIDES RMS ELBOW TVC POINTING CAPABILITY.
FAILURE OF P/T RESULTS IN_sS OF TARGET TRACK CAPABILITY AND
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-527
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8028
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAN AND TILT UNIT (RMS ELBOW TVC POSITION)
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
PAN AND TILT UNIT (PTU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
m
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REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: RMS ARM
PART NUMBER: 2294822
c[p]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENTONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. _ LOSS OF ALLCAP TO OBTAI_ CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS QF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING,_SIIi_I_!
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP AND RMS WRIST TVC TO VIEW RMS
ACTIVITY.) 'PTU PROVIDE_ _S E___!NTING CAPAB!_, _:
FAILURE OF_R_U_S_IN _SSO _ TARGET TRKCK CAPABILIT_D _
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,,24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70_740189, OMRSD NSTS 0817i
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-528
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/il/87
COMM AND TRACK
8029
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CABIN FLT DECK
PART NUMBER: 2294820
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV CABIN FLT DECK COVERAGE. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-529
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 8/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8030
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOC O LENSASSEMBLY(MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN FLT DECK
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: i • _ __ _ _ _
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP. ) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV CABIN FLT DECK COVERAGE. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, sHUTTLE FLT oPs MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-530 _ _ .......
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN MID DECK
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L' LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV CABIN MID DECK COVERAGE. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-531
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMMAND TRACK
8032
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN MID DECK
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ ..... _ _......
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN MS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS !
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP. ) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV CABIN MID DECK COVERAGE. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TT_ FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12, .13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-532
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8033
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY TVC A
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-533
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMMAND TRACK
8034
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A FWD P/L BAY)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY TVC A
229482O
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
m
mm
zl
mm
mm
mm
mm
mm
m
l
I
I
mm
m
g
m
m
mm
l
m
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-534
k
m
mm
mm
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8035 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
BAY)
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT P/L BAY TVC B
2294820
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-535
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
BAY)
FAILURE MODE:
8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8036 ABORT: 3/3
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B KEEL/EVA AFT P/L
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST : W. C . LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
....CRITICADITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AFT P/L BAY TVC B
PART NUMBER: 2294820
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE ANDUNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLQSURE RESUL_NG_N_SS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CbNTROL RESULT_G IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/_I/87 C-536
N
m
mm
I
R
|
i
i
l
mm
i
i
I
!
i
U
wr_
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8037
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TVC C AFT P/L BAY
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-537
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8038
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C AFT P/L BAY)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING ....
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TVC C AFT P/L BAY
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: :::_: :_
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIESt SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, _R-B EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIqE CCTV COVERAGE-_bPbSSIBLE_SS O_ VEHiCLE_D CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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mm
m =
nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8039
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TVC D FWD P/L BAY
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-539
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8040
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILUREMODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D FWD P/L BAY)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMiNG
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
k
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC D FWD P/L BAY
PART NUMBER: 2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPpORT MISSION EXPOPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L=BAYDOOR _TCHES__ ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW ViEW_G, RMS _;_
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF
EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8041 . ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP AND ELBOW TVC FOR VEIWING RMS
ACTIVITY.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA IRIS,
ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV
COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-541
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8042 . ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROMELENS ASSEMBLY(P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC
2294820
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, TEMPE__' LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EF?ECTS/RATIONALE: ........_!_-_i
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, _d_D ATTA_ED P/L. -LO_ OF ALL CAP TO O_AI-N CC_ ........
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS ....
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP AND ELBOW TVC FOR VEIWING RMS
ACTIVITY.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA IRIS,
ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV ......
COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MALqJAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-542
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8043 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R ' AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP AND WRIST TVC FOR VIEWING RMS
ACTIVITY.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA IRIS,
ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV
COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-543
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 8044 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC)
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
MONOCHROME LENS ASSEMBLY (MLA)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LA/_DING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC
2294820
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ ..... _ _ _
CCTV SYSPROVIDE_ ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP_D_IST _C FOR VIEWING RMS
ACTIVITY.) FAILURE OF MLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA IRIS,
ZOOM AND FOCUS CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV
COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-544
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID: •
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8045
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN FLT DECK TVC
2307088
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) WLS ONLY USED IN CABIN. LOSS
WOULD NOT BE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-545
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
M.DAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8046
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 _RTLS: 3/3 _
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LAND_G/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN FLT DECK TVC
2307088
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...........
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) WLS ONLY USED IN CABIN. LOSS
WOULD NOT BE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,p!2,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8047
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
.3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN MID DECK TVC
2307088
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) WLS ONLY USED IN CABIN. LOSS
WOULD NOT BE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-547
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMMAND TRACK
8048
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSEMBLY (WLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CABIN MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER: 2307088
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONA_:_ _.......... _!__!_
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSSOF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) WLS ONLY USED IN CABIN. LOSS
WOULD NOT BE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION, _ _ _ _
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-548
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8111187
COMM AND TRACK
8049
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: CABIN FLT DECK TVC
PART NUMBER: 2294821
B [ ] c [
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE OF CABIN. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13, 24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-549
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMMAND TRACK
8050
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (FLT DECK TVC)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: -CABIN FLT DECK TVC
PART NUMBER: 2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ ...._
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTRQ_RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE OF CABIN. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-550
I
m
m
u
I
mm
m
I
qi
m
I
m
M
B
B
I
i
m
u
I
mm
B
wn
n
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN MID DECK TVC
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE ANDCREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE OF CABIN. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-551
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/8"1
COMM AND TRACK
8052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (MID DECK TVC)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN MID DECK TVC
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP. ) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS , ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROLRESULTING IN
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE OF CABIN. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH _
16.1,.12,.13,.24_SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-552
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8053
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD P/L BAY TVC A
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-553
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8054
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC A)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION. •
PART NUMBER:
FWD P/L BAY TVC A
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TE_ERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED PilL. _ OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND CQLQRCQNTROL RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EF_ECT_ CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
R_FERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12,.13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-554
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMMAND TRACK
8055
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
.... DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT P/L BAY TVC B
PART NUMBER: 2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-555
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8056
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC B)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR .AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT P/L BAY TVC B
PART NUMBER: 2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPE__LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....... =..............
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/_EP OPS, iN_E_f___P/L BAY___; OR]_EXTERI6_
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, LOSS O?ALL CAP TO OBTAI_°CCTV ......
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLO$_ RESULTING IN LOSS OF .......
VEHiCLEq_DCREW, (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOWVIEWING, RMS :_,_
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN_
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV coVE_GE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE _D
CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-556
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8057
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT P/L BAY TVC C
2294821
CAUSES: • CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIUES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-557
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8058
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC C)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT P/L BAY TVC C
PART NUMBER: 2294821
CAUSES: CO_INATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK T0-D6_ToNoRBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16 1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-558
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8059
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD P/L BAY TVC D
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-559
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8060
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (TVC D)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD P/L BAY TVC D
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RAT IONALE z :_
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY _QR CLOSURE RESULTING IN _SS OF
vEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING_ RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP. ) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF TV CAMERA IRIS, ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN
LOSS OF EFFECTIVE CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/8 C-560
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8061
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
_AILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP AND ELBOW TVC FOR VIEWING RMS
ACTIVITY.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA IRIS,
ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE
CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-561
n
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8062
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS WRIST TVC)
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: P/L BAY RMS WRIST TVC
PART NUMBER: 2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, -VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFEcTs/RATIONALE_ ...._ _ _ _ _ii_L__i _ __
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPs, INsPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LA-TCHE_S, O-RB_EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHIC_ AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREWWINDOW VIEWING, RMS_ ......
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP AND ELBOW TVC FOR VIEWING RMS
ACTIVITY.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA IRIS,
ZooM, Focus, AND CO_RCONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE
CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-562
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/8v
COMM AND TRACK
8063
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
H DW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
3/3
5/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC
2294821
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP AND WRIST TVC FOR VIEWING RMS
ACTIVITY.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA IRIS,
ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE
CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-563
DATE."
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8064
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (RMS ELBOW TVC)
PHYSICAL BINDING/J_ING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY (CLA)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
P/L BAY RMS ELBOW TVC
2294821
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFEcTs/RATIONALE: _ _ ....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN_P.END_EZ_ .............
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, _D ATTACHED P/L. _SS OF ALL _CAP TO _0BTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHIC_ AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS ......
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP AND WRIST TVC FOR VIEWING RMS
ACTIVITY.) FAILURE OF CLA WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TV CAMERA IRIS,
ZOOM, FOCUS, AND COLOR CONTROL RESULTING IN LOSS OF EFFECTIVE
CCTV COVERAGE AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-564 ...... _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8065
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) VIEWFINDER MONITOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK
2294825
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH FLT DECK
TV CAMERAS FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF FLT
DECK AND OUT THE WINDOW SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND.
WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, MID DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.)
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-565
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8066
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) ccTv
3) VIEWFINDER MONITOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MID DECK
PART NUMBER: 2294825
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, TEMPE__, LOSS OF INPUT, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _tz ....._v _ _
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, OR B EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH MID DECK
TV CAMERAS FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE
oADJUSTME_NTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LoST OF MID
DECK SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLI_R_L_-WOULD_NOTCAUSE_SS
OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, FLT DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) ,_,_i _ , , ,
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,'13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-566
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8067
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) CONSOLE MONITOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 _ RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN
2291585
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERAS (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR
UNLIKE REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS
DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CONSOLE MON, AND UNLIKE VIA MONS LOCATED
ON THE GND. AND VIEWFINDER MONITOR FOR CABIN CAMERAS ONLY.)
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-567
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CO_ _D TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 8068 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOT._ MONITOR (CRT)
LOSS OF CRT
T._AD _ALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
m
1
[]
mB_AKDO_ HIE_CHY: 1
i) CO_ & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) CONSOLE MONITOR
4) CRT
s)
6)
7) []
8)
9)
l
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/F_C ABORT HDW/_C
P_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS:
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CABIN
2291585
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, TEMPERATE, _SS OF INPUT, _C_ICAL
SHOCK, VIB_TION, PIECE P_T FAILLE
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: ...........
CC_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO__ ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN _NDEZ _D
STA/_EP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY _OR _TCHES, ORB E_ERIOR,
_S, _D ATTACHED P/L. T_ _ CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL _ C_S (_C) _D VCR OUTPUTS. _SS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO OBTAIN DISP_YS OF _C SCENES VIA LI_ OR
_LIKE _DUND WOULD__PQ!NTING _D PIg_ A__S_NTS
DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBT._ _SS OF
CC_ COVE_GE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE _SS OF _HIC_ _D C_W.
(LIKE _DUND, A SECOND CONSOLE MON, _D _LIKE VIA MONS _CATED
ON THE GND. _D VIEWFINDER MONITOR FOR CABIN C_S ONLY.)
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLEFLT ops _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, sYs SCHE_TIC VS70-740189, O_SD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-568
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8069
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3_
LIF-TOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7A1
S12
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) TV
PWR CNTL UNIT SW APPLIES CCTV POWER FROM MAIN A OR MAIN B.
FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTIONS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-569
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8070
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV PWR CNTL UNIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7A1
S12
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PR0Y_DES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS ViA LIE AND UNLIKE REDUND cOULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KTJ BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) TV
PWR CNTL UNIT SW APPLIES CCTV POWER FROM MAIN A OR MAIN B. AN
OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF CCTV FUNCTIONS RESULTING IN POSSIBLE
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT 0P_ MANUAL JSC-12770 , SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, sYs sCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8071
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV PWR CNTL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV PWR CNTL SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $52
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE NON REDUND TV PWR CNTL SW SELECTS
CMD OR PANEL CONTROL. FAILURE OF THIS SWITCH WOULD NOT RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION. "PANEL" POSITION REQUIRES THAT ALL FUNCTIONS BE
SELECTED BY THE CREW AND THE "CMD" POSITION WILL ALLOW FUNCTIONS
TO BE SELECTED VIA GPC COMMANDS OR MANUALLY BY THE CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-571
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8072
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
TV PWR CNTL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV PWR CNTL SWITCH
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$52
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE NON REDUND TV PWR CNTL SW SELECTS
CMD OR PANEL CONTROL. FAILURE OF THIS SWITCH WOULD NOT RESULT IN
LOSS OF MISSION. PANEL POSITION REQUIRES THAT ALL FUNCTIONS BE
SELECTED BY THE CREW AND THE CMD POSITION WILL ALLOW FUNCTIONS TO
BE SELECTED VIA GPC COMMANDS OR CREW SELECTION. AN
OPEN SWITCH WOULD REQUIRE THAT ALL CCTV FUNCTIONS BE SELECTED BY
THE CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
N
mm
mm
I
m
m
mm
ms
m
m
g
m
mm
m
mm
i
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-572
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8073
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV SYNC SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV SYNC SWITCH S18
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S18
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) THE
TV SYNC SW ALLOWS SELECTION OF SYNC OSC. FAILURE TO SW WOULD NOT
BE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHJUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-573
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8074
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV SYNC SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV SYNC SWITCH S18
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S18
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD INTHE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) TV
SYNC SW ALLOWS SELECTION OF SYNC OSC. OPEN/SHORT SW WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF SYNC OSC AND TVC SELECTION CONTROL REDUCING CCTV CAP
RESULTING IN POTENTIAL LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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_NDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8075
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV DOWNLINK SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV DOWNLINK SWITCH SII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
SII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE ANDUNLIKEREDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF DOWNLINK VIDEO. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-575
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8076
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV DOWNLINK SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV DOWNLINK SWITCH Sll
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
SII
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PBQV!DES ESSENTIAL VISUA_L FEEDBACK TO __NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L_ _$SO_ADL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FORCREW VISUAL INSPECTION_D KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SHORT
CAUSES _LQSS OF DO WNLI_VIDEO AND OPEN ENABLES DOWNLINK VIDEO.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-576
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8077
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT'.
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC A)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S13
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION E_ OPS. ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SW
PROVIDE PWR TO TVC A PORT. FAILURE PREVENTS OPERATION TVC A AND
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-577
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8078
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC A)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S13
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTVSYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOWVIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SW
PROVIDE PWR TO TVC A PORT. OPEN/SHORT PREVENTS OPERATION TVC A
AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMMAND TRACK
8079
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 _TO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SW
PROVIDES PWR TO TVC B PORT. FAILURE PREVENTS OPERATION OF TVC B
AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189 OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-579
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8080
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC B)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S14
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SW
PROVIDES PWR TO TVC B PORT. OPEN/SHORT PREVENTS OPERATION OF TVC
B AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMMAND TRACK
8081
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR '
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC C)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S15
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SW
PROVIDE PWR TO TVC C PORT. FAILURE PREVENTS OPERATION OF TVC C
AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-581
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDACID: 8082
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: . 2/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERAPOWERSWITCH (TVC C)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) COMM& TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
T)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S15
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PR_I_DES. E$S__ENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK_TO_ DO__NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW yISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SW
PROVIDE PWR TO TVC C PORT. OPEN/SHORT PREVENTS OPERATION OF TVC
C AND COULD RESULT fN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND C REW_ i' _: _:: _ :::_:-
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70,740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8083
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC D)
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W,ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S16
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SW
PROVIDE PWR TO TVC D PORT. FAILURE PREVENTS OPERATION OF TVC D
AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF_FEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-583
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8084
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (TVC D)
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S16
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHORT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......
CCTV SYSPROVIDE_S ESSeNTiAL VISUAL FEEDBACKTO DO_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CC_ ....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS ......._
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FORCREW VISUAL INSP_CTi0N _D K_D
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SW
PROVIDE PWR TO TVC D PORT. OPEN/SHORTP_VENTS OPERATION OF TVC
D AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. _ :_ :
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS7Q-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-584
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8085
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (RMS TVCS)
FAILS TO SW
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S17
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUI_CTIONS VIA L_-_D UNLIKEREbU_ND C_bLD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-RED_D CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND _ BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SW
PROVIDES PWR TO RMS TVC PORT. FAILURE PREVENTS OPERATION OF RMS
TVCS AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-585
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8086
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA POWER SWITCH (RMS TVCS)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S17
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHORT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl[ ....... ......______ ...._ .........
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT QNORBiT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV ....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKETREDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA_DCOAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _D KU B_
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) SW
PROVIDES PWR TO RMS TVC PORT. OPEN/SHORT PREVENTS OPERATION OF
RMS TVCS AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION. , " " _ _
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
_DAC ID: 8087
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TV PWR SWITCH (FLT DECK TVC)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV PWR SW
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL 019
PART NUMBER: S1
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF FLT DECK TV CAMERA (TVC). NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70"740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-587
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/15/87
COMM AND TRACK
8088
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV PWR SWITCH (FLT DECK TVC)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
=
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV PWR SW
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL 019
PART NUMBER: S1
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYSPROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
OPEN/SHORT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF FLT DECK TV CAMERA (TVC). NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION. -_ :
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8089
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV PWR SWITCH (MID DECK TVC)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV PWR SW
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] S [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 058F
SI0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, _ ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF FLT DECK TV CAMERA (TVC). NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 081ZI
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-589
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8090
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV PWR SWITCH (MID DECK TVC)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV PWR SW
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 058F
SIO
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
OPEN/SHORT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF FLT DECK TV CAMERA (TVC). NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-590
I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
COMM AND TRACK
8091
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
RMS TVC SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $53
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND PORT
RMS SW.) SW SELECTS WRIST OR ELBOW TVC FOR STBD RMS. FAILURE
WOULD REDUCE STBD RMS TV COVERAGE CAPABILITY BUT WOULD NOT BE
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-591
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET _
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8092
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (STBD)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
RMS TVC SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$53
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:_ ....... ___!
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK To_D0 _CU_4ENT_ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/_KEEP QPS_ INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, LosS OF ALL tAP T0 OBTAIN CCTV _ _ _
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS_ ....
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INS_ECT!ON AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND PORT
RMS SW.) SW SELECTS WRIST OR ELBOW TVC FOR STBD RMS. OPEN/SHORT
SWI?CH WOU_L_ LOSE STBD _ST V CAPABILITY RESULTING IN POSSIBL_
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16. i_ .i-2,_13,-,24,SYS SCHE_T-I--C VS70'740189/_0MRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-592
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
8093
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
RMS TVC SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $54
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP 0PS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW, (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND STBD
RMS SW.) SW SELECTS WRIST OR ELBOW TVC FOR PORT RMS. FAILURE
WOULD REDUCE PORT RMS TV COVERAGE CAP BUT WOULD NOT BE CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-593
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
+.
8/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
8094 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS TV CAMERA SELECT SW (PORT)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
RMS TVC SELECT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $54
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE; _ ...._........ _.
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK_T0__NTONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LO_ OF ALL CAP TO+ OBTAIN CCTV_ __ i
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS _+_+
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND STBD
RMS SW.) SW SELECTS WRIST OR ELBOW TVC FOR PORT RMS. OPEN/SHORT
SWITCH WOULD LOSE PORT RMS TV CAP RESULTINGINPOSSIBLE=LO$SQF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8112/87
COMM AND TRACK
8095
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) CMD FOCUS SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION : PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: S 40
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND
FOCUS SW LOCATED ON LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT FOCUS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-595
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
suBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/12/87
COMiM AND TRACK
8096
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) CMD FOCUS SWITCH L
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$40
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUA£ FEEDBACK TO DO_C_u'M_NT ONORB_T
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L,=LQSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE_RED_6°COUL_I_ .....THE_ wORsT CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND
FOCUS SW LOCATED ON LENS ASSY.) OPEN/SHORT WOULD PREVENT FOCUS
CQN_OL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8097
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) CMD ZOOM SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ ANbsTA2KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND ZOOM
SW LOCATED ON LENS ASSEMBLY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL
CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-597
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8098
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) CMD ZOOM SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$41
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SY_s PRO..rIDES ESSEX.T_AL V!sjA_ FEEDBAC_ TO DOCUmeNT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RE NDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BaY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. _SSOFALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLI_REDUNI_COULD IN __RST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CRE W _!SUAL !NSPE_TION_D KTSBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND ZOOM
SW LOCATED ON LENS ASSEMBLY.) OPEN/SHORT WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16,1,.i2,.i3,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8099
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) CMD IRIS SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 373
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND IRIS
SW LOCATED ON LENS ASSEMBLY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT IRIS CONTROL
CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-599
L
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM-.
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) CMD IRIS SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$42
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND ......
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND IRIS
SW LOCATED ON LENS ASSEMBLY.) OPEN/SHORT WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
i
mm
mm
[]
mm
mm
I
il,
I
mm
I
z
I
mi
I
I
I
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-600
I
I
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) CMD TILT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
FAILURE WOULD PREVENT TILT TRACKING CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC
CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-601
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA CMD TILT SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) CMD TILT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$43
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'. _......................
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS_ ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR -P/L BAY DO0% LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L_ LOSS OF ALL CAp TQ_ OBTAIN CCTV _ _i_<_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE _
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _ KU-]TAN_
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
OPEN/SHORTWOULD_pREVEN__TTILT TRACKING CONTR_CAUS!N_ LO$$OF
TVC CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/s7
COMM AND TRACK
8103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) CMD PAN SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$44
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLiKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
FAILURE WOULD PREVENT PAN TRACKING CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC
CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-603
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/.12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA CMD PAN SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) CMD PAN SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
2/IR AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $44
B [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIALViSUAL'"FEEDBACK TO _CUM_NT"6NO_T
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/LBAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LO_OF_L_C_TO OBT__ !z_i
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN T_ WOnT CASE _
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
OPEN/SHORT WOULD PREVENT PAN TRACKING CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC
CAP RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. _,_,
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA PANTILT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) PANTILT SWITCH
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $56
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) P/T
SW CONTROLS RATE OF PANTILT TRAVEL. FAILURE WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,_24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-605
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FLrNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA PANTILT SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) PANTILT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: S16
B [ P ] c[p]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RA_IQNALE: _................
CCTV SYS PROVIDESESSE_IAL VISUAL FEEDBACKT0_CU_NT ONO_SIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, LOSS OF ALL_CAP TO OBTAI_C -CTV _ _; . _:_=
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNL!KE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) A
SLEW RATE MUST BE SELECTED SO THAT AN OPEN/SHORT WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF P/T CAP RESULTING IN LOSS OF TARGET TRACKING CA2AND LIMITED
CCTV COVERAGE. COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/3i/87 C-606 - _ _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (PEAK)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) ALC CMD SWITCH (PEAK)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $45
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND IRIS
SW.) EACH TVC ALC SW SELECTS A RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTNESS.
FAILURE TO SW PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE BRIGHTNESS. NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-607
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/12/87
COMMAND TRACK
8108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (PEAK)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
_)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) ALC CMD SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$45
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...........
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING,. RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND_
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CM_D AND IRIS
SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGES OF SCENE BRIGHTNESS CONTROL.
SHORTED SW CAUSES LOCK IN SELECTED MODE PREVENTING NORMALIZING
PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-608
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8112187
COMM AND TRACK
8109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (NORM)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) ALC CMD SWITCH (NORM)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND IRIS
SW.) EACH TVC ALC SW SELECTS A RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTNESS.
FAILURE TO SW PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE BRIGHTNESS. NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-609
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87
COMM AND TRACK
8110
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (NORM)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) ALC CMD SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$46
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, _D ATTACHED P/L, LOSS _OF _AP T0: OBTAIq_ tC_
FUNCTIONS VIA L_ AND _L_ COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING,
JETTISON, EVA _D COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND _ BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND IRIS
SW.) TH_E_oTV_ ALCSWSELECTS RANGES OF SCENE BRIGHTNESS CONTROL.
SHORTED SW CAUSES LOCK IN SELECTED MODE PREVENTING NORMALIZING
PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-610
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/12/8v
COMM AND TRACK
8111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (AVG)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) ALC CMD SWITCH (AVG)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND IRIS
SW.) EACH TVC ALC SW SELECTS A RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTNESS.
FAILURE TO SW PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE BRIGHTNESS. NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION. ....
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87. C-611
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/12/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8112
ITEM: TV CAMERA ALC CMD SWITCH (AVG)
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) ALC CMD SWITCH _
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL A7Al
PART NUMBER: $47
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FE_E_BACK TO D0_CL_NTONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OFALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD AND IRIS
SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGES OF SCENE BRIGHTNESS CONTROL.
SHORTED SW CAUSES _CK IN SELECTED MODE PREVENTING NORMALIZING
PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA GAMMA CMD SWITCH (WHITE STRCH)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) GAMMA CMD SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JE_SON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON TVC AND VIA REMOTE GND
CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR DARK AREAS
OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR SHADE
CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-613
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA GAMMA CMD SWITCH (WHITE STRCH)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) GAMMA CMD SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$48
CAUSES : MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: .......... ....... _:
CCTV$YSPROVIDES ESSENTIAL V_SUAL ?EEDBACK TO DO_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN g CTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE _
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS ?OR CR_W VISUAL iNSPECTION___ABDKU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON TVC AND VIA REMOTE GND
CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR DARK AREAS
OF PIC_E_ ......SHORT LOCKS POSITION AND PREVENTS SHADE CORRECTING
CAP. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS O?MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13187
COMM AND TRACK
8115
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA GAMMACMD SWITCH (NORM)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) GAMMA CMD SWITCH
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$49
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PARTFAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON TVC AND VIA REMOTE GND
CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR DARK AREAS
OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR SHADE
CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-615
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8113187
COMM AND TRACK
8116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA GAMMA CMD SWITCH (NORM)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) GAMMA CMD SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $49
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD lq_ THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON TVC AND VIA REMOTE GND
CMD.) THE TVC G_sw SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR DARK AREAS
OF PIC_. SHORT LOCKS POSITION AND PREVENTS SHADE CORRECTING
CAP. SHOULD NOT RESULT_ IN _EE 0F _MISSION'
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-616
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8113187
COMM AND TRACK
8117
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA GAMMA CMD SWITCH (BLACK STRCH)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) GAMMA CMD SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$50
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE'REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON TVC AND VIA REMOTE GND
CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR DARK AREAS
OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR SHADE
CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-617
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8118
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV CAMERA GAMMA CMD SWITCH (BLACK STRCH)
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) GAMMA CMD SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$50
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIV_ES,_SUPPORT MiSSIONE_ OPS, ASSIST IN _NDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, _p A?TACHEp P/D, LOSS 0F ALL CAP TO 0BTAIN CCTV_ i
FUNCTIONS _rfA- LIKE AND UNLIKE q_3_D_OULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON,= EVA _D CQAS_ FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KTJ B_D
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON TVC AND VIA REMOTE GND
CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR DARK AREAS
OF PICTURE. SHORT LOCKS POSITION AND PREVENTS SHADE CORRECTING
CAP. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
mm
I
l
mm
mm
z
m
am
I
m[]
m
g
mm
m
mm
I
m
m
g
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u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/8;
COMM AND TRACK
8119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [FLT DECK TVC SELECT] SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TVVIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
FLT DECK TVC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$32
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN'RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SWVIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM FLT DECK TVC FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK,
MONITORS, MUX'S, OR P/L. FAILURE TO SW NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
CCTV CAPABILTY OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-619
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [FLT DECK TVC SELECT] SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TVVIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
FLT DECK TVC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$32
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .........
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, KSSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF AL_ CA_ TO OBTAIN CCTV .....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND _LIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UN_L!K_,REDUND CREW_ W_N DOw VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND K'U BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM FLT DECK TVC FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK,
MONITORS, MUX'S, OR P/L. OPEN/SHORT SW NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
CCTV CAPABILTY OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171 _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [MID DECK TVC SELECT] SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD : A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TVVIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
MID DECK TVC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$55
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM MID DECK TVC FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK,
MONITORS, MUX'S, OR P/L. FAILURE TO SW NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
CCTV CAPABILTY OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-621
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [MID DECK TVC SELECT] SW
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TVVIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
MID DECK TVC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $55
CAUSES : MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, sUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, LOSS OF ALLCAP TO OBTAIN CCTV.........
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM MID DECK TVC FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK,
MONITORS, MUX'S, OR P/L. OPEN/SHORT SW NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
CCTV CAPABILTY OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.i3,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
mm
mm
B
i
W
mm
mm
m
m
I
m
m
mm
m
I
mm
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-622
g
m
B
w=_
L
w
_I
I
m
u
i
i
L
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC A FWD BAY SELECT] SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TVC A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$27
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES,'SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ_D STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM TVC A FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS,
MUX'S, OR P/L. FAILURE TO SW COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC A CAP AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-623
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC A SELECT] SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TVVIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TVC A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$27
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV ISyS PIROVIDES ESSENTIA_ VISUA=L FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COASFOR CREW VI_S_UA_LLINSPECTION AND KwJ BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
sWSELECTS INPUT FROM TVC A FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS,
MUX'S, OR P/L OPEN/SHORT SW COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC A CAP AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-624
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 8125 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC B KEEL/EVA SELECT] SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TVVIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TVC B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $28
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM TVC B FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS,
MUX'S, OR P/L. FAILURE TO SW COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC B CAP AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-625 _ Z
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC B SELECT] SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TVC B
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $28
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL V_$UA_ FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM TVC B FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS,
MUX'S, OR P/L. OPEN/SHORT SW COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC B CAP AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.i2,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC C AFT BAY SELECT] SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TVVIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TVC C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S29
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP O_S, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND K'U BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM TVC C FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS,
MUX'S, OR P/L. FAILURE TO SW COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC C CAP AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND. CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-627
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC C SELECT] SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TVC C
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$29
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM TVC C FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS,
MUX'S, OR P/L. OPEN/SHORT SW COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC C CAP AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-628
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC.ID:
8113/87
COMM AND TRACK
8129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC D RMS STBD SELECT] SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TVC D
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$30
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM TVC D FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS,
MUX'S, OR P/L. FAILURE TO SW COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC D CAP AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-629
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13187
COMM AND TRACK
8130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TVC D SELECT] SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TVVIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TVC D
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$30
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM TVC D FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS,
MUX'S, OR P/L. OPEN/SHORT SW COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC D CAP AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHE_TIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-630
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [RMS TVC SELECT] SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TVC RMS WRIST OR ELBOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$31
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM RMS TVC (WRIST OR ELBOW) FOR OUTPUT TO
DOWNLINK, MONITORS, MUX'S, OR P/L. FAILURE TO SW COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF RMS TVC CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION..
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-631
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMMAND TRACK
8132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [RMS TVC SELECT] SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHQRT_
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
RMS TVC WRIST OR ELBOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S31
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RAtIONALE: ......_ ..... _........... .-.- ,_ ....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, _SlIIQFIA_ICA_P T00BTA_N CCTV _i _
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE_D UNLIKE _DUND_eOU£D_THE W0_T CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTiSON,-EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTiON_D KU B_D
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) PBI
SW SELECTS INPUT FROM RMS TVC FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS,
MUX'S, OR P/L. OPEN/SHORT SW COULD CAUSE LOSS OF RMS (WRIST OR
ELBOW) TVC CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-632
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8133 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [P/L 1,2,OR 3 TVC SELECT] SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
P/L i, 2, OR 3 TVC PORT SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
[
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$33, $34, $35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) THREE
SW SELECT P/L TVC AND VCR PORTS, FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK,
MONITORS, MUX'S OR P/L. FAILURE TO SELECT REQUIRED TVC COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF DEDICATED EXPERIMENT. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-633
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8134 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [P/L 1,2,OR 3 TVC SELECT] SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
P/L 1,2, OR 3 TVC PORT SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBiT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$33, $34, $35
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT_)NORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. Loss OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV ....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE W_STCASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREWWINDOW VIEWING_S _
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTI_ A/_DK'UBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) THREE
SW SELECT P/L TVC AND VCR PORTS, FOR OUTPUT TO DOWNLINK,
MONITORS, MUX'S OR P/L. OPEN/SHORT SW COULD CAUSE LOSS OF TVC
AND DEDICATED EXPERIMENT. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, sHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-634
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8135 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [MUX 1 & MUX 2 SELECT] SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
MUX 1 & MUX 2 SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: .3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $36, $37
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL V!SUALrFEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) TWO
SWITCHES SELECT MUX 1 OR MUX 2. ONE SW FOR EACH PORT FOR OUTPUT
TO DOWNLINK AND MONITORS. FAILURE WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF CCTV
OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 • C-635
=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAIL--MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [MUX 1 & MUX 2 SELECT] SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: _
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
MUX i & MUX 2 SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA, UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $36, $37
CAUSES : MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
] c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYSPROV---iD--_SEsSENTiAL_V_IS_L FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT oNoRBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, LOSSO_FA_LLCAP TO OBTA;N_CC_TV -........
FUNCTIONS VIA LI_-AND UNLIKE REDUND _COULD IN THEWORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIK_-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING,__S _
JETTI_N/ EVA A_D COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) TWO
SWITCHES SELECT MUX 10RMUX 2 . ONE SW FOR EACH PORT FOR_OUTPUT
TO DOWNLINK AND MONITORS. OPEN/SHORT SW WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16_i,. 12,. 13 ,' 24, -SYS SCHEMATIC V_S7bL-740189--_OMTRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-636 i¸' _ _ , ,_
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8137
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TEST SELECT] SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TVVIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TEST SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7A1
$78
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN I_ENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) THIS
SW PROVIDES TEST PATTERNS FOR SYSTEM CHECKOUT VIA DOWNLINK AND
MONITORS. FAILURE TO SW WOULD NEGATE THIS CAPABILITY. NO CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION. _
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLEFLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740i89. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-637
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8138
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI [TEST SELECT] SWITCH
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
TEST SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $78
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS,' ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSSQF AL_ CAP To OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INsPEcTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.) THIS
SW PROVIDES TEST PATTERNS FOR SYSTEM CHECKOUT VIA DOWNLINK AND
MONITORS. OPEN/SHORT SW WQULDNE_ATET_IS CAPABILITY. NO CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. O_SD NSTS 08i7i
i
[]
m
mm
mm
i
i
[]
z
m
i
w
I
=
mm
l
m
m
l
[]
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-638
mm
m
wn
=
w
m
q
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8139
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [MUX SELECT] SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
MUX SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$20, $21,$24, $25
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
SWITCHES SELECT MUX OUTPUTS FOR ROUTING TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS OR
PAYLOAD AND SELECTS SPLIT SCREEN VIEWING. FAILURE TO SW WOULD
NEGATE THIS CAP. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CCTV OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-639
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8140
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [MUX SELECT] SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
MUX SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $20, $21,$24, $25
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......_ ....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD iN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUNDCREWoWINPOWVIEW_NG, RMS_
JETTISON, EVA AND COASFORCREW VISUAL INS-PECTiON AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
SWITCHES'SELECT MUX OUTPUTS FOR ROUTING TO DOWNLINK, MONITORS QR
PAYLOAD AND SELECTS SPLIT SCREEN VIEWING. OPEN/SHORT SW WOULD
NEGATE #HIS CAP. .......NoT CAUSE FOR_SS_oF CCTV O_=M_SSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-640
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [MON SELECT] SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH-
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR)
MON SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
S19, $23
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES', SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP TO VIEW
SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF ALL
CAPABILITY TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTINGAND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) EACH SW SEL OUTPUT FOR MON VIDEO INPUT SIG.
FAILURE RESULTS IN POSS LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
i
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-641
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDACID: 8142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM: TV VIDEO OUTPUTPBI [MON SELECT] SWITCH
FAILURE MODE- ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT.....
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR)
MON SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
I_DiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7A1
S19, $23
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_RAT_IONA_: ...............................
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES,_ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. ....TVCONSQ_MONITOR PROVIDES CAP TQ YIEW.
SCENES FROM ALL TV CA_P.A (TV--_)-_D_VC-R OU_UTS_. ......_Ss OF ALi
CAPABILITY TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY_
NO GPC CMD.) EACH SW SEL OUTPUT_FQR MON VIDEQ_!NPUT SIG._II_I
OPEN SHORT SW RESULTS IN POSS LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_T_E F LTOPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
R
R
|
[]
I
8
ms
mm
mm
I
mm
I
i
m
[]
m
z
ms
g
M
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-642
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8143
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [P/L SELECT] SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
P/L SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 " AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] s[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$26
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW, (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, _D SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
SWITCH SELECTS OUTPUT FOR ROUTING TO A P/L FOR DISPLAY, DOWNLINK
OR RECORDING. FAILURE TO SW WOULD NEGATE THIS CAPABILITY AND NOT
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-643
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/13/87
COMMAND TRACK
8144
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO OUTPUTPBI [P/L SELECT] SWITCH
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST; W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
I) COMM & TRACK
2) ccTv
3) TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
P/L SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 ' AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ] :
LOCATION: PANEL A7AI
PART NUMBER: $26
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO __NT O_NQRBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAI_N CCTV_ -
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORS_TCASE _
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KUB_D
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
SWITCH SELECTS OUTPUT FOR ROUTING TO A P/L FOR DISPLAY, DOWNLINK
OR RECORDING. OPEN/SHORT SW WOULD NEGATE THIS CAPABILITY AND NOT
RESULT IN LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8145
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [DOWNLINK SELECT] SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
DOWNLINK SELECT SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7AI
$22
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AN_ KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
SWITCH SELECTS OUTPUT FOR ROUTING TV TO GND. FAILURE TO SW WOULD
CAUSE LOgS oF DOWNLINK T$CHANN-EL. WOULD MOT RESULT INLOSS OF
ON BOARD CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
u
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-645
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8146
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI [DOWNLINK SELECT] SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV VIDEO OUTPUT PBI (PUSH BUTTON INDICATOR) SWITCH
DOWNLINK SELECT SW
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: . 3/3
LANDING/SAFING 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7A1
$22
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD iN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD.)
SWITCH SELECTS OUTPUT FOR ROUTING TV TO GND. OPEN/SHORT SW WOULD
CAUSE LOSS Q?DOWNLINK TV CHANNELSELECTION. WOULD NOT RESULT IN
Loss OF ON BOARD CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8147
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3,
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CC_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION-ANDKU-BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-647
=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/8v
COMM AND TRACK
8148
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:,
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) ccTv
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND _Li_ REDUND cOULD IN-THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
............ -__ ..................... ..... " LT OP_MANUAL _ 770, sSSHREFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE F JSC-12 _
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-648 _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8149
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A NORM ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL vISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND CO-AS- FORCREWVISUAL INSPECTIONAND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-649
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/13/87
COMMANDTRACK
8150
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A NORM ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAI_[ERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED PZ_L__ LOSS 9K AL_L 9_ TQ QBTA!_ c_ ::_ _:.....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS:_
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS _GE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW _AUSES LOSS QF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFE NCES: FLT-Rt, S, S TLZ FiT OPS  AT, ssc-1277o, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-650
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK '
8151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TVC A AVG ALC CONTROL SW
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
ALC CONTROL SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUN_ CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE !2/31/87 C-651
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: CO_ _D TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8152 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_C A AVG ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
I
U
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : "
i) CO_ & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
s)
6) M
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B'[ ] C [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: _C A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. O_SD NSTS 08171
C-652REPORT DATE 12/31/87
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8113/87
COMM AND TRACK
8153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP ops, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-653
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) cc_v
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3_3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L_ LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD iN THE WORST CASE _
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WIN_W VIEWING, RMS
JETTISb-N, EVA AND C6A_FORCRE-Wv_SUA=L_NSPECTION __BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGH_SS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT sW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
F  RU S, jS _ 2770    SSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31_87 C-654
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8155
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B NORM ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD : A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
a/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,'24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NsTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-655
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8156
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B NORM ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CC_V
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/31
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ................. _
CCTV SYS=PROVID- ES _ESSENTIAL VIS_%L FEEDBACK TO_NT_ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. ....[_OSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTA_ IN C_ .... : _ ±
FUNCTIONS-_A LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND _ULD-I_ _'_-W0_T=CASE='
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PRE_NTSNORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY_ ....NbT= CAUSE FOR LOSS:OF
MISSION.
_ _T_ _ .......... _:_ _:_ f_ _ .......... V _ : .........................
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, 12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-656
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8157
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B AVG ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-657
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/8 
COMM AND TRACK
8158
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B AVG ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES : FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12,.13, .24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-658
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/8v
COMM AND TRACK
8159
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-659
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8160
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) ALe CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIQNA_:.
CCTV SYS_PROVib-ES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBAC_ TO DO_N_ oNoRBI-T
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOORLATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L_LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV ;;_:
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND_CREW - WINDOW VIEWING, RMS ;_rm
JETTISON _, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW_VI_UX£IN_-_E_TIO]_ _ B_D -
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF.SCENE ....
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHQRT SWCAUSES _SS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-660
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8161
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C NORM ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 _ ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PARTNUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY NOT CAUSE FORLOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-661
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT _
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/s7
COMM AND TRACK
8162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C NORM ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 ' AOA:
DEORBIT: _ 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
] c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
CC_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TOOBTAIN C__i_!_
FUNCTIONS VIA LI_ AND _LIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SH0_ SWCAUSES LOSS OF _ETAILWHICH
PREVENTS NO_LIZINGPIC_REQuALITY_ _ NOT_CAUSE _ FOR LOss OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE F£T 0PS _L JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-662 _
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
8163 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C AVG ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
q
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-663
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8164
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C AVG ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3--
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TOIDO_ ONORBIT_
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/LBAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AN D ATTACHED P/L. _LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV_ _ ......
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD INT}{E WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS_
JETTISON_ EVA_DCOAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTIO_AND_IB_D
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCE_NE ....
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES_SS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-664 :
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/5
3/3
ITEM: TVC D PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEPOPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-665
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8166
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE. .....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_NT ONORBIT ....
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL _P TO OBTAIN CCTV_II_I =:
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CHEW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS _=
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE _C ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PRE_'ENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-666
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8167
HIGHEST cRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D NORM ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
ALC CONTROL SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-667
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8168
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D NORM ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO __NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV _ _
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-_DUNDCREW WINDO w VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
. LOSS OFBRIGHTMESS CONTROL OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES ......... DET_I'LWHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-668
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8169
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TVC D AVG ALC CONTROL SW
FAILURE MODE: ' FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
ALC CONTROL SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] ' C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-669
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET_
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8170
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:_
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D AVG ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3 _-
3/3
3/3
3/3-
c [ ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/LBAY DOOR _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULDIN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) ....THE TVCALC SW SELE_CT_ RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-670
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8171
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RMS WRIST TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-671
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8172
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: RMS WRIST TVC D
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _i
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAy D00R _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE ........
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL ATAI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH _i
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-672
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8173
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW (PEAK)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN ATAI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-673
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8174
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
_EDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC D
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/Lt ......_S_ OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CC_ _
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE _
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS_::_II _
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFE EN6ESi JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,-24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-674
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8113187
COMM AND TRACK
8175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOWAND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-675
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
CO_ _D T_CK
8176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MS mIST _C AVG ALC CONTROL SW
E_CTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD _ALYST: W.C. _NG SUBSYS _AD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAK_ HIE_CHY :
i) CO_ & T_CK
2) ccTv
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
H DW/_N C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ]
_CATION: MS _IST _C D
P_T _BER:
B [ ] c C ]
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/RATIONALF:
CC_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO _ENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN _NDEZ _D
STA/_EP OPS, INSPE_/MONITOR P/L BAY _OR _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
MS, _D A_ACHED P/L. _SS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN C_
_CTIONS VIA LI_ _D _LI_ REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
P_NT MS STOW _D P/L BAY DOOR C_SU_ RESULTING IN _SS OF
VEHIC_ _D CREW. (UNLI_-_D_D CREW WIN_W VIEWING, MS
JETTISON, EVA _D COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _D _ B_D
_D_ FOR _NDEZ _D STA/_EP, _D SW ON P_EL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD _D IRIS SW.) THE _C ALC SW SELECTS _GE OF SCENE
BRIGH_ESS CON_OL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES _SS OF DETAIL _ICH
PREVENTS NO_LIZING PIC_E QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR _SS OF
MISSION.
_FE_NCES: FLT RU_S, S_TTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHE_TIC VS70-740189. O_SD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-676
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW (PEAK)
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ELBOW TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-677
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM"
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8178
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ELBOW TVC D
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE : :
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LI_-AND UNLIKE REDUHD COULD iN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING,_S_ .....
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMAL I-7.ING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-678 ..... _=
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8179
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-679
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET....
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
811318v
COMM AND TRACK
8180
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3 .
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT 0NORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-680
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8113187
COMM AND TRACK
8181
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
mS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-681
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8182
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3 -_' •
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ]
RMS ELBOW TVC D
c [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUP_RT MISSION EXP OPS, _SIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, _SS QF H_6P T O OBTA_!_ CCTW_ ......
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE RED_D _c0uZD _ 9HE woRST: _ASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-_D_UND CREW WINDOW VIEWING_ _S ....
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALCSW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRI_TMESS CONTROL• OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF bE_AILWHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-682
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8183
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW (PEAK)
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: FLT DECK TVC
PART NUMBER: _
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-683
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8184
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _L_ .... _
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BA_DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV _
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNL!_vREDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS _
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL iNSPECTION _D KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL_ICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-684
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8185
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP- OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, _D SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-685
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8186
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION :_- ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .................
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TQDg_C_E_ ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND IKX]_BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC $_ SELE_CTS R_GEQF SCE_NE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORTSW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-686 _ L_ =--
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8187
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: FLT DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-687
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8188
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALe CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: FLT DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE"
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZAND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L_ _S_F ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW• (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPE_T!QNAND KTJ_BAND_
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7A1, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL• OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION•
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. O_SD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-688
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8189
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MID FLT DECK TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW (PEAK)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD INTHE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189 OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-689
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8190
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILUREMODE:
MID DECK TVC PEAK ALC CONTROL SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO __NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L._ LOSS OF ALL CAPTO OBTA;N CCT/V_ .......
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTIO_-_N_BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE_OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFER N6ESi FLT OPS JSC-nTV0, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-690
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8191
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID FLT DECK TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCirMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-691
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDACID: 8192
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MID DECK TVC NORM ALC CONTROL SW
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATi0NALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI, REMOTE GND
CMD AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE
BRIGHTMESS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH
PREVENTS NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-692 _ _ ....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8193
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID FLT DECK TVC AVG ALC CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PAN A7AI, REMOTE GND CMD
AND IRIS SW.) THE TVC ALC SW SELECTS RANGE OF SCENE BRIGHTMESS
CONTROL. FAILURE TO SW CAUSES LOSS OF DETAIL WHICH PREVENTS
NORMALIZING PICTURE QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-693
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
CO_ _D TRACK
8194
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK _C AVG ALC CONTROL SW
E_CTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD _ALYST: W.C. _NG SUBSYS T._AD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAK_ HIE_CHY :
i) CO_ & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) ALC CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ] ......
_CATION:
PART _BER:
MID DECK _C
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
CC_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUP_RT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN _NDEZ _D
STA/_EP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY _OR _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
_S, _D A_ACHED P/L. _SS_QF ALL CAP TO 0BTAIN CC_
_NCTIONS VIA LI_ _D _LI_ RED_D COULD IN _E WORST CASE
P_VENT _S STOW _D P/L BAY _OR C_S_ _SULTING IN _SS OF
VEHICT._ _D CREW. (_LI_-_DUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, _S
JETTISON, EVA _D COAS FOR C_W VISUAL INSPECTION _D _ B_D
RADAR FOR _NDEZ _D STA/KEEP, _D SW ON P_EL A7AI, _MOTE GND
_D _D IRIS SW.) THE _C ALC SW SE_CTS _GE OF SCENE
BRIGH_SS CONTROL. OPEN/SHORT SW CAUSES _SS OF DETAIL _ICH
PREVENTS NO_LIZING PIC_ QUALITY. NOT CAUSE FOR _SS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TT_ FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. O_SD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-694
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8195
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-695
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8196
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) cCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIQNALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS; ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. Loss OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV .....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNL_KE-_DUNp_CREWWIND0rW VIEWING, _ .....
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND =
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7Ai AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTUR_,_FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-696 _ []
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8197
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TVC A NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-697
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSH-EET
DATE: 8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8198 ABORT: 3/3 o
m
i
mm
ITEM: TVC A NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT i
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
=
mmBREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7) m
8)
9) -"
[]
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL vISUAL FEEDBACK TO DoCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DoOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAp TO OBTA_CTV
_NCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DoOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDoW VIEWING, RMS_-_:_: _
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR R_NDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
D_A_S OF PI_RE_ .....FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSSOFMISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RU_S, SHU__ FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSHI _
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-698
I
[]
D
uw
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8199
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTI__: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7A1 AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-699
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMMAND TRACK
8200
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT'.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3_
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A BLACK STRCH GAMMACONTROLSWITCH
ELECTBICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....................
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
_CTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L__ LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIK_-_D_D-COU£D IN-THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLI_TREDUND CRE W WINDOW VIEWING, RMS _
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU B_D_
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NoT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PIC_. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-701
w
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8202 . ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
i
mm
,&
mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) =
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
Q
m
mm
m
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREASOF PICTU_. FAILURE TOSWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OFMISSI_N.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-702 _ _ _
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-703
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
v)
B)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L___Q[ALL__CAPTQ__OBTAIN_C_CT__ _:
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-R/_DUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTIO_ _0 K/U_BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE ...... FAILURE TO_W_TCH REDUCES CAPA_DITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-705
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)_
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCAT±ON:
PART NUMBER:
TVC B
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE; -
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO CUITENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALLCAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS .....
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTSrRE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABIL!TYFOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, S$SH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
I
mm
mm
I
I
B
I
z
R
[]
l
J
m
mm
i
m
m
I
g
mm
m
i
i
u
W
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8207 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, _SuPPORT _MiSSiO_ EXP- 0PS, ASSIST _ IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS 0F ALL CAP TO OBTAIN C_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLEANDCREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON,- EVA AND COAS ?OR CREW VISUAL iNSPECTiON ANDKU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-707
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8208
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE" t
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL yISUALFEEDBACK TO DO__ ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN zP_ENDEZ_AN_ .........
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV ........
FUNCTIONS VIA LiKEAND UNLIKE REDUND COULD I__WORST ICASE '_II
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION A/_D KU B_p _
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7Al AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC:G_ SW SELECTIVELY ENHANgES_LIGHTOR
DARKAREASgFPICTURE. FAILU_TOSWITCH P_DUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-708
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8209
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-709
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8210
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_C C NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ET.F_CTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
_AD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS T._AD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) CO_ & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
"I)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: _C C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) _ETVC G_ SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH _DUCES_PKBTLITY-I_OR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. O_SD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-710 :
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TVC C BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
u
REPORT DATE 12/31/8_ C-711
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT •.
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C BI_CK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
GAMMA CONTROL SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT oNORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL C_TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS .....
JETTISON, Eq_A_D COAS FOR CREW V_SUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT...........OR
-b_AREASOF PICTURE. FAILURE- TO SWIT-CH REDUCES CAPABILITYFOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES : FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLTQ!S ° __ AL JSC,12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8113/87
COMMAND TRACK
8213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) ccTv
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-713
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8214
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
U
mm
mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : "
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC) i
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MIssION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALLCAPTO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24/ SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
C-714REPORT DATE 12/31/87
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8215
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-715
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 8216 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
L
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
TV CAMERA (TVC)
GAMMA CONTROL SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ............
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALLCAP TQ:OB_AIoN CC_ _ _
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND _ BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVE=LY E NHANCESLIGHT_QR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILU_TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MI__
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8217
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
. ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
GAMMA CONTROL SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTAC_D P/L$ LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTU_, FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULDNOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,'13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-717
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8218
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ............
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/_EP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR U_TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
m_s, AND ATTACHED P/L, _SS iiOF AL_-A_ _TO_OBTAiN CEn'V_-I_i_ii_i_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORSTCASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, _=_
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND K'U BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW_E_LECTIVELY E NY_ANCE_SL!GHTOR
DARK AREAS OF P!C_, FAILURE TO SWITCH _DUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8219 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: i
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-719
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8220 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C, LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
GAMMA CONTROL SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH_ 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: '3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE|
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEp OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV ....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA A/qDt-O_ ° ?OR CREW VISUAL i_ECTION AN_ KUB_
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-720
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAq ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8221
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT-.
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
12%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: RMS WRIST TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD-NOT-RESULT IN _Ss OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-721
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8222
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT'.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: .........RMS WRIST TVCN0_LGAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA. (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 . AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL V_$UA_L FEEDBACK TO __ENT IoNoRB!T
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P_LBAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L_ LQSSQ_I_I_ITO_OB_T__I_i!i_I_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNL!KE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTI_ONA/_D KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREASQ_ P ICTURE_ .....FAILURE TO SWITCH _EDUCES CAPABIL!TY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-722
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:. 3/3
8223 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-723
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK ' FLIGHT: 3/3
8224 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDiNG/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: RMS WRIST TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE P_T FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L_ LOSS OF ALL cAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CAsE _
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THETVC G_S_ SELECTIVELY EN_CES LIGHT OR
D__A_ OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHE_TIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8225 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC A WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-725
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8226 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
mS ELBOW TVC A WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUME_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L_ LOSSQFAL_CAP TO OBTAIN CC_ _ ii _
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (_LIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION A_D KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7A1 AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVCG_SWSE_LECTIVELY E_CE._ LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FA_LU_RETO_S_WITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-726
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8227
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC A NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ ] Bf[ ] C [ ]
RMS ELBOW TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189 OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-727
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/8_
COMMAND TRACK
8228
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RMS ELBOW TVC A NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
i
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO : 3/3
] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ i] B [
RMS ELBOW TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BaY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. _S OF ALLCA_TQOBTAIN C_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BaY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW V!SUALINSPECTION_KU BAND_.
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF _!_C_TUI_E. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY F0 R
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD_NOT_RESU_IN _S_ OF MISSi0N.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SH_/TTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NsTs 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-728 ...........
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8229 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC A BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ELBOW TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST.IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-729
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
=
8230 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVCA B_CK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
I
I
|
L
mBREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) g
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7) u
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B[ ] C[ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ ..... ...... _.................... ......
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL _EDBACKTO _c_UME_I ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. ...._LQ$_ O FALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (U_LIKErREDDUN D CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND_
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.)2HETV_ G__W_ELE_IVE_L¥ EN_C_ L!GHT OR
DARKAREASOF PICT_E_ ....FAILURE _Q SWITCHRED_CES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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m|
|
mr_
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8231
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
GAMMA CONTROL SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
R_DUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL ATAI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-731
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8232
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FLT DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUALFEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AR_S OF PIC_E. _FAILURE To SWITCH RED-UCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740i89. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8233
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZAND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-733
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8234
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: "3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
C CTVSYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
'ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LiKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE _ CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
J
mR
i
m
mm
J
l
l
mR
i
l
D
g
U
==
I
mmm
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-734
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8235
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) ccTv
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN _NDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL ATAI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION_
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-735
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8236
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALiTIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3_3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ .... _ ...._ ..... _-
CC_TV_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEED_BA_CK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORBEXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV _ .......
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR C_EW VISUAL INSPECT!ON AND KU BAND -
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVCGAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH R E_UCESCAPABILITY FOR
S-HAD_E co_CTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8237
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MID DECK TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-i2770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-737
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8238
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC WHITE STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT:- 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAF_NG: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........................
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
_s; AN_'__:II __=T___=ALLIIC_-T_ _OB_CC_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PRE_NT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7A1 AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-738
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8239
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B'[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-739
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8240
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC NORM GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) CO MM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
GAMMA CONTROL SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 .....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......................
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTI_VISUAL FEEDBACK TO_CUMENT 0NORB!T
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSI_ExP 6PS,-XSSIsT°IN_NDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OpS_INSPECT/MgNIT0_Rp/L BAY o_DOOR _;CHES( ORB EXTERIOR,
_7 _D ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LI_AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE_ CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS ....
JETTISON, EVA ANDCOAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECT!_ONIkND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) __TH_ETVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY EN_HAN_CE$_ LIGHT QR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE .....FAILURE TQI_W_CH__EDU_$ CAPA_ILITYFOR
_S_IA_Eco_cTI__OULD NOT_SUL-T iN LOSS OFMIssIoN.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH_
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC vS70"740i89. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-740 ......
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/13/87
COMM AND TRACK
8241
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP'oPS_ ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY ENHANCES LIGHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCH REDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE CORRECTION. SHOULD NOT RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-741
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/13/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8242
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MID DECK TVC BLACK STRCH GAMMA CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT _
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) GAMMA CONTROL SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....._ _i___ _;_
CC_ SYS-PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT_
ACTIVITIES_suPPoRT MIsSIO%EXP OPS, ASSISTINRENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES_ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, LOSS oOF_ALL CAP TO OBTAIN C_5_ _ _
_CTiONS VIA LIK_ANDUNLIK_E__COULD IN THEWORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, E_AN--D¢OASFOR CREW VISUAL INSPEL'TIONAND_BAND_ _
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW ON PANEL A7AI AND VIA
REMOTE GND CMD.) THE TVC GAMMA SW SELECTIVELY E NHANCESL!GHT OR
DARK AREAS OF PICTURE. FAILURE TO SWITCHREDUCES CAPABILITY FOR
SHADE:_O_E_TI_ sHOuLb_OT_RESULT IN LOSSOF MISSION. •
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,_i3,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740i89. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-742 J
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lINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8243 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC A CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-743
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8244 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYSPRQVIDESESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, iNSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. _$S:0F A_LCAP TO OBTAI_gC_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC A CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.i'. 12,. 13, .24 /sYs SCHEMATIC VS70_-7_0Y89. OMRSD NsTs 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-744
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8245 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LiKE AND UNLIKEREDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC B CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-745
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8246 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B MONOCHROMELENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROLSWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT_
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : _ 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO : 3/3
•LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (.UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VI_EWING, RMS ......
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW vISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY. ) SHORT WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC B CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12, .13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-746
u
g
uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8247 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
I_OCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC C CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-747
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8248 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LoNG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _i
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV ....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC C CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/51/87 C-748
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8249 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
MONOCHROME LENS
FOCUS SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC D CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-749
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8250 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3-
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, vIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC D CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-750
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8251 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS WRIST TVC CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-751
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8252 ABORT: 3/3 _
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3- ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: - _ _ _! __
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/_EPOPS, INSP--E-CT/MONITOR P/L-BAY-DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, _D ATTACHED=P/L. .........LOESS OFALLCA_ TO OBTAiN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DQQR CLQSURE RESULTING IN Loss OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS __:_
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI _D LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS WRIST TVC CAPABILITY, CO_D
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-752
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8253 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ELBOW
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL vISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITORP/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS ELBOW TVC CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-753
D
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER suBSYSTE_ANALYSIS W0_KSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8254 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3y3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ELBOW
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/_POPS, INSpECT/MONiTOR P/LBALDgOR_TCH_S, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/LBAY_DQORCLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF_
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWIN< _S
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SWLOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) ....S HgRTWOULD PREVENT_
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS ELBOW TVC CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-754
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8255 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF FLT DECK TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-755
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8256 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECKTVC MONOCHROMELENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: "3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........ v .......
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, _DA_fACH-ED P/L. _SS-0F ALL GAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNL!KE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS _
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ _D STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF FLT DECK TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-756
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: . 3/3
8257 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO CAT ION :
PART NUMBER :
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF MID DECK TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-757
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8258 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
......CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ......._ ...._ .....
cc vsYsPROVIDESESSENTIALVISUALFEEDBACKS6
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS/INSPECT/MONITOR-P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING !NLOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FQCUS
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF ID DECK TVC CAPABILITY. N6T CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRS D NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-758
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8259 • ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP_ AND SW ViA _MOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC A CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMI_SD NSTS 08171
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-759
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8260 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A MONOCHROMEL NS ASSY ZOOMCONTROLSWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L, LOSS OF ALLCAP TQ OBTAIN CC_TV ......
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, .RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION-AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOVED CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC A CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND. TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8261 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [_P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PARTFAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP 0PS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC B CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-761
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
_OMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8262 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTVSYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALLCAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
---CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC B CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF _HICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87
COMM AND TRACK
8263
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP 0PS, ASSIST IN-_NDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC C CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-763
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CO_ _D T_CK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8264 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD _ALYST: W.C. _NG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAK_ HIE_CHY:
i) CO_ & T_CK
2) CCTV
3) _ C_E_ (TVC)
4) MONOC_OME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LiFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
RED_D_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
_CATION: TVC C
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
CC_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VI_SUA_ FEEDBACK TO/_/_ENTQNORBIT
ACTIVITIES, sUPPORT_ISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST iN _NDEZ _D
STA/_EP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
_, _D ATTACHED P/L. _SS OF ALL CAP TQ OBTAIN CC_ _ _,
_CTIONs VI-A LIKE ANS__N_D_C=6U_N_T=H__T_A_ I
PR_ENT _S STOW _D P/L BAY DOOR C_SURE RESULTING IN _SS OF
VEHIC_ _D CREW. (_LI_-REDUNDCREW WINDOW VIEWING, _S
JETTISON, EVA _D COAS FOR CREW VISUALINSPECTION_D _B_
_D_ FOR _NDEZ _DSTA/_EP, _D SW VIA _OTE GND _D, ZOOM SW
_CATED ON P_EL A7AI _D _NS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD P_VENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING _SS OF _C C CAPABILITY, COULD RESULT IN _SS
OF VEHIC_D C_R-EW'
REFERENCES: FLT RUT?S, S_TT_ FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.i3,.24, sYS SCHE_TIC VS70-740189. O_SD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8265 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
MONOCHROME LENS
FOCUS SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP oPs, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC D CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OM]_SD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-765
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8266 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE;
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSpECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES,L ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC D CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FL T RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.i2,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8267 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _ KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS WRIST TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-767
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS .WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8268 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
L .
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
"ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: ..... 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RMS WRIST TVC
PART_BER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_T!ONA_: _ . :_ _ :_ _
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCENT ®NORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP oPS, _SPECT/MONITOR p/L BAY pOOR_TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF_
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS _
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, _D S_W VIA REMOTE GND _D_ oZ00M SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT_WOg_DPREVENT ZOQM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS WRIST TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-768
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
8269 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
MONOCHROME LENS
FOCUS SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS ELBOW TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-769
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8270 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
RMSELBOWTVC MONOCHROMELENS ASSY ZOOMCONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) COMM& TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
MONOCHROME LENS
FOCUS SW
.........f  T!CALITIES
FLIGHT pHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LA/_DING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ELBOW
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _!_ .........
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LA_C_ ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW _ P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS ELBOW TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-770
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8271 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF FLT DECK TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-771
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8272 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROMELENS ASSY ZOOMCONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FU-NC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF FLT DECK _C CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION. .....
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-772
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8273 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBiT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS_ A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CAmE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF MID DECK TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-773
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8274 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECKTVC MONOCHROMEL NS ASSY ZOOMCONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5 ) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
FLIG_ PHASE ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/_NC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B E ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KUBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF ID DECK TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-774
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 8275 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TVC A MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: .FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC A CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-775
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8276 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A MONOCHROMEL NS ASSY IRIS CONTROLSWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT _
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
L_DING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCU_fENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/__EP_0PS , INSPECT/MONITOR PXLBAY DOOR _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/_ LOSS 0F _ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV _ -_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLEAND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS ....
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHQRT WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC A CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16,i,_i2,_i3,.24, SYSSCHEMATICVS701740i89'OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-776
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 8277 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TVC B MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP Ops, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC B CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-777
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8278 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B MONOCHROMELENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROV[D__ES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. _SS OF AL£ CAP TO OBTAIq_CL"rv
FUNCTIONS VIA LI_ AND UNLI_ REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING,_RMnS_I_
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC B CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
14.1/_12,.13,.24, sYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-778
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8279 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SuBsYs LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC C CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
i
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-779
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87
COMM AND TRACK
8280
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM;
FAILURE MODE:
TVC_MQ_QCHROME LENS ASSYIRIS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
A_IVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, _D ATTACHED P/L, LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND--UNLIKE_ED_J_D COULDIN_ WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND Ku BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING_SS OF TVC C CApABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF. VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8281 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC D CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-781
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8282 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) ccTv
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFiNG: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK To DoC_/MENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV ....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHIC_ AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA_D cOAS FOR CREW VISUAL INS_CTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC D CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN LOSS
OF VEHiC__ _ CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLrTOPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8283 ABORT: 3/3
RMS WRIST TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS WRIST TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-783
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET []
DATE: 8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDACID: 8284 ABORT: 3/3 i
ITEM: RMSWRIST TVC MONOCHROMEL NS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
SWITCH i
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
m
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV []
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW i
6) I
7)
8)
_ _C_IT!CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 RTLS : 3/3 []
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
RMS WRIST TVCLOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
mm
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/ TIONA :
CCTV sYs PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV .....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF_
VEHIC_ AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMSz_T_I_
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
_CATED ON PA!JEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMSWRIST TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLTRULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS_MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH _
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-784 __;
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8285 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L' LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS ELBOW TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-785
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
CO_ _D T_CK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8286 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
MS ELBOW TVC MONOCHROME LVNS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
E_CTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
_AD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
i) CO_ & T_CK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
C_E_ (TVC)
MONOCHROME LENS
FOCUS SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F_C
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAF_G: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SC_ENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
MS ELBOW
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFF CTS/RATIONAU :
CCTVSYS PROVIDESESSENTIALVISUALFEEDBACKTO ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/_EP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BA_ _OR _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
MS, AND ATTACHED P/L. _SS OF ALL CAP TO OBTaiN CC_
_CTIONS VIA LI_ _D _LI_ REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
P_VENT _S STQW _D P/L BAY DOOR C_S_ _SULTING IN _SS OF
VEHIC_ _D CREW. (_LI_-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, __!!_
JETTISON, EVA _D COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _D _ BAND
_D_ FOR _NDEZ AND STA/_EP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
_CATED ON P_EL A7AI AND _NS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING _SS OF MS ELBOW _C CAPABILITY' COULD RESULT
IN _SS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, s_TTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHE_TIC VS70-740189. O_SD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-786
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8287 ABORT: 3/3
FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF FLT DECK TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-787
-.
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8288 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: FLT DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 ......RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF FLT DECK TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-788
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
8/17/87
COMM AND TRACK
8289
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4 ) MONOCHROME LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKEREDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF MID DECK TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13, 24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-789
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
8/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8290 ABORT: 3/3
I
MID DECK TVC MONOCHROME LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
TV CAMERA (TVC)
MONOCHROME LENS
FOCUS SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: =_ ............
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN C_
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7A1 AND LENS ASSY. ) SHORT WO_LD PREVENT TRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF ID DECK TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES : FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT O PS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1, .12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-790
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8291 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) WIDE ANGLE LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: . 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW vISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND OTHER LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW
WOULD PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF FLT DECK TVC
CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-791
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8292 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECKTVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA(TVC)
4) WIDE ANGLE LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_UNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTWOUL D PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF CABIN TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-792
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8293 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM_
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) WIDE ANGLE LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO : 3/3
B[ ] cC ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND OTHER LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF CABIN TVC CAPABILITY. NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, Sys SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-793
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8294 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECKTVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY ZOOMCONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) WIDE ANGLE LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF CABIN TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-794
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8295 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH .
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) WIDE ANGLE LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND OTHER LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF CABIN TVC CAPABILITY. NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-795
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8296 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
.SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
WIDE ANGLE LENS
FOCUS SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: __±i ...._ .... .....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOO R LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR C_SURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW, (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS _
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF CABIN TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-796
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8297 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) WIDE ANGLE LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
!
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
MID DEcK TVCLOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND OTHER LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW
WOULD PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF MID DECK TVC
CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-797
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8298 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
WIDE ANGLE LENS
FOCUS SW
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART _BER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAI_'. _ ........
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND _ ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN_C_TV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/LBAYDOOR _SURE RESULTING!N LOSS_OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNL!KE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZAND STA/KEEP_ AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.)SHORT WOULD PREVENT
FOCUS CONTROL _USfNG _SS OF CABIN _C CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE
FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLTRULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-798
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8299 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) WIDE ANGLE LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND OTHER LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF MID DECK TVC CAPABILITY.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-799
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8300 ABORT: 3/3
i
mm
z
m
H
ITEM: MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL
SWITCH i
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDISLEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG z
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV u
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) WIDE ANGLE LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6) U
7)
8)
9) []
CRITICALITIES
=__
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC_
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3 []
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 []
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
MID DECK TVC
m
B C ] c C ] i
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
l
i
i
mm
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUALFEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT ZOOM
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF CABIN TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-800
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8301 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
WIDE ANGLE LENS
FOCUS SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ _ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND OTHER LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF MID DECK TVC CAPABILITY.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-801
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMANDTRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8302 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
SWITCH
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC WIDE ANGLE LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
t _
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) WIDE ANGLE LENS
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _;_ .....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL vIsuAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORT WOULD PREVENT IRIS
CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF CABIN TVC CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189. OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-802
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 8303 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC A CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-803
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8304
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT _
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
COLOR LENS ASSY
FOCUS SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
CCTV SYS PROVIDE_ESSENTIAL VIS_A_FEEDBACKTQ DO_E_ ONORBiT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV ........
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHQR2E_D SW WOULD
PREVENT Focus c_T_RO£ CAUSING_SS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD .....
RESULT IN LOSS OF_HICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYSS_HEMATIC VS70-740i89 _,
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
8305 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC A CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-805
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8306
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRET._UNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIA_LVISUAL FE_D_AgK TO DO_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT M_SSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLI_REDUND COULD iN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8307
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/iR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
COLOR LENS ASSY
FOCUS SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC A CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
m
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-807
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8308
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC A
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ............
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACH_E-D-P/L, LO_-KLL-_APTO_BTAI_-UCTV ._.
FUN--CT-IONS ViA LIKE L_N-D UNLIKE REDUND _CO_ULD IN TI_ WO-RST CASE
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PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS .....
JETTISDI_, EVA AND COAEFOI_L'REWVISUALIN_AND K'UBAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.i2,.i3,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8309
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC B CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-809
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
CO_ _D T_CK
8310
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_C B CO_R LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
E_CTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD _ALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
I) CO_ & T_CK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV C_ (_C)
4) CO_R L_NS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: _C B
P_T _BER:
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
CC_ SYSPROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO __NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN _NDEZ _D
STA/_EP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
_S, _D ATTACHED P/L, _SS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN C_
F_CTIONS VIA LI_ _D _LI_ RED_ COULD IN _E WORST CASE
PREVENT _S STOW _D P/L BAY DOOR C_S_E RESULTING IN _SS OF
VEHICLE _D CREW. (UNLI_-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, _S
JETTISON, EVA _D COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _D _ B_D
_D_ FOR RENDEZ _D STA/KEEP, _D SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW _CATED ON P_EL A7AI _D LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD
P_NTFOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF _C CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN _SS OF VEHIC_ AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS_AL JSC-12770, O_SD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHE_TIC VS70-740189,
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8311
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: ' 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 i ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC B CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-811
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8312 ABORT: 3/3 _
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B COLORLENS ASSY ZOOMCONTROLSWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR _OA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 i ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8313
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ p ]
LDCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC B CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-813
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8314
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC B
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8315
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBI_:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC C CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-815
k
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8118187
COMM AND TRACK
8316
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
• ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/8v
COMM AND TRACK
8317
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY sCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC C CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-817
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8318
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,._2,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK . FLIGHT:
8319 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC C CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-819
r/0
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET _
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK ,
832o
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC C
PART NUMBER:
A [ 1 ] B [ P ] ' C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OFALL CAP TO OBTAIq_ CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
m
I
I
mm
mm
l
ms
-_=
!
m
l
I
B
mm
i
mm
i
i
l
D
m
i
Q
l
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-820
mm
I
iw
?
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8321 ABORT: 3/3
6
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC AD CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-821
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 8322 ABORT: 3/3
8
ITEM: TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC)
COLOR LENS ASSY
FOCUS SW
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] c[p]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT_
ACTiViTiES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP 0PS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L_ LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
_CTIONS ViA LI_ AND _Li_ _EDUND CouLD _N THE WoRsT CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8323
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
IgtNDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: r
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDCOULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SWVIAREMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC AD CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-823
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8324
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CC_V
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8325
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC AD CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-825
b
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
8326 ABORT:
i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: TVC D
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDE_ ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NsTS 08171, SSSH i6.i,.12,'13,.24' SYS S_TIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8327 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS WRIST TVC CAPABILIT-Y.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-827
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
1,
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 8328 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8329 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS WRIST TVC CAPABILITY.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-829
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8330 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CC_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. _SSOF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS_ _
JETTISON, E_A _Dg_A_ FOR CREW Y_SUAL INSI_EC__D_B_D
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
ZOQM CQNT_Q_ C_S_NG_ LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
Loss OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, O_SD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,._
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8331 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMSWRIST TVC COLORLENS ASSY IRIS CONTROLSWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7Ai AND LENS ASSY') FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS WRIST TVC CAPABILITY.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-831
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
8332 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS WRIST TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LA_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] .C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS WRIST TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITiES, SUPPORT MISS IONEXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE'REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7A1 AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8333 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SWI
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[p]
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS ELBOW TVC CAPABILITY.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-833
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8334 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOWTVC COLORLENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROLSWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ELBOW TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, _ VIBRATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYSPROV!DES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND.
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND U_LI_ REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8335 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ELBOW TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS ELBOW TVC CAPABILITY.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-835
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8336 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOWTVC COLORLENS ASSY ZOOMCONTROLSWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
!) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ELBOW TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBiT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV _ _....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLI_ REDUND_COU£DiN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, _S
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUALINSPECTION _K_J-_ i_
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHiC_D CREW. _.......................
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
8337 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RMS ELBOW TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
P
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
RMS ELBOW TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP. OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7A1 AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF RMS ELBOW TVC CAPABILITY.
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-837
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDACID: 8338 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RMS ELBOWTVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELA_NCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/2R
3/3
3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3 .
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: RMS ELBOW TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV sYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_ENTQNORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULDINTHE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON,_ EyA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTIQN _D KU BAN_D
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP/ _D SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
IRIS CONTROL CAU$1_GLO$_OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-838
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8339 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECKTVC COLORLENS ASSY FOCUSCONTROLSWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA(TVC)
4) COLORLENS ASSY
5) FOCUSSW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCYSCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF FLT DECK TVC CAPABILITY.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-839
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8340 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
L/iNDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: FLT DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8341 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
_AILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF FLT DECK TVC CAPABILITY.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-841
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8342 ABORT: 3/3 _
ITEM:
FAILURE. MODE:
FLT DECKTVC COLORLENS ASSY ZOOMCONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
m
l
m
I
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: []
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY u
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7) []
8)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
FLT DECK TVCLOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
c [ ]B [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS,-_SSiST IN RENDEZAND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS' VIA LIKE _D UNLI_REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE ....
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS-?OR CREW-V-TSUAL iNSPECTI0_AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP,_AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CM--D, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
ZOOM CONTRQ_ cAUSINGLOSS OF TVCCAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE _D CREW. _ ......... _ _ '_
REFERENCE S:=FL T RULES__SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740i89,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8343 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W,C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) coMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCAT_D 0N P_EL A7AI _D LENS ASSy.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF FLT DECK TVC CAPABILITY.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-843
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8344 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/S_HORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLT DECK TVC
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDCOULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVAAND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
m
[]
[]
[]
[]
mm
mm
[]
[]
m
mm
l
U
I
mm
I
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-844
I
u
ww
i
w
w
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8345 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MID DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3) Tv CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT FOCUS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF MID DECK TVC CAPABILITY.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
r_ REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-845
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: CQ_ AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8346
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY FOCUS CONTROL SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
"LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CC_SYSPROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN _NDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE '_
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAT DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA _p_cQAS FOR CREW YISUAL INSPECTION _D KU.... BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, FOCUS
SW LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD
PREVENT Focus CONTRQL CAUSING LOSS OF _C CAPABILITY. COULD
RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW,
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8347 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY ZOOM CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W,ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT ZOOM CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF MID DECK TVC CAPABILITY.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-847
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8348 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECKTVC COLORLENS ASSY ZOOMCONTROLSWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: MID DECK TVC
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTVSYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE_
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSpECTIO_ _AN_D _KAI______
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, ZOOM SW
LOCATE DQN PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
ZOOM CONTROL CAUSINGLOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW. "
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_HUTTLEFLT OPS_AL JSC-12770, OMRSD_
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-848
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8349 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MID DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL'SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD
PREVENT IRIS CONTROL CAUSING LOSS OF MID DECK TVC CAPABILITY.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLE OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-849
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8350 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: MID DECK TVC COLOR LENS ASSY IRIS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC)
4) COLOR LENS ASSY
5) FOCUS SW
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MID DECK TVC
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP, AND SW VIA REMOTE GND CMD, IRIS SW
LOCATED ON PANEL A7AI AND LENS ASSY.) SHORTED SW WOULD PREVENT
IRIS CONTROLCAUSING LOSS OF TVC CAPABILITY. COULD RESULT IN
LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPSMANUAL JSC-12770, OMRSD
NSTS 08171, SSSH 16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 8351 ABORT:
ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PWR SW
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) VIEWFINDER MONITOR
4) PWR SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VIEW FINDER
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH
FLT DECK TV CAMERAS FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD
MAKE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF
CABIN AND OUT THE WINDOW SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND.
WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, MID DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) FAILURE TO SW PWR "ON" LOSES VIEWFINDER
CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-851
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT:
MDACID: 8352 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECKVIEWFINDER MONITORPWRSW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) VIEWFINDER MONITOR
4) PWR SW
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
=
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
_DiNG/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
5/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VIEWFINDER MONITOR
PART NUMBER:
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH FLT DECK
TV C_RA FOR SEeP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE _
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF FLT
DECK AND OUT THE WINDOW SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, MID DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND_) ......_SHORTED/OpEN S W PREVENTS PWR "ON"
sE_cTION A/N_D LOSES VIEWFINDER CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8353
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PWR SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
VIEWFINDER MONITOR
PWR SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VIEWFINDER MONITOR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUA L FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH
MID DECK TV CAMERA FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF
CABIN SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND. WOULD NOT CAUSE
LOSS OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, FLT DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) FAILURE TO SW PWR "ON" LOSES VIEWFINDER
CAPABILITY, NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-853
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDACID: 8354
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MID DECKVIEWFINDER MONITORPWRSW
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) VIEWFINDER MONITOR
4) PWR SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: VIEWFINDER MONITOR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAU_:
CCrV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACk< TO DOCUMENT O_ORBIT
ACTIVi¥_E_/SUP_R¥_§S_ EXPb_S, _ST_ _NDEZAND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH MID DECK
TV AMERA FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF MID
DECK SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, FLT DECK_-_- ..... _ _
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLEMONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) SHORTED/OPEN SW PREVENTS PWR "ON"
SELECTION AND LOSES VIEWFINDER CAPABILITY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
CCTV 6R_LO_OFM_SS_ON.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-854
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 8355 ABORT:
ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PEAK SW
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) VIEWFINDER MONITOR
4) PEAK SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VIEWFINDER MONITOR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH FLT DECK
TV CAMERA FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF FLT
DECK AND OUT THE WINDOW SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, MID DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) FAILURE TO SW PREVENTS SELECTION OF
PEAK CONTRAST THUS REDUCING CAPABILITY TO ENHANCE SCENES. NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-855
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8356
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PEAK SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT _ _
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) VIEWFINDER MONITOR
4) PEAK SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VIEWFINDER MONITOR
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH FLT DECK
TV CAMERA FOR SETUP AND A_ST}_EISTB? -- ?AiLURE W6ULD _ _:
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF FLT
DECK AND OUT THE WINDOW SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. (LIKE RED_D, MID DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) SHORTED/OPEN SW PREVENTS SELECTION OF
PEAK CONTRAST THUS REDUCING CAPABILITY TO ENHANCE SCENES. NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8357
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PEAK SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) VIEWFINDER MONITOR
4) PEAK SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: _ 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: VIEWFINDER MONITOR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV.... SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUALFEEDBACKTO_Ct_qENTONORBiT
ACTIVITIES_-SUPPORT MISSIONEXP_OPS,_ASsisT IN_EZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH MID DECK
TV CAMERA FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS, FAILURE WOULD MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF MID
DECK SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, FLT DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) FAILURE TO SW PREVENTS SELECTION OF
PEAK CONTRAST THUS REDUCING CAPABILITY TO ENHANCE SCENES NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS_OF_MISSION. _ _ _
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-857
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8358
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR PEAK SW
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) VIEWFINDER MONITOR
4) PEAK SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: . 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VIEWFINDER MONITOR
PART NUMBER:
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, sUPPORTMiSSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH MID DECK
TV CAMERA FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF MID
DECK SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, FLT DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CoNSoLEMONiTORS IN AFT cABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) SHORTED/OPEN SW PREVENTS SELECTION OF
PEAK CONTRAST THUS REDUCING CAPABILITY TO ENHANCE SCENES. NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CC_ OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8359
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND
CONTRAST CONTROL SW
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIEWFINDER MONITOR
BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VIEWFINDER MONITOR
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH FLT DECK
TV CAMERA FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF FLT
DECK AND OUT THE WINDOW SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, MID DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) FAILURE TO SW PREVENTS BRIGHTNESS AND
CONTRAST CONTROL THUS REDUCING CAPABILITY TO ENHANCE SCENES. NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT 0PS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-859
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8360
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FLT DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND
CONTRAST CONTROL SW
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIEWFINDER MONITOR
BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: VIEWFINDER MONITOR
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH FLT DECK
TV CAMERA FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF FLT
DECK AND OUT THE WINDOW SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND
WouLD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, MID DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF
PICTURE/SCENE DISPLAY VIA VIEWFINDER. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CCTV
OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-860
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 8361
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MID DECK VIEWFINDER MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND
CONTRAST CONTROL SW
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIEWFINDER MONITOR
BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: . 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: VIEWFINDER MONITOR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH MID DECK
TV CAMERA FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF MID
DECK SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, FLT DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) FAILURE TO SW PREVENTS BRIGHTNESS AND
CONTRAST CONTROL THUS REDUCING CAPABILITY TO ENHANCE SCENES. NOT
CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CCTV OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-861
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDACID: 8362
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MID DECKVIEWFINDER MONITORBRIGHTNESSAND
CONTRASTCONTROLSW
FAILURE MODE: ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
2)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIEWFINDER MONITOR
BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VIEWFINDER MONITOR
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VIEWFINDER MONITOR USED WITH MID DECK
TV CAMERA FOR SETUP AND ADJUSTMENTS. FAILURE WOULD MAKE
ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN LOST OF MID
DECK SCENES. LOSS OF LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION. (LIKE REDUND, FLT DECK
VIEWFINDER, AND UNLIKE VIA TWO CONSOLE MONITORS IN AFT CABIN AND
MONITORS ON THE GROUND.) OPEN/SHORT RESULTS IN LOSS OF
PICTURE/SCENE DISPLAY VIA VIEWFINDER. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF CCTV
OR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-862
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8363
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR PWR SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) CONSOLE MONITOR
4) PWR SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) PWR SW CONTROLS PWR TO MON. FAILURE TO SW WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MON CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-863
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
8364
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR PWR SW
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) CONSOLE MONITOR
4 ) PWR SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: PANEL A3
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION_ =:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) PWR SW CONTROLS PWR TO MON. OPEN/SHORT SW WOULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MON CAP AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/19/87
COMM AND TRACK
8365
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
. FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR X-HAIR SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) CONSOLE MONITOR
4 ) X-HAIR SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
12%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ASSISTACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ...... rN RENDEZ _D
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) FAILURE OF X-HAIR SW WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MON
CROSSHAIR REF. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-865
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/19/87
COMM AND TRACK
8366
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR X-HAIR SW
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) ccTv
3 ) CONSOLE MONITOR
4) X-HAIR SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
J/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL A3
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL sHOCK, VIBRATION i r
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) OPEN/SHORTED X-HAIR SW WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MON
CROSSHAIR REF. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70"740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _NALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/19/87
COMM AND TRACK
8367
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR SYNC SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) CONSOLE MONITOR
4) SYNC SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD PREVENT SELECTING BETWEEN EXT
OR INT MONITOR SYNC. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-867
=
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/19/87
COMM AND TRACK
8368
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR SYNC SW
OPEN/SHORT .
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) CONSOLE MONITOR
4) SYNC SW
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3 _ _
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) OPEN/SHORT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF SYNC AND MON CAP
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/19/87
COMM AND TRACK
8369
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR DATA SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) CONSOLE MONITOR
4) DATA SW
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ! ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A3
CAUSES". CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, sUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS,-ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) FAILURE TO SW WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DATA STATUS
DISPLAY. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-869
DATE:
_UBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/19/87
COMM AND TRACK
8370
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR DATA SW
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) CONSOLE MONITOR
4) DATA SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A[
PANEL A3
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) OPEN/SHORT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF DATA STATUS DISPLAY.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-870
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/19/87
COMM AND TRACK
8371
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR SCAN SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3 ) CONSOLE MONITOR
4 ) SCAN SW
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) FAILURE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CAP TO SELECT DISPLAY
FOR NORM OR VERT TEST PATTERN. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-871
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/19/87
COMMAND TRACK
8372
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLEMONITORSCAN SW
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
I) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) CONSOLE MONITOR
4 ) SCAN SW
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 373 ......
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTs/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) OPEN/SHORT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CAP TO SELECT
DISPLAY FOR NORM OR VERT TEST PAT. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-872
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87
COMM AND TRACK
8373
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR SOURCE SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) coMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) CONSOLE MONITOR
4) SOURCE SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS LOCATED ON THE GND AND VIEWFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY.
NO GPC CMD.) SW SELECTS SIG TO BE DISPLAYED ON MON FROM PANEL OR
DOWNLINK. FAILURE NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-873
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/2o/87
CO_ _D T_CK
8374
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSO_ MONITOR SOURCE SW
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD _ALYST: W.C. _NG
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY i
I) CO_ & T_CK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
CONSOT._ MONITOR
SOURCE SW
SUBSYS _AD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
_CATION: P_EL A3
P_T _BER:
ABORT HDW/_NC
RT_: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
c[P]
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
CC_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO _ENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ _D
STA/_EP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY _OR _TCHES, ORB E_ERIOR,
MS, _D ATTACHED P/L. THE _ CONSO_ MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VI_ SCENES FROM ALL _ C_E_ (_C) _D VCR OUTPUTS. _SS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISP_YS OF _C SCENES VIA LI_ OR UNLI_
_D_D. WOULD _ _C POINTING _D PIC_E A_S_ENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IM_SSIBT._ RESULTING IN POSSIB_ _SS OF VEHIC_
_D C_W. (LI_ _D_D, A SECOND CON MON _D SW, _D UNLI_ VIA
MONS ON THE GND _D _FNDR MON FOR CABIN C_ ONLY. NO GPC _D.)
SW SET._.CTS SIG TO BE DISP_YED ON MON. OPEN/SHORT WOULD PREVENT
VIEWING SCENES ON MON. POSS _SS OF VEHICL_ _D CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TT_ FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHE_TIC VS70-740189, O_SD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-874
1
ll
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
8375 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST CONTROL SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
e)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
CONSOLE MONITOR
BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS ON THE GND AND VUFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY. NO GPC
CMD.) FAILURE TO SW PREVENTS BRGHTNSS AND CNTRST CONTROL FOR
NORMALIZATION OF MON SCENES. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-875
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 2/IR
8376 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONSOLE MONITOR BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST CONTROL SW
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
CONSOLE MONITOR
BRIGHTNESS AND CONTRAST SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERA (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS OF
ALL CAP TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR UNLIKE
REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS DIFFICULT
IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE
AND CREW. (LIKE REDUND, SECOND CON MON AND SW, AND UNLIKE VIA
MONS ON THE GND AND VUFINDER MON FOR CABIN CAM ONLY. NO GPC
CMD.) OPEN/SHORT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MONITOR DISPLAY CAP
RESULTING IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT:
8501 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RCU 3A CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 37 & CB 42)
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO CONTROL UNIT (VCU)
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT (RCU)
MNA AND MNB
CB 37 AND CB 42 (3A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 37 AND CB 42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND K_ BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) RCU LRU PRIMARILY PROVIDES TV
CAM (TVC) MASTER SYNC SIGNALS AND PROCESSES CCTV SYS CMDS. OPEN
CB CAUSES LOSS OF RCU FUNCTIONS. DUAL REDUND CB BOTH NOR CLOSED
FAILURE OF ONE NOT READILY DETECTABLE IN FLT.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-877
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET __
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RCU 3A CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 37 & CB 42)
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO CONTROL UNIT (VCU)
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT (RCU)
MNA AND MNB
CB 37 AND CB 42 (3A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]'
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 37 AND CB 42
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV sYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS_ INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV .....
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOWAND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS_
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KIT BAND
RADAR FOR P_NDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) RCU r.aUPRImaRILY PROVIDES TV
CAM (TVCLMAS_ERSYNC SIGNALS AND PROCESSES CCTV SYS CMDS. DUAL
REDUND CB BOTH NOR CLOSED, NO AF_ONMISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, S_TTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MON 3A CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB'38 & CB 43)
FAILS OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
CONSOLE MONITOR 1 & 2
MN A AND MN B
CB 38 & CB 43 (3A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 38 AND CB 43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERAS (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR
UNLIKE REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS
DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CONSOLE MON, AND UNLIKE VIA MONS LOCATED
ON THE GND. AND VIEWFINDER MONITOR FOR CABIN CAMERAS ONLY.) OPEN
CB WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ONE OF TWO MON.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-879
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
12/11/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
8504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: MON 3A CIRCUIT BREAKER(CB 38 & CB 43)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
CONSOLE MONITOR 1 AMD 2
MNA AND MNB
CB 38 & CB 43 (3A)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 38 AND CB 43
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE TV CONSOLE MONITOR PROVIDES CAP
TO VIEW SCENES FROM ALL TV CAMERAS (TVC) AND VCR OUTPUTS. LOSS
OF ALL CAPABILITY TO OBTAIN DISPLAYS OF TVC SCENES VIA LIKE OR
UNLIKE REDUND. WOULD MAKE TVC POINTING AND PICTURE ADJUSTMENTS
DIFFICULT IF NOT IMPOSSIBLE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CCTV COVERAGE RESULTING IN POSSIBLE LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
(LIKE REDUND, A SECOND CONSOLE MON, AND UNLIKE VIA MONS LOCATED
ON THE GND. AND VIEWFINDER MONITOR FOR CABIN CAMERAS ONLY.)
CLOSED CB WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MON.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-880
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 39 FWD BAY TVC & P/T (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHy:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) / PAN & TILT (P/T)
MNB
CB 39
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF FWD
BAY TVC & P/T FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-881
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 39 FWD BAY TVC & P/T (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) / PAN & TILT (P/T)
4) MNB
5) CB 39
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 39
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT FWD
BAY TVC & P/T FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 40 FWD BAY TVC HTR (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) HTR
4) MNB
5) CB 40
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 40
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE HTR LOSS
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF FWD BAY TVC FUNCTIONS DUE TO COLD TEMP.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-883
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 40 FWD BAY TVC HTR (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) HTR
4) MNB
5) CB 4O
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 40
CAUSES. ....CONTAMINATION, TEM@ERA_, LOSS OF INP_, _MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT FWD
BAY TVC FUNCTIONS CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL OF HTR.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 41 FWD BAY P/T HTR (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) PAN AND TILT (P/T) HTR
4) MNB
5) CB 41
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE HTR LOSS
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OR SLUGISH OPERATION OF FWD BAY P/T FUNCTIONS
DUE TO COLD TEMP.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-885
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
12/1'1/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
8510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 41 FWD BAY P/T HTR (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3) PAN AND TILT (P/T) HTR
4) MNB
5) CB 41
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL f5:D
PART NUMBER: CB 41
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS
OF FWD BAY P/T FUNCTIONS DUE TO THERMOSTAT CONTROL OF HTR.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 34 AFT BAY TVC & P/T (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) / PAN & TILT (P/T)
4 ) MNA
s) CB 34
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 34
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF AFT
BAY TVC & P/T FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-887
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
12/11/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
8512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CB 34 AFT BAY TVC & P/T (3A)
FAILURE MODE: -FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) / PAN & TILT (P/T)
4 ) MNA
5) CB 34
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
D_O_BIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 15:D
PART NUMBER: CB 34
CAUSES: CONT_INATiON, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT AFT
BAY TVC & P/T FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 35 AFT BAY TVC HTR (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) HTR
MNA
CB 35
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/iR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 35
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE HTR LOSS
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF AFT BAY TVC FUNCTIONS DUE TO COLD TEMP.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-889
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 35 AFT BAY TVC HTR (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC) HTR
4 ) MNA
5) CB 35
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 15:D
PART NUMBER: CB 35
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _ _
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
_S, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PRE_NT _ STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT AFT
BAY TVC FUNCTIONS CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL OF HTR.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
M
I
mm
I
g
m
mm
mm
m
mm
mm
[]
[]
mm
I
mm
mm
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-890
mm
ms
Iu
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 36 AFT BAY P/T HTR (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) PAN AND TILT (P/T) HTR
4) MNA
5) CB 36
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE HTR LOSS
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OR SLUGISH OPERATION OF AFT BAY P/T FUNCTIONS
DUE TO COLD TEMP.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-891
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/11/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
8516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 36 AFT BAY P/T HTR (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3) PAN AND TILT (P/T) HTR
4) MNA
5) CB 36
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDIN_/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 15:D
PART NUMBER: CB 36
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: .... _ : %:_._ _ _
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L_A___0R LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS,_DATTAC_D==P/L. LOSS OF ALL_L_APTO OBTA_N_CC_ ..........
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLI_-REDUND C_W WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS
OF AFT BAY P/T FUNCTIONS DUE TO THERMOSTAT CONTROL OF HTR.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8517
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 45 KEEL/EVA TVC & P/T (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) / PAN & TILT (P/T)
MNC
CB 45
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND C REWWINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
KEEL/EVA TVC & P/T FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-893
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8518 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 45 KEEL/EVA TVC & P/T (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
mum
U
mm
n
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : []
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) / PAN & TILT (P/T) i
4) MNC
5) CB 45
6)
7) []
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 15:D
PART NUMBER: CB 45
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, T_PERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT
KEEL/EVA TVC & P/T FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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I
U
m--
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8519
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 46 KEEL/EVA TVC HTR (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC) HTR
4) MNC
5) CB 46
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
2/IR AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 46
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE HTR LOSS
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF KEEL/EVA TVC FUNCTIONS DUE TO COLD TEMP.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-895
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: CO_ _D TRACK/EPD&C
MDAC ID: _ 8520
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABO_:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILU_ MODE:
CB 46 _EL/EVA TVC HTR (3A)
FAIL C_SED
_AD _ALYST: W.C. _NG SUBSYS_AD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAK_ HIE_CHY:
i) CO_ & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) _ C_ERA (_C) HTR
4) MNC
5) CB 46
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT P_SE
P_UNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
_DING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/_C
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
ABORT HDW/_NC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
RED_D_CY SC_ENS: A [
LOCATION: PNL 15:D
P_T _BER: CB 46
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: C01TTAMI"SATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFE_S/_IgNA_: ........ _ ............ ....
CC_ SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO _C_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN _NDEZ _D
ST A/_EP 0PS, INSPECT/MONITORp/L BAY_0 R _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
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1_S, _D ATTACHED_/L. -LOSS OF ALL_TO__
_CTIONS VIA LI_ _D _LI_ _D_D COULD IN THE WOnT CASE
PREVENT _S STOW _D P/L BAY DOOR C_S_ RESULTING IN _SS OF
_HIC_ _D C_W. (_LI_LRED_D C_W WINDOW vIEWING, _S
JETTISON, EVA _D COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION _D _ B_D
_DAR FOR _NDEZ _D STA/_EP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT
_EL/EVA _C _NCTIONS CONSIDERING THE_OSTAT CONTROL OF HTR.
REFERENCES: FLT RU_S, S_TT_ FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHE_TIC VS70-740189, O_SD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-896
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8521
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 47 KEEL/EVA P/T HTR (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2 )- CCTV
3) PAN AND TILT (P/T) HTR
4) MNC
5) CB 47
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE HTR LOSS
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OR SLUGISH OPERATION OF KEEL/EVA P/T FUNCTIONS
DUE TO COLD TEMP.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-897
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8522
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 47 KEEL/EVA P/T HTR (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) PAN AND TILT (P/T) HTR
4) MNC
5) CB 47
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:D
CB 47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS
OF KEEL/EVA P/T FUNCTIONS DUE TO THERMOSTAT CONTROL OF HTR.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-898
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8523
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 48 CABIN TVC (5A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) FLT AND MID DECK
4) MNC
5) CB 48
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL RI5:D
CB 48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/LBAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND IVA CREW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF IN
CABIN FLT DECK AND MID DECK SCENES FOR TRANSMISSION TO GROUND.
NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-899
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8524 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CB 48 CABIN TVC (5A)
FAILURE MODE: FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
m
m
==
J
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BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) FLT AND MID DECK
4) M_C ........... m
5) CB 48
6)
7) u
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA¢ 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
PNL RI5:D
CB 48
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_NT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND IVA CREW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT IN
CABIN FLT DECK AND MID DECK SCENES TVC OPERATIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8525
m
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 51 STBD RMS TVC & P/T (3A)
FAIL OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) / PAN & TILT (P/T)
4) MNA
5) CB 51
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:E
CB 51
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF STBD
RMS TVC & P/T FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT 0PS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-901
I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
g
DATE: 12/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: . 8526 ABORT: 3/3 i
CB 51 STBD RMS TVC & P/T (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDISLEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
[]
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : ..
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) / PAN & TILT (P/T) []
4) MNA
5) CB 51
6)
7) ,,
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 15:E
PART NUMBER: CB 51
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/LBAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE,REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT STBD
RMS TVC & P/T FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8527
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 52 STBD RMS TVC HTR (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) HTR
MNA
CB 52
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:E
CB 52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE HTR LOSS
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF STBD RMS TVC FUNCTIONS DUE TO COLD TEMP.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-903
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID :
12/11/8v
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8528
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 52 STBD RMS TVC HTR (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) HTR
MNA
CB 52
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: -3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: _ 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:E
CB 52
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERA_, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT STBD
RMS TVC FUNCTIONS CONSIDERING THERMOSTAT CONTROL OF HTR.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8529
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 53 STBD RMS P/T HTR (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) PAN AND TILT (P/T) HTR
4) MNA
5) CB 53
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 AT0: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:E
CB 53
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE HTR LOSS
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OR SLUGISH OPERATION OF STBD RMS P/T FUNCTIONS
DUE TO COLD TEMP.
REFERENCES" FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-905
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/11/87
COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C
8530
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 53 STBD RMS P/T HTR (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM& TRACK
2) CCTV
3) PAN AND TILT (P/T) HTR
4) MNA
5) CB 53
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PNL 15:E
PART NUMBER: CB 53
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA _D COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS
OF STBD RMS P/T FUNCTIONS DUE TO THERMOSTAT CONTROL OF HTR.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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rINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8531
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 55 PORT RMS TVC & P/T (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
TV CAMERA (TVC) / PAN & TILT (P/T)
MNB
CB 55
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: -3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR ' AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: I 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:E
CB 55
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF PORT
RMS TVC & P/T FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-907
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8532
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 55 PORT RMS TVC & P/T (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) / PAN & TILT (P/T)
4) MNB
5) CB 55
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI_FF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: ' 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PNL 15:E
PART NUMBER: CB 55
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT PORT
RMS TVC & P/T FUNCTIONS.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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=INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8533
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 56 PORT RMS TVC HTR (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3 ) TV CAMERA (TVC) HTR
4) MNB
5) CB 56
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
12iNDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:E
CB 56
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAiLURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATC_S, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE HTR LOSS
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF PORT RMS TVC FUNCTIONS DUE TO COLD TEMP.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-909
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT:
8534 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG
CB 56 PORT RMS TVC HTR (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
=
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) TV CAMERA (TVC) HTR
4)
5) CB 56
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PNL 15:E
CB 56
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: _ _;!_
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO&_JMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA ANDLCOAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT AFFECT PORT
RMS_TV_F_NCTIONS CONSID_RMOSTAT CONTROLOFHTR.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
Ill
ll
ll
ll
z
ll
ll
ll
ll
_=
lm
z
ll
ll
ll
ll
ll
I
Ill
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-910
ll
ll
wv
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
8535
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT.:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 57 PORT RMS P/T HTR (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM & TRACK
2 ) CCTV
3) PAN AND TILT (P/T) HTR
4) MNB
5) CB 57
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PNL 15:E
PART NUMBER: CB 57
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) OPEN CB WOULD CAUSE HTR LOSS
WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OR SLUGISH OPERATION OF PORT RMS P/T FUNCTIONS
DUE TO COLD TEMP.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-911
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
m
I
DATE: 12/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C , FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 8536 ABORT: 3/3 j
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CB 57 PORT RMS P/T HTR (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY : u
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) PAN AND TILT (P/T) HTR
4) MNB "
5) CB 57
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 . RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 .... TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
PNL 15:E
CB 57
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz ......... _...................._.....__ ............_ ..
CCTV SYS PR0_IDES ESSENTIAL vISUAL FEEDBACK TO __NTONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. LOSS OF ALL CAP TO OBTAIN CCTV
FUNCTIONS VIA LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUND COULD IN THE WORST CASE
PREVENT RMS STOW AND P/L BAY DOOR CLOSURE RESULTING IN LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW. (UNLIKE-REDUND CREW WINDOW VIEWING, RMS
JETTISON, EVA AND COAS FOR CREW VISUAL INSPECTION AND KU BAND
RADAR FOR RENDEZ AND STA/KEEP.) CLOSED CB WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS
OF PORT RMS P/T FUNCTIONS DUE TO THERMOSTAT CONTROL OF HTR.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-912
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zINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/2R
9001 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACCU BYPASS
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
3) ACCU BYPASS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: _ 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAY
SED16101900-301
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ACCU BYPASS IS A DEVICE THAT CAN BE USED TO BYPASS EITHER OF
THE REDUNDANT AUDIO CENTRAL CONTROL UNIT (ACCU) SETS, OR BOTH IN
CASE OF TOTAL LOSS OF ACCU. THE BYPASS ACTION IS DONE BY AN IN-
FLIGHT MAINTENANCE (IFM) PROCEDURE. LOSS OF ALL TWO-WAY
VOICE COMM REQUIRES MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM SED16101900-301; FLIGHT RULES JSC-
12820, SECTION ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-913
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
9011
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: HEADSET, VERY LIGHT WEIGHT
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
VERY LIGHT WEIGHT HEADSET
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: USED IN VARIOUS ORBITER LOCATIONS
PART NUMBER: SED16101291-305, -309
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATI_ONALE_ _i___ ±_i_i___i_ _ _ ....
THE VERY LIGHT'WEIGHT HEADSET IS USED BY CREW MEMBERS TO PROVIDE
TWO-WAY VOICE COMM FOR INTERCOMM, WITH GROUND, AND WITH EVA CREW
_ERS. LOSS_A HEADSET WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION OR ENDANGER
CREW/VEHICLE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY _FOR 'VOICE coMM WOULD
CAUSE MISSION ABORT.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM SED16101291; JSC-12820 FLIGHT
RULES, SECTION ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMM, AND TRACK
9012
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COMM CARRIER ELECTRONICS MODULE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
COMM CARRIER
COMM CARRIER ELECTRONICS MODULE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
'B [NA ]
USED IN VARIOUS ORBITER LOCATIONS
SIDI61023XX
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c[P]
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE COMM CARRIER ELECTRONICS MODULE (CCEM) IS AN ELECTRONICS
DEVICE USED TO AMPLIFY AUDIO SIGNALS FOR THE MICROPHONE
(TRANSMIT) CIRCUIT AND TO PASS THROUGH EARPHONE (RECEIVE) SIGNALS
FROM/TO A CREW MEMBER USING THE COMMCARRIER. LOSS OF
FUNCTION OF A SINGLE CCEM WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION NOR ENDANGER
CREW/VEHICLE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR VOICE COMM WOULD CAUSE
MISSION ABORT.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAMS SID16102312, SID16102320,
SID16102324, SID16102330; JSC-12820 FLIGHT RULES, SECTION ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-915
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
12/18/87
COMMAND TRACK
9021
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TELEPRINTER _ ;NTERIM
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, INTERMITTENT OPERATION,
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT,
SHORTED, FAILS TO START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
TELEPRINTER, INTERIM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PiECE-PART FAILURE, vIB TION ........... ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TREINTERIHTELEPRE IS USED FOR UPLINKING OF TEXT D_TA. IT
USES _ONE -O__EIS_TI-OSW_L_C_E_ ___ _t__IN_'_OR_TEXT
DATA, DOWNLINK FOR A 400 HERTZ TELEMETRY TONE. A FAILURE IN THE
AUDIO SIGNAL INPUT LINE, COMM CONTROL MODULE, MEMORY,
CENTRAL PROCESSOR UNIT, PRINTER CONTROL, OR PRINTER, FOR
INSTANCE, COULD PREVENT RECEIPT OF TEXT. LOSS OF TELEPRINTER
FUNCTION WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OR ENDANGER
CREW/VEHICLE, ..............
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.6
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-916
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ZINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
9031
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE NODE:
MICROPHONE, HAND HELD
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
MICROPHONE, HAND- HELD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: .... 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
USED IN VARIOUS LOCATIONS, FLT DECK, MIDDECK
SID16101316
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HAND HELD MICROPHONE IS USED BY THE CREW ALONG WITH THE
SPEAKER-MICROPHONE FOR VARIOUS TWO-WAY VOICE COMM OPERATIONS, AND
THAT PROCEDURE OBVIATES THE NEED TO HAVE A HEADSET ON. LOSS OF
FUNCTION WOULD NOT CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OR ENDANGER
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC SID16101316
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-917
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORB!TERSUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WQ_S_ET ....
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
9041
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
/
3/IR
ITEM:
• FAILURE MODE:
RADIO, PRC 90-2
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
RADIO, HAND-HELD TRANSCEIVER PRC 90-2 .......
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SURVIVAL KIT
PART NUMBER: ACR ELECTRONICS, INC. 18560
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, __ICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
THE PRC 90-2 TRANSCEIVER IS USED AS A SURVIVAL RADIO. IT CAN
OPERATE IN BEACON OR BEACON/VOICE MODE. LOSS OF THE ITEM WOULD
NOT BY ITSELF CAUSE LOSS OF CREW MEMBER. LOSS OF REDUNDANT MEANS
OF LOCATION (E.G., AN/URT-33 RADIO BEACON, DAY/NIGHT SMOKE
FLARE, PEN-GUN FLARE KIT, DYE MARKER, SIGNAL MIRROR) COULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: NONE AVAILABLE
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-918
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
9042
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
/
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RADIO, RF BEACON, AN/URT-33
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
RADIO, RF BEACON, AN/URT-33
CRITICALITIE S
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SURVIVAL KIT - PARACHUTE
AN/URT-33
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE,PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE AN/URT-33 RF BEACON IS ACTUATED AT PARACHUTE OPENING. IT
OPERATES ONLY IN RF BEACON MODE (NO VOICE CAPABILITY). LOSS OF
THE ITEM WOULD NOT BY ITSELF CAUSE LOSS OF CREWMEMBER. LOSS OF
REDUNDANT MEANS OF LOCATION (E.G., PRC 90-2 HAND-HELD
TRANSCEIVER, DAY/NIGHT SMOKE FLARE, PEN-GUN FLARE KIT, DYE
MARKER, SIGNAL MIRROR) COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW MEMBER.
REFERENCES: NONE AVAILABLE
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-919
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMMAND TRACK
9051
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEADSETINTERFACE UNIT
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
HEADSET INTERFACE UNiT (HIU)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
3/3 RTLS:
3/3 TAL:
3/3 AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VARIOUS AUDI0_TE_INATION UNIT LOCATIONS
MC409-0005-0XXX
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..... - _ __ ,_i_ _:ii _i_i
_HIqJ--_PH_N_ ..................VOLUME_ROL AND PUSH-TO-TALK
TRANSMIT CAPABILITY FOR HEADSETS. LOSS OF FUNCTION FOR EITHER
TRANSMIT OR RECEIVE WOULD PREVENT TWO-WAY COMM VIA HEADSET FOR
THE AFFECTED CREWMAN. _J ...........
U
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REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM MC409-0005-0144, FLIGHT RULES JSC-
12820 SECTION ii
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
9052
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEADSET INTERFACE UNIT
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
HEADSET INTERFACE UNIT (HIU)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
USED AT VARIOUS AUDIO TERMINATION UNIT LOCATIONS
MC409-0005-0
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HIU PROVIDES EARPHONE VOLUME CONTROL AND PUSH-TO-TALK
TRANSMIT CAPABILITY FOR HEADSETS. LOSS OF FUNCTION FOR EITHER
TRANSMIT OR-RECEIVEWOULDPREVE-N-T-TWO -WAY COMM VIA HEADSET FOR
THE AFFECTED CREWMAN.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM SED16101900-301; FLIGHT RULES JSC-
12720, SECTION ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-921
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 12/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK
MDACID: 9053
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MULTIPLE HEADSETADAPTER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
COMM& TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
MULTIPLE HEADSET ADAPTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: USED AT VARIOUS AUDIO TERMINATION UNIT LOCATIONS
PART NUMBER: MC409-0005-0XXX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE ."
T.EMULTIPLEHEADSETADA_ER (m_A)PEWITSUP_Tm_E C_W_m__O
BE CO_D TOASINGLEAUDIO TERMTNATION UNIT (ATU). LOSS OF
MHA FUNCTION WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM MC409-0005-0300, FLIGHT RULES JSC-
12820 SECTION Ii
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-922
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/8v
COMM AND TRACK
9054
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HEADSET CABLE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
3) HEADSET CABLE
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
USED AT VARIOUS AUDIO TERMINATION UNIT LOCATIONS
MC409-0005-0240
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE HEADSET CABLE IS A FOUR-FOOT CABLE USED TO CONNECT THE
HEADSET INTERFACE UNIT TO COMM BULKHEAD RECEPTACLES DIRECTLY OR
THROUGH A MULTIPLE HEADSET ADAPTER. ADDITIONAL SECTIONS CAN BE
USED TO EXTEND THE OVERALL LENGTH OF THE CABLE. LOSS OF FUNCTION
OF THE CABLE WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM MC409-0005-0240, FLIGHT RULES JSC-
12820 SECTION Ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-923
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
9061
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER
LOSS OF OUTPU T
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
B_KDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
CRITICALiTIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
= LI ....
LOCATION: PANEL LI2 OR RII
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RAT!ONALE: _i _ _ ...._......_
C_SYS PROVYDEE_ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VTR PROVIDES THE CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV C_RAS. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.)
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REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/11/87
COMM AND TRACK
9062
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER
FAILS TO START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
CRiTiCALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LI2 OR RII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYSPROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VTR PROVIDES THE CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.)
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
%,.-
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-925
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/12/87
COMMAND TRACK
9063
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LI2 OR RII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/_%ONALE_
l_ S_ S _0_ ES S E_L _AL _ E EDB_ _ TO __NT _0NORB i T
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VTRPROVIDES THE CAPTO RECORD _D
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. BINDING/JAMMING
WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VTR CAPABILITY WHICH MAY CAUSE LOSS OF
EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT PROVIDE BASISFORLOSS OF MISSION.
(NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT )
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REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-926
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87
COMMAND TRACK
9064
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
•3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER PWR SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
4) PWR SW
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LI2 OR RII
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VCR PROVIDES THE CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.) PWR SW CONTROLS POWER TO VCR. FAILURE
TO CLOSE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VTR CAP. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-927
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/2o/8_
COMMAND TRACK
9065
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER PWR SW
OPEN/SHORT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3_
LEAD ANALYST : W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
4) PWR sw
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LI2 OR RII
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXPOPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VCR PROyIDES CAP TO RECORD AND -
PLAYBAC_VIDEO FROM ANY_F-THE CCTVCAMER_S. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.) PWR SW CONTROLS POWER TO VCR. OPEN/SHORT
WOULD PREVENT INERGIZING VTR. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-928
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/20/87
SUBSYSTEM: COMM AND TRACK
MDAC ID: 9066
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER AUDIO MODE SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
AUDIO MODE SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: - 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VCR PROVIDES CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.) AUDEO MODE SW SELECTS PTT OR HOTMIKE FOR
THE HEADSET INTERFACE UNIT (HIU) RECORDING MODE. FAILURE TO SW
WOULD PREVENT AUDIO MODE SELECTION. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-929
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/20/8?
CO_ AND T_CK
9067
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER AUDIO MODE SW
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) CO_ & T_CK
2) CCTV
3) VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
AUDIO MODE SW
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 AT0: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: PANEL LI2
P_T _BER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: _C_ICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION _ : ::
EFFECTS/_TIONA_: ..... _
CC_SYS_OVIDES EsS_L VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DO_NT QNORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT M_Iss_N EXP 0PS, ASS_ST IN RENDEZ _D
STA/_EP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY _OR _TCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
_S, AND A_ACHED P/LL VCR _DES CAP _ _CORD
CAPABI£ITY _Y CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LI_ OR UNLI_ REDUNDANCY
EXISTS ..................FOR THIS UNIT.) .....AUDEO=<:_DE SWSE_CTS PTT OR HOTM_ FOR
THE HEADSET INTERFACE UNIT (HIU) RECORDING MODE. OPEN/SHORT
WOULD PREVENT AUDIO MODE SELECTION. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RUES, S_TTLE FLT OPS _AL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHE_TIC VS70-740189, O_SD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-930
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87
COMMAND TRACK
9068
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER VIDEO MODE SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
VIDEO MODE SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: VTR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VCR PROVIDES CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.) VIDEO MODE SW SELECTS NTSC COLOR OR
B/W / FSC (BLACK AND WHITE /FIELD SEQUENTIAL COLOR) SIGNALS.
FAILURE TO SW WOULD PREVENT VIDEO MODE SELECTION. NO CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-931
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/2o/8v
COMMAND TRACK
9069
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER VIDEO MODE SW
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
VIDEO MODE SW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: VTR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION:_:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
AC_VITIES,- _-_iSDRT_L_xq _ oPs, ASSIST _N RENDEZ AND
J
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STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VCR PROVIDES CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. LOSS OF THIS_-
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.) VIDEO MODE SW SELECTS NTSC COLOR OR
B/W / FSC-_LACKAND WHITE/_fELD SE_NTI_COLOR) SIGNALS.
OPEN/SHORT WOULD PREVENT VIDEO MODE SELECTION. NO CAUSE FOR
LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-932
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMM AND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
9070 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDER FUNCTION SELECT PUSH BUTTONS
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
FUNCTION SELECT PB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
. 3/3
3/3
c[ ]
LOCATION: VTR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VCR PROVIDES CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.) VTR FUNC SW CONTROL VTR OPERATION
i.e. EJECT, FF, RCD, PLAY, STOP, REWIND, ETC. ONLY RCD, PLAY,
AND STOP POSITIONS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VTR CAP. FAILURE TO SW
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VTR. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-933
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
COMMAND TRACK FLIGHT: 3/3
9071 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIDEO TAPE RECORDERFUNCTION SELECT PUSH BUTTONS
OPEN/SHORT
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
FUNCTION SELECT PB
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ; ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: VTR
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYSPROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP _ 6PS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. VCRPROVIDESCAPTO RECORD_=_D _
P_YBACKViDEO_FROM_OF _CC_CAMERAS. LOSS°0F _S
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.) _R_NC SW CONTROL VTRQPERATION
i.e. EJECT, FF, RCD,PLAY, STOP, REWIND, ETC. ONLY RCD, PLAY, AND
STOP POSITIONS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF VTR CAP. OPEN/SHORT COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF VTR CAP. NOT CAUSE FOR LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-934
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/lS/8v
COMM AND TRACK
9091
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WIRELESS CREW COMM SYSTEM (WCCS)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT
WIRELESS CREW COMM SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: USED IN VARIOUS ORBITER LOCATIONS
PART NUMBER: SEC1602306-311/321 (NASA/DOD); SED1602305-311 THRU
315/321 THRU 325 (NASA/DOD)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE WCCS IS A TWO-WAY RADIO VOICE LINK THAT PERMITS CREWMEMBERS
TO MOVE ABOUT IN THE ORBITER UNHAMPERED BY CABLE CONNECTIONS TO
BULKHEAD AUDIO JACKS. THE DOD VERSIONS PROVIDE CAPABILITY FOR
VOICE ENCRYPTION/DECRYPTION. THE SED1602306 DEVICES ARE
CARRIED BY CREWMEMBERS; THE SED1602305 DEVICES ARE THE BULKHEAD-
MOUNTED UNITS THAT INTERFACE VIA RF WITH CREW AND VIA
CABLE/CONNECTOR WITH BULKHEAD AUDIO JACKS. LOSS OF TWO-WAY COMM
VIA ONE WCCS SET WOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION OR ENDANGER
CREW/VEHICLE.
LOSS OF ALL AUDIO CAPABILITY FOR VOICE COMM VIA WCCS AND VIA
HARDLINE WOULD CAUSE MISSION ABORT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-935
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
9521
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) COMM & TRACK
2) CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
3) TELEPRINTER, INTERIM
PANEL 016/014
CIRCUIT BREAKER CB9/CBI0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CB9 SUPPLIES UTILITY POWER TO PANEL All (AFT FLIGHT DECK), CBI0
TO MO52J (MID-DECK). TELEPRINTER POWER CORD CAN BE PLUGGED IN AT
EITHER PANEL. THE TELEPRINTER IS USED TO UPLINK TEXT DATA. LOSS
OF TELEPRINTER FUNCTION BECAUSE OF FAILED CIRCUIT BREAKERS WOULD
NOT AFFECTMiSSiON OR_CREW/VEHiCLE _. -._ _: __ .....
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-936
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
9541
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
/
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
RADIO, HAND-HELD TRANSCEIVER PRC 90-2
BATTERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT:. / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SURVIVAL KIT
BAI586/U
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS MERCURY-OXIDE TYPE BATTERY PROVIDES POWER FOR THE PRC 90-2
HAND-HELD TRANSCEIVER. LOSS OF BATTERY POWER AND CONSEQUENT LOSS
OF TRANSCEIVER FUNCTION WOULD NOT BY ITSELF CAUSE LOSS OF
CREWMEMBER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT MEANS OF LOCTION (REFERENCE
IOA 9041) COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWMEMBER. NOTE: BECAUSE OF
THE MERCURY CONTENT IN THE BATTERIES, A TOXIC SUBSTANCE WAIVER
MUST BE APPROVED TO CARRY THE BATTERIES ON THE ORBITER.
REFERENCES: NONE AVAILABLE.
w
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-937
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMMAND TRACK
9542
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
/
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
RADIO, RF BEACON AN/URT-33
BATTERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
' ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: SURVIVAL KIT - PARACHUTE
PART NUMBER: POWER PACK ACR-311A
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A PO_R PACK USING ALKALINE MAGNESIUM DIOXIDE BATTERIES PROVIDES
POWER FOR THE AN/URT-33 RF BEACON TRANSMITTER. LOSS OF POWER AND
CONSEQUENT LOSS OF RF BEACON WOULD NOT BY ITSELF CAUSE LOSS OF
CREWMEMBER. LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANT MEANS OF LOCATION
(REFERENCE IOA 9042) COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW MEMBER. NOTE:
ACR IS DESIGNATOR FOR ACR ELECTRONICS, INC. OF FORT LAUDERDALE,
FLORIDA.
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REFERENCES: NONE AVAILABLE
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-938
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
9561
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VTR CB 3 (5A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
CABPL 2
CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY scREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
._ 3/3
C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VCR PROVIDES THE CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.) CB 3 CONTROLS POWER TO VCR CBI. FAILURE
TO CLOSE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VTR CAP. NO CAUSE FOR LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-939
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
9562
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VTR CB 3 (5A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
CABPL 2
CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB 3)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO __NT ONORBIT
A_IVITIES, SUI_O_T MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN_RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VCR PROVIDES THE CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
ExisTS FOR THIS UNIT. ) CS 3 CONTROLSPO_ TO VCR CBI.
CLOSED CB WOULD HAVE NO AFFECT ON VTR OPE_TION .......
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-940
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C , FLIGHT:
9563 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VTR CB 1 (3A)
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) COMM & TRACK
2) CCTV
3) VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
4) _ CABPL 2
5) CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB i)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL LI2
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL VISUAL FEEDBACK TO DOCUMENT ONORBIT
ACTIVITIES, SUPPORT MISSION EXP OPS, ASSIST IN RENDEZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VCR PROVIDES THE CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
EXISTS FOR THIS UNIT.) CB 1 CONTROLS POWER TO VCR. FAILURE
TO CLOSE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF VTR CAP. NO CAUSE FOR Loss OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: FLT RULES, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-941
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/11/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
9564
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VTR CB 1 (3A)
FAIL CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: W.C. LONG SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CCTV
VIDEO TAPE RECODER (VTR)
CABPL 2
CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB i)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL LI2
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] c [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CCTV SYS PROVIDES ESSENTIAL yISUAL FEEDBAcK To__NT_ONORBIT
:_°_S=, S-U-P-_0_T_SION--_E-X_°_S, ASS I_INT&E_EZ AND
STA/KEEP OPS, INSPECT/MONITOR P/L BAY DOOR LATCHES, ORB EXTERIOR,
RMS, AND ATTACHED P/L. THE VCR PROVIDES THE CAP TO RECORD AND
PLAYBACK VIDEO FROM ANY OF THE CCTV CAMERAS. LOSS OF THIS
CAPABILITY MAY CAUSE LOSS OF EXPERIMENT DATA BUT WOULD NOT
PROVIDE BASIS FOR LOSS OF MISSION. (NO LIKE OR UNLIKE REDUNDANCY
_Xi_T_ FOR _ISUNTr.) e_1 r_ sm_r_s_c_ 3 CONTROLS .....
POWER TO VCR. CLOSED CB WOULD HAVE NO AFFECT ON VTR OPERATION.
REFERENCES: FLTRU_S, SHUTTLE FLT OPS MANUAL JSC-12770, SSSH
16.1,.12,.13,.24, SYS SCHEMATIC VS70-740189, OMRSD NSTS 08171
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-942
ms
iw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/87
COMM AND TRACK
9591
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BATTERY
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM & TRACK
CREW EQUIPMENT/COMM
WIRELESS CREW COMM SYSTEM (WCCS)
BATTERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION-.
PART NUMBER:
USED IN VARIOUS ORBITER LOCATIONS
SED16102307
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION, CHEMICAL
REACTION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THIS ZINC/AIR BATTERY POWERS THE WCCS UNITS (REFER TO RELATED IOA
9091). LOSS OF BATTERY POWER AND CONSEQUENT LOSS OF WCCS
FUNCTION FOR ONE SET WOULD NOT BY ITSELF CAUSE MISSION LOSS.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR TWO-WAY VOICE COMM VIA WCCS UNITS AND
VIA HARDLINE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
i
REFERENCES: SED16102307; FLIGHT RULES JSC-12820, SECTION ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-943
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87
CO_ _D T_CK
i0001
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
E_/TV-POWER SWITCH
FAIL OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD _ALYST: W.H. T_
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
i) CO_ & T_CK
2) E_
3) TV
4) PO_R SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC
PRE_CH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
_ DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/_NC
RT_: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUND_CY SC_ENS: A [
LOCATION: EMU HELMET
PART NUMBER: 10160-20070-1
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIB_TION, CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
NONE. PO_R NOT SUPPLIED TO SYSTEM USED TO PROVIDE _ CO_GE
OF THE _A C__'S A_IVITIES. NOT CRITICAL TO CREW/_HIC_
SAFETY OR MISSION COMPT,_TION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/20/87
COMM AND TRACK
10002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU/TV-LIGHT EMITTING DIODE
FAIL OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) EMU
3) TV
4) LED
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: ! A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
EMU HELMET
10160-20070-01
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. LED INDICATES POWER SUPPLIED TO SYSTEM. DIODE FAILED OPEN
DOES NOT RESTRICT POWER TO THE REMAINDER OF THE SYSTEM. TV
SYSTEM CAN CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN THE NORMAL WAY.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-945
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87
CO_ _D T_CK
10003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
E_/_-CLOSE-UP LENS SWITCH
FAILED TO T_SFER
HDW/_NC
3/3
3/3
LEAD _ALYST: W.H. T_ SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BRE_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) CO_ & T_CK
2) EMU
3) TV
4) C_SE-UP LENS SWITCH
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
FLIGHT P_SE
PRE_CH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
_DING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_NC
3/3 RT_: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/5
3/3
RED_D_CY SCREENS: A [
_CATION: E_ HE_ET
P_T _BER: 10160-20070-
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIB_TION, CONT_INATION
EFFECTS/_Ti0NAL_:
NONE. O_E_S IN THE _GE OF THE MODE _E SWITCH IS IN WILL BE
VIE_D. NOT CRITICAL TO C_W2VEHIC_ SAFETY OR MISSION
COMPL_TION.
_FERENCES:
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_PORT DATE 12/31/87 C-946
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87
COMM AND TRACK
10004
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU/TV-TV CAMERA
NO OUTPUT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) EMU
3) TV-CAMERA
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC "ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
EMU HELMET
SED 181000277-303
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. NO VIDEO SIGNALS RECEIVED TO BE TRANSMITTED. NO TV
COVERAGE OF EVA CREWMAN'S ACTIVITIES. NOT CRITICAL TO
CREW VEHICLE SAFETY BY MISSION COMPLETION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-947
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/20/87
COMMAND TRACK
10005
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU/TV-TRANSMITTER
NO OUTPUT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) EMU
3) TV
4) TRANSMITTER
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: EMU HELMET
PART NUMBER: 102101-1
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONAL_-
NONE. VIDEO SIGNAL NOT TRANSMITTED, NO TV COVERAGE OF EVA
CREWMAN'S ACTIVITIES• NOT CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY OR
MISSION COMPLETION.
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-948
III
III
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87
COMM AND TRACK
10006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU/TV-ANTENNA
NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST : W. H. TRAHAN SUBSYS LEAD : A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) EMU
3) TV
4) ANTENNA
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITiCALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS : 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
EMU HELMET
SED 18100042-305
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. VIDEO SIGNAL NOT TRANSMITTED, NO TV COVERAGE OF EVA
CREWMAN'S ACTIVITIES. NOT CRITICAL TO CREW VEHICLE SAFETY OR
MISSION COMPLETION.
i
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-949
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/20/87
COMMANDTRACK
10007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU/TV-REC/VPU
NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) COMM & TRACK
2) EMU
3) TV
4) REC/VPU
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: MID DECK
PART NUMBER: SED 18100025-302
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTSI_T_ONA_ :
NONE, _S__ RE(_EIVE-D ARE NOT CONVERT_TO ' IMAGES.
COVERAGE OF EVA CREWMAN'S ACTIVITIES. NOT CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY OR MISSION COMPLETION.
NO TV
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/20/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
10501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: EMU/TV-BATTERY PACK
FAILURE MODE: NO OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYS _EAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM & TRACK
2) EMU
3) TV
4 ) BATTERY PACK
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA_ 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MID DECK
PART NUMBER: I0160-2000-01
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. NO POWER SUPPLIED TO THE SYSTEM USED TO PROVIDE TV
COVERAGE OF THE EVA CREWMAN'S ACTIVITIES. NOT CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY OR MISSION COMPLETION.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-951
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/20/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: COMMAND TRACK/EPD&C FLIGHT: i/i
MDACID: 10502 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMU/TV-BATTERY PACK
VENTING/EXPLOSION
LEAD ANALYST: W.H. TRAHAN SUBSYSLEAD: A.W.ADDIS
U
mm
m
mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM & TRACK
2) EMU
3) TV
4) BATTERY PACK I
5)
6)
8)
9)
J
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : I/1 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: I/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : 1/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO : 1/1
LANDING/SAFING : 1/1
] B[ ] C[ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: MID DECK
PART NUMBER: 10160-2001-01
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VENTING THAT RESULTS IN EXPLOSION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREWMAN
OR DAMAG_TO_VEHIC_DESIGN, _G_D FAILURE HISTORY
RESULTS IN LOW PROBABILITY OF THIS FAILURE OCCURING.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-952
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/87
COMM AND TRACK
ii001
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GCIL DRIVER, S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
COMM AND TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
GCIL DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC450-0051-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL) DRIVERS PROVIDE
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SELECTED COMM & TRACK LRU'S EITHER IN
"COMMAND" MODE (GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD INPUTS) OR IN "PANEL"
MODE (CREW CONTROL VIA PANEL SWITCHES). LOSS OF GCIL DRIVER
OUTPUT (E.G., "XPNDER 1/2 ON") WOULD DISABLE THE AFFECTED LRU
BECAUSE THE ASSOCIATED TYPE III DRIVER WOULD NOT BE TURNED ON,
AND TWO-WAY COMM VIA THAT XPNDR WOULD BE LOST. THE REDUNDANT
XPNDR WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR STATE VECTOR
UPDATE VIA S-BAND PM, UHF VOICE, (AND KU-BAND ON-ORBIT) COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATICS VS70-740129; VS70-740299; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 3, 5; OMRSD V74 FILE III;
JSC-12820 FLT RULES SECT ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-953
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/o9/87
COMM AND TRACK
11002
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GCIL DRIVER, S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
INADVERTENT OPERATION, PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
COMM AND TRACK
S-BAND PM/NSP SYSTEM
S-BAND PM TRANSPONDER
GCIL DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0051-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:i _ ii!!!i!i!!!!_!i!!_!_ _ _= ........
THE GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL) DRIVERS PROVIDE
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SELECTED COMM & TRACK LRU'S EITHER IN
"COMMAND" MODE (GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD INPUTS) OR IN "PANEL"
MODE (CREW CONTROL VIA PANEL SWITCHES). PREMATURE/INADVERTENT
OPERATION OF A MODE/CONFIGURATION CONTROL GCIL DRIVER (E.G.,
XPNDR FREQUENCY LOW WHEN FREQUENCY HIGH IS DESIRED, OR XPNDR 1 ON
WHEN LRU 2 IS ON) COULD CAUSE SYSTEM MISCONFIGURATION OR CYCLING
BETWEEN TWO MODES THAT WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF S-BAND
PM COMM. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY FOR STATE VECTOR UPDATE VIA S-
BAND PM, UHF VOICE, (AND KU-BAND ON-ORBIT) COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATICS VS70-740129; VS70-740299; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 3, 5; OMRSD V74 FILE III;
JSC-12820 FLT RULES SECT ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-954
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/87
COMM AND TRACK
11003
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM"
FAILURE MODE:
GCIL DRIVER, S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM AND TRACK
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
S-BAND PM POWER AMP/PREAMP
GCIL DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PARTNUMBER: MC450-0051-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL) DRIVERS PROVIDE
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SELECTED COMM & TRACK LRU'S EITHER IN
"COMMAND" MODE (GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD INPUTS) OR IN "PANEL"
MODE (CREW CONTROL VIA PANEL SW). LOSS OF GCIL DRIVER OUTPUT FOR
"PA i/2 OPERATE" WOULD DISABLE THE AFFECTED LRU BECAUSE THE
ASSOCIATED TYPE II DRIVER WOULD NOT BE TURNED ON, & HI-POWER MODE
FOR PA 1/2 WOULD BE LOST. THE REDUNDANT PA WOULD BE SELECTED.
COMPLETE LOSS OF HI-POWER MODE FOR S-BAND PM SYS OPERATION AND
KU-BAND COMM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF PRIME MISSION OBJECTIVES BECAUSE
OF CONFLICTING VEHICLE ALTITUDE CONSTRAINTS (EXPERIMENT VS COMM
ATTITUDE RQMTS). OTHER GCIL DRIVERS CONTROL SYS FUNCTIONS WHICH
IF LOST COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS (E.G. PREAMP 1/2 POWER).
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATICS VS70-740129; VS70-740299; SSSH
16.1, 16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 3, 5; OMRSD V74 FILE III;
JSC-12820 FLT RULES SECT Ii; VS70-740299
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-955
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
12/09/87
COMM AND TRACK
11004
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GCIL DRIVER, S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM AND TRACK
S-BAND PM AMPLIFIER SYSTEM
S-BAND PM POWER AMP/PREAMP
GCIL DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
L_NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAY 3A
MC450-0051-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL)DRIVERS PROVIDE
CAPABILITY TO CO_ROL SE_CTED COMM & TRACK LRU'S EITHER IN
"COMMAND" MODE (GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD INPUTS) OR IN "PANEL"
MODE (CREW CONTROL VIA PANEL SWITCHES). PREMATURE/INADVERTENT
OPERATION OF A _/_CON?_G_T_C_ROL GCIL DRIVER (E'G., PA 1
ON WHEN PA 2 IS ON, OR XPNDR i ON W/ XPNDR 2 ON, OR FREQUENCY HI
& FREQUENCY LO OUTPUTS SIMULATNEOUSLY) WOULD CAUSE COAXIAL RF
SWITCH-ESTdCY_ CO_ONTi-N_U_USLY & TWO-WAYCOMM iN HI-PWR MODE
WOULD BE LOST, REQUIRING SELECTION OF LOW POWER MODE. LOSS OF
KU-BAND COMM & HI-POWER MODE FOR S-BAND PM COMM COULD CAUSE LOSS
OF PRIME MISSION OBJECTIVES BECAUSE OF CONFLICTING VEHICLE
....AT_TUDEeONSTRAINTS (EXPERIMENT-VS _t_'_ATTkTUDE CoNsTRAiNTS).
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATICS VS70-740129; VS70-740299; SSSH
16.2; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEFS 3, 5; OMRSD V74 FILE III; JSC-
12820 FLT RULES SECT ii
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-956
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
12/09/87
COMM AND TRACK
11005
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GCIL DRIVER, S'BAND FM SYSTEM
PREMATURE OPERATION, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) COMM AND TRACK
2) S-BAND FM SYSTEM
3 ) GCIL DRIVER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0051-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL) DRIVERS PROVIDE
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SELECTED COMM & TRACK LRU'S EITHER IN
"COMMAND" MODE (GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD INPUTS) OR IN "PANEL"
MODE (CREW CONTROL VIA PANEL SWITCHES). LOSS OF CONTROL OF THE
FM SYSTEM DOES NOT AFFECT MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATICS VS70-740269, 279, 299
JSC-12820 FLT RULES SECT II
SSSH 16.8;
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-957
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET _
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/09/87
COMM AND TRACK
11006
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE;
GCIL DRIVER, S-BAND PAYLOAD SYSTEM
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM AND TRACK
S-BAND PAYLOAD SYSTEM
GCIL DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0021-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..............................................
WE GROW I TERFACELOGIC DRIERS
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SELECTED COMM & TRACK LRU'S EITHER IN
"COMMAND" MODE (GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD INPUTS) OR IN "PANEL"
MODE (CREW CONTROL VIA PANEL SWITCHES). LOSS OF GCIL DRIVER
OUTPUT FOR "PL INTGR 1/2" WOULD DISABLE THE LRU (PAYLOAD
INTERROGATER 1/2). THE REDUNDANT LRU WOULD BE SELECTED. LOSS OF
BOTH LRU'S WOULD PREVENT TWO-WAY COMM (COMMANDS/TELEMETRY) WITH
DETACHED PAYLOADS AND COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION. MANY OTHER
GCIL DRIVERS CONTROL PAYLOAD SYSTEM FUNCTIONS WHICH IF LOST COULD
CAUSE MISSION LOSS (E.G., PSP 1/2 ON, PAYLOAD ANTENNA
POLARIZATION, PI FREQUENCY SWEEP).
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATICS VS70-740239, 299; SSSH 3, 31, 34
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-958
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
11007
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GCIL DRIVER, NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
COMM AND TRACK
NETWORK SIGNAL PROCESSOR (NSP)
GCIL DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0021-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL) DRIVERS PROVIDE
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SELECTED COMM & TRACK LRU'S EITHER IN
"COMMAND" MODE (GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD INPUTS) OR IN "PANEL"
MODE (CREW CONTROL VIA PANEL SWITCHES). LOSS OF GCIL DRIVER
OUTPUT FOR "NSP 1/2 ON" WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF THE AFFECTED LRU.
LOSS OF BOTH NSP'S WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO UPDATE STATE
VECTOR VIA S-BAND PM (AND VIA KU-BAND ON-ORBIT). SUBSEQUENT LOSS
OF UHF VOICE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ALL PATHS FOR SV UPDATE,
AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATICS VS70-740229, 299; SSSH 16.3; JSC-
12820 FLT RULES SECTION Ii; INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 3, 27
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-959
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/lO/8V
COMM AND TRACK
11008
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GCIL DRIVER, KU-BAND SYSTEM
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM AND TRACK
2) KU-BAND SYSTEM
3) GCIL DRIVER
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALiTIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
R DUNDANCYSCREENS:AE 1 J
LOCATIO.: AVIONICSBAY3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0021-0002
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_T_QNALE _ .... _ _t_ _
THE GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL) DRIVERS PROVIDE
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SELECTED COMM & TRACK LRU'S EITHER IN
"COMMAND" MODE (GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD INPUTS) OR IN "PANEL"
MODE (CREW CONTROL VIA PANEL SWITCHES). LOSS OF GCIL DRIVER
OUTPUT FOR "COMMA PWR ON" WOULD DISABLE THE KU-BAND SYSTEM FOR
TWO-WAY OPERATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS FOR ORBIT OPERATIONS.
ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS WOULD BE PERFORMED BY THE S-BAND PM SYSTEM.
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO UPDATE STATE VECTOR VIA KU-BAND,
S-BAND PM, OR UHF VOICE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATICS VS70-740109, 299; SSSH 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 18; OMRSD V74 FILE III
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-960
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/lO/87
COMM AND TRACK
11009
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: GCIL DRIVER, KU-BAND SYSTEM
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) COMM AND TRACK
2 ) KU-BAND SYSTEM
3 ) GCIL DRIVER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
CRIT_AL_TIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING! 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0021-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE GROUND COMMAND INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL) DRIVERS pRoVIDE
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SELECTED COMM & TRACK LRUIS EITHER IN
"COMMAND" MODE (GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD INPUTS) OR IN "PANEL"
MODE (CREW CONTROL VIA PANEL SWITCHES). LOSS OF GCIL DRIVER
OUTPUT FOR "RADAR POWER ON" WOULD DISABLE THE KU-BAND SYSTEM FOR
RADAR MODE DURING ORBIT OPERATIONS. LOSS OF RADAR FOR PAY_AD
REDEZVOUS OPERATIONS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATICS VS70-740109, 299; SSSH 16.3;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 18; OMRSD V74 FILE III
L.
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-961
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC iD:
12/10/87
COMMAND TRACK
ii010
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GCIL DRIVER, CCTV SYSTEM
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) COMM AND TRACK
2) CCTV SYSTEM
3) GCIL DRIVER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3_i_
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: AVIONICS BAY 3A
PART NUMBER: MC450-0021-0002
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONT_iNATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......
THE GROUND CO_D INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL) DRIVERS PROVIDE
CAPABILITY TO CONTROL SELECTED COMM & TRACK LRU'S EITHER IN
"COMMAND" MODE (GROUND COMMANDS OR KEYBOARD INPUTS) OR IN "PANEL"
MODE (CREW CONTROL VIA PANEL SWITCHES). LOSS OF GCIL DRIVER
OUTPUT FOR MNA/MNB POWER SELECTION WOULD DISABLE THE CCTV SYSTEM
FOR THE AFFECTED POWER SOURCE. LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT
EITHER MNA OR MNB POWER FOR CCTV COULD CAUSE LOSS OF ABILITY TO
STOW RMS ARM AND COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: SYSTEM SCHEMATICS VS70-740189, 299; SSSH 16.1;
INCO/COMM SYSTEMS BRIEF 16
mm
I
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-962
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zINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/oi/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
11501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
FA_LS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) KU-BAND (GCILC)
2) GCIL
3) GCIL
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A MNA, CB44; MNC, CB49
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/IR
3/IR
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI5
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH CIRCUIT BREAKER (CB) PROTECTS ITS ASSOC. MAIN BUS (CB44-MNA,
CB49-MNC) & LOAD SIDE GROUND CONTROL INTERFACE LOGIC (GCIL)
CIRCUITRY, & SUPPLIES PWR FOR ONE REDUNDANT GCIL PWR SUPPLY & FOR
1 OF 2 COMMAND MODE LINES VIA EACH OF THE 5 "COMMAND/PANEL"
GCIL MODE SELECTOR SWITCHES. LOSS OF ONE CB WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
OUTPUT FROM THE ASSOCIATED REDUNDANT PWR SUPPLY, BUT NO LOSS OF
GCIL "COMMAND" MODE FUNCTION. LOSS OF THE OTHER CB WOULD CAUSE
LOSS OF GCIL "COMMAND" CONTROL FOR MODE/CONFIG MANAGEMENT OF
THE 5 ASSOCIATED COMM SYSTEMS (S-BAND'S PM, FM, & PAYLOAD, KU-
BAND, CCTV). FAILURE OF "PANEL" MODE CONTROL OF THE S-BAND PM
SYS PLUS FAILURE OF UHF VOICE COULD PREVENT STATE VECTOR UPDATES
AFTER KU-BAND STOW & COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.17, SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740299
REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-963
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
9/Ol/87
COMM AND TRACK/EPD&C
11502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A.W.ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND (GCILC)
COMM & TRACK
GCIL
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A MNA, CB44; MNC, CB49
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 _ AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: PANEL RI5
PART NUMBER:
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION,
MECH SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .... _ _-L_i_ _ _'_i_
INA_BILI_T-0 _bVE P_TO ONE OF THE DUAL 28 VC POWER SUPPLIES
AND TO THE ASSOCIATED S-BAND, KU-BAND, AND TV "COMMAND/PANEL"
MODE SELECTOR SWITCHES. DISCONNECT COULD BE PROVIDED BY THESE
THIS CB NORMALLY CLOSED THROUGHOUT MISSION.
FAILURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH 16.17, SYSTEM SCHEMATIC VS70-740299
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REPORT DATE 12/31/87 C-964
mR
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w
MDAC-ID
1045
1046
1050
1051
1052
1053
1054
1056
1068
1502
1504
1506
1508
1510
1512
1514
1516
1518
1521
1522
.... 1555
1607
1609
1612
1615
1618
1622
1625
1627
1631
1633
1635
1637
1639
1641
1643
1645
1647
1649
1651
1653
1655
1657
1659
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
FLIGHT ITEM
2/IR
2/1R
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/IR
3/2R
NETWORK SIGNAL PROC
NETWORK SIGNAL PROC
NSP ENCRYPTION PWR
NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SW
NSP ENCRYPTION MODE SW
NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT
NSP ENCRYPTION SELECT
ENCRYPTION ZEROIZE/
NORMAL SWITCH
UPLINK BLOCK SWITCH
FUSE, IA
3/2R RESISTOR, 1.2K
3/2R DIODE
3/2R DIODE
3/2R FUSE, IA
3/2R RESISTOR, 1.2K
3/2R FUSE, 10A
3/2R FUSE, 10A
3/2R DIODE
3/IR DIODE, AI6CRI
3/IR DIODE, AI6CR2
3/2R DIODE, AI8CRI2
3/IR FUSE, IA
3/IR RESISTOR, 1.2K
3/IR DIODE
3/2R RESISTOR, 1.2K
3/2R RPC
3/2R RPC
3/2R DIODE
3/2R DIODE
3/IR FUSE, 3A
3/IR FUSE
3/IR DRIVER
3/IR DRIVER
3/IR DIODE
3/IR DIODE
3/IR DIODE
3/IR DIODE
3/IR DIODE
3/IR DIODE
3/IR DIODE
3/IR DIODE
3/IR DIODE
3/IR DIODE
3/IR DIODE
FAILURE MODE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
INTERMITTENT OPERATION
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSE
SHORTED
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
SHORTED
FAILS TO OPEN/CLOSE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
=
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
D-I
w
MDAC-ID
1661
1663
1665
1667
3001
3003
3004
3017
3019
3021
3023
3025
3027
3029
3501
3503
3505
3507
3509
3512
3513
3516
3517
3519
3521
.... 3523
3526
3527
4041
4042
4043
4044
4505
4508
4511
4512
4513
4514
4516
4520
4524
4527
4528
4535
FLIGHT ITEM
3/IR DIODE
3/!R DIODE
3/2R DIODE
3/2R DIODE
2/2 PAYLOAD ANTENNA
FAILURE MODE
2/2 PAYLOAD RF TRANSFER SW
2/2 .......PAYLOAD __E_SW
2/2 S-BAND PAYLOAD SYS SLCT
2/2 S-BAND PL PI/PSP PWR SW
2/2 S-BAND PL ANTENNA
2/2 PI TRANSMITTER RF PWR
2/2 PL SYS XMTR MODULATION
FAILS OPEN
FAIL_QPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
LOSS OF OUTPUT
2/2
2/2 S-BAND PL PSP CMD
3/2R FUSE, 3A
3/2R FUSE, IA
3/2R FUSE, IA
3/2R FUSE, 10A
3/2R FUSE, 3A
3/2R FUSE, IOA
3/2R FUSE, 10A
3/2R DIODE
FAILS MID-TRAVEL
SHOR_
SHORTED
SHORTED
SHORTED
SHORTED
SHORTED
S-BAND FREQUENCY SWEEP _SHORTED
=3/2R -°DIODE
3/2R FUSE, 3A
3/2R DRIVER
3/2R DRIVER
3/2R DRIVER
3/2R DRIVER
I/i KU BD _T A PYRO
ARM/SAFE SW
1/1 Ku BD _T A PYRO
ARM/SAFE SW
1/! r_ BD ANT A PYRO
.......JETT/SAFE SW
1/1 Ku BD ANT A PYRO
JETT/SAFE SW
2/2 CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5A
2/2 RPC, 10A
3/2R FUSE, 3A
2/2 FUSE, 3A
2/2 FUSE, 3A
2/IR CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
2/IR CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
3/2R CIRCUIT BREAKER, 3A
3/2R RPC, 5A
3/2R FUSE, IA
3/2R FUSE, IA
3/2R FUSE, IA
SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAIr.S OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
.........FAI_ _ TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
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MDAC-ID
4537
4543
5001
5003
5O05
5010
5013
5502
5503
6030
6033
6036
6039
6042
6045
6048
6051
6069
7026
7027
7028
7029
7030
7031
7032
7033
7034
7035
7036
7037
7038
7039
7040
7042
7043
7044
7045
7046
7047
8001
8002
8003
8004
8005
8008
8009
8010
8011
8014
8015
FLIGHT ITEM
3/2R
3/2R
2/2
2/2
2/2
3/1R
2/2
3/2R
3/1R
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
FUSE, IA
RESISTOR, 1.2K
UHF EVA/ATC ANTENNA
UHF EVA/ATC TRANSCEIVER
UHF EVA/ATC TRANSCEIVER
UHF SIMPLEX POWER SW
UHF XMIT FREQUENCY SW
CB, UHF, MNC
CB, UHF, MNC
DR C&W SW
DR/SL PAGE SW
DR/SL ICOM SW
DR/SL A/A SW
DR/SL A/G SW
UHF A/A SW
UHF A/G SW
VOICE RCD SEL SW
2/IR AUDIO CENTER SW
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/-2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
RENDEZVOUS RADAR
RR EA-I
RR EA-2
RR DEA
RR DEA
RR DMA
RR DMA
RR DMA
RR DMA
KU-BAND POWER SWITCH
KU-BAND POWER SWITCH
KU-BAND POWER SWITCH
KU A MODE SWITCH
KU A MODE SWITCH
RADAR OUTPUT SWITCH
RADAR OUTPUT SWITCH
SLEW AZIMUTH CONT SW
SLEW AZIMUTH CONT SW
SLEW ELEV CONTROL SW
SLEW ELEV CONTROL SW
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
VIDEO SWITCHING UNIT
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
REMOTE CONTROL UNIT
TV CAMERA A
TV CAMERA B
TV CAMERA C
TV CAMERA D
PAN AND TILT UNIT
PAN AND TILT UNIT
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
SHORTED
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN/CLOSE
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
SHORT TO GROUND
LOSS OF OUTPUT
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
FAILS TO START/STOP
ERRATIC OPERATION
FAILS TO CLOSE
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
FAILS TO START/STOP
D-3
MDAC-ID
8016
8017
8018
8019
8O2O
8021
8022
8023
8024
8025
8033
8034
8035
8036
8037
8038
8039
8040
8053
8O54
8055
8056
8057
8058
805_
8060
8067
8068
8069
8070
8074
8077
8078
8079
8080
8081
8082
8083
8084
8095
8096
8097
8098
8099
8100
8101
8102
8103,
8104
8106
FLIGHT
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/JR
2/IR
2/IR
2/!R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/iR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
21iR
2/iR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM FAILURE MODE
PAN AND TILT UNIT
PAN AND TILT UNIT
PAN AND TILT UNIT
PAN AND TILT UNIT
PAN AND TILT UNIT
PAN AND TILT UNIT
PAN AND TILT UNIT
PAN AND TILT UNIT
PAN AND TILT UNIT
PAN AND TiLT UNIT
MONOCHROME LENS ASSY
MONOCHROME LENS ASSY
MONOCHROME LENS ASSY
MONOCHROME LENS ASSY
MONOCHROME LENS ASSY
MONOCHROME LENS ASSY
MONOCHROME LENS ASSY
MONOCHROME LENS ASSY
COLOR LENS ASSEMBL
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY
COLOR LENS ASSEMBLY
CONSOLE MONITOR
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMiNG
FAILS TO START/STOP
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
FAILS TO START STOP
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
FAILS TO START/STOP
ERRATIC/INTERMITTENT OPER
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LOSS 0F OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
Loss OF OUTPUT
CONSOLE MONITOR (CRT) LOSS OF CRT
TV PWR CNTL UNIT SW
TV PWR CNTL UNIT SW
TV SYNC SWITCH
TV CAMERA POWER SW
TV CAMERA POWER SW
TV CAMERA POWER SW
TV CAMERA POWER SW
TV CAMERA POWER SW
TV CAMERA POWER SW
TV CAMERA POWER SW
TV CAMERA POWER SW
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
TV CAMERA CMD FOCUS SW ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SW
TV CAMERA CMD ZOOM SW
TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SW
TV CAMERA CMD IRIS SW
TV CAMERA CMD TILT SW
TV CAMERA CMD TILT SW
TV CAMERA CMD PAN SW
TV CAMERA CMD PAN SW
TV CAMERA PANTILT SW
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN SHORT
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
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MDAC-ID
8123
8124
8125
8126
8127
8128
8129
8130
8243
8244
8245
8246
8247
8248
8249
8250
8259
8260
8261
8262
8263
8264
8265
8266
8275
8276
8277
8278
8279
828O
8281
8282
8303
8304
8305
8306
8307
8308
8309
8310
8311
8312
8313
8314
8315
8316
8317
8318
8319
8320
FLIGHT
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/:R
211R
2/:R
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI
TV VIDEO INPUT PBI
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A MONOCHROMI_LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME _NS
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC B MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC C MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC D MONOCHROME LENS
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC A COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC B COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC C COLOR LENS ASSY
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
D-5
8321
8322
8323
8324
8325
8326
8363
8364
8368
8374
8376
8501
8503
8505
8507
8509
8511
8513
8515
8517
8519
8521
8525
8527
8529
8531
8533
8535
10502
11007
i1009
FLIGHT ITEM
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
I/I
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY
TVC D COLOR LENS ASSY
CONSOLE MNTR PWR SW
CONSOLE MNTR PWR SW
CONSOLE MNTR SYNC SW
CONSOLE MNTR SOURCE SW
CONSOLE MNTR BRIGHT
RCU 3A CB
MON 3A CB
CB 39 BAY TVC
CB 40 FWD BAY TVC HTR
CB 41 FWD BAY P/T HTR
CB 34 AFT BAY TVC
CB 35 AFT BAY TVC HTR
CB 36 AFT BAY P/T HTR
CB 45 KEEL/EVA TVC
CB 46 KEEL/EVA TVC HTR
CB 47 KEEL/EVA P/T HTR
CB 51 STBD RMS TVC
CB 52 STBD RMS TVC HTR
CB 53 STBD RMS P/T HTR
CB 55 PORT RMS TVC
CB 56 PORT RMS TVC HTR
CB 57 PORT RMS P/T HTR
EMU/TV-BATTERY PACK
2/I R =_ GCIL DRIVER .......
2/2 GCIL DRIVER
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
ELECTRICAL OPEN/SHORT
FAILS TO SWITCH
OPEN/SHORT
OPEN/SHORT
OPEN/SHORT
OPEN/SHORT
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
FAIL OPEN
VENTING/EXPLOSION
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
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